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CHAPTER 0: Introduction 
 
Section 0.1 The Importance of the Insurance Industry 
The financial system plays a vital role in a nation’s financial and economic 
development. One of its basic functions – of providing financing to promote real 
economic growth in a situation of instability – is not easy to execute. Therefore, it is 
helpful to investigate the health of the various sub-components, e.g. the insurance or 
banking sectors, in the system in order to understand its overall stability.     
 
There is a notable link between an economy’s financial development and insurance 
market growth, see, Outreville (1990, 1996), Ward and Zurbruegg (2000), Kugler and 
Ofoghi (2005), Lee, Lin, Zeng (2016). Both economy and financial development involve 
the protection of a population’s properties against unexpected events, which are hard to 
avoid and may lead to further losses. For this reason, the insurance concept was developed.  
 
From an insurer’s perspective, different products are targeted to different customers, 
and the features of different products are accordingly varied. However, these products are 
based on all three principal services in general: (1) risk pooling and risk bearing; (2) real 
services relating to insured losses; and (3) financial intermediation. Acting as a risk-bearer, 
the insurer provides a range of financial products to clients in exchange for premiums. 
Insurers collect premiums from the pool of policyholders and redistribute most of the 
funds to those policyholders who suffer losses. This means that the risk of losses is spread 
across the pool. Also, the insurers facilitate financial development and stability by 
monitoring and supporting risk-taking activities. In any event, the primary functions of 
an insurer is to serve as an essential post-loss financing mechanisms for individual or 
corporations by transferring downside risks through insurance (Froot, Scharfstein and 
Stein, 1993; Zou, Adams and Buckle, 2003). With this protection, corporations can 
expand their business and therefore contribute to economic development. Insurers also 
contribute to economic growth by acting as intermediaries, which allows them to collect 
premiums and invest them in capital markets to generate further investment-related 
income.  
 
Moreover, insurance companies are closely connected to different individuals, 
business units and other financial institutions. Hasman (2012) and Acemoglu, Ozdaglar 
and Tahbaz-Salehi (2013) state that interlinkages among financial institutions have 
important implications for risk contagion, as they can amplify negative effects. Billio et 
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al. (2010) also found that the level of systemic risk in insurance industries increased as 
they revealed that banks, insurance companies, hedge funds and brokers had become 
highly interrelated and illiquid. In addition, the potential impacts of insurers on the other 
financial institutions are also significant. Both Mirzaei and Moore (2014) and Clerides, 
Delis and Kokas (2015) draw attention to the fact that the growth of the insurance industry 
may have significant impacts on market structure in banking.  
 
The 2007 – 2009 financial crisis can be regarded as one example of how interlinkages 
and the financial distress of insurance firms may reduce financial system stability. An 
early collapse in the cycle was not caused by the default of a bank, but rather by the near-
breakdown of an insurance company (American International Group, AIG). Just like a 
‘bank run’, the default of a large insurer with extensive interconnections with other 
financial institutions could trigger a shock to the real economy. The AIG case led 
economists, academics and regulators to consider the possibility of insurers becoming 
systemically important and thereby make an effort to identify the systemically important 
financial institutions (SIFIs) and enact rigorous regulations for financial institutions. A 
study by Acharya et al. (2009) generates the first evidence to confirm the contribution of 
large US insurers to systemic risk after the collapse of Lehman Brothers. 
 
More recent reports on the potential systemic relevance of insurers have argued that 
some insurers could contribute to the instability of the global financial system if they are 
to offer functions similar to those of banks (Geneva Association, 2010; IAIS, 2013). Weiß 
and Mühlnickel (2014) also confirm that several insurers do contribute significantly to 
the instability of the US financial system during the crisis period, and that firm size is a 
contributory factor to systemic risk. Their results also indicate that those insurance 
companies also had a significant impact on financial fragility. Cummins and Weiss (2014) 
further confirm that insurer’s non-core activities (such as financial guarantees and 
derivatives trading) and high degrees of interconnected growth are the primary sources 
of systemic relevance. Overall, the contribution of an insurer to systemic risk can be 
driven by a persistent risk raised from its underwriting and investment strategies. 
Therefore, insurers not only have high systemic risk exposure but also contribute riskiness 
back to the financial system.  
 
On the other hand, we can also expect insurers with more rigorous risk governance to 
stabilise the financial system in times of crisis. Das, Davies and Podpiera (2003), 
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Rothstein (2011), Lee and Chang (2015) and Lee, Lin and Zeng (2016) all suggest a 
( healthy and well-developed) insurance industry might improve financial stability. The 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2016) also suggested that the insurance industry per 
se warrants particular attention, as it contributes to the high systemic relevance in the 
overall economy. Then, as one of the key players in this interconnected network, the 
insurance industry should be investigated. In specific, three vital elements – performance, 
capital structure and soundness (stability) – are examined in this research. 
 
Section 0.2 Why Choose the UK Insurance Market? 
Existing studies on the insurance sector use different approaches to achieve varied 
research purposes, with the bulk of analyses focusing on the US market and the unitary 
EU market by pooling member countries together. Eling and Jia (2018) state that 
variations of the business and regulatory culture within different nations in the EU could 
provide a persuasive context to analyse the insurance sector’s soundness. Burchell and 
Hughes (2006), Adams and Jiang (2016) and Eling and Jia (2018) also reveal that the UK 
market would be a good research subject to analyse an insurer’s failure due to its cultural 
factor.1 
 
Moreover, in contrast to the multi-state-based supervision framework in the US market, 
the UK market has a unitary regulatory regime. For example, some states in the US 
impose restrictions on premium setting - but this is not the case in the UK, and this 
difference is important in terms of underwriting strategies. Another main difference 
between the UK and the US insurance sector is the number of publicly listed firms. Only 
a small number of UK insurers are listed, but one-third of insurers are listed in the US. 
This means that external corporate control is less likely to be an effective governance 
mechanism in the UK insurance market (Adams and Jiang, 2016). 
 
As a uniform supervision framework is shared across EU markets, by studying the UK 
insurance market, we can make comparisons to other markets in the EU. Different 
features are associated with different markets: for instance, compared with the UK, the 
German market is highly regulated. Bikker and Gorter (2008) introduce the concept that 
the financial reforms (e.g. the 1994 deregulation) have limited impact on traditionally less 
 
1 The business and regulatory culture in the United Kingdom has a feature that allows firms to exit more 
freely than they can in other EU countries. As a result, more failure cases exist in the UK (Burchell and 
Hughes, 2006; Eling and Jia, 2018), notably the failure of Equitable Life and Independent Insurance Plc. in 
the early 2000s. 
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regulated countries, such as the UK. 
 
In general, the UK insurance industry is an important contributor to economic growth 
both in the country itself and worldwide, and is ranked as the largest across the EU and 
the third largest in the world (Association of British Insurers, 2014). Moreover, the UK 
insurance sector makes £1.9 trillion in investments and pays nearly £12 billion in taxes 
to the government per year (Association of British Insurers, 2016). It also contributes £35 
billion per annum to the UK economy (Office for National Statistics, 2015). The 
contributions from insurers to the UK economy are significant.  
 
The UK market has its own specific features and research contributions. However, not 
many studies have focused on the unitary UK market. Therefore, this research is focused 
on the UK market only, although the results that are gained can be used to make further 
comparisons to other markets.  
 
 
Section 0.3 The Development of the Current Research 
This research first looks at performance which is the insurer’s primary concern, 
because it acts a prelude to the analysis of other research topics, such as the insurer’s 
financial stability. Performance is the basic outcome of an insurer’s operational activities, 
but it can also be a fundamental source of a firm’s soundness. Eling and Jia (2018) stated 
that efficiency (performance measurement) could be defined as a candidate of failure 
indicators as they believed that inefficient firms would fail to maintain operations in the 
market due to external pressure. Thus, by defining insurers’ performance, two questions 
can be answered: (1) How well is the firm being operated? and (2) How has the market 
evolved over time? In order to obtain a more comprehensive and accurate overview of 
insurers’ performance, the results encompass various aspects, which are generally 
covered in three areas: (1) different performance indicators - efficiency and productivity; 
(2) types of insurers - life, non-life and composite insurers; (3) types of ownership - stocks 
and mutual insurers. The results are presented in Chapter 1.  
 
Further, it is worth determining the driving forces of insurers’ performance. As in line 
with the requirement of the Solvency II framework, the foundation of the insurer’s 
advanced management is detecting and identifying (quantitatively and qualitatively) the 
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existence of risks,1 and then to manage these accepted risks. For example, pricing risk, 
which is one of the underwriting risks, represents the uncertainty that costs and claim 
payments will not coincide with the premiums received. Thus, one effective conduct is to 
maintain an adequate level of capital (Jakov and Žaja, 2014). In addition, insurers are 
exposed to various underwriting risks in the first place because uncertainties always occur 
from the business activities, and they are hard to predict. In other words, underwriting 
risks originated from insurers’ business strategies. These fundamental strategies will 
further impact insurers’ other activities, such as investment strategies and risk 
management activities. Then, Chapter 2 reveals the influences of insurers’ risk takings 
and risk management practices on the performance, as these are the fundamental factors 
that insurers need to consider. 
 
   In the aftermath of the recent global financial crisis, insurers’ risk-taking behaviours 
and risk management tactics are essential issues of concern for regulators and 
policyholders, as well as for the shareholders and managers of insurance firms. The 
primary objective of the solvency framework is to ensure that insurance companies hold 
enough capital to enhance an insurer’s financial health. Harrington (2009) also states 
that insurers must fulfil the rigorous capital requirements in order to limit their potential 
to destabilise the system. Capital thus act not only as a loss cushion but also as a barrier 
to prevent insurers from taking excessive risks from their underwriting and investment 
practices. More specifically, insurers could choose to accept an excessive amount of risk 
in exchange for a higher level of incentive. In the absence of an external guarantee (e.g. 
a national insurance guarantee scheme), the insurers could then choose to transfer the risk 
to policyholders unilaterally via a higher premium level. This is referred to as a reverse 
moral hazard. As a result, this would reduce the insurer’s competitiveness in the market. 
Accordingly, to main the firm’s competitiveness, it could raise external capital as an 
optimal solution, but there are costs of capital. Therefore, the insurer needs to make a 
trade-off between incentives gained from excessive risk taking and cost spending on 
raising additional capital. As the capital provides these critical functions to ensure a firm’s 
financial health, it is important to reveal the impacts of potential factors on insurers’ 
 
1 Risks can be classified in several ways. Under solvency II, the main categories within this classification 
include underwriting risk, market risk, credit risk, operational risk and liquidity risk. Different risks may 
adversely affect the operation of the insurer, and it can lead to disturbances in achieving an insurer’s goals. 
The worst case would be that the insurer is not able to meet its obligation, and thereby becomes insolvent. 
Underwriting risk represents the possibility of failing to meet future liability due to incorrect pricing and 
an inappropriate business scope. 
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capital structures. Specifically, the results from this research reveal that the insurers past 
leverage level, retained earnings, business volatilities and the use of reinsurance are all 
relevant factors that influence insurers’ capital structure’. Chapter 3 presents the detail of 
relevant investigations.  
 
The role of the insurance sector in maintaining the stability and sustainability of the 
financial system, facilitating business growth and creating wealth is well established, as 
discussed. Thus, it is important to ensure that the insurers maintain the ability to meet 
their obligations, thereby further enhancing their soundness. The impact of an insurer 
becoming insolvent can be extensive, as it acts as the ultimate carrier of risks. To be 
specific, the insurer’s financial ability to continually meet the promised obligations is 
essential for policyholders/clients, as they pay premiums long before receiving any 
claim/benefit payments. Thus, for the purpose of identifying early warning signs of 
insurer instability, it is important to determine some particular driving factors on insurers’ 
financial health.1  More specifically, insurer’s performance, risk takings (i.e. leverage and 
liquidity) and management practices (i.e. the use of reinsurance) all contribute 
significantly to the insurer’s stability, as discussed in Chapter 4.    
 
This thesis mainly contributes to ongoing discussions on insurers’ performance (Fenn 
et al., 2008; Bikker, 2016; Eling and Schaper, 2017), capital structure (Campello, 2003; 
Shiu, 2011; Altuntas, Berry-Stölzle and Wende, 2015) and financial soundness (Cummins, 
Rubio-Misas and Vencappa, 2017); meanwhile, some particular internal driving forces, 
which are related to each of the already mentioned elements, are defined. We also 
consider the influence of external pressures on the discussed relationships, i.e. the market 
structure (Canton et al., 2005; Dam, Escrihuela-Villar and Sánchez-Pagés, 2015) and the 
underwriting cycle (Elango, 2009; Ren et al., 2011).  
 
Regarding market structure, direct cross-border selling was not allowed among 
national markets in the EU before 1994, and limited competition therefore occurred in the 
single market. After the introduction of deregulation, insurance companies were able to 
use a single license to operate throughout the European market, as the barriers to entry 
 
1 For example, Brockett et al. (1994), Hsiao and Whang (2009) and Eling and Jia (2018) demonstrated 
various financial insolvency prediction models for the insurance industry. Meanwhile, a large volume of 
studies have been conducted to determine the impacts of different factors on insurers’ financial health, see, 
Shiu (2005), Trufin, Albrecher and Denuit (2009), Cheng, Elyasiani and Jia (2011), Dutang, Albrecher and 
Loisel (2013) and Cummins, Rubio-Misas and Vencappa (2017).  
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into the other countries were removed. The initial objective of this deregulation was to 
gain market efficiency and enhance productivity by imposing competition1. Eling and 
Schaper (2017) reveal that different external environmental factors have significant 
impacts on insurers’ efficiency. After years of adopting the financial reforms (1994 
deregulation, 2007 reinsurance directive), it is necessary to analyse dynamic changes in 
the market structure (e.g. competition or others) and its potential impact on insurers 
practices, as this should be considered in policymaking. And Pandey (2004) further 
confirm that there is a cubic relationship between market structure and capital structure. 
Thus, market structure is considered as one of the key variables in Chapter 3. 
 
The underwriting cycle, is another external factor, is one of the key variables in 
Chapter 4. The existence of it has directly impacted insurers’ practices, such as pricing 
strategies, and revenue and profit generations, in the general insurance market (Cummins 
and Outreville, 1987; Eling and Luhnen, 2009; Zhang and Tang, 2012; Jakov and Žaja, 
2014). The causes of the appearance of the underwriting cycle have been well discussed 
from different perspectives, see studies from Winter (1991), Cagle and Harrington (1995), 
Grace and Hotchkiss (1995), Cummins and Danzon (1997), Lamm-tennant and Weiss 
(1997), Meier (2006b, 2006a), and Meier and Outreville (2006).2 Simmons and Cross  
(1986), Jones and Ren (2006) and Jakov and Žaja (2014) further suggest that this cycle 
indirectly influences the general insurers’ risk-taking behaviours and their solvency 
situation. Therefore, mainly in Chapter 4, the impact of this cyclical pattern on insurers’ 
stability will be discussed.   
 
 
Section 0.4 Contributions to the extant literature 
Summarily, we contribute to the extant literature in the following respects:  
1. The UK insurance industry can be categorised as one of the most advanced markets 
from the perspective of participation and supervision. Therefore, it is both beneficial and 
necessary to research the UK insurance market, in order to provide a clear standard and a 
potential benchmark to its counterparts; for example, emerging countries (e.g., China). 
 
1 Studies related to the financial liberalization, competition and their impacts on financial industries (banks 
and insurers), see, Barros (1996), Boonyasai, Grace and Skipper (2002), Turk Ariss (2008), Lin, Officer 
and Zou (2011), Delis (2012), Alhassan and Biekpe (2017) and Goetz (2018). 
2 Harrington (2004) and Meier (2006a) both provided good reviews on the explanation of the causes of the 
underwriting cycle. However, the causes of the cycle are not the priority, as the primary aim is to reveal its 
impact on insurers’ stability in this research.  
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Based on this point, the first contribution is to provide a relatively comprehensive analysis 
that investigates domestic insurers’ performance and risk-related activities (both risk-
taking and risk management).  
 
2. In comparison to previous, related UK studies, the sample used in this research can 
be considered the largest, and its acquired data are also the most recent and the second 
widest in coverage regarding time.1  
 
3. It is the first and most comprehensive study to investigate the UK insurer’s 
performance. Chapter 1 encompass various aspects, which are generally covered in three 
areas: (1) different performance indicators - efficiency and productivity; (2) types of 
insurers - life, non-life and composite insurers; (3) types of ownership - stocks and mutual 
insurers. 
 
4. Chapter 2 is the first study to consider the interaction effects between different 
insurers’ risk-taking behaviours and risk management activities on performance. It is 
worth to determine such impacts, because of the fact that insurers’ risk-taking behaviours 
and risk management activities are often jointly considered. 
 
5. The main contribution of Chapter 3 is to determine how market structure affects UK 
insurers’ capital structure directly and indirectly—for example, considering the individual 
effect of market structure and its interactions with firm-specific characteristics on the UK 
insurance market’s capital structure. Because, such relationship is ambiguous. 
 
6. Chapter 4 contributes to the literature by incorporating the influence of the 
underwriting cycle on an insurer’s financial soundness (stability or risk-taking behaviour), 
including the interaction term between both internal and underwriting cycle in 
consideration of their joint effects. Because, such relationship is ambiguous. 
 
As a background for the following chapters, this chapter presents a brief overview of 
the reasons why the insurance sector, especially the UK insurance sector, was selected as 
the research target, and roughly introduces some of the key concepts discussed in this 
 
1 According to my best knowledge, the insolvency study undertaken by Caporale, Cerrato and Zhang 
(2017) was based on data from 1985 to 2015 - the widest coverage in terms of time.  
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thesis. The remainder of this thesis is organised as follows. As the foundation of the 
research, in Chapter 1, the performance of UK insurers is determined by using efficiency 
and productivity analysis. Then, Chapter 2 reveals the driving forces behind UK insurers’ 
performance from two perspectives: risk-taking and risk-management activities. Chapter 
3 investigates insurers’ capital structure, paying particular attention to the influence of 
market structure. Chapter 4 determines the influence of performance and risk-related 
practices on insurers’ soundness (stability), with a consideration of the impact of the 
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CHAPTER 1: Analysing Insurer’s Performance in the UK Market: 




   The UK insurance industry could be regarded as an essential contributor to both 
domestic and international economic strength, but it also plays an important role in the 
financial system. Therefore, investigating this market from different perspectives is a 
worthwhile pursuit. The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of insurers’ 
performance in the U.K. insurance market from 1996 to 2017. Efficiencies and 
productivities, both performance indicators, are introduced and used to measure the 
performance of UK insurers in the chapter. These indicators are also treated as one of the 
basic variables for further analysis, which is related to different insurers’ behaviours.   
 
   The result first shows that no significant improvements in both cost and profit 
efficiencies from the past 20 years. On average, there are chances for insurers to improve 
their performance: about 40% for cost efficiency and 70% for profit efficiency. Besides, 
there is evidence to show that the insurer’s cost efficiency are higher than its profit 
efficiency. Regarding the cost-scale efficiency, the year of 2010 is a “break-even” point, 
as the entire market (except the life insurers) starts to operate at an opposite condition 
since that. Overall speaking, UK insurers (except the life insurers) suffer productivity 
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Section 1.1 Introduction 
 
1.1.1 Introduction: The U.K. Insurance Market 
   In contemporary society, the UK insurance industry has become an important 
contributor to economic growth in both at home and abroad. It is ranked as the largest 
such market across the EU, and the third largest in the world, with generating 24% of 
total EU premium income, with a contribution of £25bn to the UK GDP as well as, more 
than 314,400 job opportunities in the domestic market (Association of British Insurers, 
2014).  
 
   As the UK insurance industry has undergone regulatory reforms since the early 1990s, 
an analysis of its past and present performance was warranted. Insight in this respect could 
provide a comparative benchmark to its counterparts over time and a clear foundation for 
further analysis on how different internal or external factors might influence a firm’s 
behaviours, such as risk taking and risk management. 
 
1.1.2 Introduction: Performance Measurements 
   Performance can be treated as an outcome of business activities, but it can also be seen 
as fundamental to a firm’s soundness. Eling and Jia (2018) point out that performance 
(e.g., efficiency) could be defined as a candidate of failure indicators because they believe 
that underperforming firms would fail to maintain operation in the market due to external 
pressure (e.g. competition). Giroud and Mueller (2010) state that well-performing 
insurers would gain an advantage from acquiring market knowledge, establishing 
distribution networks and appropriating existing customer networks. Therefore, by 
analysing a firm’s performance, two questions can be answered: (1) How well is the firm 
being operated? and (2) What can be achieved from the firm’s performance?   
 
   There are two types of performance measurement: ratio-type analysis (e.g. the solvency 
margin, expenses and claims ratios, the return on invested assets, etc.) and modern frontier 
efficiency analysis (e.g. data envelopment analysis or stochastic frontier analysis). 
Although some researchers use ratio-type analyses in testing the performance of 
insurance companies - for example, return on asset, return on equity, underwriting profit 
ratio and expenses ratio1, see, Chen and Wong (2004), Shiu (2004), Leverty and Grace 
 
1 Return on asset (ROA) shows the profit earned per unit of asset and reflects the firm’s ability to generate 
profit from its asset holding. Return on equity (ROE) reflects the ability of the firm to generate profit with 
the amount that shareholders have invested, and it relates to financing decisions. The underwriting profit 
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(2010), Fields, Gupta and Prakash (2012) and Tan (2016) - some problems appear in 
association with a simplistic multiple-ratios analysis (Diacon, Starkey and O’Brien, 
2002).1 
 
   Modern frontier efficiency analysis, which has become a popular performance 
measurement over the last 20 years, can create a framework for analysing companies, 
which are not totally efficient (Farrell, 1957). A frontier is a component of the frontier 
set, in which firms utilise a minimum range of inputs to produce a given level of 
contemporaneous outputs; therefore, it is a modern approach to benchmarking. It has been 
further pointed out by Diacon, Starkey and O’Brien (2002) that the limitations of using a 
simple ratio-type analysis can be avoided by applying efficiency methodologies in two 
steps: first, confirm the frontier, which could represent the best performance achievable 
by applying current production technology; second, identify the efficiency of the object, 
which could be measured by benchmarking the object against the nearest ‘frontier’ 
company. An increasing number of studies are using efficiency as their performance 
indicators, see overview from Eling and Luhnen (2010b) and Cummins and Weiss (2011). 
 
   Furthermore, efficiency analysis is focused more on economic than accounting 
performance, and it could help to avoid potentially confounding effects originating from 
differences in firms’ adoption of financial reporting schemes of annual income and their 
accounting items (Hardwick, Adams and Zou, 2011). For this reason, the tangible 
implications for insurance economics can be studied and identified after applying modern 
frontier efficiency methodologies (Cummins and Weiss, 2011).  
 
   Worldwide, studies of firm’s efficiency have been conducted due to a strong fascination 
with insurers’ performance and related activities (Eling and Luhnen, 2010a). This 
measurement could be regarded as a critical indicator, one which could help stakeholders 
 
ratio for nonlife insurers, which is 1- Pure Loss ratio – Expense ratio, is positively related to performance; 
and the expense ratio is negative related to performance for life insurers.  
1 (Diacon, Starkey and O’Brien, 2002) summarised the limitations as followed: (1) Since it is impossible 
to find out a company, which is pointed by all ratios, it is not achievable for identifying the best practice 
frontier. (2) If some of the ratios conflict with each other, it might be difficult to make further determinations 
in advance on deciding which ratio could be regarded as the key indicator to compare efficiency or 
performance. (3) Since the basic rule of ‘like-for-like’ should be properly applied for making performance 
comparisons, underperforming companies could be identified, this is because underperforming companies 
are inferior to their competitors. Simple ratio comparison is hard to achieve this purpose. (4) It is not 
possible to allow companies to identify the backup source (reasons) of any inefficiency from traditional 
measures.  
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to gain an overview of the insurance company’s position at the industry level. This could 
in turn provide clearer and more solid guidelines for taking further actions to minimise 
(maximise) the cost (profit) from an operational perspective (Farrell, 1957). Doing so 
could ultimately directly predict a firm’s and a stakeholder’s value in both the short and 
long term (Bikker & van Leuvensteijn, 2008).  
 
   Although insurers and regulators have paid a great deal of attention to insurer’s 
efficiency, only about 100 empirical studies on the topic have been studied thus far.1 
Within these studies, two types of methodologies have been frequently employed: 
econometric approaches and mathematical programming approaches. More specifically, 
about 60 studies utilised a non-parametric approach (Data Envelopment Analysis), while 
the other 40 used a parametric approach (Stochastic Frontier Analysis). Besides, 
efficiency is also used for testing different economic hypotheses, and various implications 
have been involved in efficiency studies across different countries, mainly in the US and 
the unitary EU market. Most of these studies focus on the the level of efficiency, its 
evolution over time, and its implications on various corporate governance issues – for 
example, firm’s ownership structure, regulation changes, distribution system, financial 
and risk management, and capital utilization and others. By studying the relationship 
between the internal or external factors,and efficiency, both managers and regulators 
would receive a guidance on appropriate responses to problems and managerial issues at 
a firm or industry level.  
 
  Performance is not only one of the insurer’s operational outcome, but also a potential 
indicator of an insurer’s financial health (Eling and Jia, 2018). By providing a 
comprehensive study on the U.K. insurers’ performance, two main questions can be 
answered: (1) How well is the firm being operated? and (2) How has the market evolved 
over time?  
 
   Financial services industries, such as banking, have been studied extensively. 
Regarding insurance, although the insurance sector has recently received more attention 
and relevant studies have become more popular than ever since the recent financial crisis, 
more comprehensive studies are still lacking. The chapter mainly several contributes to 
 
1 Eling and Luhnen (2010b, 2010a) and Cummins and Weiss (2011) provide detailed reviews on 
efficiency studies. 
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ongoing discussions on insurer’s performance (e.g., Eling and Luhnen, 2010a; Eling and 
Luhnen, 2010b; Bertoni and Croce, 2011).  
 
  First, the U.K. insurance industry is an important contributor to economic growth both 
in the country itself and worldwide, and is ranked as the largest across the EU and the 
third-largest in the world. However, in contrast to the number of studies related to the US 
market or the EU market, the number of studies that focus on the U.K. market is relatively 
low. Therefore, it is essential to fill the gap and draw a picture of this important market. 
Second, it is the first and most comprehensive study to investigate the U.K. insurance 
market. In order to obtain a more accurate overview of insurers’ performance, this chapter 
encompasses various aspects, which are generally covered in three areas: (1) different 
performance indicators - efficiency and productivity; (2) types of insurers - life, non-life 
and composite insurers; (3) types of ownership - stocks and mutual insurers. On the other 
hand, most of the extant performance studies only focused cost efficiency in one business 
market (either life or non-life), and even fewer studies attempted to analysis productivity 
growth and its decomposed components for the insurance sector. Third, in comparison to 
other performance studies related to the U.K. market, the sample used in this chapter can 
be considered the largest, and its acquired data are also the most recent and the widest in 
coverage regarding time. Fourth, this chapter also serves as a prelude for other studies 
presented in this thesis which have focused on analysing the driving factors of insurer’s 
performance, capital structure and stability.  
 
   Therefore, it is first to provide a detailed description of the principal methodologies that 
have been adopted to measure efficiency and productivity1. Then, detecting cost and 
profit efficiencies2 with consideration of different types of businesses and ownership 
structures; at the same time, productivity and its components are also assessed. However, 
no expectations or hypothesis will be made in this chapter because the main purpose is to 
reveal the feature of the U.K. insurers’ performance. 
 
   This chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review of the literature 
pertaining to the U.K. insurers’ efficiency and productivity. Methodological issues and 
 
1 Discussions on how to choose inputs, outputs and prices are also provided 
2 Estimating both cost and profit efficiencies is essential, because cost efficiency only captures information 
from the input side, whereas the profit maximised as the initial goal of management contains information 
from both input and output sides. 
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sample descriptions are discussed in Section 3. Next, in Section 4, the estimated 
efficiency scores, as well as productivity are presented. Finally, the main conclusion is 
summarised in Section 5.   
 
Section 1.2 Literature Review 
 
1.2.1 Literature Review on Efficiency (Performance) Research 
   According to Eling and Luhnen (2010b), the term ‘frontier efficiency’ (which is also 
called frontier analysis) refers to a result/score generated by utilising ‘frontier efficiency 
measurement techniques’ that test whether the performance of a corporation could be 
measured as the relative ‘best practice’ frontier in comparison with the most efficient 
competitors in the industry. More specifically, Donni and Fecher (1997) claim that a more 
accurate interpretation of efficiency analysis is not being attributed only based on the 
parameters of input and output, but also in line with an additional frontier set, named as 
the production set, which could be described as ‘a point lying on the frontier is 
characteristically one that corresponds to the maximum achievable quantity of output for 
any given level of input, or also to the minimum required quantity of input for any given 
level of output’ (Page 525).  
 
   Also as pointed out by Eling and Luhnen (2010b), such an analysis generally 
encompasses two main approaches: an econometric approach and a mathematical 
programming approach. Whereas econometric approaches are subject to the process of 
specifying a corporation’s capacity of production, cost, revenue (or profit) with a specific 
shape, and then generating assumptions about the distributions of inefficiency and error 
terms. On the other hand, mathematical programming approaches focus on measuring the 
relationship between produced outputs and inputs (assigned resources) by utilizing linear 
programming method (e.g., Data Envelopment Analysis), without involving distribution 
assumptions, and without separating inefficiency terms and error terms (Eling and 
Luhnen, 2010b).  
 
   In the last 20 years, studies of frontier efficiency analysis have ‘dramatically increased’, 
from only eight up to 1997 (Berger and Humphrey, 1997), and 21 by 2000 (Berger et al., 
2000); yet more than 95 studies in insurance industry were conducted 2010 (Eling and 
Luhnen, 2010b). 
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   Broadly speaking, in the early period, the orientation of frontier efficiency analysis, in 
terms of examining insurance corporations’ operational efficiency, was more on the 
results of output efficiency and its counterparts (such as methodological and analytical 
targets), an emphasis observable in studies of international corporations, e.g. Rai (1996). 
Moreover, by conducting ‘output-focusing’ orientated studies, Fields and Murphy (1989) 
and Grace and Timme (1992) demonstrated the clear tendency towards economies of 
scale in small and medium enterprises and diseconomies of scale in large enterprises in 
the US insurance market. Furthermore, apart from large firms, which hold 90% efficiency 
levels (Cummins and Weiss, 1993), low efficiency in operating capacities across US 
insurance firms have also been identified from Gardner and Grace (1993) and Yuengert 
(1993). In addition, in Gardner and Grace (1993)’s study, a positive linkage between 
efficiency and improvement technology, while no linkage between efficiency and form 
of corporate ownership.  
 
   It was only in recent years that, efficiency studies include two additional features: 
1. The studies and results of frontier efficiency generally covered all major lines of 
business in a wide range of countries, e.g., intercountry comparison studies.1 
2. Applied implication fields, in terms of factor influencing efficiency, have also been 
intensely refined and developed. Some new topics, such as distribution system, 
organization form and corporate governance issues, regulation changes, market 
structure and risk management-related investigations, have also been developed. 2 
 
   According to Eling and Luhnen (2010b) survey, until now, different fields of applied 
implications, were involved in efficiency studies carried out worldwide and were included 
in more than 100 studies. It should be noted that the efficiency findings, which were 
subject to investigation under the same economic issue, varied as a result of differences 
of time horizon, country, line of business and the methodologies employed (Eling and 
Luhnen, 2010b). A summary of some selected findings, which were well studied in 
various popular implication fields, is presented in Appendix 1. And the UK relevant 




1 Appendix 1 shows a brief review of relevant studies of the topics on intercountry comparisons.  
2 Appendix 1 shows a brief review of relevant studies of the topics on distribution system, organization 
form and corporate governance issues, regulation changes. 
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1.2.2 Literature Review on Efficiency in the UK Insurance Market 
   Regarding studies of frontier efficiency in the UK insurance industry, although 
numerous UK-related investigations have been carried out, most only focus on comparing 
the UK efficiency figure with those of other countries, e.g. Rees and Kessner (1999) and 
Hussels and Ward (2007). Therefore, their approaches are aimed at tackling their research 
problems for an aggregated market than at presenting a comprehensive investigation of 
the UK single market. Even though several (around 10 studies) UK-based frontier 
efficiency studies have been published by now, the lack of a decent investigation into 
some specific applications (e.g. risk management, market structure, etc.) remains a 
persistent issue. In order to fill these research gaps accurately, as well as to test for 
consistency between the findings for the UK and those of previous studies, it is necessary 
to review previous UK-related frontier efficiency studies in this chapter.  
 
   As mentioned earlier, under the topic of the impact of distribution on efficiency, Berger, 
Cummins and Weiss (1997) developed two hypotheses: the product-quality hypothesis 
and the market imperfection hypothesis. The product-quality hypothesis was investigated 
by Ward (2002), while the market imperfection hypothesis was further discussed within 
a UK insurance study undertaken by Klumpes (2004).  
 
   Ward (2002) analyse 44 UK life insurance companies from 1990 to 1997, by using SFA 
to estimate three types of efficiency, with his findings illustrating that the average cost 
efficiency is 76.3%, which is comparable to the 70% figure presented by Hardwick (1997) 
in the 1989-1993 period. Additionally, the UK life insurance market is expressed as being 
low revenue inefficient with a high level of profit inefficiency. A difference across 
various channels is found for cost efficiency, but it is not sufficient to clearly support the 
product-quality hypothesis, as no significant relationship between the choice of 
distribution channels and the level of profit (and revenue efficiency). However, the 
product-quality hypothesis is achieved when testing an independent channel associated 
with mutual companies and the selling of complex products.  
 
   Klumpes (2004) provides another similar study under both hypotheses for UK insurers, 
but with a slightly different period, in which profit and cost efficiency functions are 
utilised to assess the performances of 40 life companies in the 1994-1999 period. The 
result of his study contrasts with those obtained by Berger, Cummins and Weiss (1997), 
who support the product-quality hypothesis. Klumpes (2004) find strong support for the 
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market imperfection hypothesis in contrast to its counterpart (the product-quality 
hypothesis).  
 
   Rai’s (1996) research could be regarded as one of the earliest UK-related studies, in 
which a comparison of cost efficiency between the UK and other EU countries in the 
1988–1992 period was performed. Moreover, this study could be considered one of the 
most constructive in its hypothesis that the efficiency of insurers could be various, 
depending on a firm’s size and other macro factors (i.e. country-specific). It is worthy of 
noting that the UK’s X-efficiency was ranked at the lowest stage in comparison to other 
markets, such as Finland’s and France’s, indicating that the competitive advantages of 
UK insurers have remained relatively low, a finding consistent with Hardwick’s (1997) 
suggestions.  
 
   Hardwick (1997) measured the cost inefficiency among UK life insurers only. Within 
his study, 54 life-insurers from 1989 to 1993 are tested, and an estimated flexible form 
stochastic cost frontier was applied in measuring the ‘scale’, ‘economic’ and ‘total’ 
inefficiency for different size groups within the sample Hardwick (1997).  His study 
revealed the following findings: (1) high inefficiency in the UK life market, which was 
in line with Rai (1996); (2) a significant positive scale of economies; (3) larger life 
insurers are more efficient; (4) London-based stock companies were economically 
inefficient; and (5) competition from EU countries (from one single EU market) was not 
yet a threat to the domestic market.  
 
   However, in another UK-related study, Donni and Fecher (1997) compare the UK with 
the other 14 OECD countries over the 1983-1991 period, and arguing that the level of 
both technical efficiency and productivity in the UK remain in a leading position. (Bertoni 
and Croce (2011) investigate life insurance companies operating in five EU countries 
from 1997–2004, finding that the UK insurance has the lowest local efficiency score, and 
that this local score is higher than the UK’s global efficiency score and the EU’s average 
score. This also indicated that the UK’s efficient firms dominate those in other markets. 
However, by comparing their scale efficiency scores, Bertoni and Croce (2011) 
documented that UK insurers were operating in a decreasing return to scale because the 
lowest scale inefficiency was found in the group with the largest firms.  
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   There are several potential reasons for such controversial results: (1) the involved 
countries and the time periods are different; (2) the methodologies used to determine 
efficiency are different, with DEA applied in Donni and Fecher (1997)’s case, whereas 
both Rai (1996) and Hardwick (1997) used SFA; and (3) Donni and Fecher (1997)’s 
research, which is focused on explaining the shift of the product frontier, could be 
reflected by monitoring technological progress; whereas the the others concentrate on 
explaining the different factors among different countries regarding efficiency.  
 
   Later, a mixed results from both Rai (1996) and Donni and Fecher (1997)’s are 
confirmed by Diacon, Starkey and O’Brien (2002), who focus on detecting three different 
types of efficiencies (scale efficiency, technical efficiency and mix efficiency) for 
European long-term insurers between 1996 and 1999. They suggested that a requirement 
of reducing the operating cost among the UK’s long-term insurers by 19.6% (related to 
the European frontier in 1996), 16.9% in 1997, 12.9% in 1998, and 14.3% in 1999 was 
recommended. As a result, the highest average levels of technical efficiency could be 
detected in the UK market, a finding consistent with Donni and Fecher (1997), but a 
particularly lower level of mix and scale efficiency also appear among UK insurers, which 
confirmed by Rai’s (1996) hypothesis. 
 
   Diacon, Starkey and O’Brien’s (2002) study was an extension of those by Rai (1996), 
Donni and Fecher (1997) and Katrishen and Scordis (1998) and is aimed at testing 
whether a firm’s risks could explain the difference in efficiency among firms, sizes and 
organisational forms. To be more specific, an increase in the solvency ratio is associated 
with higher technical efficiency. Mutual firms have a higher level of technical efficiency 
than stock firms, but a lower level of mix efficiency. There seems to be little relationship 
between liquidity and efficiencies, and profitability has a significantly positive influence 
on scale one but a negative impact on mix one. A high proportion of reinsurance is also 
associated with lower mix efficiency. Moreover, the most efficient UK insurers are those 
that have businesses in specific target market sectors (e.g., merchant banks, investment 
houses or specialized in doing group pensions business).  
 
   As suggested by Rai (1996), companies with higher X-inefficiency may have a 
competitive disadvantage, under the circumstances of deregulation in 1994. Base on this 
point, Hussels and Ward (2007) further analyse the impact of deregulation on the dynamic 
development of efficiency in the UK and German life insurance markets. The authors 
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assume that by allowing EU insurance firms to operate freely across the EU zone, the 
highly regulated German insurance industry was expected to carry a greater enhancement 
in post-deregulation efficiency in comparison to the UK insurance industry. However, the 
statistics do not sufficiently verify this assumption from two perspectives: On the one 
hand, there is scant of evidence to indicate a strong cause-effect relationship between 
deregulation and efficiency enhancement (only a modest level) - for example, overall cost 
efficiency declined over the period from 1991 to 2002, only showing some improvement 
post 1995 in the UK.1 On the other hand, when individual efficiency scores are compared, 
it is revealed that the UK’s score is higher than that of its counterpart’s2; yet, when joint 
efficiency scores (aggregated two markets) are compared, Germany’s score is closer to 
the frontier level than that of the UK.  
 
   Again, under the environment of a single European insurance market, stemming from 
deregulation, Fenn et al. (2008) and Kasman and Turgutlu (2011) make further UK-
related comparisons, which are focused on detecting cost-efficiency and scale economies 
within the single European insurance market. Throughout the study by Fenn et al. (2008), 
the authors utilise a stochastic frontier methodology in modelling efficiency in the 1995 
– 2001 period, and estimations for different businesses are considered. The results 
indicated that businesses in non-life and composite sectors are relatively stable in cost 
efficiency among firms in the 1995 – 2001 period. However, according to Fenn et al. 
(2008), cost efficiency is declined, especially in the 1997-2000 period, for those firms in 
the life insurance sector. To be specific, the UK insurers carry an average score of 0.776 
in the life sector from 1995 to 2001 (which declined from 0.8000 in 1995 to 0.759 in 
1999); in comparison to this, the average score of 0.944 appeared in the non-life sector; 
whereas the score of composited insurers is around 0.988 (Fenn et al., 2008). In addition, 
the authors also point out the relatively low level of efficiency in Germany, the UK and 
France, with a high level of concentration of M&A.3 However, the scale of economies 
still exists due to consolidation. Also, by studying the impact of business environment 
 
1 Hussels and Ward (2007) stated that the firm could be expected to reduce its cost by 35%, as the average 
cost efficiency was around 65% in the UK market. The results are similar to those of Hardwick (1997), 
Diacon, Starkey and O’Brien (2002) and Ward (2002).  
2 When comparing the efficiency scores with other countries, the authors found that the score in the UK 
was much higher than in the Spanish (Cummins and Rubio-Misas, 2006) and German industry (Mahlberg 
and Url, 2000) industries. 
3 The supporting evidence can be found in Table 1 and Table 2 in Cummins and Weiss (2004). 
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factors on insurers’ efficiency, no significant efficiency differences are found in the UK 
(Eling and Schaper, 2017). 
 
Kasman and Turgutlu (2011) study efficiency for EU-15s from 1995 to 2005. Their 
results show that the UK average inefficiency score is 0.083, which indicates that insurers 
could improve their cost efficiency by 8.3%. During this period, the fluctuation could be 
regarded as the feature of estimated cost inefficiency, with an increasing trend from 1995 
(of 5.6%) to 2002 (of 11.2%), and a decreasing trend from 2002 (of 11.2%) to 2005 (of 
9.8%) in the UK market. The authors also point out that the higher cost inefficiency 
generally appears within those large size firms, than other smaller size groups, and this 
result is also consistent those of with Fenn et al. (2008) and Cummins, Tennyson and 
Weiss (1999) in the case of the US market, but contradicts to the market evidence from 
Spain, see, Cummins and Rubio-Misas (2006). 
 
   Hardwick, Adams and Zou (2011) and Bahloul, Hachicha and Bouri (2013) also argue 
that corporate governance mechanisms could influence efficiency as well. Hardwick, 
Adams and Zou (2011) tried to examine the impact of corporate governance mechanisms1 
on profit efficiency within UK life insurance companies but find little impact on 
efficiency with the board characteristics in the UK life insurance market from 1994 to 
2004. Bahloul, Hachicha and Bouri (2013) introduce the score of CEO power into the 
cost efficiency analysis in order to test its impact on different European markets. As a 
result, the authors concluded that the optimal level of CEO power exerted a significant 
effect on both efficiency and productivity across European markets. However, they also 
suggested that higher CEO power is correlated with lower cost-efficiency score, as an 
increase of the CEO power score would imply that the firm would be operating towards 
CEO’s interests, rather than those of firms, leading the insurance company to a suboptimal 
situation. To be specific, the Netherlands is the most efficient system over the 2002-2008 
period - that is 0.7084 - when not taking into consideration the CEO power score. 
However, if the CEO power score had been considered, then the efficiency of the UK 
non-life sector would become the most efficient system (0.7318) in comparison with the 
others, and the UK insurance market would be ranked as having the best growth over this 
 
1 The tested mechanisms included the existence of an audit committee, the percentage of actuaries and non-
executive directors on the board, and the separation between the board chairman and the CEO. But, a 
significant positive or negative effect on profit efficiency was observed only by the percentage of non-
executive directors on the board.  
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period, as the average TFP is 7.84%. From the other perspective, Adams and Jiang (2016) 
find that both inside and outside board directors’ expertise are the most significant 
contributors to a firm’s financial performance for UK property-casualty insurers. 
However, their result is not consistent with those of Kumar and Sivaramakrishnan (2008) 
or Faleye, Hoitash and Hoitash (2011).  
 
1.2.3 Literature Review on Productivity  
  Cummins and Weiss (2011) define productivity as changes in technology over time, 
such that technical progress refers to a firm that can produce more outputs at a given level 
of inputs; whereas technical regress refers to producing less outputs. However, one 
concern is raised about the fixed costs of adopting a new technology: the cost can be 
relatively high, thus affecting efficiency and productivity. Therefore, by examining 
changes in productivity over time and its decomposed components, the impact of both 
internal and external factors (such as management decisions to adopt a new methodology 
and competition due to deregulation) on performance can be found, and further actions 
can be taken to improve the firm’s performance by managers. Moreover, from a 
regulatory perspective, understanding the nature of the driving factors behind 
productivity are critical for policymakers to avoid setting misleading rules. For example, 
deregulation may impose competitive pressure, which is supposed to boots M&As and 
further enhance a firm’s productivity, or the adoption of a new regulation may be too 
costly for some particular firms. 
 
   Mahlberg and Url (2010) find that deregulation could lead to a decreasing tendency 
towards efficiency, but an opposite trend for productivity is observed in Germany from 
1992 to 1996. They also identify the main contributors as technical progress and scale 
efficiency effects; two types of convergence were tested as well, but only σ-convergences 
is confirmed.1 Controversially, according to (Boonyasai, Grace and Skipper’s (2002) 
multinational study, under the impact of deregulation and liberalisation, improvements in 
productivity could be found in the Korean and Philippine life markets; however, no such 
impacts on productivity growth are observed in either the Thailand or Taiwan markets. A 
 
1 Based on Barro and Sala-i-Martin’s (1995) definition, Mahlberg and Url (2010) hypothesis that external 
pressure (e.g., competition) would force insurance companies to improve their efficiency. Therefore, σ-
convergence is defined as efficiency that should converge to the benchmark level. while the dispersion of 
efficiency should decline over time. And β-convergences hypothesise according to the notion that the lower 
or inefficient firms at the beginning of the period should have a higher rate of productivity growth 
afterwards. Convergence analysis is also considered in this chapter, and the results are shown in Appendix.  
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more competitive market with more new diversified products is the other potential result 
from deregulation. As expected, geographical diversification was positively related to the 
property/liability insurer’s revenue efficiency and total factor productivity growth in the 
US from 1994 to 2003 (Cummins and Xie, 2008). At a later stage, by investigating 14 EU 
countries, Vencappa, Fenn and Diacon (2013) estimate and decompose both life and non-
life insurers’ productivity growth from 1995 to 2008. They reveal that changes in 
technical efficiency is the main factor that drives productivity changes, and that the trend 
of estimated productivity varies due to the choice of different output measurements.   
 
   In Spain, under the impact of consolidation, which could be attributed to deregulation 
as well, a growing trend in productivity and an increasing number of companies with 
decreasing return to scale are observed from 1989 to 1998, and the productivity gains are 
almost due to gains in efficiency (Cummins and Rubio-Misas, 2006).1 Ownership is also 
found to explain the difference in productivity growth, e.g. Spanish stock companies face  
positive growth, but mutual companies experience negative growth. Eling and Schaper 
(2017) also state that efficiency increases are the main driver of growth in productivity 
and further emphasise that changes in the external business environment should be the 
main channel for productivity enhancements.  
 
   From Donni and Fecher’s (1997) cross-country study, a growth in productivity could 
be observed among EU-15s, a trend attributable to technical progress improvements from 
1983 to 1991. They also explain that U.K. insures are more dynamic in adopting new 
technology in comparison to the other 14 markets, and this helps the U.K. insurers to 
achieve higher productivity from 1983-1991. On the other hand, as Germany carries a 
greater power of technological improvements than in the U.K., this may explain why the 
UK is weaker in contrast to Germany (Hussels and Ward, 2007). Technical progress could 
be regarded as an effective factor, one which boosts both efficiency and productivity 
worldwide, as argued by Eling and Luhnen (2010b). From a slightly later study relevant 
to the impact of deregulation and liberalisation, Bertoni and Croce (2011) study five EU 
life markets and find significant productivity improvement over the 1997-2004 period. 
The U.K. market is one of the five markets and its annual total factor productivity growth 
 
1 There are 47% of insurers still operating with increasing return to scale at the end of 1998. However, the 
proportion of firms facing a decreasing return to scale had an upwards trend in the largest two size groups.  
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is about 9.62%, in which innovation in best-practice1 (technology changes) contributes 
76% of the productivity growth, and no significant correlation between TFP growth and 
a firm’s financial stability is found. 
 
   From a study of the Swiss insurance industry in the 1997-2013 period, Biener, Eling 
and Wirfs (2016) find that total factor productivity decline in the life sector is mainly due 
to technical regress, which could be explained by the increasingly challenging business 
environmental factors, such as low interest rates and increased competition from banks. 
Although they do not find significant changes in general insurance and reinsurance 
sectors on average, annually improvements exist due to both positive technical changes 
and efficiency increases in these two sectors. 
 
   From another study on the Thai insurance market, Yaisawarng, Asavadachanukorn and 
Yaisawarng (2014) also find that both the technology effect and the scale effect negatively 
contribute to total factor productivity growth in non-life markets from 2000 to 2007, with 
positive growth in TFP occurring from 2005, but a decline beforehand.  
 
   Cummins and Xie (2013) adopted Data Envelopment Analysis to analyse efficiency, 
return to scale and used the Malmquist Index to represent productivity in the US property-
liability insurance market from 1993 to 2009, their results confirm improvements in 
productivity. Based on this study, a similar study was done by Alhassan and Biekpe 
(2015), who focused on the non-life market in South Africa from 2007 to 2012. They 
observed that productivity growth attributable to technology change (i.e. innovation in 
production outputs) could be explained by the adoption of new technology through 
innovation. Technology change in sales, underwriting and other relevant services may 
force insurers to adopt the innovations.  
 
Section 1.3 Research Methodology and Data 
 
   In this chapter, a comprehensive analysis of UK insurers’ efficiencies and productivity 
is undertaken. Stochastic frontier analysis is used to estimate both efficiency and 
productivity. Meanwhile, comparisons among types of businesses, types of ownerships 
 
1 Best practice innovation refers to improve current productivity through the introduction of new products 
and more efficient processes, which belong to technology progress; and best practice adoption means to 
simulate and adopt other insurers’ best-practices processes, which is related to efficiency improvements 
(Bertoni and Croce, 2011). 
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are also illustrated. Then, Finally, changes in productivity over time and its decomposed 
components are examined. 
 
1.3.1 Literature Review on Stochastic Frontier Analysis 
Acknowledging existing studies, two main approaches that have been widely used to 
estimate the frontier: the non-parametric approach and the econometric approach. These 
methods all involve determining an efficient frontier in achieving either the observed 
minimum cost or observed maximum profit (or revenue). 
 
   The non-parametric approaches have the advantage that significantly less assumptions 
are required on the specification of function forms, while the disadvantage is that they do 
not decompose the error and the inefficiency terms (Eling and Luhnen, 2010b). A 
commonly applied method is data envelopment analysis (DEA), which was presented 
originally by Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978). By using DEA, one limitation is the 
estimated result can only account for technical efficiency because this technique does not 
consider price vectors; another potential limitation is that the result is also sensitive to 
some constraints (Canton et al., 2005).   
 
   In comparison to the non-parametric approaches, the econometric approaches focus on 
utilising production, cost, profit or revenue function, with specific assumptions on the 
shape of the distribution of error and inefficiency terms (Greene, 2008; Eling and Luhnen, 
2010b; Cummins and Weiss, 2011). According to previous studies, three econometric 
approaches are popular to estimate efficiency: stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) 1 , 
distribution-free approach (DFA) and thick frontier approach (TFA).  
 
   To be more specific, the composed error term (both error term and inefficiency term) 
in the production function is assumed to follow some kind of distributions within 
stochastic frontier approach (Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt, 1977; Meeusen and van Den 
Broeck, 1977; Stevenson, 1980). The distribution-free approach doesn’t assume specific 
distribution assumptions on inefficiency term; therefore, it is assumed that the random 
noise averages out to zero and the efficiency of each firm is stable over time (Eling and 
Luhnen, 2010b). Thick frontier approach also does not make any distributional 
 
1    According to Eling and Luhnen’s (2010b) survey, two configuration decisions - the choice functional 
forms and the distributional assumptions 1  - must be made when applying econometric approaches, 
especially in SFA. However, in Berger and Mester’s (1997) study, the authors find that flexible form and 
translog form are equal to each other from the point of economic view, and their efficiency score are highly 
correlated. These assertions are also confirmed by Vennet (2002).  
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assumptions (Berger and Humphrey, 1991); yet, it could be built on the assumption that 
inefficiency appears difference between the lowest and highest quartile companies (Eling 
and Luhnen, 2010b). 
 
   Based on a sample set of 6,462 insurance companies from 36 countries, Eling and 
Luhnen (2010b) also state that cost and technical efficiencies calculated from DEA and 
SFA are in a similar extraordinary range. Therefore, similar scores could be presented 
within both approaches, if these methodologies were performing consistently and 
correctly. However, a slightly different statement is made by Cummins and Zi (1998), 
and they point out that there are differences in the estimated score when different 
distributional assumptions are imposed on the error term. Additionally, the average 
efficiencies are higher for econometric approaches than its counterpart, while the results 
from two methods are still significant correlated, i.e. the correlation is around 0.5 – 0.6. 
 
   As noted, there are advantages and disadvantages associated with both methods. And 
the SFA should provide the least biased result in principle because the constructive 
advantages of SFA allow the action of separating composited error into pure random error 
term and inefficiency term (Cummins and Weiss, 2011).1 Then, the stochastic frontier 
analysis (SFA) is applied in this study, and the non-parametric approach would not be 
explained any further. The panel data analysis is adopted throughout the study, because 
the key advantage of this is to enable heterogeneity, whereas the cross-sectional approach 
may not be able to achieve it (Kumbhakar, Wang and Horncastle (2015), pp 241). 
Therefore, by utilizing panel data analysis via SFA, estimating efficiency can be achieved 
by introducing an individual unobservable effect variable, which is time-invariant and 
individual-specific, and does not interact with other variables. 
 
   Within developments of the frontier analysis, various advanced models are introduced 
from 1984 to 2014. However, those developments and assumptions are made regarding 
the generalised form, which can be written as:  
yit = αi(t) + xit𝛽 + vit 
where αi(t) = β0 − ui(t). the first assumption is regarding unobserved individual effects 
(αi(t)): if this term is assumed of being a fixed-effect variable in different observations, 
the model is called a fixed-effects model (Schmidt and Sickles, 1984); otherwise, is 
 
1 The purely random departures from the frontier is not counted as inefficiency. 
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categorized as a random-effects model (Pitt and Lee, 1981; Kumbhakar, 1987). The 
second assumption is regarding the inefficiency term (ui(t)): if the inefficiency term is 
assumed to be constant through the time, the model is called a time-invariant model1; 
otherwise, it is a time-varying model with αi(t) and ui(t) in the above equation (Cornwell, 
Schmidt and Sickles, 1990; Lee and Schmidt, 1993). Further distributional assumptions 
on inefficiency term in time-varying model are also imposed into the above equation, as 
shown in studies from Kumbhakar (1990), Battese and Coelli (1992) and Kumbhakar and 
Wang (2005). Further, Greene (2005) introduced both the true fixed-effects model and 
true random-effects model, which aim at solving the heterogeneity drawback, and it 
introduces a time-varying inefficiency 𝑢𝑖𝑡: 
yit = αi + xitβi + vit − uit 
 
   However, as the number of observations (N) is getting larger, the incidental parameters 
problem exist in Greene’s (2005) models. It means there would be an inconsistency in 
estimation, as the number of αi increased with N. However, this problem can be solved 
by applying a first-difference transformation within 𝑢𝑖𝑡, i.e. to separate firm effects from 
persistent inefficiency (Wang and Ho, 2010; Chen, Schmidt and Wang, 2014; Kumbhakar, 
Wang and Horncastle, pp241, 2015). 
 
   In addition, Mundlak (1961) also suggests that it is important to identify persistent 
inefficiency, as it indicates the effects of management (or other unobserved inputs, which 
are vary across firms, but not over time). Kumbhakar and Heshmati (1995) develop a 
model that considers the separation between the persistent (time-invariant) 
inefficiency(𝜏𝑖), and the time-varying inefficiency(𝑢𝑖𝑡) in their model. As this persistent 
inefficiency might produce a downwards bias in estimating of total inefficiency, the 
equation is now presented in form of: 
yit = αi + xitβi + vit − (uit + τi) 
   
 
1 There are two main drawbacks of time-invariant model. First, if time is great, the inefficiency of a firm 
may not stay constant; otherwise, persisting an inefficient firm would not able to help the firm to survive 
in the market (Kumbhakar et al., pp 241, 2015). Second, the heterogeneity cannot be distinguished from 
inefficiency; therefore, the estimated inefficiency might be ‘picking up heterogeneity’ in addition to 
efficiency (Greene, 2005) 
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   Up to the recent frontier studies, Kumbhakar, Lien and Hardaker (2014) develop a 
model based on the abovementioned models. Their model overcomes the shortages 
associated with the other models by splitting the inefficiency into four components: 
random shock effects(𝑣𝑖𝑡), time-varying inefficiency(𝑢𝑖𝑡), time-invariant (persistent) 
inefficiency(𝜏𝑖) and heterogeneity effects(𝜇𝑖), and the form of equation becomes:  
yit = αi + xitβi + vit − (uit + τi + μi) 
    
   Throughout the study, some of the mentioned models will also be used to estimate 
efficiency for UK insurers, and mathematical details are presented Appendix 1. 
 
1.3.2 Efficiency Functional Function  
   Although the following discussions and formulas focus on the estimating cost efficiency 
only, the estimation of profit efficiencies are also involved in this research and can be 
found by using the same logic. To be more specific, the following specification for the 
cost function (Battese and Coelli, 1995) can be used to find cost frontier:      
                                 
TCit = f(𝐘𝐢𝐭, 𝐏𝐢𝐭, T) + εit 
Equation (1.1) 
in which the TC𝑖𝑡 stands for the total cost of insurer i in year t, the Y𝑖𝑡 stands for a vector 
of outputs, P𝑖𝑡 stands for vector of input price, and ε𝑖𝑡 stands for the composited error term, 
which is specified as,  ε𝑖𝑡 =  v𝑖𝑡 + u𝑖𝑡 . Apart from this, the inclusion of a time trend 
variable (T) ensures that changes over time in technology and underwriting cycle can be 
captured. The term v𝑖𝑡 stands for the error term, u𝑖𝑡 denotes insurer’s inefficiency, and 
the inefficiency term u𝑖𝑡 is usually assumed to follow a half normal or truncated normal 
distribution, and the truncated normal distribution is adopted in this paper, as half normal 
distribution is special case of truncated normal distribution.  
 
   The translog cost function, opted in here, takes the form of 
ln 𝑇𝐶𝑖𝑡 = α0 +  ∑ 𝛼𝑔 ln 𝑌𝑖𝑔𝑡
2
𝑔




                       +
1
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where TC = Total Cost (or TP = Operating Profit) 
           Y1 = Output 1: Incurred Losses 
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           Y2 = Output 2: Total Investment 
           P1 = Input price 1: Price of Labor and Business 
           P2 = Input price 2: Price of Financial Capital 
           P3 = Input price 3: Price of Technical Reserves 
           T  = Time Trend 
 
and, the detail of these chosen variables is discussed later in the following section. The 
symmetry property requires that 𝛼𝑖𝑘 = 𝛼𝑘𝑖,  𝛽𝑗ℎ = 𝛽ℎ𝑗 and 𝛿𝑖𝑗 = 𝛿𝑗𝑖 . The cost function 
is homogeneous of degree 1 in input price, and so the following restrictions apply: 
∑ 𝛽𝑗 = 1,  ∑ ∑ 𝛽𝑗ℎ = 0,  ∑ ∑ 𝛿𝑔𝑗 = 0,  ∑ ∑ 𝜉𝑗 = 0. These constraints can be substituted 
into the model; therefore, the homogeneity conditions are satisfied. This procedure 
amounts to using one of the input prices (e.g. P1) to normalized total cost and another 
input price. Using P1 as the normalizing price, the above equation can be simplified as 
follows: 
               ln (
TC
P1
) =  α0 + α1lnY1 + α2lnY2 + β2ln (
P2
P1
) + β3ln (
P3
P1
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P2
P1










) + δ12lnY1ln (
P2
P1
) + δ13lnY1ln (
P3
P1
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   Maximum likelihood estimation techniques are used to estimate the parameters of the 
stochastic frontier models. The cost inefficiency scores can be estimated by using 
Jondrow et al.’s (1982) approach, while efficiency score can be obtained from (Battese 
and Coelli’s (1988) approach.  
 
   Once the parameters are available for the cost frontier, it is possible to estimate cost-
scale efficiency by using the formula for the elasticity of scale:  
 















   This formula represents the sum of the partial derivatives of the cost function, with 
respect to each of the output variables. If this value < 1, economies of scale (decreasing 
cost) exists; if the value > 1, it indicates diseconomies of scale (increasing costs). 
P a g e  | 31 
 
Economies of scale are present if average costs per unit of output decline as the volume 
of output increases. The source of scale economies is the spreading of the insurer’s fixed 
costs over a larger volume of output, for example, operating at larger scale may reduce 
the firm’s cost of capital. 
 
1.3.3 Estimating Productivity and its Decomposition 
   Broadly speaking, there are two main approaches have been widely applied to measure 
productivity growth in many studies on industrial productivity: the frontier approach and 
non-frontier approach. 1  The recent literature of financial industry has extensively 
followed the frontier approaches (parametric and non-parametric), which base on 
identifying the best-practice firms in the market, see, Esho and Sharpe (1994), Koop, 
Osiewalski and Steel (1999), Mahlberg and Url (2010), Cummins and Weiss (2011) and 
Eling and Schaper (2017). In line with efficiency estimation, the parametric SFA 
techniques has been used on panel data set throughout the study.2 Within the SFA, by 
following both Karagiannis, Midmore and Tzouvelekas (2004) and Kumbhakar and 
Lozano-Vivas (2005), a Stochastic Distance Cost Frontier model with multi-output is 
used. They have pointed some advantages of using this model: (1) The distance cost 
function is able to accommodate multi-output, which is consistent with the setting of 
multi-outputs in efficiency estimation; (2) No restrictions on the implied return to scale; 
(3) Cost approach is more appropriate than production approach because insurers’ outputs 
may be demand driven; and (4) Restrictions on market competition is not necessary in 
cost function approach.  
 
   According to Karagiannis, Midmore and Tzouvelekas (2004), Kumbhakar and Lozano-
Vivas (2005) and Kumbhakar, Wang and Horncastle (2015), productivity changes, when 
there are multiple inputs (j inputs) and multiple outputs (m outputs), is measured by TFP 
growth, and can be defined as: 
𝑇𝐹𝑃̇ = ∑ 𝑅𝑚?̇?𝑚𝑚 − ∑ 𝑆𝑗?̇?𝑗𝑗  , 
Equation (1.5) 
where 𝑅𝑚 = 𝑝𝑚𝑦𝑚 𝑅⁄  and 𝑆𝑗 = 𝑤𝑗𝑥𝑗 𝐶⁄ , in which 𝑝 is the output price, 𝑦 is output vector 
and 𝑅 = Total Revenue = ∑ 𝑝𝑚𝑦𝑚𝑚 ; and 𝑤 is the input price, 𝑥 is the input vector and 
 
1  Vencappa, Fenn and Diacon (2013) provide an introduction on the difference between these two 
approaches.  
2 The main advantage of choosing parametric approach is that both estimating and decomposing TFP 
growth is allowed, which cannot be achieved by non-parametric approach (Kumbhakar and Lozano-Vivas, 
2005).  
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𝐶 = Total Cost = ∑ 𝑤𝑗𝑥𝑗𝑗 . This measurement framework starts with a cost function if 
decomposition is also preferred; and the cost function can be identified as 𝐶 = 𝐶(𝑦, 𝑤, 𝑡), 
where t, the time trend variable, is introduced to capture external technical changes. Thus, 
using the same method presented by Denny, Fuss and Waverman (1987), Kumbhakar and 
Lozano-Vivas (2005) and Kumbhakar, Wang and Horncastle (2015), the TFP growth and 
its components can now be defined as: 
𝑇𝐹𝑃̇ = 𝑇𝐶𝐶 + 𝑇𝐸𝐶 + [(1 − 𝑅𝑇𝑆−1)?̇?𝑐] + [?̇?𝑝 − ?̇?𝑐] , 
Equation (1.6) 
where TCC is the technical change component; 
           TEC is the technical efficiency change component; 
           (1 − 𝑅𝑇𝑆−1)?̇?𝑐 is scale component, and 𝑅𝑇𝑆
−1 =  ∑ 𝜕ln𝐶 𝜕ln𝑦𝑚⁄𝑚  ; 
           ?̇?𝑝 − ?̇?𝑐 is the markup component, in which ?̇?𝑝 = 𝑅𝑇𝑆{∑ (𝜕ln𝐶 𝜕ln𝑦𝑚⁄ )?̇?𝑚𝑚 }  
           and ?̇?𝑝 = ∑ 𝑅𝑚?̇?𝑚𝑚  ; ?̇?𝑚 = 𝜕ln𝑦𝑚 𝜕𝑡⁄  and ?̇?𝑚 = 𝜕ln𝑥𝑗 𝜕𝑡⁄  .  
 
 
1.3.4 Data, Output and Input Factors Used in Efficiency Measurement 
   The database used in this chapter is built on information from financial statements of 
individual insurers, which included balance sheet and income statement, collected from 
Orbis, Fame and ISIS (or Insurance Focus) provided by Bureau van Dijk. The sample 
covers at least 90% of the market capacity from 1996 to 2017. In line with Eling and 
Luhnen (2008), Fenn et al. (2008), Kasman and Turgutlu (2011) and Yaisawarng, 
Asavadachanukorn and Yaisawarng (2014), companies were included in this analysis, if 
they have positive values for all outputs, inputs and input price variables, which are used 
to measure efficiency and productivity. This is because that the estimation of the 
efficiency function requires that the input prices are strictly positive. However, there is 
not required of data for all years; therefore, unbalanced panel data is accepted. To ensure 
all monetary values are directly comparable, we deflate each year’s value by the consumer 
price index to the base year 2015. 
 
   Two types efficiencies, cost and profit efficiency, will be estimated. First, the insurer’s 
operating expenses that associated with both underwriting and administrative costs is 
used to determined total cost (Berger et al., 2000; Kasman and Turgutlu, 2011). 
Following Fenn et al. (2008), the claim paid is excluded in order to avoid confusion with 
the output factor. Additional, total profit is the simple operating profit, profit before tax, 
presented in financial statement. Then, in order to estimate efficiency scores, definition 
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of outputs, inputs and their prices that shown in Equation (1.1) must also be specified.  
 
Choice of output factors and output prices 
   There is a difficulty lies in previous efficiency studies of measuring insurance 
companies’ outputs (Donni and Fecher, 1997; Diacon, Starkey and O’Brien, 2002; Eling 
and Luhnen, 2008; Cummins and Weiss, 2011). In addition to this difficulty, Cummins 
and Weiss (2011) further point out that the cause of this difficulty is attributed to the main 
feature around financial firms; in another words, the intangibility of outputs (consists 
primarily of services). Brockett et al. (2005) also have a similar statement, that the 
selection of variables to represent inputs and outputs is vital to the validity of the analysis, 
and it is difficult for financial services firms, as opposed to manufacturing firms of 
utilizing physical resources inputs to produce physical products as outputs. This stems 
from the statement of Hornstein and Prescott (1991), that a conceptual definition of output 
must be needed to measure its product; otherwise, it is not clear what data should be 
collected and how it should be used to compute output measures. In previous studies, 
there are many unresolved debates around the definition of outputs in the insurance 
industry, e.g. Berger et al. (2000), Eling and Luhnen (2010b), Cummins and Weiss (2011) 
and Yaisawarng, Asavadachanukorn and Yaisawarng (2014) also state that different 
measures of output lead to different conclusion on efficiency.  
 
   As summarised in the studies of Eling and Luhnen (2010b) and Cummins and Weiss 
(2011), three principal approaches used to measure outputs in financial services: the user-
cost approach (Hancock, 1985), the intermediation approach (Brockett et al., 1998), and 
the value-added approach (Berger and Humphrey, 1992). Appendix 1 provides a full 
review on these approaches. Since the value-added approach has been established as the 
best practice, and large numbers of authors choose it; then, it is adopted to measure 
outputs in this paper, and the following discussions are only based this chosen approach.  
 
   Cummins and Weiss (2011) explain that it is necessary to find suitable proxies for the 
volume of services provided by insurers, as these outputs from insurers are mostly 
intangible. (Zanghieri, 2009) mention that one of the most important challenges is how 
to proxy outputs for analysing efficiency in the financial services industry. According to 
Berger et al. (2000), Eling and Luhnen (2008), Zanghieri (2009) and Cummins and Weiss 
(2011), the output produced by the insurer is the provision of three principal services, and 
the pragmatic approach is therefore to identify these services, and to find measurable 
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proxies that are highly correlated with these services (Diacon, Starkey and O’Brien, 2002). 
To be more specific, the three principal services are: the risk-pooling and risk-taking, the 
financial intermediation, and the ‘real’ financial services relating to insured losses. 
Details of these three services are summaries in Appendix 1.  
 
   Based on the defined services, Donni and Fecher (1997) suggest two alternatives can 
be chosen as output proxies: premiums or incurred losses (claims or benefits paid to 
policyholders), and the number of policies contracted.  
 
   Individuals tend to purchase insurance because they are risk averse. The price that 
individuals are willing to pay is an indicator of their degree of risk aversion and their 
willingness to transfer risk, as such net premiums are a reflection of the value-added for 
each individual policyholder of the insurance firm (Ward, 2002). This may be one of the 
reasons why premium could be included within the measure of output, particularly from 
a value-added perspective.  
 
   Prior to Yuengert (1993), most of studies  measured risk bearing/pooling outputs as the 
value of premiums (Grace and Timme, 1992; Fecher et al., 1993; Gardner and Grace, 
1993). Hirshhorn and Geehan (1977) state that the premium could reflect the ability of an 
insurance company to select clients and to accept risks. It means that premiums collected 
directly concern the technical activities of insurers. By following this concept, the 
premium income may be the most acceptable indicator of an insurance company’s 
services (Grace and Timme, 1992; Fecher et al., 1993; Gardner and Grace, 1993; Rai, 
1996; Hardwick, 1997; Boonyasai, Grace and Skipper, 2002; Diboky and Ubl, 2007; Hu 
et al., 2009). Again, because all of the three services are related to premium income 
(Diboky and Ubl, 2007), risk-pooling and -bearing can be measured in terms of insurance 
coverage, and the intermediation services do depend on the level of funds collected from 
policyholders. Moreover, another issue concerning whether premiums should be net or 
gross, written or earned.1 
 
 
1 This issue needs to be concerned in long-term insurance policy, where there is a substantial delay between 
the collection of premiums and the payment of claims. Net written premiums or net earned premiums have 
been used as proxies for outputs in most early cost studies (e.g., Grace and Timme, 1992; Fecher et al., 
1993; Gardner and Grace, 1993; Rai, 1996; Donni and Fecher, 1997; Hardwick, 1997; Diacon, Starkey and 
O’Brien, 2002; Hao and Chou, 2005; Bikker and van Leuvensteijn, 2008). 
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   However, Yuengert (1993) argues that premium should be a questionable measure of 
policies. It does not represent a count of output units (quantity), but a form of revenue 
(price times number of policies, price is included). Both Fenn et al. (2008) and Fiordelisi 
and Ricci (2010) state that the price of product provided by insurers could be viewed as 
the expected present value of future claims. However, premium paid normally exceeds 
this expected value, then the differences may result in misleading conclusions about 
insurers’ operational efficiency. In addition to this, Doherty (1981) and Leverty, Lin and 
Zhou (2004) state that bias would be arsing by using premium, as it is not independent of 
the pricing policies (across the industry), which violates the assumption that independent 
variables should be exogenous. But, Allen (1974) and Blair, Jackson and Vogel (1975) 
suggest that a premium would be appropriate the proxy, if assuming the product is 
homogeneous and the market is competitive, and further compelling all insurers charge a 
similar price. In fact, this restriction of using premium as an output proxy is not be a 
serious problem in the UK insurance market. The liberalization and deregulation has 
resulted in enhancing the competition among EU insurers, further leading to a similar 
price competition potentially; and homogeneous product assumption is not very 
restrictive, as the UK insurers do offer fair homogeneous products. As these potential 
problems of using premium to proxy outputs, Yaisawarng, Asavadachanukorn and 
Yaisawarng (2014) mention that the number of policies issued would be an ideal measure 
of ‘production’ output because it represents the primary function of an insurance company; 
namely, to provide financial stability by selling ‘protection’ to policyholders in exchange 
for premiums. However, the number of policies written is unavailable or not published in 
most cases.  
 
   Alternatively, a large number of previous studies use the amount of losses incurred as 
a proxy (Cummins and Santomero, 1999; Cummins, Tennyson and Weiss, 1999; 
Cummins, Rubio-Misas and Zi, 2004; Cummins and Rubio-Misas, 2006). Berger et al. 
(2000) state that incurred losses is meaningful to represent both risk-pooling/bearing 
services and real financial services. It is attributed to the fact that incurred losses (claims 
or benefits) represents two ideas: the total amount redistributed by the pool and the legal 
protections amount offered by real financial services in unexpected events.  
 
   Based on this point, the present value of incurred losses is used as an output proxy 
(Berger, Cummins and Weiss, 1997; Berger et al., 2000; Choi and Weiss, 2005; Weiss 
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and Choi, 2008; Cummins et al., 2009). Fiordelisi and Ricci (2010) and Kasman and 
Turgutlu  (2011) use claims incurred net of reinsurance as a measure of insurance output1; 
Yuengert (1993) and Cummins and Rubio-Misas (2006) suggest that the value of real 
incurred losses (current losses paid plus additional to reserves) is a good indicator to 
proxy the amount of risk pooling/bearing and real financial services. Based on this 
suggestion, Cummins and Zi (1998), Carr, Cummins and Regan (1999), Boonyasai, Grace 
and Skipper (2002), Erhemjamts and Leverty (2010) and Huang and Paradi (2011) all use 
losses plus additional to reserve as an output proxy. Leverty and Grace (2010) use the 
expected losses, i.e. multiplying a firm’s current year earned premiums by a three-year 
average of its loss rate.  
 
   However, one limitation of the suggestions from Yuengert (1993) and Cummins and 
Rubio-Misas (2006) is that reserves amount would change when new policies are sold or 
old policies are mature (Greene and Segal, 2004). Diacon, Starkey and O’Brien (2002) 
and Klumpes (2005) solved this issue by using premium paid, plus investment income, 
minus claims due to the accounting period, and minus changes in reserves. Again, the 
main drawback is not controlling the effect of the insurance price, as mentioned before.  
 
   Further to this point, it is difficult to understand why insurers would seek to maximize 
the value of claims, as it violates the insurers’ characteristic identified by output, which 
should be preferred to less (if the output is claimed payments). Brockett et al. (2005) also 
disagree with using incurred losses as the proxy, and argue that if there was no change in 
inputs, a dramatically increase in losses can be expected (due to extreme events); and this 
would be a bad case as there would be a lack of efficient enhancement available for an 
insurer. Therefore, they use solvency scores, financial returns and claims-paying ability 
to replace losses as output; because owners, managers and regulators would be likely to 
take a response action in favour to improve these outputs. Yaisawarng, 
Asavadachanukorn and Yaisawarng (2014) further argue that losses incurred is not an 
appropriate output proxy, since it does not consider the quality of insurers’ loss control 
and risk management; and insurers with excellent risk control skill should have a lower 
amount of losses incurred, therefore a producing lower output.  
 
 
1 Fiordelisi and Ricci (2010) used net incurred claim to approximate the output: it was defined as gross 
claims paid less claims received from reinsurers, plus increase in loss reserves (addition to reserve), and  
plus bonuses and rebates, but before the addition of claims management costs. 
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   According to Eling and Luhnen (2008, 2010b), there are still many debates among those 
using the value-added approach, as to whether incurred losses (claims or benefits) or 
premiums (sum insured) are the most appropriate proxies for risk-pooling/-bearing 
outputs. They also recognise that there are more studies using incurred loses to proxy 
outputs than premiums (sum insured). However, no recognisable conclusion can be 
achieved. 
 
   As discussed, there is no simple ‘right or wrong’ solutions in directing the choice of the 
correct proxies. Taking into consideration of the risk-pooling/bearing activities,  
Cummins and Weiss (2000) state that no proxy was valid in principle. Thus, this study 
the choice of Berger et al. (2000), Fenn et al. (2008), Fiordelisi and Ricci (2010) and 
Kasman and Turgutlu  (2011): using net claims paid (claims incurred net of reinsurance) 
to represent the risk pooling/bearing activity and the real financial services. Another  
reason is that the restricted homogeneous product assumption need to be made, if using 
premium as the proxy.  
 
   Moreover, Boonyasai, Grace and Skipper (2002) and Diacon, Starkey and O’Brien 
(2002) use investment income to represent output from the financial intermediation 
service. Alternatively, total investment amount is also chosen as one output by Grace and 
Timme (1992), Klumpes (2004), Hao and Chou (2005), Eling and Luhnen (2010b) and 
Yaisawarng, Asavadachanukorn and Yaisawarng (2014). The reason of imposing total 
investment is that insurers not only generate underwriting profit, but also make huge 
investments to meet future obligations for both policyholders and stakeholders 
(Yaisawarng, Asavadachanukorn and Yaisawarng, 2014). Therefore, the insurer’s total 
investment is picked as the second output proxy to represent financial intermediation 
services.  
 
   To find out the TFP growth and its components, the prices of two outputs are required. 
Following Cummins and Xie’s (2008) approach,1,the price of output, which associated to 
risk pooling/bearing activity and real financial activities, can be defined as the insurer’s 
 
1 Due to data availability, the exact measurements of output prices, from Cummins and Xie (2008), are not 
able to use in this study. However, the applied methods is selected based on the similar logic to Cummins 
and Xie’s (2008) suggestion. For example, the underwriting income is a reasonable variable to proxy the 
difference between premium earned and losses incurred for reporting period; meanwhile, expected return 
on invested asset is defined as return on total investment because of the lack of information on individual 
asset data.  
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underwriting income divided by net claim amount. In addition, the ratio of investment 
income to total investment can represent the price of output from financial intermediation 
services.  
 
Choice of input factors and input price 
   After considering the choice of outputs, the process of selecting appropriate input 
variables is much simpler and less controversial. According to Eling and Luhnen (2008) 
and Cummins and Weiss (2011), most of the studies used at least labour, financial capital, 
and add a third category as input vectors. There are two different methods to determine 
the price of these chosen inputs: (1) to assume that the price is invariable among firms 
when insurers purchase their production inputs in competitive markets, see, Hao and 
Chou (2005), Cummins and Rubio-Misas (2006), Fenn et al. (2008) and Kasman and 
Turgutlu  (2011); and (2) to specify variable input prices for individual firms, e.g. Greene 
and Segal (2004), Barros, Barroso and Borges (2006) and Bikker and van Leuvensteijn 
(2008). The second method is adopted in this research, as the chosen input factors are 
firm-specific variables, which carry individual firm’s characteristics. 
 
   By following the recent insurance efficiency studies, three input factors were selected: 
labour cost, business cost and financial capital. It is necessary to simplify this selection 
by combining labour cost and business cost as administration expenses. Simplicity and 
data availability is the main reason behind using this simplification, and this practice has 
been used in many other studies, e.g. Diacon et al. (2002), Fenn  et al. (2008) and Bahloul 
et al. (2013). This also helps to reduce the number of parameters (Ennsfellner, Lewis and 
Anderson, 2004). By focusing on the studies of Hasan and Marton (2003), Kasman and 
Yildirim (2006) and Kasman and Turgutlu  (2011), the proxy for the input price, which 
is related to the labour and business cost, is the ratio of administration expenses to total 
assets.  
 
   As discussed above, the risk pooling/bearing and the financial intermediation are two 
main functions of insurers. Financial capital can be regarded as the main input used to 
provide these services (Diboky and Ubl, 2007; Jeng, Lai and McNamara, 2007; Klumpes, 
2007; Erhemjamts and Leverty, 2010). In fact, the inclusion of financial capital indicates 
that the contractual relationship (between capital supplier and the firms) is one major part 
of firm’s operation. Therefore, two types of capital are considered: equity and debt capital.   
Equity serves as an important indicator of insurers’ financial strength and reliability 
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(Hughes, 1999; Berger et al., 2000; Eling and Luhnen, 2010b; Kasman and Turgutlu, 
2011). Equity capital can be viewed as an input because it provides a source of funds that 
enable insurers to cover unexpected losses if the amount is larger than expected (Tone 
and Sahoo, 2005; Hardwick, Adams and Zou, 2011). However, equity is treated as the 
fixed input in studies of Berger, Cummins and Weiss (1997), Berger et al. (2000), Fenn 
et al. (2008), as they assume it has been built up over a long time and is difficult to adjust 
quickly. Zanghieri (2009) disagree with this point for two reasons: (1) insurers are able 
to raise equity capital quite rapidly in the EU capital market; and (2) the price of equity 
partially explain the level of risk implied in investing in the firm, and the insurer’s risk 
level varies over time. Therefore, equity capital would be treated as a variable input in 
this research. Debt capital, in insurance companies, can be defined as the total borrowings 
from creditors (e.g. banks and policyholders), and it also represents the sources for the 
intermediation function of an insurance firm (Cummins and Weiss, 2011), which is a 
liability item. It can also be treated as a input variable.  
 
   Therefore, by adopting the method from the studies undertaken by Jeng and Lai (2005), 
Cummins and Weiss (2011), Yaisawarng, Asavadachanukorn and Yaisawarng (2014) and 
Alhassan and Biekpe (2016), the price of the equity capital is defined as the ratio of net 
income to equity capital. The price of debt capital is proxied as the ratio of investment 
income to total reserves. Due to data unavailability, it is hard to consider different proxies 
for capital prices separately. Therefore, the combination of two capital is preferred; thus 
the price of financial capital (the sum of equity and debt) is proxied as the ordinary profits 
to the sum of equity capital and total reserve (Jeng and Lai, 2005).1 In line with Berger, 
Cummins and Weiss (1997), Berger et al. (2000) and Fenn et al. (2008), total net technical 
provisions (reserves)2 is also included as the third inputs, and its price is the ratio of total 
net technical provisions to total asset.  
 
Section 1.4 Results and Discussions 
    
   Table 1.1 shows the descriptive statistics of the discussed variables used to estimate the 
insurer’s efficiency and productivity, and all variables are positive due to the modelling 
restrictions of translog form. As discussed, this study has applied different mathematical 
 
1 Ordinary profit is also called profit from operations, it could be calculated as the sum of underwriting 
profits, net investment income and other income minus other expenses related to investment; or the sum of 
total investment return (total investment * investment yield) and operating profit minus cost of investment.  
2 It includes unearned premium reserves, loss reserves, and mathematical reserves (Fenn et al. 2008). 
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approaches to estimate the insurer’s efficiency; Appendix 1 presents the details of the 
estimated results from different models. Thus, the following discussions are based on the 
results estimated by using Kumbhakar, Lien and Hardaker (2014)’s model.  
 
Table 1.1: Descriptive Statistics       
Variable Obs. Mean Standard Deviation Min Max 
Total Cost 5716 10380.93 42863.84 0.07 979190.08 
Total Profit 6252 969.42 4901.93 0.00 178617.88 
Output 1 5794 4058.68 15927.84 0.00 431176.47 
Output 2 6972 55529.61 444324.39 0.00 26883116.05 
Input Price 1 5418 0.12 0.57 0.00 26.71 
Input Price 2 5395 0.38 20.61 0.00 1509.00 
Input Price 3 6412 0.54 0.35 0.00 5.27 
Notes: Total Cost equals to Operating Expenses - Claim Paid.  Total Profit is the profit before 
tax shown in the income statement. Output 1 is Net Claims Paid, and Output 2 is Total 
Investment. Input Price 1 equals to the ratio of Administration Expenses to Total Asset.  Input 
Price 2 is the ratio of Ordinary Profits to the sum of Equity and Reserve. Input Price 3 equals 
to Net Technical Provisions / Total Asset. The values of Total Cost, Total Cost, Output 1, 
Output 2 are in thousand pounds, while Input Price 1, Input Price 2, Input Price 3 are ratios. 
The detailed definition can be found in Section 1.3.4. 
 
1.4.1 Efficiency Estimations 
   Table 1.2 presents the annual means of the predicted scores of cost and profit 
efficiencies. On one hand, the average cost efficiency score is around 0.6, in line with 
Eling and Luhnen’s (2010) result of 0.615, but it is lower than the average score of 0.90 
observed by Fenn et al. (2008). Then, from the spending (or cost) perspective, the average 
score of 0.6 suggests that most of the UK insurers spend 40% more on the cost compared 
to the best-practice player in the market. On the other hand, the average profit efficiency 
score is only about 0.30. Given the same level of input prices and outputs, most of the 
market players can only generate 30% of the profits attainable by the best-practice one. 
Moreover, this score is much less than Hardwick, Adams and Zou’s (2011) finding, which 
is 0.69 on average. The differences between the estimated findings and the previous 
findings may be explained by the usage of different output and input vectors, estimation 
techniques and study periods. Despite the UK insurers’ cost performance is always better 
than the profit performance, the 2008 financial crisis has had harmful influences on both 
cost and profit performance. Both have dropped from their peak values since 2008, the 
cost efficiency was dropped from 61.19% in 2008, and the profit efficiency was dropped 
from 30.81% in 2009. It is interesting to know that the profit performance was enhanced 
from 2012, while the cost performance was enhanced from 2014.  Moreover, if looking 
backwards, the 2000 Dotcom Bubble crisis (or the internet crisis) may also affect the UK 
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insurer’s cost performance, as the cost efficiency score started to drop from 61.20% in 
2000. No such pattern is found for profit performance. 
 
   Figure 1.1 clearly shows that the insurer’s cost efficiency is higher than its profit 
efficiency, indicating that the UK insurers may tend to put more efforts on managing cost 
(i.e., reducing its cost) than on generating profit. Gaganis, Hasan and Pasiouras (2013) 
and Alhassan and Biekpe (2016) also confirm the differences between cost efficiency and 
profit efficiency. Furthermore, the uncertainty of profit performance is higher because 
more significant fluctuations are associated with the movement of profit efficiency over 
the study period.  
 
Table 1.2 Cost and Profit Efficiencies for All insurers 
   
Year Cost Efficiency Profit Efficiency 
   
1996 0.6193 0.2469 
1997 0.6204 0.2654 
1998 0.6243 0.2611 
1999 0.6295 0.2147 
2000 0.6120 0.2172 
2001 0.6022 0.2198 
2002 0.5986 0.2308 
2003 0.6018 0.2419 
2004 0.5955 0.3054 
2005 0.5997 0.3051 
2006 0.5937 0.3165 
2007 0.5913 0.3274 
2008 0.6119 0.3027 
2009 0.6024 0.3081 
2010 0.5990 0.3066 
2011 0.5927 0.2715 
2012 0.5876 0.3059 
2013 0.5810 0.3006 
2014 0.6107 0.2913 
2015 0.6102 0.2708 
2016 0.5917 0.3124 
2017 0.5711 0.3166 
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   Tables 1.3 and 1.4 present the cost and profit efficiency scores over time, respectively, 
when the UK insurance market is decomposed into five sub-markets. Here, the types of 
businesses and organisational forms are the two main sub-groups of concern. The former 
involves non-life insurers, life insurers and Lloyds insurers, while stock and mutual 
insurers belong to the latter group. Apart from what has been discussed, Figures 1.2 and 
1.3 show that the Lloyds insurers are in the leading position of reducing cost and 
generating profit. This finding should not be surprising because Lloyds comprises 
specialised insurers who have expertise in particular areas. In other words, they have 
better control of underwritings; meanwhile, it is difficult for the changes in external 
conditions to influence the special events that trigger the insurance claims in Lloyds firms. 
 
   In contrast, the life insurers resemble laggards because they always have the lowest 
scores in both cost and profit performance over the study period. Furthermore, in 
generating or maintaining a specified level of profit, life insurers face more uncertainties 
than non-life insurers. Between the two organisational forms, mutual insurers will more 
likely be the high-performing ones. Interestingly, the profit graph (Figure 1.3) clearly 
shows a concave curve from 2012 to 2017, while the cost graph (Figure 1.2) illustrates a 
convex shape from 2013 to 2017. These results suggest that the insurers might have 
needed to balance between generating profits and reducing costs from 2012 to 2017. 
Specifically, the UK insurers tended to pay more attention to cost management from 2012 
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is a noteworthy absence of significant improvements in the UK market from both cost 
and profit perspectives over the study period.  
 
 
Table 1.3: Cost Efficiency from Different Sub-groups        
       
Year All Non-life Life Lloyds Stock Mutual 
              
1996 0.6193 0.5985 0.5753  0.5753 0.6855 
1997 0.6204 0.5942 0.5782  0.5748 0.6875 
1998 0.6243 0.6011 0.5718  0.5807 0.6851 
1999 0.6295 0.5867 0.5677  0.5771 0.6962 
2000 0.6120 0.5706 0.5786  0.5630 0.6728 
2001 0.6022 0.5744 0.5429  0.5408 0.6793 
2002 0.5986 0.5720 0.5594  0.5438 0.6700 
2003 0.6018 0.5755 0.5563  0.5578 0.6533 
2004 0.5955 0.5742 0.5205 0.8446 0.5442 0.6583 
2005 0.5997 0.5721 0.5316 0.8417 0.5517 0.6495 
2006 0.5937 0.5614 0.5258 0.8529 0.5364 0.6493 
2007 0.5913 0.5640 0.5178 0.8532 0.5395 0.6526 
2008 0.6119 0.5981 0.5294 0.8663 0.5641 0.6725 
2009 0.6024 0.5896 0.5356 0.8464 0.5576 0.6740 
2010 0.5990 0.5851 0.5264 0.8473 0.5567 0.6489 
2011 0.5927 0.5743 0.5284 0.8468 0.5481 0.6566 
2012 0.5876 0.5740 0.5321 0.8361 0.5431 0.6532 
2013 0.5810 0.5690 0.5339 0.8131 0.5413 0.6423 
2014 0.6107 0.5980 0.5138 0.8857 0.5636 0.6598 
2015 0.6102 0.5919 0.5305 0.8613 0.5678 0.6627 
2016 0.5917 0.5865 0.4663 0.8519 0.5402 0.6723 
2017 0.5711 0.5435 0.4960 0.8326 0.5188 0.6596 
              
Average 0.6001 0.5802 0.5356 0.8498 0.5526 0.6662 
This table presents the cost efficiency scores for the entire market and five sub-markets, which are non-
life insurers, life insurers, Lloyds insurers, stock insurers and mutual insurers, from 1996 to 2017 (except 
for Lloyds insurers). The first three can be considered as different business types, and the latter two are 
different organisational forms. The cost efficiency is estimated by adopting Kumbhakar, Lien and 
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Table 1.4 Profit Efficiency from Different Sub-groups        
       
Year All Non-life Life Lloyds Stock Mutual 
              
1996 0.2469 0.4444 0.2135  0.2317 0.2829 
1997 0.2654 0.4946 0.1813  0.2533 0.3026 
1998 0.2611 0.5020 0.2056  0.2346 0.3171 
1999 0.2147 0.4543 0.1653  0.1972 0.2722 
2000 0.2172 0.4742 0.1604  0.2084 0.2378 
2001 0.2198 0.4302 0.2350  0.2069 0.2746 
2002 0.2308 0.4416 0.1724  0.2294 0.2249 
2003 0.2419 0.4593 0.1757  0.2141 0.3062 
2004 0.3054 0.4776 0.2233 0.5737 0.2671 0.3359 
2005 0.3051 0.4981 0.2250 0.5747 0.2773 0.3367 
2006 0.3165 0.4828 0.2690 0.5806 0.2775 0.3433 
2007 0.3274 0.4985 0.2725 0.5993 0.2933 0.3372 
2008 0.3027 0.4788 0.1776 0.5820 0.2892 0.2537 
2009 0.3081 0.4798 0.2348 0.5905 0.2777 0.3274 
2010 0.3066 0.4798 0.2207 0.5790 0.2771 0.3299 
2011 0.2715 0.4473 0.2148 0.5414 0.2514 0.2887 
2012 0.3059 0.4794 0.2268 0.6148 0.2710 0.3555 
2013 0.3006 0.4609 0.2447 0.5833 0.2690 0.3297 
2014 0.2913 0.4665 0.2083 0.5884 0.2641 0.2966 
2015 0.2708 0.4281 0.2181 0.5425 0.2460 0.2460 
2016 0.3124 0.4883 0.2262 0.6486 0.2830 0.3760 
2017 0.3166 0.5363 0.2383 0.5683 0.2968 0.3444 
              
Average 0.2908 0.4747 0.2148 0.5848 0.2638 0.3074 
Notes: This table presents the profit efficiency scores for the entire market and five sub-markets, which 
are non-life insurers, life insurers, Lloyds insurers, stock insurers and mutual insurers, from 1996 to 
2017(except for Lloyds insurers). The first three can be considered as different business types, and the 
latter two are different organisational forms. The profit efficiency is estimated by adopting Kumbhakar, 


























Figure 1.2 Cost Efficiencies for Different Sub-groups Over Time 
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Table 1.5: Cost-Scale Efficiency for Different Sub-groups Over-Time        
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Year All Non-life Life Lloyds Stock Mutual 
              
1996 0.9566 0.9734 0.8857  0.9406 0.9217 
1997 0.9582 0.9744 0.8893  0.9434 0.9259 
1998 0.9582 0.9750 0.9040  0.9452 0.9311 
1999 0.9641 0.9823 0.9048  0.9521 0.9393 
2000 0.9719 0.9838 0.8974  0.9606 0.9413 
2001 0.9760 0.9802 0.8698  0.9648 0.9417 
2002 0.9775 0.9863 0.8933  0.9679 0.9479 
2003 0.9793 0.9874 0.8944  0.9707 0.9515 
2004 0.9890 0.9989 0.8788 1.0972 0.9801 0.9594 
2005 0.9875 0.9992 0.9017 1.0778 0.9805 0.9629 
2006 0.9887 0.9979 0.8973 1.0635 0.9821 0.9626 
2007 0.9938 1.0030 0.8948 1.0551 0.9885 0.9713 
2008 0.9959 0.9978 0.9007 1.0370 0.9921 0.9703 
2009 0.9975 1.0002 0.9107 1.0240 0.9954 0.9774 
2010 1.0034 1.0044 0.9131 1.0128 1.0028 0.9849 
2011 1.0037 1.0029 0.9194 0.9960 1.0041 0.9855 
2012 1.0129 1.0118 0.9150 0.9868 1.0141 0.9940 
2013 1.0150 1.0161 0.9167 0.9746 1.0169 0.9993 
2014 1.0143 1.0176 0.9306 0.9627 1.0184 1.0083 
2015 1.0163 1.0188 0.9343 0.9491 1.0216 1.0123 
2016 1.0256 1.0282 0.9348 0.9404 1.0322 1.0234 
2017 1.0270 1.0295 0.9489 0.9234 1.0353 1.0273        
       
Average 0.9905 0.9979 0.9055 1.0628 0.9854 0.9686 
Notes: This table presents the cost-scale efficiency for entire market and five sub-markets, which are 
non-life insurers, life insurers, Lloyds insurers, stock insurers and mutual insurers, for the period of 1996 
to 2017(except for Lloyds insurers). The first three can be considered as different business types and the 
latter two are different organisational forms. The cost-scale efficiency can be estimated by using the 
elasticity of scale formula (see, section 1.3.2), once the parameters of the cost function are determined. 
If the cost-scale efficiency score < 1, economies of scale (decreasing cost) exists; if the cost-scale 
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   Based on the results of the cost analysis, the parameters of the cost function can be used 
to measure cost-scale efficiency, as shown in Equation (1.4). Table 1.5 and Figure 1.4 
present the average of the insurers’ scale efficiencies over time. It is measured for each 
insurer at its own output level. As mentioned, a value of less than one indicates economies 
of scale, which means that the unit average cost decreases as the output quality increases. 
Otherwise, if the unit cost increases as the output quality increases, decreasing returns to 
scale (i.e., diseconomies of scale) exist. Column (1) in Table 1.5 shows that on average, 
the UK insurers may be scale efficient because they operate closely to constant returns to 
scale (scale = 0.99 ≈ 1). When considering different sub-markets, Columns (2) and (3) 
confirm that the non-life insurers are more closer to becoming scale efficient compared 
to the life insurers. In contrast, the Lloyds insurers operate at diseconomies of scale 
because their average score is more than one.  
 
   Figure 1.4 shows the movements of the scale efficiency over time. Except for the Lloyds 
sample, an upward trend in the cost scale-efficiency can be observed from all other sample 
groups. This finding potentially indicates that the insurers accept a higher unit cost as 
their output level increases. The 2009–2010 period is interesting because the changes 
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to operate at diseconomies of scale in 2010. Similar findings are observed in the sub-
markets of non-life (Column (2)) and stock (Column (5)). In contrast, Lloyds has operated 
at economies of scale since 2011 and has continued to operate at a lower degree of scale-
efficiency (i.e., a downward trend) since then. Furthermore, the life insurers comprise the 
only sub-group that always enjoys the benefit of economies of scale but with an upward 
trend towards scale efficient. Comparing stock and mutual firms, mutual insurers enter in 
the stage of diseconomies of scale four years later than stock firms, and on average, they 
have a slightly lower cost-scale efficiency than stock firms.  
 
1.4.2 Productivity Estimations 
   Productivity represents the efficiency of converting inputs into outputs. This subsection 
focuses on two aims: 1) to examine changes in productivity and 2) to decompose it into 
different constituent parts. First, Table 1.6 and Figure 1.5 present the changes in 
productivity of the entire market and different sub-markets. Overall, except for the life 
insurers, others suffer productivity declines on average, that is, more and more inputs are 
used to produce outputs. Figure 1.5 shows more fluctuations in productivity since 2008, 
with the insurers entering a stage of decline; previously, the index was relatively stable 
over time. It is also noteworthy that the Lloyds insurers show a contradicting pattern 
compared with others. They have had a positive productivity index since 2014, while a 
negative index remains for the entire market group, the non-life group and the stock group; 
prior to that, the positions were reversed.  
 
   Table 1.7 summarises the insurers’ productivity and its components. Studying various 
constituent parts helps in understanding how each component influences productivity. 
The results shown in Table 1.7 confirm that the life group (Panel C) is the only one that 
enjoys productivity growth and further reveal that the main driver is technical 
change/development. The results indicated in the other panels demonstrate that the 
negative productivity growth has mainly been driven by the decrease in the markup ability 
and the decline in technical efficiency, while some improvement has occurred in technical 
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Table 1.6: Total Factor Productivity for Different Sub-groups        
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Year All Non-life Life Lloyds Stock Mutual 
              
1996       
1997 0.1760 0.1378 0.3145  0.1637 0.1885 
1998 0.0446 0.0400 0.0765  0.0652 -0.0012 
1999 -0.0268 -0.0781 0.0837  -0.0539 0.0256 
2000 -0.1383 -0.1682 -0.0537  -0.0979 -0.2123 
2001 0.0858 0.0660 0.1489  0.1060 0.0503 
2002 0.0471 0.0508 0.0749  0.0672 0.0138 
2003 0.1091 0.0694 0.2546  0.1507 0.0316 
2004 0.0424 0.0648 0.0393  0.0600 0.0324 
2005 0.0885 0.0594 0.5317 -0.2694 0.1700 0.1227 
2006 0.0996 0.0317 0.6036 -0.0721 0.1533 0.0276 
2007 0.1001 0.0804 0.1248 0.0632 0.0795 0.1019 
2008 0.0724 0.0915 0.0561 -0.0141 0.1204 -0.0753 
2009 -1.1109 -1.6570 -0.0050 -0.0566 -1.7408 -0.0964 
2010 1.0361 1.9299 0.0932 -1.0631 1.9151 0.2363 
2011 -0.1533 -0.1943 0.0075 -0.1014 -0.1302 -0.3789 
2012 -0.3405 -0.5145 0.1329 -0.0230 -0.5022 0.0801 
2013 -0.5056 -0.6566 -0.5929 -0.0858 -0.0059 -4.6620 
2014 -0.6439 -1.1392 0.0409 0.0376 -1.0042 0.2934 
2015 -0.0249 -0.1003 0.1010 0.0575 -0.0633 0.0170 
2016 -0.7279 -1.3337 0.0903 0.0562 -1.0537 -0.1283 
2017 0.0061 0.0543 0.0363 -0.0078 0.0291 0.0818 
              
Average -0.1315 -0.2021 0.096 -0.1159 -0.1289 -0.1652 
Notes: This table presents the total factor productivity score for the entire market and five sub-markets, 
which are non-life insurers, life insurers, Lloyds insurers, stock insurers and mutual insurers, from 1996 
to 2017(except for Lloyds insurers). The first three can be considered as different business types, and the 
latter two are different organisational forms. The productivity score is estimated by using the Stochastic 
Distance Cost Frontier model with multi-output (see, section 1.3.3). If the productivity score < 0, 
productivity decline exists; if the cost-scale efficiency score > 0, it indicates productivity growth. 
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Table 1.7: Total Factor Productivity and its Components for Different Sub-groups 
Panel A: All insurers 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max      
Total Factor Productivity -0.1315 8.1800 -281.2850 286.7017 
Technical Change Component 0.0308 0.0161 -0.0170 0.0932 
Scale Component 0.0034 0.1648 -7.4217 5.2056 
Mark Up Component -0.1833 8.1870 -283.3449 286.7073 
Technical Efficiency Change -0.0170 0.0030 -0.0224 -0.0127      
Panel B: Non-life insurers 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max      
Total Factor Productivity -0.2021 10.1670 -273.7856 286.8146 
Technical Change Component 0.0425 0.0192 -0.0131 0.1033 
Scale Component 0.0024 0.4231 -23.3677 8.7202 
Mark Up Component -0.1801 8.0847 -281.8399 286.7179 
Technical Efficiency Change -0.0229 0.0049 -0.0311 -0.0151      
Panel C: Life Insurers 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max      
Total Factor Productivity 0.096 1.217 -23.923 12.636 
Technical Change Component 0.049 0.041 -0.197 0.227 
Scale Component -0.005 0.689 -29.351 23.731 
Mark Up Component -0.191 9.072 -355.796 286.593 
Technical Efficiency Change -0.032 0.009 -0.046 -0.018      
Panel D: Lloyds Insurers 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max      
Total Factor Productivity -0.1159 2.4346 -64.2118 8.2404 
Technical Change Component -0.0224 0.0646 -0.2481 0.3059 
Scale Component -0.0079 0.6216 -35.6765 7.3028 
Mark Up Component -0.1666 7.8275 -279.1986 286.0084 
Technical Efficiency Change 0.0320 0.0149 0.0129 0.0620      
Panel E: Stock Insurers 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max      
Total Factor Productivity -0.1289 9.6556 -277.2867 286.7546 
Technical Change Component 0.0384 0.0204 -0.0214 0.1062 
Scale Component 0.0043 0.1402 -4.3541 5.0541 
Mark Up Component -0.1835 8.1804 -280.8606 286.7478 
Technical Efficiency Change -0.0244 0.0054 -0.0333 -0.0160      
Panel F: Mutual Insurers 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max      
Total Factor Productivity -0.1652 5.0751 -127.9028 9.1447 
Technical Change Component 0.0436 0.0244 -0.0689 0.1391 
Scale Component 0.0038 0.4101 -15.0216 19.4308 
Mark Up Component -0.1876 8.3103 -297.5512 286.7891 
Technical Efficiency Change -0.0209 0.0043 -0.0282 -0.0141 
Notes: This table presents the total factor productivity and its components for the entire market and five 
sub-markets, which are non-life insurers, life insurers, Lloyds insurers, stock insurers and mutual 
insurers, from 1996 to 2017(except for Lloyds insurers). The first three can be considered as different 
business types, and the latter two are different organisational forms. The TFP components include 
technical change component, scale component, markup component and technical efficiency component. 
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Section 1.5 Conclusion 
 
   The purpose of this chapter is to provide a comprehensive analysis of the UK insurance 
market’s performance. The first part of this chapter (Section 1.3) has presented a detailed 
literature review on two main performance measurements – efficiency and productivity. 
It has offered a basic understanding of the potential applications of using these indicators. 
Second, the methodology section has carefully discussed various mathematical 
approaches and the choices of model vectors. Finally, using a large unbalanced panel data 
from 1996 to 2017, cost and profit efficiencies, scale-efficiency scores and productivity 
are calculated by employing one of the latest developed stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) 
approaches, that is, Kumbhakar, Lien and Hardaker’s (2014) model.  
 
   The results suggest that insurers have opportunities to improve their performance – 
approximately 40% for cost efficiency and 70% for profit efficiency. Nonetheless, the 
findings also indicate that both cost and profit efficiencies tend to remain within a 
relatively stable range over the study period (i.e., no significant improvements in both 
cost and profit performance from the past 20 years). Besides, evidence shows that the UK 
insurers may tend to put more efforts on cost management since the insurers’ cost 
efficiency is higher than their profit efficiency. After splitting the entire market into five 
sub-groups, the Lloyds insurers are in the leading position of reducing costs and 
generating profits, while the life insurers are in the lagging position.  
 
   Regarding the insurers’ cost-scale efficiency, except for the life insurers, the year 2010 
is vital because it acts as a break-even point. Specifically, on average, the entire market 
(except the Lloyds and the life insurers) started to operate at diseconomies of scale, while 
Lloyds started to operate at economies of scale in 2010. Moreover, the life insurers always 
enjoy the benefit of economies of scale. Except for the life insurers, other insurers suffer 
productivity declines on average (i.e., more and more inputs are used to produce outputs). 
By decomposing productivity into various parts, the results show that the decrease in the 
markup ability has mainly driven the negative productivity growth. These findings can be 
used as the basis of further analysis. 
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CHAPTER 2: The Impact of Underwriting Risks, Investment Risks and 
Relevant Risk Management on Insurer’s Performance: Evidence from 





   Insurers’ risk-taking behaviour has stimulated researchers’ attention because it concerns 
the financial interest of policyholders and insurers. This risk-taking is also a paramount 
concern of regulators because they must enhance insurers’ performance and stabilise the 
financial system. Insurers face specific risks arising from their business and investment 
strategies. This chapter explores the relationship between risk-related activities (risk-
taking and risk management) and firm performance in the UK market from 1996 to 2013. 
To examine the issues, both cost and profit efficiencies are used to present the firm’s 
performance. The ordinary least squares (OLS) fixed effects model and the dynamic panel 
model are adopted to examine the impacts of two risk-taking strategies (i.e. underwriting 
and investment strategies) on insurers’ performances. At the same time, the impacts of 
two risk management techniques—capital holding and using reinsurance—are further 
considered and embedded with the risk-taking strategies. 
 
   The overall findings confirm that underwriting and investment strategies are 
fundamental factors affecting insurers’ performance from both cost and profit 
perspectives. Analysing the impacts of interaction between underwriting and investment 
strategies on the insurer performance reveals that short-term investment volatility takes 
the dominant role in lowering cost performance. However, the benefit of diversification 
can overcome short-term investment volatility and enhance insurers’ abilities to generate 
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Section 2.1 Introduction 
 
   The primary task of running a business is carefully evaluating an insurer’s performance 
and disclosing the driving forces behind changes in performance because insurers who 
perform well can easily fulfil stakeholder expectations and maintain firm solvency 
(Cummins, Rubio-Misas and Vencappa, 2017; Eling and Jia, 2018). Among all 
performance measurements, efficiency analysis can present a more accurate and unbiased 
indication of an insurer’s ability and performance in a pool (Baluch, Mutenga and Parsons, 
2011). Lin, Wen and Yang (2011) also state that cost-efficiency significantly reflects 
whether risk management could improve firm performance. 
 
   To effectively perform insurers’ functions, enhance soundness and maintain a 
competitive position in the market, the firms’ initial focus should be to identify and 
understand the risks they face. Risks to which insurers are exposed can be classified in 
many ways, and different international organisations have provided various guidelines to 
clarify risks across different business lines. For instance, the Casualty Actuarial Society 
(2000) categorised risks for property-casualty insurers, into four divisions: obligation risk, 
mismanagement risk, asset risk and interest rate risk. The Financial Services Authority 
(2001) also set six dimensions of risks across UK insurers: market risk, operational risk, 
group risk, credit risk, liquidity risk and insurance risk. It was only recently that the 
Solvency II (2009 Directive) unified these various guidelines and categorised risk factors 
into the ‘life risk model’ and the ‘non-life risk model’. The five catalogues in the life risk 
model are persistency risk, mortality risk, longevity risk, expenses risk and morbidity risk; 
and the four catalogues in the non-life risk model are operating risk, market risk, 
underwriting risk and default risk. All factors in the non-life risk model also influence 
those in the life risk model.1 
 
   Traditionally, underwriting risk is a priority factor to consider in the spectrum of 
enterprise risks, as underwriting is the insurer’s primary activity (Baranoff and Sager, 
2011). Underwriting allows an insurer to remove risks from the policyholder in exchange 
for a premium. Stronger underwriting ability would potentially improve the insurer’s 
performance (i.e. gaining underwriting profit) and maintain its competitiveness (i.e. 
 
1 More details about the Solvency II framework can be found from Directive 2009/138/EC on the European 
Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) website: https://eiopa.europa.eu/regulation-
supervision/insurance/solvency-ii.  
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gaining market share). Unfavourable underwriting results may cause a high probability 
of financial distress (Browne and Hoyt, 1995). Underwriting risks arise when the sum of 
claims and expenses deviate from the received premium level due to accidents, errors and 
unexpected changes in circumstances, thus leading to uncertainty of underwriting profit 
or even underwriting losses. Thus, from the view of the technical process, Jakov and Žaja  
(2014) suggest that underwriting risks could be split into pricing risk, reserve risk, 
reinsurance risk and occurrence risk.  
 
   Product risks can also be treated as a branch of underwriting risks. For example, health 
insurance is riskier than the annuity contract in the life sector (Baranoff and Sager, 2002); 
homeowner and general liability insurance are more easily affected by external factors 
(e.g. underwriting cycle) than auto liability insurance in the non-life sector (Ren and 
Schmit, 2006); and insurers with diversified businesses can be more cost-effective than 
those with monoline businesses (Berger et al., 2000). Sharpe and Stadnik (2007) 
demonstrate that the mix of an insurer’s businesses influence the firm’s financial 
soundness. Therefore, production plans or business strategies are essential in an insurer’s 
underwriting and also play a vital role in a firm’s operation (see Baranoff and Sager 
(2002); Hardwick and Adams (2002); Hu and Yu (2015)). For example, Berger and 
Humphrey (1997) state that a bank’s profit inefficiency due to suboptimal production 
plans is much higher than its cost inefficiency; this is also true for insurance firms. A 
profit-inefficient insurer may write too many risky contracts or use inappropriate discount 
rates when pricing, thereby incurring excessive risk for both debtholders and shareholders 
in exchange for less effort needed to monitor policyholders’ risk profiles (cost reduced). 
This leads the current research to focus on the insurer’s performance from two different 
perspectives: cost and profit. 
 
      In addition to underwriting risks, according to Baranoff and Sager (2002), Lin, Wen 
and Yang (2011) and Zou et al. (2012), another type of risk that must be considered with 
underwriting risk is investment risk (asset risk). As there is a time gap between receiving 
premiums and paying off claims, apart from setting up regulatory reserves, insurers also 
invest most of the collected premiums into various assets to generate investment returns, 
which can fulfil stakeholders’ expectations.1 Hammond, Melander and Shilling (1976) 
 
1  For example, the investment return can be used to pay interests to debtholders and dividends to 
shareholders or can be treated as internal capital for future business expansions. There are even some 
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state that return on investments is important because insurer’s underwriting results are 
often negative. Insurers not only generate excess returns through investment but also bear 
a higher level of risk from market volatility, resulting in more uncertain underwriting 
capacity and firm performance. Therefore, even if a firm has profited from its 
underwriting activities, it is still unable to meet all its obligations due to poor performance 
from investments, which results in higher insolvency risk. The insurer aims to manage 
and control its insolvency risk at the enterprise level, and, thus, it must make a trade-off 
among different risks. For example, under the asset-liability matching strategy, the insurer 
adjusts its investment strategy based on the nature of its underwriting strategy. Insurers 
with a highly volatile business may prefer investments with a high degree of liquidity and 
a low degree of volatility. Zou et al. (2012) demonstrate that it is difficult and costly to 
modify underwriting strategies, since such adjustment exerts an adverse effect on the 
long-term customer relationships.1 From this perspective, investment strategies follow 
basic underwriting.  
 
   On the other hand, the insurer can also modify its underwriting strategy according to 
investment strategy, if the investment is costly and difficult to adjust at the time of market 
downturn. Thus, as stated by Hammond, Melander and Shilling (1976) nd Hammond and 
Shilling (1978), there should be interconnections between an insurer’s underwriting risks 
and investment risks. Therefore, managing these two risks is the primary concern of the 
insurer’s operations. 
 
   To improve customer protection, fulfil future liabilities and prevent unexpected losses, 
regulators and policymakers set up a series of appropriate policies or standards, which 
impose capital requirements based on insurers’ risk appetites and disclosing firms’ risk 
profile so that they may be assessed by the public. For an insurance company, the primary 
objective is to correctly specify types of risk taken from its operations and to use risk 
management techniques, such as reinsurance, to enhance performance and stability.  
 
   From regulatory perspectives, the primary objective of supervision is to strengthen the 
insurer’s soundness and maintain adequate capital levels for the firm’s number of 
 
products closely linked to investment activities, such as unit-link products, in which bonuses are paid to 
policyholders at maturity. 
1 Such as scaling down the liability amount by underwriting less business or changing underwriting criteria, 
which would reduce firm attractiveness. 
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obligations. Underwriting and investment activities automatically affect a firm’s liability 
obligations and lead to a change in required capital. For example, Zanjani (2002) 
demonstrates that insurer’s with more businesses exposed to natural disasters had more 
capital holding than others. Insurers hold financial capital to provide a future source of 
payments to policyholders when clients need to be paid if claims (benefits) are higher 
than expected and/or if investment returns are lower than predicted (Cummins and Nini, 
2002). Brockett et al. (2004b, 2005) and Kasman and Turgutlu (2011) also mention that 
holding equity capital could be a buffer against unexpected future losses to fulfil 
insurance obligations. Thus, the higher an insurer’s capital amount, the safer the 
policyholders’ compensations (Brockett et al., 2005). However, holding capital could be 
expensive because of the regulatory cost, agency cost and tax payments (Cummins and 
Grace, 1994). Still, insurers may face debt overhang problems if they hold too little equity 
capital because debtholders and policyholders are usually merged in the insurance 
industry, and this may further reduce a firm’s ability to attract new customers; it may even 
start to lose current business as it faces more insolvency risk (Cheng and Weiss, 2012a). 
External factors can also influence the use of capital. For example, regulatory pressure 
plays a crucial role in determining whether equity capital should be held or should be 
used to make a different investment (Kasman and Turgutlu, 2011).  
 
   Apart from regulatory capital building, an efficient internal risk management system 
can also help insurers enhance safety for policyholders after quantitatively and 
qualitatively identifying the risks in its business activities—but also by allowing insurers 
to accept other (or more) risks to achieve higher profitability. Froot, Scharfstein and Stein  
(1993) also note that risk management techniques could enhance insurers’ market values. 
Cummins et al. (2009) further point out that risk management decisions could be regarded 
as the consequences of external factors and that they provide insurers with an objective 
function to reduce their total costs. Smith and Stulz (1985) specify that risk management 
helps a company to reduce: 1) bankruptcy and distress costs, 2) financing costs, and 3) 
expected payments to stakeholders. They further suggest that using financial derivatives 
could manage investment risks to reduce costs, and this is confirmed by Clark and Siems 
(2002), Lieu, Yeh and Chiu (2005) and Rivas, Ozuna and Policastro (2006), who find that 
utilising derivatives can improve bank performance. Cummins, Phillips and Smith (2001) 
also suggest that insurers could use derivatives to hedge market risk. Lin, Wen and Yang 
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(2011) propose a study of using financial derivatives1 and reinsurance to manage insurer’s 
risk, as they believe that derivatives could be used to manage investment risk and that 
insurers use reinsurance to reduce underwriting risk. Froot and O’Connell (2008) further 
suggest that insurers are likely to use reinsurance when facing more non-standardised and 
difficult to assess risk exposures. Chen, Hamwi and Hudson (2001) argue that an insurer 
with solvency problems might like to use more reinsurance because raising financial 
capital would be too expensive. Thus, reinsurance not only mitigates policyholders’ 
concerns about insurers’ insolvency but also enables insurers to effectively manage cash 
flow volatility (e.g., pre-tax income volatility), maintain future underwriting capacity and 
enhance firms’ ability to bear risk (Doherty and Tinic, 1981; Cole and McCullough, 2006; 
Shiu, 2011). Moreover, Liu, Shiu and Liu (2016) note that reinsurance could also reduce 
the liquidity problem arising from asset-liability mismatch due to the nature of general 
insurance.  
 
   This chapter mainly contributes to ongoing studies on revealing the determinants of 
insurer’s efficiency (Lin, Wen and Yang, 2011; Biener, Eling and Wirfs, 2016; Bikker, 
2016; Eling and Schaper, 2017). The purpose of this chapter is to exam the extent to 
which risk-taking behaviours (underwriting risk and investment risk) influence insurer 
performance, while simultaneously considering insurers’ risk management activities, 
which are represented by usage capital and reinsurance. The expected results will be 
useful for policyholders, regulators and insurers to enhance understanding of the driving 
forces behind the insurers’ performance in the UK market from the risk-related 
perspective.  
 
   Then, several contributions can be made to the literature. Firstly, this study investigates 
the impact of both risk-taking behaviours and risk management activities on the insurers’ 
performance, but most of the extant studies only focus from one perspective (Lin, Wen 
and Yang, 2011; Biener, Eling and Wirfs, 2016). Secondly, it is the first study to consider 
the interaction effects between insurers’ risk-taking behaviours and risk management 
activities. It is worth to determine such impacts, because of the fact that insurers’ risk-
taking behaviours and risk management activities are often jointly considered. Third, this 
chapter responds to measurement issues and employs product risk, diversification 
 
1 Due to lack of data, it is not possible to test derivatives-related activities in this study; therefore, it will 
focus only on using reinsurance as a strategy to mitigate underwriting risk. 
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strategy and pricing risk as underwriting risk measures. This provides more detailed 
information on insurers’ underwriting strategies. Fourth, it is vital to consider the impact 
on both cost and profit efficiencies, as two efficiencies capture different information.  
 
   Moreover, the results confirm that both risk-taking and risk management strategies have 
significant impacts on insurer performance. Some impacts are consistent in both cost and 
profit models; others may have varied impacts across different models. In particular, by 
considering the interplay between risk-taking and risk-management (or between business 
strategies and financial decisions), the results confirm interacting effects that significantly 
contribute to insurer performance. This finding can help insurers devise appropriate 
strategies combining both business and operational activities at the aggregated level to 
improve performance. Regulators can also use the findings to establish regulations or 
standards related to insurers’ business and operational activities. 
 
   The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 develops this study’s 
hypotheses based on the empirical literature, and Section 2.3 briefly discusses the 
methodology and interprets the data and variables used. Empirical results are presented 
in Section 2.4, and Section 2.5 concludes the chapter. 
 
Section 2.2 Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
 
   This section reviews relevant empirical literature linked to risk-taking, risk management 
and firm performance. The business-strategy hypothesis (Regan and Tzeng, 1999) notes 
that the choice of product or business strategy is the fundamental decision for a firm, and 
it might be seen as coming logically and operationally before other operating decisions, 
such as investment, capital raising and risk management. 
 
   Earlier studies (e.g. Barniv and Rave (1989); Barrese (1990); Brockett et al. (1994)) 
reveal the relationship between performance (efficiency) and firms’ overall solvency, 
indicating a potential conflict in which solvency becomes the central concern of 
regulatory agencies and consumers while management professionals and investors focus 
on efficiency (especially in terms of profit). Later, Brockett et al., (2004b) indicates that 
solvency exerts little or no influence on efficiency. This is not attributed to the lack of 
importance of solvency, but is based on the fact that all regulators, managers, investors 
and policyholders pay serious attention to their firms’ solvency situations. Diacon, 
Starkey and O’Brien (2002) point out that solvency is positively associated with technical 
P a g e  | 59 
 
efficiency, where indicated customers seem willing to pay more premiums to high 
solvency ratio insurance companies. Shiu, (2004) also state that the solvency margin 
could be regarded as the driver of a firm’s (revenue) efficiency, as it indicates an insurer’s 
financial soundness. Insurers have a few options for managing solvency, such as through 
underwriting activities and business strategies, holding more capital and managing 
internal risk. In the following section, after splitting overall insolvency risk into risks 
related to underwriting and investment activities,1 the hypothesis concerning the impact 
of each decision on insurer performance is developed; meanwhile, the hypothesis about 
interaction effects on performance will also be built.  
 
   Regarding performance indicators, potential relationships not only test on cost 
efficiency but also profit efficiency. Cost and profit efficiencies refer to a firm’s cost 
minimisation and profit maximisation strategies, both of which are performance 
indicators. Compared to cost, Berger, Hancock and Humphrey (1993), Berger, Cummins 
and Weiss (1997) and Hardwick, Adams and Zou (2011) point out the advantages of 
considering profit as an indicator. Profit efficiency contains a much broader concept, 
which examines the firm’s ability maximise profits given a set of inputs and outputs, 
while cost efficiency determines deviations from the best-practice firms in the market. 
Specifically, profit efficiency reflects differences due to unobserved product/service 
quality because customers are willing to accept a higher price for better quality products 
or services. Thus, considering both cost and profit efficiencies reveals a possible situation 
in which some insurers may provide superior products/services by imposing higher costs, 
which can then be offset by higher revenues. Profit efficiency can, therefore, be seen as 
an overall performance indicator, which jointly reflects the effects of minimising cost and 
maximising revenues (Hardwick, Adams and Zou, 2011). Finally, Berger, Hancock and 
Humphrey (1993) further suggest that the insurer’s ability to control loss and manage risk 
can be reflected by profit efficiency because firms with better risk control techniques 
achieve higher risk-adjusted profit but not necessarily lower costs.  
 
2.2.1 Business Strategy and Underwriting Risk 
   In previous banking literature, many studies use loan loss or reserve items to represent 
riskiness in the banking business (Kwan and Eisenbeis, 1997; Deelchand and Padgett, 
2009). Kasman and Carvallo (2013) find a significant, positive impact of increased risk, 
 
1 Insurers faces both underwriting and investment risks, which simultaneously affect insolvency risk (Zou 
et al., 2012).  
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also measured by loan loss reserve, on a firm’s efficiency in Latin American banking. In 
a similar study in the European market, Altunbas et al. (2007) draw a consistent 
conclusion. However, these indicators do not adequately represent insurers’ risk, as stated 
by Hu and Yu (2015). Baranoff and Sager (2002) treat an insurance policy as a contract 
to identify the embedded riskiness of different insurance products. 
 
   Every product sold by insurers is in the form of a contract; the more explicit the contract, 
the fewer the risks taken by both insurer and insured. In general, life insurers mainly offer 
various types of product—pension/annuity, life and health insurances, life reinsurance, 
etc. As described in the life studies of Baranoff and Sager (2002) and Baranoff, 
Papadopoulos and Sager (2007), transaction cost theory, introduced by Williamson 
(1985), can define the risk level embedded in each contract or product. Based on 
Williamson (1985), three contract types are identified regarding: classical (low-risk), 
neoclassical (medium-risk) and relational (high-risk). According to explanations from 
Baranoff and Sager (2002, 2011) and Baranoff, Papadopoulos and Sager (2007), a 
product that is non-specific and occasionally sold (does not need to be renewed), such as 
annuity/pension products, can be treated as a classical contract. Annuities/pensions are 
savings-type products, similar to bank deposits but maturing at the owner’s death. 
Annuitants/pensioners do not need to meet specific underwriting criteria to obtain 
protection; the insurer’s primary concern is longevity risk1 (tied to age and sex). Life 
products can be seen as neoclassical contracts because they require underwriting criteria 
relating to individuals’ lifestyles. In general, life products have a longer term than 
annuity/pension products, if the trigger event does not exist. Thus, they may pose a higher 
level of risk to the firm if the force of mortality changes dramatically. Most health 
products are sold recurrently, and coverages vary by different conditions. The actual 
payments to cover medical or treatment expenses are hard to define due to the dynamic 
changes in medical technology and the difficulty of illness/health predictions. So, 
Baranoff and Sager (2002, 2011) suggest that health products fit the features of relational 
contracts. Hu and Yu (2015) find that taking more product risks, defined as health 
writings plus accident writings, damage insurers’ operating efficiency in the Taiwan 
insurance market due to extra cost or expenses for dealing with risky business, according 
to the transaction-cost hypothesis.   
 
1  Actuaries use a mortality table to predict the probability of death for different aged and gendered 
policyholders and to price products to reduce longevity risk.  
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   Types of business in the non-life industry are much more complex than those in the life 
industry. Non-life insurers can have business in many segments—motor, property, 
catastrophe, liability, personal accident, miscellaneous and pecuniary loss insurance, etc. 
For example, Powell and Sommer (2007) and Mankaï and Belgacem (2016) use 
premiums raised in catastrophe business to represent product risk. Choi and Weiss (2005) 
state that profits are lower in insurance companies with more personal lines of business 
than in those with more commercial lines. Sharpe and Stadnik (2007) find that 
international business might cause a higher probability of financial distress in relation to 
fire insurance.  
 
   Moreover, Cheng and Weiss (2013) identify particularly risky lines as: commercial auto, 
allied, earthquake, surety, theft, inland marine, fire, international, boiler and machinery, 
reinsurance and medical malpractice lines. Concerning the complexity of non-life 
products, Sommer (1996), Pottier and Sommer (1999) and Zou et al. (2012) use the 
premiums of long-tail liability insurance to represent product risk in the non-life sector. 
Bikker and Popescu (2014) reveal that issuing fire and motor insurance positively impacts 
total cost in the Dutch non-life market.  Froot (2001), Ibragimov, Jaffee and Walden (2009) 
and Upreti and Adams (2015) believe that motor insurance is less risky than legal liability 
and catastrophe insurance, which are more complex and less predictable. Most recently, 
Caporale, Cerrato and Zhang (2017) find financial loss insurance and marine, aviation 
and goods insurance to be the riskiest business groups with the highest default probability 
after the financial crisis, which began in 2007. They also stated that businesses exposed 
to catastrophes would be treated as risky products, such as accident, household and 
property, third-party liability, etc.  
 
   According to the expected bankruptcy costs argument,1 it is reasonable to assume that 
insurers with more risky businesses are exposed to a higher likelihood of insolvency and, 
thus, face higher bankruptcy costs. To reduce insolvency risk and avoid bankruptcy costs, 
an insurer would choose to either monitor or rebalance its portfolio frequently or adopt 
risk management techniques (e.g., raising capital or purchasing reinsurance).  
 
 
1 the expected bankruptcy costs argument is widely used to hypothesis the relationship between risk and 
capital (or reinsurance) building, for example, studies from (Baranoff and Sager, 2002; Baranoff, 
Papadopoulos and Sager, 2007; Shiu, 2011) 
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   The fundamental concept of insurance business is risk mitigation technique, in which 
includes two components: risk identification and risk management. Product risk, which 
is one of the nature factors originated from the insurance business, need to be identified 
and cannot be avoided, as it is directly linked to day-to-day operations.  Therefore, based 
on the nature of product risk and both transaction cost theory (Williamson, 1985) and the 
expected bankruptcy costs argument, this study’s first hypothesis is developed as follows.  
H1a: Product risk negatively affects cost performance. 
H1b: Product risk negatively affects profit performance. 
 
   For a firm, underwriting risks not only arise from issuing risky products but also from 
the insurer’s business strategies and technical processes (Bikker and Gorter, 2008; Jakov 
and Žaja, 2014; Mankaï and Belgacem, 2016). Business diversification (focus) is one of 
the key concepts relating to business strategies, and two types of diversification—product 
types and geographic area—are involved in underwriting activities. To be more specific, 
two hypotheses are used to explain the impact of business strategy on firm performance. 
Theconglomeration hypothesis predicts that diversification improves firm performance 
through economies of scope (Teece, 1980). In contrast, the strategic focus hypothesis 
predicts that insurers will be less likely to engage in unproductive business and only focus 
on one or a few profitable businesses (Berger et al., 2000). 
 
   Product diversification refers to the degree of concentration on an insurer’s core 
business, and, the lower the degree of concentration, the higher the product diversification. 
Adams (1996) mentions that product diversification can reduce an insurer’s underwriting 
risk. For example, an increase in life expectancy can be seen as a systematic life risk, 
which can threaten life companies. However, the degree of damage depends on the 
insurers’ business portfolio because the damage of annuity policy increases with 
longevity, while the risk of term insurance decreases with longevity. Thus, by producing 
economies of scale and scope, product diversification can also help the insurer realise 
efficiency benefits (Huberman, Mayers and Smith, 1983; Berger et al., 2000; Meador, 
Ryan and Schellhorn, 2000; Hirao and Inoue, 2004; Alhassan and Biekpe, 2016). 
Hardwick and Adams (2002) also note that more diversified insurers enjoy greater growth 
rates because of the economies of scope. Upreti and Adams (2015) confirm that 
diversified insurers have higher growth in product-market shares as they have the 
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advantage of accessing different distribution channels and reaching more potential 
customers. 
 
   Mayers and Smith (1990) point out that insurers might expose significant concentration 
risk (e.g., increasing cash flow volatility) if they focus on writing policies in a few lines 
of business, while higher concentration might also mean that insurers specialising in 
particular businesses should have better risk pricing and cost control techniques (Bikker 
and Gorter, 2008; Zhang and Nielson, 2015). In line with the focused strategy hypothesis, 
Bikker and Gorter (2008) find that monoline insurers (specialised insurers) have lower 
average costs than multiline insurers, but they pay out more substantial amounts in claims. 
This indicates that a diversification strategy would reduce firm value. Confirming this, 
Mankaï and Belgacem (2016) expect a positive link between business focus and overall 
risk-taking. Aligned with this result, Shim (2011) demonstrates that focused-firms might 
face more profit volatility but have higher returns on assets (ROAs) and returns on equity 
(ROEs). Cummins et al. (2010) also conclude that focus strategies are superior to the 
conglomeration hypothesis in non-life sectors, implying that diversification costs 
outweigh benefits (Shim, 2011). Findings from banking are inconsistent. Tan and Floros 
(2012) show that less diversified banks in China have higher profits, but this is contrary 
to the findings from Tan’s (2017) Chinese banking analysis and Goddard, Molyneux and 
Wilson’s (2004) UK banking study. Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) explain that the 
negative relation is due to stronger competition in the banking sector.  
 
   Similar to the business mix, an insurer with more geographic expansion may reduce its 
overall risk because of the benefit of diversification (Wheelock and Wilson, 2000; Berger, 
DeYoung and Udell, 2001). Berger, DeYoung and Udell (2001) also suggest that 
increased geographic diversification can lead to an increase in both cost and revenue 
efficiencies. Leverty and Grace (2010) find that insurers with a specified line of business 
(or geographically focused insurers) operate better. Shim (2011) indicates that 
geographically focused insurers outperform geographically diversified insurers, but 
focused insurers have more volatile profits.  
 
  Diversification strategy is another nature factor originated from the insurance business, 
and is closely linked to insurers’ operation. And it can also be treated as one of the risk 
management technique. Thus, as results from the prior studies are inconsistent, this 
study’s second hypothesis is based on the conglomeration hypothesis.  
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H2a: Diversification positively affects cost performance.  
H2b: Diversification positively affects profit performance.  
 
   From the perspective of the technical process, Jakov and Žaja (2014) suggest that 
underwriting risks could be split into pricing risk, reserve risk1 and two other risks. For 
example, insurers writing larger growth premiums face large amounts of potential future 
claims, and the rapid growth of premiums may indicate there is a possible mispricing 
problem (Caporale, Cerrato and Zhang, 2017). Both under- and overvaluing will be a 
severe problem for insurers, as they may be unable to raise sufficient revenue to cover the 
promised claim payments if policies are undervalued, and they may become 
uncompetitive in the market due to charging excessive premiums (Jakov and Žaja, 2014). 
Aligned with Akotey et al. (2013), Alhassan, Addisson and Asamoah (2015) indicate that 
high probabilities of high-claim payments reduce both the firm’s underwriting profit and 
overall return because of issuing high-risk business, and they find this damage is even 
more significant in the non-life sector than in the life sector. However, Alhassan and 
Biekpe (2016) confirm that the underwriting risk, measured by claim ratios, is positively 
related to both cost and profit efficiencies in South Africa’s non-life market. Based on 
this discussion, hypothesis three is formulated as follows:  
H3a: Pricing risk negatively affects cost performance.  
H3b: Pricing risk negatively affects profit performance.  
 
2.2.2 Investment Risk 
   Cummins et al. (2009) state that insurers may be regarded as financial intermediaries, 
who borrow premium payments from policyholders and invest the funds raised in 
financial assets—which is one of their most important activities for generating more 
returns. Insurers are highly involved with asset trading strategies; therefore, managing 
investment risk is at the core of insurers’ operations and asset-liability management. 
Cummins et al. (2009) also explain that asset-liability management was first created to 
reduce the asset-liability mismatch, which was mainly due to investment return volatility. 
Because insurance companies also invest in various asset markets to generate a well-
diversified investment portfolio, they also encounter other external risks related to their 
investments, such as inflation and interest rate risk, property risk, credit risk and equity 
risk. Therefore, the insurer’s investment allocations can be adjusted based on changes in 
 
1 Reserve risk is defined as the amount of technical reserve is varied from insurers expectation. It can cause 
either insufficiency reserve holding or holding too much reserve, which leads to extra cost.  
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the external environment. For example, according to the Association of British Insurers 
(2014), from 2003 to 2007, 35% of total funds were allocated into the equity market, and 
about 40% were allocated into the bond market. However, the total investment in the 
equity market was cut to less than 30% after 2008. Compared to the continuing trend of 
decline in equity investment after 2008, the proportion of investment in the bond market 
remained at the same level, yet with a higher amount of investment into the private sector 
debt market. Moreover, there was a significant increase in unit trust investment, from 7% 
of the total fund in 2003 to 18% in 2013. Therefore, these movements indicate that the 
insurer will modify investment strategies and asset allocations to avoid losses or to 
generate profits due to market volatilities, most of which are unexpected and 
unpredictable. Therefore, insurers will take time when making investment modifications. 
 
   In banking studies, Berger and Humphrey’s (1997) ‘bad luck’ hypothesis1 assumes that 
nonperforming loans might arise because of adverse external factors beyond a bank’s 
control, and they indicate that increased credit risk, which arises from those bad loans, 
will decrease firm efficiency because additional cost and more management efforts are 
required. This negative relation is confirmed by Berger and DeYoung (1997), but 
Fiordelisi, Marques-Ibanez and Molyneux (2011) do not find evidence to support this 
hypothesis. Still, instead of considering the firm’s credit risk, Mamatzakis and Bermpei 
(2014) find evidence to support the bad luck hypothesis from perspectives on default risk 
and liquidity. 
 
   Breaking the firm’s risks into internal and external components, Pastor (2002) also 
confirms that both could significantly affect a bank’s estimated efficiency. Based on the 
results from Pastor (2002), Pastor and Serrano (2005) further find that the impact of credit 
risk, influenced by external factors, could become more important and meaningful for 
profit efficiency than for cost efficiency. In Chang and Chiu’s (2006) study, value at risk 
(VaR) is used to measure investment risk, and they find that banks carrying a higher 
 
1 Originally, Berger and Humphrey (1997) proposed three hypotheses to reveal the relations between credit 
risk and performance in banking sectors. First, the bad luck hypothesis predicts the higher credit risk should 
lead to a drop in efficiency, and it assumes that bad loans are caused by external factors. Second, the bad 
management hypothesis assumes inefficient management causes bad loans; thus, it predicts that bad 
management of costs (low cost efficiency) will lead to greater credit risk. Finally, the skimping hypothesis 
predicts a positive relationship between cost efficiency and credit risk when banks do not allocate resources 
to monitor business application; thus, cost efficiency will lead to higher credit risk.  
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degree of VaR encounter decreasing efficiency. Sun and Chang (2011) investigate market 
risk and two other risk aspects, and they indicate that cost efficiency relates to these risks.  
 
   Because of the similarity between banks and insurers, the above findings may be 
reasonably used as references for the insurance industry and are also suitable for 
identifying the relationship between volatility of investment return and efficiency, in 
which most return volatilities are due to uncontrollable fluctuations in different asset 
markets or bad asset-liability management. Thus, if unexpected external events (e.g., 
external shocks) lead to capital market volatility, insurers may face higher risk in their 
investments, and they should spend more resources on managing this risk. Consequently, 
this can increase the insurer’s cost and decrease its profit. For the insurance industry, Shiu 
(2004) demonstrates that stock insurers could invest in relatively risky assets, such as 
equities, and this could decrease performance. Similar to Pastor’s (2002) findings, Huang 
and Paradi (2011) also find that both internal risk factors and external factors significantly 
impacted insurers’ efficiency in the Chinese insurance market from 1999 to 2006. 
According to the profit-incentive hypothesis, which posits a positive relationship between 
efficiency and risk-taking, insurers may want to engage in risky financial investments to 
maximise profit because high risk, according to the investment principle, means high 
profitability. Both Liang, Lin and Huang (2011) and Hu and Yu (2015) prove this positive 
relationship. However, carefully monitoring and rebalancing investment portfolios is 
essential when insurers make risky investments; thus, the cost of monitoring and of 
modifying assets may weaken cost efficiency. Thus, the following hypotheses can be 
proposed. 
H4a: Investment risk negatively affects cost performance.  
H4b: Investment risk positively affects profit performance. 
 
2.2.3 Capital 
   From early banking studies, not only portfolio risks, but also financial capital, were 
essential components of a firm’s insolvency (Hughes and Mester, 1993; Berger and 
Mester, 1997). The use of capital is vital from the perspectives of investors and insurers. 
Investors are concerned about the security of their returns, while insurers are concerned 
about the tradeoff between the costs and benefits of raising capital (Kielholz, 2000). The 
primary benefit of holding capital is security. Under the assumption that holding more 
capital allows a firm to run better, well-capitalised firms should outperform those less-
capitalised. Berger and DeYoung (1997), Kwan and Eisenbeis (1997) and Mongid, Tahir 
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and Hsron (2012) prove this, finding that banks with more capital operate more efficiently 
than those with less capital. Hu and Yu (2015) also confirm this result in Taiwan’s life 
insurance sector. However, by holding capital, insurers incur extra costs due to taxation 
and transaction costs. Thus, Kasman and Carvallo (2013) suggest that a decline in capital 
will lead to increased cost efficiency; this might indicate that the cost of capital is too 
high in Latin American banking, which was the subject of their study. A higher degree of 
equity capital may generate increased costs and prevent insurance companies from 
optimally using their resources. A mixed result was found in Altunbas et al. (2007). Most 
results were in line with Kasman and Carvallo’s (2013) findings, but capital is also 
revealed to negatively impact efficiency for the most efficient banks and co-operative 
banks.1 Therefore, the following hypotheses are developed: 
H5a: The capital level negatively affects cost performance. 
H5b: The capital level affects profit performance. 
 
2.2.4 Reinsurance 
   Reinsurance contracts are based on the expected underwriting losses of a pool of 
policies. Thus, insurers could reduce these losses by using reinsurance (Niehaus and 
Mann, 1992). Insurers take out reinsurance to increase their ability to write new business, 
stabilise earnings/spending, reduce capital costs and lower the probability of ruin 
(Doherty and Tinic, 1981; Doherty, Lamm-Tennant and Starks, 2003; Shiu, 2004; 
Cummins et al., 2008). Cummins et al. (2008) also states that reinsurance increases 
company value when the benefit of risk-shifting exceeds its cost. Reinsurance enables 
insurers to increase their market share (Upreti and Adams, 2015).  
   According to Donni and Fecher’s (1997) national level study, countries with higher 
reinsurance rates are generally high in efficiency. Investigating the average shadow price 
of financial intermediation and risk management activities, Cummins et al. (2009) 
suggests that, in general, insurers could lower their costs by leveraging both. Rochet and 
Villeneuve (2011) also demonstrate that cash-rich firms are likely to use insurance to 
reduce risk and are more likely to outperform cash-poor firms.  
 
   Although Liu, Shiu and Liu (2016) reveal that reinsurance could help firms increase 
liquidity, they also find an inverted, U-shaped relationship between them. In the EU long-
term (life) insurance market, a higher percentage of reinsurance is accompanied with 
 
1 Altunbas et al. (2007) split the sample into five types: all banks, commercial banks, savings banks, 
cooperative banks, most efficient banks and least efficient banks.  
P a g e  | 68 
 
lower mix efficiency (Diacon, Starkey and O’Brien, 2002). Shiu (2004) also contends 
that the purchase of reinsurance could substitute for capital and allow insurance 
companies to hold less capital without increasing their probability of insolvency, but 
reinsurance decreases profitability over an extended period due to reinsurance premiums, 
which may be expensive. Similar to Shiu’s (2004) result, Lin, Wen and Yang (2011) also 
find that using reinsurance is negatively linked to cost efficiency, indicating that 
reinsurance costs may be too high. Thus, the following may be postulated:  
H6a: Reinsurance negatively affects cost performance. 
H6b: Reinsurance positively affects profit performance. 
 
2.2.5 Interactions 
Interactions between underwriting and investment risks 
   Insurer’s underwriting and investment risks are not independent, and insurers may 
control the overall insolvency risk by adjusting weight allocation between these risks 
(Hammond, Melander and Shilling, 1976; Hammond and Shilling, 1978). Therefore, the 
insurer would like to simultaneously adjust these two risks in order to achieve a target 
expected return.  
 
   Two hypotheses can explain the possible interplays between underwriting and 
investment risk—the trade-off hypothesis and the co-movement hypothesis (Zou et al., 
2012). The former posits a trade-off (negative relationship) between two risks when the 
insurer’s total risk tolerance (overall insolvency risk) is limited. Hammond, Melander and 
Shilling (1976) support this hypothesis by studying property-liability insurers from 1952 
to 1967. In contrast, the co-movement hypothesis predicts a positive relationship between 
the two risks.1 Achleitner, Biebel and Wichels (2002) report that large insurers suffered a 
massive loss due to the events of September 11, 2001, mainly because of the high 
correlation between underwriting and investment risk. Baranoff and Sager (2002) test the 
relationship between the two risks and confirm a positive link. In the recent study, Zou et 
al. (2012) use simultaneous system equations to examine the relations, but they do not 
find any evidence to support either hypothesis. Based on the business strategy hypothesis, 
which assumes underwriting activity is the foundation of an insurer’s business, the impact 
on performance of the interaction between these risks can be predicted as follows:  
 
1 The co-movement hypothesis can be explained by two rationales: (1) two risks increase together if a firm’s 
maximum risk tolerance level is not fully filled, and (2) investment return volatility leads to fluctuations in 
underwriting (Achleitner, Biebel and Wichels, 2002; Zou et al., 2012).  
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H7a: The interaction between underwriting risk and investment risk affects cost 
performance. 
H7b: The interaction between underwriting risk and investment risk affects profit 
performance. 
 
Risks interacting with capital or reinsurance 
   Dhaene et al. (2017) state that insurers’ underwriting activities are closely linked to 
their capital structures through creating additional obligations and future uncertainties. 
Capital structure is also connected to an insurers’ investment activities; thus, insurers with 
more risky investments may be asked to hold adequate capital to offset the risk of 
investment losses. Under the transaction-cost hypothesis, according to Williamson (1988), 
insurers with risky policies or risky investments may try to hold more capital to respond 
to the higher level of risks and reduce insolvency risk. In turn, an insurer’s financing 
decision is also affected by risk-taking. If an insurer is well-capitalised, this might mean 
the firm has greater ability to take more risks due to its higher power of protecting itself 
through financial capital or greater risk tolerance. These points indicate that the relation 
between risk-taking and capital is positive, and this is called the ‘finite risk paradigm’ or 
the ‘capital buffer theory’, in which the insurer seeks to limit overall risk.1  
 
  In sum, if a positive link between a firm’s risk-taking and capital is assumed, then the 
insurer can adjust the firm’s risk-taking (capital level) according to its capital level (risk-
taking amount). For example, Zanjani (2002) proves that insurers with more business 
related to natural disasters would hold more capital.  
 
   According to Baranoff and Sager’s (2002) study, it is also important to recognise the 
difference between asset risk (investment risk) and product risk (underwriting risk), 
because this difference may lead to varied conclusions on their relationships with a firm’s 
capital. Separating the insurer’s asset risk from product risk indicates a positive 
relationship between capital and asset risk but a negative relationship between capital and 
product risk. However, Hu and Yu (2014) find an opposite result in the Taiwanese market: 
a negative relationship between investment risk and capital and a positive relationship 
between underwriting risk and capital. Some negative relationships between capital and 
 
1 Limiting overall risks implies that risk is increased in one area by reducing risk in another. Thus, a positive 
relationship between risks and capital is expected (Dhaene et al., 2017).  
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risk-taking have also been found in banking studies1 (Berger, 1995b; Jacques and Nigro, 
1997; Mongid, Tahir and Hsron, 2012). The excessive risk paradigm can describe the 
negative relationship, in which no limits posited in overall risk, as a lower level of capital 
is associated with a higher level of risk-taking.2 This can be explained by the fact that 
undercapitalised or low-franchise-value insurers like to engage in risk-seeking or risk-
shifting activities to generate higher returns (Lee, Mayers and Smith, 1997; Dhaene et al., 
2017). In fact, most of the empirical literature believes that the insurance industry 
supports the finite risk paradigm or the capital buffer theory (e.g., Cummins and Sommer 
(1996); Baranoff and Sager (2003); Baranoff, Papadopoulos and Sager (2007); Shiu 
(2011); Cheng and Weiss (2013); Kasman and Carvallo (2013); Hu and Yu (2015); and 
Mankaï and Belgacem (2016)).  
 
   Simultaneously considering the impacts of risk and capital on firms’ performance, 
Altunbas et al. (2007) tests relationships among risk, equity capital and cost inefficiency 
in European banking—showing that increasing risk and lowering capital can improve a 
bank’s cost efficiency. Kasman and Carvallo (2013) confirm this result in Latin American 
banking. However, Hu and Yu (2015) note that less product risk and an increase in both 
asset risk and capital level enhances insurers’ operating efficiency in Taiwan’s life market. 
Tan (2016) studies the impacts of risk on Chinese banking and notes that well-capitalised 
commercial banks and more diversified business (reduced product risk) achieve better 
profit performance. However, these studies only consider the effects of risk and capital 
separately on performance and do not test the interaction effects. This interaction 
indicates the trade-off effect between the cost of protection and the benefit of taking more 
risks. Findings from previous studies are inconsistent and unclear, and the following 
hypotheses in this subsection are built from business-strategy theory and profit-incentive 
theory, which state that insurers make operational decisions based on 
underwriting/investment activities, and they seek a higher return from taking more risks. 
 
   There are many similarities between purchasing reinsurance and raising external capital. 
The aim of obtaining both is to enhance insurer stability and underwrite new business, 
 
1 Jacques and Nigro (1997) use asset risk to investigate this relationship, and portfolio risk is adopted by 
Berger (1995b). 
2 The existence of external guaranteed funds (e.g., Financial Services Compensation Scheme (FSCS) in the 
UK), which provide external financial support to customers in case of insurer default, creates moral hazards, 
which can be seen as one of the reasons (Lee, Mayers and Smith, 1997). Dhaene et al. (2017) also notes 
that asset substitution could be another reason, due to the higher cost of raising external capital. 
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and both result in extra cost (reinsurance premiums and cost of capital). Indeed, according 
to the renting capital hypothesis, reinsurance can be used as an essential, off-balance-
sheet financing source for primary insurers (Mayers and Smith, 1990; Adiel, 1996; Stulz, 
1996; Dror and Armstrong, 2006). For example, as predicted by the risk-subsidy 
hypothesis, Lee, Mayers and Smith (1997) confirm that stock insurers tend to take more 
asset risks after the introduction of external guaranty funds. This supports the view that 
using (re)insurance extensively leads to higher risk-taking (Aunon-Nerin and Ehling, 
2008; Shiu, 2011). Further, Mankaï and Belgacem (2016) study the interaction between 
using reinsurance and risk-taking, and they confirm the preceding results. They also find 
evidence that insurers tend to use more reinsurance when they have accepted more risks. 
Thus, the above discussions for capital can also be adopted to explain the impact of 
interactions between reinsurance and performance risks. 
 
Due to the abovementioned interconnections between risk management, various risk 
factors (asset risk and product risk), performance and their complexities, it is worth to 
reveal the impact of the interactions on the insurer’s performance. 
H8a: the interaction between risk management strategies (capital or reinsurance) and 
risk activities (underwriting risks or investment risk) affects cost performance. 
H8b: the interaction between risk management strategies (capital or reinsurance) and 
risk activities (underwriting risks or investment risk) affects profit performance. 
 
Section 2.3 Data and Methodology 
 
   This section describes the empirical strategy employed to examine the impact of the 
insurer’s risk-taking and risk management on the firm performance in the UK insurance 
market. The SFA technique that is employed to measure insurance efficiency is first 
described. The database used in this chapter is built on information from financial 
statements of individual insurers, which included balance sheet and income statement, 
collected from Orbis, Fame and ISIS (or Insurance Focus) provided by Bureau van Dijk. 
The World Bank database is the main source for those macro-economic data. The sample 
covers at least 90% of the market capacity from 1996 to 2013. There is no requirement of 
data for all the years; therefore, unbalanced panel data is accepted. To ensure all monetary 
values are directly comparable, we deflate each year’s value by the consumer price index 
to the base year 2015. 
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2.3.1 Measuring cost and profit efficiency 
   In this study, insurance performance is measured by the Stochastic Frontier Analysis 
(SFA). More specifically, Kumbhakar, Lien and Hardaker's (2014) model is employed. 
The advantage of this model is that the composite error term is separated into four 
elements, namely firm effects, persistent inefficiency, time-varying inefficiency and 
random error, and time-varying inefficiency can be used to represented firm’s 
performance. The model is specified in Equation 2.1 as:  
y𝑖𝑡 =  f(𝐘𝐢𝐭, 𝐏𝐢𝐭, T) +  𝜇𝑖  +  𝑣𝑖𝑡 −  u𝑖𝑡 −  𝜏𝑖   
                                                                                                                     Equation (2.1) 
where y𝑖𝑡 is the total cost or total profit for insurer i in year t. 𝐘𝒊𝒕 is the vector of outputs, 
𝐏𝐢𝐭 the vector of input price and T is the time trend. The term 𝜇𝑖 is the heterogeneity effect, 
which vary across firms only; 𝑣𝑖𝑡 is the random shock (or statistical noise); u𝑖𝑡 is time-
varying inefficiency and 𝜏𝑖 represents the persistent inefficiency. The translog function is 
opted in here, and both Jondrow et al. (1982) and Battese and Coelli's (1988) methods 
can be used to find insurer’s inefficiency and efficiency score, respectively1.  
 
   In line with Fenn et al. (2008) and Yaisawarng, Asavadachanukorn and Yaisawarng 
(2014), companies are included in estimating efficiency, if they have positive values for 
all outputs and input price variables, since the estimation of the efficiency function 
requires that the input prices are strictly positive. As discussed, two types of efficiencies, 
namely, cost and profit efficiency, will be estimated. In order to estimate efficiency scores, 
the definition of outputs, inputs and their prices shown in Equation (2.1) must be specified. 
First, total cost (TC), excluding incurred claims in order to avoid confusion with the 
output measure (Fenn et al., 2008), is defined as insurer operating expenses, including 
underwriting and administrative costs (Berger et al., 2000). Total profit (TP) is the 
operating profit presented in a financial statement.  
 
   By following Berger and Humphrey (1992) and Cummins and Weiss (2011), the value-
added approach is adopted to define output factors. Net claims paid and total investment 
are chosen as output vectors (see, Klumpes (2004), Eling and Luhnen (2010b), Fiordelisi 
and Ricci (2010), Kasman and Turgutlu (2011) and Yaisawarng, Asavadachanukorn and 
Yaisawarng (2014)). For the choice of inputs, according to Eling and Luhnen (2008) and  
Cummins and Weiss (2011), most of the studies use at least labour and financial capital 
 
1 More detail of Kumbhakar, Lien and Hardaker's (2014) model and efficiency functional function are 
provided on Section 1.3.2 and 1.3.3 from Chapter 1.   
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and add a third category as input vectors. In this study, by following Fenn et al. (2008),  
Kasman and Turgutlu (2011), and Yaisawarng, Asavadachanukorn and Yaisawarng  
(2014), labour and business, financial capital and technical reserves are selected to 
represent insurer’s inputs. The ratio of administrative expenses to the total asset can be 
treated as the proxy of the input price of labour and business. Then, the price of capital is 
proxied by the ratio of ordinary profits to the sum of equity capital and total reserve.1 
Finally, the proxy of the price of the reserve is the ratio of total technical provisions to 
the total asset.  
 
2.3.2  The Empirical Model 
   In order to estimate the effect of risk-taking and risk management (capital building or 
reinsurance purchased) on firm performance and to test the hypotheses described in 
section 2.2, a baseline model is formulated as below: 
𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖,𝑡 = α + 𝛽1𝑈𝑊𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑉𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡                     
        +𝛽3(𝑈𝑊𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐼𝑉𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡) + 𝜑𝑖 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 Equation (2.2a) 
 
𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖,𝑡 = α + 𝛽1𝑈𝑊𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑉𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖,𝑡  
                    +𝛽5(𝑈𝑊𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽6(𝐼𝑉𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖,𝑡) 
                                            +𝜑𝑖  𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
 Equation (2.2b) 
𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖,𝑡 = α + 𝛽1𝑈𝑊𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑉𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑅𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑖,𝑡  
                         +𝛽5(𝑈𝑊𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽6(𝑈𝑊𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑖,𝑡) 
                                            +𝜑𝑖  𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
Equation (2.2c) 
where 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖,𝑡 , which is estimated by using Equation (2.1), is the cost or profit efficiency 
score of insurer i at time t. 𝑈𝑊𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡 is the underwrting risk measuments of insurer i at 
time t, and is used to test hypothesis 1 - 3. 𝐼𝑉𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡  measures the investment risk of 
insurer i at time t and relates to hypothesis 4. 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖,𝑡  represents the amount of capital 
holding and 𝑅𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑖.𝑡 denoted the purchase of reinsurance of insurer i at time t, hypthesis 5 
and 6 are tested by these two variables, respectively. (𝑈𝑊𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐼𝑉𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡 ) is the 
interaction term used to test hypothesis 7. Finanlly, hypothesis 8 can be tested by 
considered two interaction terms:  (𝑈𝑊𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖,𝑡) and (𝑈𝑊𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑖,𝑡). 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 
 
1 Ordinary profit is calculated as the sum of underwriting profits, net investment income and other income 
minus other expenses related to investment. 
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is a set of control variables. α and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 are the constant term and error term, respectively. 
The detail of definition for each of the elements will be decribed in the following.  
 
   In the first step of this analysis, the fixed effect estimator1 is used to wipe out the impact 
of time-invariant effect and to capture unobserved firm-specific characteristics 
(heterogeneity across firms).  
 
2.3.3 Dynamic Panel Model 
   An important econometric consideration is the issue of endogeneity, which originated 
from: unobservable heterogeneity 2 , simultaneity and dynamic nature of regressors 
(Wintoki, Linck and Netter, 2012). Although the issue arising from unobservable 
heterogeneity can be corrected by traditional fixed-effects estimation, the bias remains 
from the dynamic nature of the regressors (Nickell, 1981).  
 
   The dynamic panel Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) model 3 , which was 
developed by Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995), and Blundell and 
Bond (1998), is used to control the bias raised from endogeneity. This model, first, allows 
firm-fixed effects to account for unobservable heterogeneity; second, allows the present 
value of variables to be influenced by their past performance; finally, introduces a set of 
instruments contained within the panel in order to allow the dynamic nature of the model 
(Wintoki, Linck and Netter, 2012). The last point indicates that some historical variables 
can be treated as valid instruments to account for simultaneity, and then it may eliminate 
the requirement of external instruments. Further, Roodman (2009) suggested the dynamic 
panel model was suitable to use when there were fewer periods relative to more 
 
1 The null hypothesis of Hausman's (1978) test is rejected, suggesting that the fixed effect estimator is 
prefered.  
2 Unobservable heterogeneity represents the missing or non-constant firm/time conditions due to both 
internal and external changes (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Upreti and Adams, 2015).  
3 The Difference-GMM model, which is developed by Arellano and Bond (1991), uses the differencing in 
regressors. The DIF-GMM method specifies the model as a system of equations and it allows instruments 
(e.g., lags value of the endogenous variables) applicable to each equation to vary. However, the weakness 
of this method is that the lagged levels will be poor instruments if the first-differenced variables are close 
to a random walk. A System-GMM was modified by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond  
(1998) based on Arellano and Bond's (1991) model. They assumed that the first differences of instrument 
variables are uncorrelated with the fixed effects, and both lagged levels as well as lagged value of the 
difference are included in SYS-GMM estimations. Thus, these allow more instruments to be introduced 
and improve efficiency of estimation. In this paper, the STATA command “xtabond2”, written by Roodman 
(2009), is adopted. He summed up the above discussions and apply the “Windmeijer finite-sample 
correction” to the two-step standard errors that tend to be downward; this can make two-step estimations 
more efficient than one-step, especially for SYS-GMM. And the details of this correction could be found 
in Windmeijer's (2005) study.  
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individuals (“Small T, large N” panels) in the sample. Meanwhile, the relationships 
should assume to be linear, and the dependent variable should have a dynamic nature.  
 
   The two-step SYS-GMM is used to estimate the dynamic relations between the 
discussed variables and performance of the UK insurers. It has been indicated that the 
SYS-GMM is efficient to control unobserved heterogeneity and potential endogeneity in 
firm-level panel data (Upreti and Adams, 2015). To be specific, according to Roodman  
(2009) and Upreti and Adams (2015), orthogonal deviation is used as a transformation 
method of instruments in the SYS-GMM model to maximise the number of observations. 
In addition, in order to maintain the number of instruments used at a low level, thereby 
retain the power of Hansen test which examining the over-identifying restrictions, the 
maximum lag-depth of GMM-style instruments is limited with a ceiling up to the number 
of firms per model. Then, the collapsed form of the instrument matrix is used to minimise 
the number of GMM-style instruments (Roodman, 2009; Upreti and Adams, 2015). 
 
2.3.4 Data: variables definitions 
   Based on the hypothesis developed in Section 2.2, four key variables are required to be 
defined: underwriting risk, investment (asset) risk, capital and reinsurance. 
 
Underwriting risk variables (UWrisks) 
   As discussed in the hypothesis development section, three proxies are used to define 
underwriting risk in order to test Hypotheses 1-3. For Hypothesis 1, the logarithm of 
proportions of premium derived from the riskiest business lines (UWrisk1) is used to 
present product risk. By following Baranoff and Sager's (2002) study, the riskiest business 
in the life sector is health insurance. Thus the ratio of premium from health insurance to 
gross premium written (GPW) is used to proxy product risk for life business. For non-life 
insurance, due to the complexity of the product market, the sum of premium from 
‘property & liability’ insurance, ‘marine, aviation & transport’ insurance and ‘financial 
guarantee’ insurance is used to represent the premium arose from the riskiest non-life 
business (Sommer, 1996; Froot, 2001; Caporale, Cerrato and Zhang, 2017). 
 
   Apart from product risk, the degree of diversification (UWrisk2) is the second proxy of 
underwriting risks; and two types of diversification, business diversification and 
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geographic market diversification, are considered in this research. Herfindahl index1 
(HHI) is widely used to present the level of concentration from preceding literature, such 
as Powell and Sommer (2007), Shiu (2011) and Caporale, Cerrato and Zhang (2017). 
Although this method is popular to use, the number of observations will be dropped 
dramatically if HHI is applied due to data availability. Therefore, the number of business 
lines and the number of geographic business areas, which are more simple and direct 
indicators, are substitutes of the Herfindahl index. Consequently, a lower number 
indicates that the insurer is more specialized in writing a specific type of business or 
operating in a particular geographic location. Relatively, a higher number might mean 
that the firms prefer to build a well-diversified business portfolio.  
 
   The last underwriting risk proxy is defined as pricing risk (UWrisk3), which is arisen 
from the technical process. The expense ratio, loss ratio and combined ratio2 are widely 
used to represent this risk (Sharpe and Stadnik, 2007; Zou et al., 2012; Ng, Chong and 
Ismail, 2013). Here, similar to Lamm-Tennant and Starks (1993) and Eling and Marek's 
(2014) methods, the standard deviation of combined ratio with three-year rolling window 
is adopted to represent pricing risk3, in which a higher standard deviation indicates a 
higher volatility of balancing between outflow and inflow in the firm’s core business 
portfolio. Moreover, this measurement also corresponds to investment risk measurement 
in this analysis.   
 
Investment (asset) risk variable (IVrisk) 
   In several prior studies, the amount of investment in different asset classes or the risk-
adjusted items are used to measure investment risk, e.g. Pottier and Sommer (1999), Zou 
et al. (2012), and Hu and Yu (2015). However, due to data limitations, the detail of 
 
1 HHI is defined as: HHI =  ∑ 𝑆𝑖
2𝑁
𝑖=1 , where 𝑆𝑖 is the premium writtern for business line i (or geographic 
area i) as a presentage of the gross premium written (GPW), and N represents the number of different 
business lines (or geographic area). A higher the HHI indicates a lower level of diversification, the max 
value is 1. Then, 1- HHI represents the degree of diversification (the higher the number means a higher 
degree the diversification).  
2 The expenses ratio is calculated as the ratio of aggregate expense from operating and underwriting to 
gross premiums written. The loss ratio is defined as the ratio of claim (or benefit) payments to gross 
premiums written. And the sum of expenses ratio and loss ratio is the combined ratio. A higher combined 
ratio implies a higher underwriting (pricing) risk (Zou et al., 2012).  
3 Lamm-Tennant and Starks (1993) and Eling and Marek (2014) used standard deviation of loss ratio to 
represent the underwriting risk. However, when insurers price products in the technical process, they 
don’t only make assumptions on future obligations but also costs (expenses) arised from various 
activities, such as underwritting and operating. Then, it is reasonable to combined ratio rather than only 
loss ratio to represent the risk from the point of pricing. Zou et al. (2012) also used the combined ratio as 
underwriting risk indicator, as the combined ratio is the sum of loss ratio and expenses ratio.  
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investment in different assets is unavailable. Thus, the standard deviation of the ratio of 
investment income to the total investment is used to represent investment (asset) risk,1 
and a higher standard deviation means the higher volatility of return from investments. 
The advantage of using this proxy is to consider the investment risk at the aggregate level, 
in which investment diversification/concentration effect is taken into account.    
 
Capital ratio variable (Cap) 
   By following most of the previous studies, the ratio of surplus (equity) to total assets 
was widely adopted to represent the capital ratio of the insurer (Baranoff and Sager, 2002, 
2003; Ng, Chong and Ismail, 2013; Hu and Yu, 2015), and this proxy is also used in this 
study.  
 
Reinsurance variable (Rein) 
   The ratio of reinsurance premiums ceded to the net premium written is adopted by 
following Chen, Hamwi and Hudson (2001), Cole and McCullough (2006), and Sheikh, 
Syed and Ali Shah (2018).2 
 
Control variables 
   Both firm characteristics and environmental factors that affect an insurer’s performance 
are included as control variables and discussed.  
 
   Firm size is controlled and defined as the natural logarithm of total assets. On the one 
hand, large insurers are likely to gain benefits from economies of scale; on the other hand, 
large-scale operations can result in diseconomies of scale (Mahlberg and Url, 2003). 
Baranoff and Sager (2002) demonstrate that size plays a vital role in the insurer’s risk-
taking and capital holding. Also, by following Shim (2011) and Alhassan and Biekpe's 
(2015) studies, the square of size is also included to exam potential nonlinear relationship 
between firm size and performance. Worthington and Hurley (2002) and Eling and 




1 Standard deviation of return on equity, return on asset and its adjusted forms are often used as risk 
indicators, see Boyd and Runkle (1993), Baranoff and Sager (2011), and Cheng, Elyasiani and Jia (2011); 
however, due to data limitation, separated investment returns from different asset classes is not available, 
therefore, the investment return at firm level is used.  
2 The ratio of reinsurance premiums ceded to the gross premium written plus reinsurance assumed is a 
more robust measurement, as adopted by Liu, Shiu and Liu (2016) and Mankaï and Belgacem (2016). 
But, the amount of reinsurance assumed is not avaiable due to data availability.  
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   In addition, liquidity is also one of the main concerns of insurers since the timing of 
future payments is uncertain in most cases, and it represents the insurer’s ability to fulfil 
its short-term obligations (Mwangi and Murigu, 2015). Moreover, from banking study, 
liquidity is also treated as one of the vital driving force of the firm’s performance 
(Mamatzakis and Bermpei, 2014). Thus, a firm’s liquidity is closely associated with the 
firm’s operation strategy, such as business writing, capital structure, reinsurance 
purchased and further affects the firm’s stability and performance (see, Fresard (2010), 
Rochet and Villeneuve (2011), Liu, Shiu and Liu (2016), and Chiaramonte and Casu 
(2017). Chen and Wong (2004) also indicated that liquidity was one of the crucial factors 
in assessing insurer’s solvency. Firms with a higher level of liquidity might face less risk 
in case of an unexpected extreme event than those with a lower level of liquidity. Thus it 
indicates a positive relationship between liquidity and performance (see banking 
examples, Athanasoglou, Brissimis and Delis (2008) and Mamatzakis and Bermpei 
(2014)). In contrast, Adams and Buckle (2003) support the notion that insurers with lower 
liquidity have better performance because high liquidity could increase agency cost by 
providing insurers opportunities to misuse excess liquid asset (e.g. cash). However, 
Diacon, Starkey and O’Brien (2002), Mwangi and Murigu (2015), and Cummins, Rubio-
Misas and Vencappa (2017) find no relationships between firm performance and liquidity 
in various insurance markets. Here, the ratio of liquid assets to total assets represents an 
insurer’s liquidity. Higher values of this ratio mean that insurers face less liquidity risk.  
 
   Aside from the firm-specific control variables, business environment factors are also 
included to control external influences. According to Eling and Schaper (2017), six 
factors are chosen to control environmental (uncontrollable) effects on firm performance:  
economic maturity, unemployment rate, inflation, interest rate, stock market performance 
and competition.1 The economic maturity that is proxied by GDP per capita (or growth in 
GDP per capita) represents economic growth and national demand condition. The higher 
unemployment rate may also affect the insurer’s surrender rate and the demand for 
insurance (Eling and Kochanski, 2013). Inflation and interest rate are the fundamental 
figures need to be considered and predicted when the insurer develops a product and price 
it, and the incorrect predictions on these may lead to unexpected payment raised in the 
 
1 From Eling and Schaper's (2017) study, the country average of equity capital to total assets is used to 
represent changes in regulation among countries as the authors treat regulation as the seventh uncontrollable 
factors. However, we do not consider this factor as external factors because capital adequacy is treated as 
firm specific variable in this research.  
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future (Huang and Eling, 2013). The stock return is one of the key components in the 
insurer’s profit account, then the growth rate of annual average stock market return is a 
proxy of stock market performance. Competition, is used to control for the effect of 
market structure in the cost efficiency function, that is calculated as the cumulative market 
share held by the five largest insurers (five-firm concentration ratio) by following Pope 
and Ma (2008), Cummins, Rubio-Misas and Vencappa (2017), and Eling and Schaper 
(2017). In the profit function, the firm’s market share is representing the degree of 
competition. Additional to the above variables, underwriting income is added as the 
control variable in profit function, it shows how well the insurer operates its core business. 
This variable is determined as the difference between total revenue and total underwriting 
expenses. In general, the higher the value indicates that that the insurer is in a sound 
condition to generate more profit.  
 
   Table 2.1 shows the descriptive statistics of the firm-specific and market-specific 
variables used to test hypotheses. Then, Table 2.2 further presents the correlation between 
the discussed variables. The highest correlation coefficient of 0.72 is observed between 
Firm Size and Underwriting Income, and the correlation coefficient between Stock 
Market Return and GDP per capital Growth is 0.69. It may lead to the potential issue of 
multicollinearity. Then, the variance inflation factor (VIF) analysis is computed for all 
independent variables. The highest individual score is 3.31, and the overall score is 1.69, 
these are well below the commonly accepted threshold value of 10, see, Kennedy (1998). 
Thus, multicollinearity is unlikely to be a serious issue in this study. 
 
[Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics insert here] 
 
[Table 2.2 Correlation Coefficient Matrix insert here]
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Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Function Observations Mean Median Standard Deviation Min Max 
Cost Efficiency Dependent for Cost 5327 0.6173 0.6293 0.0908 0.0695 0.8572 
Profit Efficiency Dependent for Profit 4812 0.2908 0.3085 0.1315 0.0007 0.7971 
Product Risk Variable for H1 2698 48.6995 43.5000 31.7934 0.1000 100.0000 
Business Diversification Variable for H2 4991 3.1671 3.0000 2.1722 1.0000 14.0000 
Geographic Market Diversification Variable for H2 3548 2.4183 2.0000 1.8611 1.0000 17.0000 
Pricing Risk Variable for H3 8015 47.1398 0.2300 537.1321 0.0000 19006.3232 
Investment Risk Variable for H4 9207 0.3266 0.0052 4.7340 0.0000 218.4826 
Capital Variable for H5 9676 0.3164 0.2325 0.3322 -0.2118 0.9952 
Reinsurance Variable for H6 7796 0.7885 0.2198 1.9126 -1.4600 8.9709 
Firm Size Control Variable 10582 7.9375 7.9444 2.6649 -6.8330 17.4328 
Liquidity Control Variable 9804 -0.9286 -0.4577 1.3360 -12.9516 2.9571 
Underwriting Income Control Variable 4827 4.5387 4.5678 2.5269 -4.5890 13.2519 
Competition Indicators: Market Share Control Variable 8690 0.0025 0.0004 0.0091 -0.0268 0.1486 
Competition Indicators: Concentration Control Variable 27302 0.3379 0.3274 0.0383 0.2941 0.4667 
Stock Market Return Control Variable 26061 4.4597 4.6000 12.2281 -17.6000 20.9600 
GDP per Capita Control Variable 27302 24786.4277 25254.1595 1978.6242 20304.1784 27514.4982 
GDP per Capita Growth Control Variable 27302 1.5102 1.7447 1.7474 -4.9097 3.7706 
Unemployment Rate Control Variable 27302 6.0233 5.5900 1.2657 4.3220 8.1900 
Inflation Rate Control Variable 27302 1.9144 1.8891 0.8303 0.3680 3.8561 
Note: Cost and Profit efficiencies are measured by Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) with two outputs and three inputs; Product Risk defines as the ratio of premium from 
Health business (P&L, MAT and MR businesses) to Gross Premium Written for life (non-life) insurers; The number of business lines written by insurers is used to calculate 
the degree of Business Diversification; Geographic Diversification is calculated based on the number of geographic markets in which the insurer has business; Pricing Risk 
is calculated as the standard deviation of insurer’s combined ratio with 3-year rolling window; Investment Risk is the standard deviation of insurer’s investment return with 
3-year rolling window; Capital is defined as the ratio of Surplus to Total asset; Reinsurance is the ratio of premium ceded to the net premium written; Firm Size is defined 
as the natural logarithm of total asset; Liquidity is the ratio of liquid asset to total asset; Underwriting Income is the natural logarithm of the Insurer’s underwriting result; 
Market Share uses to represent market competition in cost function, it is defined as the ratio of individual premium to industry market premium; Concentration is the top 5 
firms concentration ratio, that is the control variable for competition in profit function; other market specific control variables include Stock Market Return, Unemployment 
Rate, Inflation Rate, GDP per Capital (in cost function) and GDP per Capita Growth (in profit function). To mitigate the confounding effects of outliers, some firm-specific 
variables are winsorized at 3% level at each tail and further take natural logarithm to ensure the distribution is normally skewed. 
 
 





Table 2.2 Correlation Coefficient Matrix 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
1. Cost Efficiency  1                   
2. Profit Efficiency -0.19*  1                  
3. Product Risk -0.13* -0.02  1                 
4. Business Diversification  0.11*  0.14* -0.16*  1                
5. Area Diversification  0.06  0.15* -0.02  0.19*  1               
6. Pricing Risk  0.30*  0 -0.22*  0.09 -0.05  1              
7. Investment Risk -0.03 -0.02 -0.13* -0.06 -0.06  0.12*  1             
8. Capital -0.05 -0.10*  0.15* -0.49* -0.05 -0.17*  0.16* 1            
9. Reinsurance  0.01 -0.03  0.04  0.01  0.08 -0.13* -0.03  0.01  1           
10. Firm Size -0.14*  0.16* -0.11*  0.39*  0.18* -0.29* -0.08 -0.17*  0.04  1          
11. Liquidity  0.12* -0.22*  0.04 -0.25*  0 -0.11*  0.04  0.24*  0.04 -0.18*  1         
12. Underwriting Income -0.09*  0.37* -0.11*  0.35*  0.16* -0.09 -0.02 -0.17* -0.03  0.72* -0.24*  1        
13. Market Share -0.19*  0.17*  0  0.21*  0.11* -0.18* -0.06 -0.07  0.08  0.55* -0.04  0.43*  1       
14. Concentration  0.03 -0.09  0.01 -0.05 -0.03 -0.05  0.06  0.14*  0.07 -0.03  0.09 -0.11*  0.06  1      
15. Stock Market Return -0.08  0.11*  0 -0.01 -0.04 -0.06 -0.05 -0.02 -0.01  0.02 -0.09  0.09 -0.01 -0.25*  1     
16. GDP per Capita  0.07  0.05  0  0.04  0.06  0.11*  0.01 -0.19* -0.06 -0.05 -0.08  0.05 -0.16* -0.42*  0.21* 1    
17. GDP per Capita Growth -0.07  0  0.01 -0.05 -0.02 -0.06 -0.11*  0.01  0.01  0.02 -0.01  0.03  0.09 -0.06  0.69*  0.21*  1   
18. Unemployment Rate -0.11* -0.03  0.01  0.02 -0.08 -0.07 -0.03  0.02 -0.01  0.02 -0.15*  0.02 -0.06  0.17* -0.03 -0.32* -0.41* 1  
19. Inflation Rate  0.02 -0.10 -0.05 -0.02 -0.03  0.06*  0 -0.08 -0.07 -0.01 -0.08 -0.01 -0.15*  0.01 -0.10  0.41* -0.07 0.29* 1 
Notes: The correlation coefficient between Firm Size and Underwriting Income is 0.72, between Stock Market Return and GDP per capital Growth is 0.69, raising the potential issue of multicollinearity.  
The variance inflation factor (VIF) analysis is computed for independent variables.  
And the highest individual score is 3.31, and the overall score is 1.69, these are well below the commonly accepted threshold value of 10 (see, (Kennedy, 1998)).  
Thus, multicollinearity is unlikely to be a serious issue in this study. 
* represent statistical significance at p<0.001 levels. 
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Section 2.4 Results and Discussions 
 
2.4.1 Efficiency Estimations 
 
   The annual means and standard deviations of the predicted score of cost and profit 
efficiencies are reported in Table 2.3. On average, the cost efficiency score of 0.619 
suggests that most insurers in the UK market spend almost 40% more on cost compared 
to the best-practice insurers. This score is mainly in line with Eling and Luhnen’s (2010a) 
result of 0.615, but it is lower than the average score of 0.90 observed by Fenn et al. 
(2008).1 For profit efficiency, the overall average score is 0.279. This indicates that the 
UK insurers, on average, only generate 28% of the profits attainable by the best-practice 
firms, given the same level of input price and outputs. This profit score is much less than 
the 0.69 result determined by Hardwick, Adams and Zou (2011). This difference can be 
explained via the use of different output vectors and stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) 
models.2 
 
   In line with the insurance findings from Gaganis, Hasan and Pasiouras (2013) and 
Alhassan and Biekpe (2016), a higher level of cost efficiency compared with profit 
efficiency is confirmed here. Due to this difference between cost and profit efficiencies, 
an imperfect competitive market can be suggested (Bos and Kool, 2006; Alhassan and 
Biekpe, 2016). Over the investigation period, a higher level of uncertainties is associated 













1 Fenn et al. (2008) determined the cost efficiencies from 1995 to 2001 for life, non-life and composited 
markets separately, and the average scores were 0.78, 0.94 and 0.99, respectively. Thus, the overall average 
score for the UK insurance market is approximately 0.90. Eling and Luhnen (2010a) show that, from 2002 
to 2006, the cost efficiencies for life insurers and non-life insurers were 0.64 and 0.59, respectively. So the 
overall avergae score is approximately 0.615. More detail regarding the predicted efficiency scores for 
different types of businesses can be found in Chapter 1.  
2 As discussed in Section 2.3, the efficiency scores are determined by Kumbhakar, Lien and Hardaker’s 
(2014) model, which has four components in composite error terms. However, Hardwick, Adams and Zou 
(2011) only consider the random shock and inefficiency terms in the composite term.  
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Table 2.3: Summary of Average Efficiencies 
 Cost Efficiency Profit Efficiency 
Year Mean (s.d.) Mean (s.d.) 
1996 0.6345 (0.0767) 0.2469 (0.1264) 
1997 0.6350 (0.0660) 0.2654 (0.1393) 
1998 0.6356 (0.0677) 0.2611 (0.1418) 
1999 0.6299 (0.0751) 0.2147 (0.1416) 
2000 0.6243 (0.0793) 0.2172 (0.1449) 
2001 0.6332 (0.0721) 0.2198 (0.1119) 
2002 0.6313 (0.0650) 0.2308 (0.1427) 
2003 0.6248 (0.0743) 0.2419 (0.1360) 
2004 0.6116 (0.0667) 0.3054 (0.1165) 
2005 0.6105 (0.0808) 0.3051 (0.1216) 
2006 0.6033 (0.0823) 0.3165 (0.1156) 
2007 0.6098 (0.0837) 0.3274 (0.1133) 
2008 0.6286 (0.0934) 0.3027 (0.1409) 
2009 0.6211 (0.0986) 0.3081 (0.1239) 
2010 0.6216 (0.1032) 0.3066 (0.1169) 
2011 0.6175 (0.0973) 0.2715 (0.1265) 
2012 0.6158 (0.0971) 0.3059 (0.1264) 




2.4.2 Panel Estimations 
   By following Goddard, Molyneux and Wilson (2004) and Mamatzakis and Bermpei 
(2016), the main regression model is estimated using both OLS fixed effect estimation 
and the dynamic panel Generalized Method of Moment (GMM) model. The former not 
only eliminate the impact of time-invariant effect and to capture unobserved firm-specific 
characteristics (heterogeneity across firms), but also represents the long-run relationship. 
The GMM model is used to address the potential endogeneity issue that may arise in the 
OLS estimation; meanwhile, it can be used to further estimate the dynamic features of the 
model, which is the short-run relationship. Therefore, a comprehensive story, in which 
variabilities existed between the long-run relationship and the short-run relationship are 
considered, can be provided by comparing the results from these two models. 
2.4.2.1 The impact of the underwriting risks, investment risk, capital and reinsurance 
Cost Function 
   Tables 2.4 and 2.5 present the regression results for the ordinary least squares (OLS) 
fixed effects and dynamic panel regressions, in which cost efficiency is the performance 
indicator. Consistent with Hypothesis 1a, which is based on both transaction cost theory 
Williamson (1985) and the expected bankruptcy costs argument, the fixed effects model 
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reveal a significant negative relationship between an insurer’s product risk and cost 
efficiency (Model 1, 8-10 in Table 2.4). Dynamic panel models provide further evidence 
of this negative relationship (Models 1 and 8-10 in Table 2.5). These results indicate that 
insurers writing more risky business have lower cost efficiency because monitoring or 
rebalancing the business portfolios can be costly in both long-run and short-run. Thus, 
Hypothesis 1a is supported. 
 
[Table 2.4: Individual Effect of Factors on Cost Efficiency – OLS insert here] 
 
[Table 2.5: Individual Effect of Factors on Cost Efficiency – GMM insert here] 
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Table 2.4: Individual Effect of Factors on Cost Efficiency - OLS 
 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7 M8 M9 M10 
VARIABLES Cost Eff. Cost Eff. Cost Eff. Cost Eff. Cost Eff. Cost Eff. Cost Eff. Cost Eff. Cost Eff. Cost Eff. 
                      
Product Risk  -0.0069**       -0.0099*** -0.0098*** -0.0104*** 
 (-2.332)       (-3.770) (-3.357) (-3.323) 
Business Diversification  -0.0009      0.0024 0.0015 0.0031 
  (-0.353)      (0.525) (0.315) (0.650) 
Area Diversification   -0.0073***     -0.0054* -0.0050* -0.0056** 
   (-2.882)     (-1.962) (-1.827) (-2.320) 
Pricing Risk    0.0052***    0.0092*** 0.0086*** 0.0066** 
    (5.026)    (3.942) (3.489) (2.389) 
Investment Risk     -0.1464***   -0.2090 -0.2229 -0.3622 
     (-6.419)   (-0.869) (-0.937) (-1.494) 
Capital      0.0056**   0.0088**  
      (2.391)   (2.585)  
Reinsurance       0.0022**   0.0064*** 
       (2.030)   (3.030) 
Firm Size -0.0061 -0.0328* -0.0533*** -0.0253* -0.0356** -0.0361** -0.0295 -0.0368 -0.0245 -0.0186 
 (-0.180) (-1.705) (-2.638) (-1.648) (-2.264) (-2.277) (-1.562) (-0.943) (-0.564) (-0.444) 
Square of Firm Size -0.0002 0.0015 0.0025** 0.0010 0.0014* 0.0017* 0.0014 0.0019 0.0013 0.0010 
 (-0.096) (1.506) (2.324) (1.224) (1.648) (1.869) (1.257) (0.876) (0.561) (0.443) 
Liquidity 0.0089** 0.0099*** 0.0116*** 0.0076*** 0.0079*** 0.0082*** 0.0087*** 0.0110*** 0.0101*** 0.0090*** 
 (2.576) (3.950) (4.006) (3.928) (4.028) (4.058) (4.610) (3.306) (3.123) (2.643) 
Market Share -2.3021*** -0.5382*** -0.2177 -0.3317* -0.4711** -0.5274*** -0.4731** -3.4221** -3.5150** -4.0007*** 
 (-3.328) (-2.912) (-1.296) (-1.949) (-2.426) (-2.676) (-2.248) (-2.480) (-2.487) (-2.716) 
Stock Market Return -0.0467*** -0.0301*** -0.0309*** -0.0235*** -0.0306*** -0.0357*** -0.0345*** -0.0309** -0.0314** -0.0259** 
 (-4.018) (-4.097) (-3.562) (-3.785) (-4.866) (-5.450) (-5.388) (-2.346) (-2.276) (-2.224) 
GDP per Capita -0.0086** -0.0076*** -0.0057** -0.0053*** -0.0041*** -0.0040*** -0.0053*** -0.0082* -0.0087** -0.0088** 
 (-2.175) (-3.172) (-2.200) (-3.559) (-2.976) (-3.041) (-3.803) (-1.911) (-2.015) (-2.029) 
Unemployment Rate -0.0034** -0.0025** -0.0024* -0.0015 -0.0001 -0.0006 -0.0011 -0.0043** -0.0049*** -0.0031* 
 (-1.972) (-2.106) (-1.829) (-1.124) (-0.079) (-0.527) (-0.960) (-2.390) (-2.717) (-1.653) 
Inflation Rate -0.0001 0.0008 -0.0001 -0.0026** -0.0038*** -0.0026** -0.0037*** 0.0001 0.0007 -0.0005 
 (-0.051) (0.564) (-0.033) (-2.212) (-3.194) (-2.283) (-2.883) (0.066) (0.374) (-0.225) 
Constant 0.9604*** 1.0061*** 1.0563*** 0.9355*** 0.9500*** 0.9415*** 0.9391*** 1.0882*** 1.0567*** 1.0190*** 
 (5.164) (9.435) (8.853) (13.080) (13.050) (13.701) (11.305) (5.346) (4.847) (4.794)            
           
Observations 1,067 1,966 1,389 3,022 3,029 3,295 2,801 822 784 723 
Number of Firms 285 490 381 637 636 648 601 236 219 214 
Adjusted R-squared 0.096 0.069 0.083 0.091 0.072 0.063 0.075 0.176 0.172 0.194 
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-test 5.17*** 6.56*** 6.64*** 11.32*** 14.12*** 10.11*** 8.37*** 5.69*** 5.46*** 5.81*** 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 2.5: Individual Effects on Cost Efficiency - GMM 
 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7 M8 M9 M10 
VARIABLES Cost Eff. Cost Eff. Cost Eff. Cost Eff. Cost Eff. Cost Eff. Cost Eff. Cost Eff. Cost Eff. Cost Eff. 
                      
L. Cost Eff. 0.4585*** 0.5106*** 0.5234*** 0.1872* 0.2821* 0.3056* 0.2827** 0.7119*** 0.3992*** 0.1497** 
 (3.106) (6.258) (7.050) (1.649) (1.716) (1.733) (1.968) (5.221) (2.688) (2.173) 
Product Risk  -0.0209*       -0.0079 -0.0115* -0.0198*** 
 (-1.692)       (-1.066) (-1.868) (-2.907) 
Business Diversification  -0.0019      -0.0102* 0.0081 0.0318** 
  (-0.449)      (-1.697) (0.644) (1.997) 
Area Diversification   -0.0035**     0.0186*** 0.0026 -0.0049 
   (-1.988)     (3.270) (0.520) (-0.654) 
Pricing Risk    0.0097***    0.0093*** 0.0085** 0.0080* 
    (3.343)    (3.799) (2.600) (1.872) 
Investment Risk     -0.3081***   0.5116 0.1149 0.4447 
     (-5.607)   (0.852) (0.308) (0.740) 
Capital      0.0146**   0.0016  
      (2.277)   (0.206)  
Reinsurance       0.0121**   0.0172** 
       (2.286)   (2.091) 
Firm Size -0.0216 -0.0363* -0.0325 -0.0316 0.0226 0.0543* 0.0530** -0.0132 0.0038 0.0697 
 (-0.463) (-1.735) (-1.610) (-1.016) (0.631) (1.846) (2.157) (-0.596) (0.105) (0.861) 
Square of Firm Size 0.0013 0.0020* 0.0020* 0.0016 -0.0023 -0.0023 -0.0029** 0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0039 
 (0.568) (1.802) (1.713) (0.958) (-1.180) (-1.611) (-2.547) (0.314) (-0.169) (-0.757) 
Liquidity  0.0076 0.0068 -0.0000 0.0099* 0.0148 -0.0086 0.0043 0.0117* 0.0062 0.0123 
 (1.043) (1.084) (-0.001) (1.721) (1.533) (-0.913) (0.670) (1.801) (1.372) (1.504) 
Market Share  -0.4949 -0.8287* -0.9640*** -0.8736 0.2100 -0.6178 0.5506* 2.0370 -5.4012** -9.9536*** 
 (-0.959) (-1.838) (-2.662) (-1.207) (0.334) (-1.238) (1.750) (0.878) (-2.202) (-2.648) 
Stock Market Return -0.0414*** -0.0181 -0.0114 -0.0293** -0.0211 -0.0024 -0.0265** 0.0010 -0.0335 -0.0507** 
 (-2.756) (-1.589) (-0.817) (-2.574) (-1.051) (-0.115) (-2.133) (0.053) (-1.371) (-2.095) 
GDP per Capita 0.0058* -0.0046** -0.0011 -0.0075*** -0.0014 -0.0018 -0.0021 -0.0041 -0.0076* -0.0087 
 (1.899) (-2.506) (-0.399) (-4.263) (-0.388) (-0.646) (-0.974) (-1.311) (-1.805) (-1.360) 
Unemployment Rate -0.0029** -0.0037*** -0.0044*** -0.0054*** -0.0062* -0.0047* -0.0014 -0.0061*** -0.0042** -0.0030 
 (-2.160) (-3.473) (-4.095) (-2.850) (-1.899) (-1.737) (-0.755) (-3.332) (-2.234) (-1.380) 
Inflation Rate -0.0058 0.0012 -0.0006 0.0000 -0.0087** 0.0025 -0.0011 0.0082 0.0015 0.0014 
 (-1.425) (0.375) (-0.203) (0.006) (-2.168) (0.760) (-0.660) (1.608) (0.448) (0.311) 
Constant 0.3849 0.6025*** 0.4829*** 0.9114*** 0.5503* 0.2312 0.2998 0.4356*** 0.6509*** 0.5715 
 (1.238) (4.382) (4.139) (4.419) (1.940) (1.071) (1.463) (3.163) (2.795) (1.636) 
                      
Observations 822 1,523 1,079 1,278 575 369 1,345 683 426 389 
Number of Firms 230 405 307 439 275 121 407 200 161 154 
Number of Instruments 41 85 85 134 90 86 56 68 128 90 
Robust Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-test 8.151*** 17.77*** 19.92*** 9.952*** 5.534*** 3.967*** 5.530*** 11.28*** 14.23*** 5.194*** 
AR(1) -1.815* -2.939*** -2.520** -2.636*** -2.115** -2.275** -2.852*** -1.701* -1.669* -2.626*** 
AR(2) 0.395 1.461 0.916 1.206 1.454 1.421 0.190 0.370 0.285 -1.694 
Hansen Test (P-value) 30.39 (0.446) 78.98 (0.324) 79.70 (0.304) 127.1 (0.381) 87.28 (0.245) 88.11 (0.143) 55.60 (0.134) 63.41 (0.155) 109.2 (0.556) 83.34 (0.214) 
t-statistics in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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   Regarding Hypothesis 2a concerning cost efficiency, two types of diversification 
strategies—business diversification and geographic area diversification—are tested. 
Consistent with the results from Bikker and Gorter (2008) and Shiu (2011), and in line 
with the strategic focus hypothesis, a negative relationship between geographic area 
diversification and cost efficiency is found in both long-run and short-run model. Thus, 
it is reasonable to confirm that insurers with more businesses allocated in different 
geographic markets do not have any cost advantage, if only considering the impact of 
geographic area diversification. Thus, this result does not support Hypothesis 2a. 
Additionally, from the point of product mix, the results, from both tables, are inconsistent 
and significant. For example, a negative relationship is shown when only considering the 
impact of business diversification, while the relationship becomes positive when 
controlling for other key interest variables. Thus, to reveal a true impact of business 
diversification, joint effects with other vital variables must be considered. (More details 
will be provided in the interaction sections). 
 
   Surprisedly, Hypothesis 3a is significantly rejected. Strong positive evidence, from both 
Tables 2.4 and 2.5, is found on the relationship between pricing risk and cost efficiency. 
Specifically, more pricing risk may enhance the insurer’s cost performance; this is also 
confirmed by Alhassan and Biekpe (2016). If this pricing risk comes in the wake of the 
insurer’s business nature (i.e., business types, by definition, being accompanied by more 
pricing uncertainties, or pricing issues always being the primary concern.), then the 
insurers may have already paid serious attention to these risks.1 In such a case, this 
underwriting uncertainty may benefit the cost structure through other monitoring 
activities, investment and risk management. This could explain the positive effect of 
pricing risk on cost efficiency. 
 
   As Hypothesis 4a expected, insurers with higher investment risk may face cost 
disadvantages due to the costs of asset monitoring and modification. It indicates that 
insurers who bear more investment risk may spend sources on asset monitoring or re-
balancing. This result is significant when investment risk is solely considered in both 
long-run and short-run (Model 5 in Tables 2.4 and 2.5). The negative impact remains in 
the other models after controlling for key variables, but it is no longer significant. 
 
 
1 Brockett et al. (2004b) also suggests that the impact of overall solvency on efficiency is either little or 
invisible. They explain that the firm’s solvency situation is given serious attention by all stakeholders. 
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   Because there are costs associated with using both capital and reinsurance, Hypothesis 
5a and 6a predicted that using them should negatively impact cost efficiency. However, 
the results of Models 6-10 in Tables 4 and 5 lead to rejecting both hypotheses. The 
positive impact from capital and reinsurance is confirmed, indicating that the benefits of 
risk-avoiding/shifting exceed the cost of using capital or reinsurance. It also indicates that 
cost of default is reduced by holding more capital or taking more reinsurance protections, 
then lead to enhance the cost performance. These results are in line with suggestions from 
Donni and Fecher (1997) and Hu and Yu (2015).  
 
Profit Function 
   As discussed in Section 2.2, an alternative performance indicator (profit efficiency) is 
also considered. The individual impacts of critical variables (underwriting risks, 
investment risk, capital and reinsurance) on profit performance are shown in Tables 2.6 
and 2.7—the fixed effects model (the long-run model) and the dynamic panel model (the 
short-run model), respectively. 
 
[Table 2.6: Individual Effect of Factors on Profit Efficiency – OLS insert here] 
 
[Table 2.7: Individual Effect of Factors on Profit Efficiency – GMM insert here] 
 
 
   Evidence to support Hypothesis 1b, which assumes a negative impact of product risk 
on insurers’ profit performance, can be found from Model 1 in both Tables 2.6 and 2.7. 
However, this impact is not significant when controlling for the other key variables 
(except for dynamic Model 10 in Table 2.7). This further confirms both transaction cost 
theory and the expected bankruptcy costs argument, from the point of profit containing 
broader information than cost indicators. The result indicates that insurers who issue more 
risky business may not generate more profit and achieve better profit performance. 
    
   In contrast to the cost-regression, the impact of business diversification is more 
consistent and robust in the profit models. An insurer writing different types of products, 
tends to have a better ability to generate profit; significant evidence can be found in both 
long-run and short-run models (see, Models 8-9 in Table 2.6 and Model 2 in Table 2.7). 
Meanwhile, both models confirm a robust positive effect of geographic area 
diversification on profit efficiency, contradicting the negative impacts shown in the cost 
models. It also indicates that insurers with more businesses across different geographic 
area may have better ability to generate profit. Therefore, by comparing the different 
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results between cost model and profit model, it is acceptable to suggest that the extra costs, 
arising from writing business in different geographic markets, can be overcome by 
geographic diversification. Thus, the results support Hypothesis 2b. 
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Table 2.6: Individual Effects on Profit Efficiency - OLS  
 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7 M8 M9 M10 
VARIABLES Profit Eff. Profit Eff. Profit Eff. Profit Eff. Profit Eff. Profit Eff. Profit Eff. Profit Eff. Profit Eff. Profit Eff. 
                      
Product Risk  -0.0047*       -0.0021 -0.0032 -0.0017 
 (-1.680)       (-0.804) (-1.187) (-0.613) 
Business Diversification  -0.0020      0.0127** 0.0132** 0.0118** 
  (-0.464)      (2.294) (2.302) (2.117) 
Area Diversification   0.0074*     0.0017 0.0017 0.0014 
   (1.802)     (0.337) (0.298) (0.289) 
Pricing Risk    -0.0019    -0.0008 -0.0009 -0.0010 
    (-1.547)    (-0.433) (-0.438) (-0.518) 
Investment Risk     0.0706***   0.2056 0.0905 0.1468 
     (3.763)   (0.675) (0.288) (0.447) 
Capital      0.0139***   0.0062*  
      (5.441)   (1.923)  
Reinsurance       0.0007***   -0.0617** 
       (5.148)   (-2.041) 
Firm Size 0.0929** 0.0504** 0.0509* 0.0266 0.0248 0.0175 0.0370* 0.0872* 0.1015* 0.0907* 
 (2.161) (2.135) (1.814) (1.254) (1.440) (1.107) (1.761) (1.889) (1.782) (1.805) 
Square of Firm Size -0.0050* -0.0024* -0.0029* -0.0016 -0.0015 -0.0008 -0.0023* -0.0050* -0.0060* -0.0053* 
 (-1.913) (-1.766) (-1.708) (-1.292) (-1.449) (-0.864) (-1.880) (-1.771) (-1.735) (-1.712) 
Liquidity -0.0021 -0.0047 -0.0071** -0.0105*** -0.0087*** -0.0105*** -0.0110*** -0.0028 -0.0020 -0.0023 
 (-0.430) (-1.323) (-2.151) (-3.755) (-3.241) (-4.040) (-3.936) (-0.607) (-0.450) (-0.492) 
Underwriting Income level 0.0184*** 0.0100*** 0.0155*** 0.0085*** 0.0084*** 0.0074*** 0.0094*** 0.0232*** 0.0238*** 0.0236*** 
 (6.496) (4.461) (6.303) (5.162) (5.137) (4.874) (5.881) (8.229) (7.223) (8.243) 
Stock Market Return 0.0906*** 0.0664*** 0.0788*** 0.0824*** 0.0868*** 0.0773*** 0.0768*** 0.0811*** 0.0859*** 0.0821*** 
 (3.802) (3.615) (3.807) (5.459) (5.726) (5.195) (5.007) (3.346) (3.313) (3.285) 
GDP per Capita Growth -0.0050*** -0.0041*** -0.0057*** -0.0044*** -0.0045*** -0.0039*** -0.0045*** -0.0050*** -0.0053*** -0.0052*** 
 (-3.609) (-3.620) (-4.552) (-4.740) (-4.835) (-4.203) (-4.718) (-3.319) (-3.287) (-3.299) 
Unemployment Rate -0.0053*** -0.0062*** -0.0069*** -0.0041** -0.0048*** -0.0050*** -0.0051*** -0.0058*** -0.0061*** -0.0062*** 
 (-2.665) (-3.570) (-3.675) (-2.582) (-3.010) (-3.561) (-3.600) (-2.848) (-2.618) (-2.969) 
Inflation Rate -0.0078** -0.0042 -0.0045 0.0014 0.0025 0.0028 0.0025 -0.0085** -0.0087** -0.0088** 
 (-2.307) (-1.576) (-1.504) (0.746) (1.292) (1.525) (1.292) (-2.246) (-2.235) (-2.258) 
Concentration 0.1356 0.1557 0.2704* 0.0548 0.0485 0.0560 0.0842** 0.3892** 0.4096** 0.4549** 
 (0.744) (1.191) (1.948) (1.335) (1.183) (1.443) (2.075) (2.289) (2.296) (2.564) 
Constant -0.1429 0.0152 -0.0100 0.1491 0.1667** 0.2010*** 0.1110 -0.2175 -0.2660 -0.2499 
 (-0.746) (0.135) (-0.078) (1.490) (2.082) (2.799) (1.116) (-1.087) (-1.099) (-1.140)            
           
Observations 1,263 2,074 1,575 3,082 3,136 3,363 3,204 1,050 965 1,018 
Number of Firms 346 550 440 674 683 708 675 294 280 286 
Adjusted R-squared 0.159 0.072 0.126 0.054 0.056 0.058 0.060 0.218 0.217 0.225 
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-test 10.85 10.85 10.85 10.85 10.85 10.85 10.85 10.85 10.85 10.85 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 2.7: Individual Effects on Profit Efficiency - GMM  
 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7 M8 M9 M10 
VARIABLES Profit Eff. Profit Eff. Profit Eff. Profit Eff. Profit Eff. Profit Eff. Profit Eff. Profit Eff. Profit Eff. Profit Eff. 
                      
L. Profit Eff. 0.0778* 0.1535** 0.0868* 0.0972* 0.0744* 0.0879* 0.1106** 0.0925* 0.1269* 0.1682*** 
 (1.654) (2.017) (1.859) (1.942) (1.651) (1.908) (2.378) (1.684) (1.937) (2.747) 
Product Risk  -0.0216*       0.0007 0.0009 -0.0169* 
 (-1.679)       (0.084) (0.135) (-1.678) 
Business Diversification  0.0426***      0.0023 0.0043 0.0067 
  (2.729)      (0.204) (0.440) (0.463) 
Area Diversification   0.0521***     0.0136* 0.0134* 0.0209** 
   (4.901)     (1.688) (1.715) (2.140) 
Pricing Risk    -0.0034*    -0.0014 0.0021 0.0013 
    (-1.683)    (-0.284) (0.583) (0.375) 
Investment Risk     0.1714***   0.1394 1.0090* -0.0380 
     (4.933)   (0.334) (1.901) (-0.051) 
Capital      0.0267***   0.0168*  
      (3.068)   (1.760)  
Reinsurance       0.0004** 
  -0.0724* 
       (2.105) 
  (-1.962) 
Firm Size 0.0814 -0.0312 0.0402 0.1038*** 0.1200*** 0.1105*** 0.1336*** 0.0168 0.0301 -0.1232 
 (0.796) (-0.451) (0.903) (2.740) (4.339) (3.471) (3.196) (0.292) (0.746) (-1.560) 
Square of Firm Size -0.0052 0.0006 -0.0041* -0.0072*** -0.0083*** -0.0068*** -0.0086*** -0.0010 -0.0019 0.0069 
 (-0.802) (0.161) (-1.666) (-3.430) (-5.531) (-3.932) (-3.698) (-0.287) (-0.819) (1.395) 
Liquidity -0.0188 -0.0040 -0.0158* -0.0002 0.0026 0.0032 0.0015 -0.0314** -0.0160** -0.0192** 
 (-1.460) (-0.474) (-1.848) (-0.032) (0.418) (0.562) (0.215) (-2.027) (-2.013) (-2.053) 
Underwriting Income level 0.0246** 0.0140*** 0.0170*** 0.0072** 0.0089*** 0.0089*** 0.0118*** 0.0200*** 0.0228*** 0.0195** 
 (2.466) (3.211) (4.480) (2.386) (3.088) (3.251) (3.449) (3.285) (4.542) (2.427) 
Stock Market Return 0.0711 0.1651*** 0.1697*** 0.1184*** 0.0998*** 0.1764*** 0.1522*** 0.1395*** 0.1303*** 0.1647*** 
 (1.586) (3.751) (3.752) (3.739) (3.124) (5.681) (4.528) (3.801) (3.405) (2.918) 
GDP per Capita Growth -0.0067** -0.0081*** -0.0118*** -0.0057** -0.0075*** -0.0107*** -0.0057** -0.0091*** -0.0064*** -0.0101*** 
 (-2.448) (-2.946) (-4.528) (-2.502) (-3.308) (-4.515) (-2.253) (-3.960) (-2.700) (-2.744) 
Unemployment Rate -0.0108*** -0.0067** -0.0108*** -0.0060** -0.0113*** -0.0074** -0.0048 -0.0141*** -0.0087** -0.0122*** 
 (-3.133) (-2.006) (-2.734) (-2.080) (-3.041) (-1.967) (-1.298) (-3.837) (-2.353) (-3.094) 
Inflation Rate -0.0092* 0.0041 0.0037 0.0089*** 0.0106** 0.0094* 0.0128*** -0.0063 -0.0073 -0.0098 
 (-1.653) (0.789) (0.592) (2.647) (2.260) (1.841) (2.796) (-1.130) (-1.496) (-1.311) 
Concentration All 0.8048** 0.2641 0.4335* 0.3366*** 0.1155** 0.4045*** 0.3145*** 0.9614*** 0.5584** 0.8805*** 
 (2.303) (1.223) (1.725) (4.930) (2.026) (6.005) (5.100) (3.624) (2.168) (2.860) 
Constant -0.2196 0.3428 0.0653 -0.1974 -0.1448 -0.2469* -0.3656** -0.1076 -0.0401 0.5708* 
 (-0.548) (1.138) (0.295) (-1.154) (-1.100) (-1.650) (-1.989) (-0.449) (-0.236) (1.846) 
                      
Observations 919 1,535 1,190 2,473 2,505 2,454 2,302 827 794 799 
Number of Firms 280 455 364 590 596 592 560 260 248 249 
Number of Instruments 93 152 122 192 210 234 201 141 185 101 
Robust Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-test 4.013*** 6.540*** 8.579*** 8.922*** 14.84*** 13.98*** 9.494*** 6.345*** 7.665*** 6.072*** 
AR(1) -4.826*** -4.753*** -4.681*** -5.784*** -6.157*** -5.868*** -5.919*** -4.608*** -4.213*** -4.346*** 
AR(2) 0.232 -0.817 -0.968 1.443 1.482 1.364 1.490 0.525 0.216 0.287 
Hansen Test (p-value) 90.38 (0.223) 149.8 (0.270) 123.5 (0.179) 201 (0.136) 218.9 (0.147) 246 (0.129) 213 (0.111) 124.3 (0.500) 163.9 (0.575) 91.89 (0.261) 
t-statistics in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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   As expected by Hypothesis 3b concerning the impact of pricing risk on profit efficiency, 
the negative effect can be found in most models in Tables 2.6 and 2.7. However, this 
effect is only significant in short-run model (see, Model 4 from Table 2.7), when pricing 
risk is solely included. It means that insurers who face more pricing issues may have weak 
ability to generate profit in short-run. And this weak evidence suggests that insurers 
always pay serious attention to pricing issue, as it leads to a harmful impact on profit 
performance. 
 
   From both fixed effects and dynamic panel models, there is evidence (see Model 5 in 
Tables 2.6 and 2.7) to support the profit-incentive hypothesis (Hypothesis 4b), which 
indicates that insurers are willing to use more aggressive investment strategies to achieve 
the goal of generating higher profits in both long-run and short-run. These results oppose 
those from the cost models. However, a positive impact is no longer significant after 
controlling for other key variables (except Model 9 in Table 2.7). Thus, Hypothesis 4b is 
supported, but the joint effects with other key factors must be considered. (More details 
will be provided in the interaction sections). 
 
   Models 6 and 9 in Tables 2.6 and 2.7 confirm that insurers with more capital are more 
profit efficient, and this is in line with the results of the cost model. The positive effect 
from the profit model further indicates that capital potentially helps insurers expand their 
underwriting abilities and receive higher levels of underwriting income. Regarding 
reinsurance, in both long-run and short-run models, there is a positive relationship 
between reinsurance and profit performance when the reinsurance variable is solely 
considered (Model 7). The positive result indicates that insurers can use reinsurance to 
mitigate exposures and to generate more profit. However, the conflicted result (a negative 
coefficient) is appeared after considering for other key variables (Model 10). That 
indicates the joint effects with other key factors must be considered.  
 
   The findings above show that underwriting risks, investment risks and risk management 
(capital and reinsurance) are significant determinants of UK insurers’ cost and profit 
performance between 1996 and 2013. Insurers can make operational decisions on these 
factors to adjust their performance. Apart from these individual effects raised from the 
sole variables, further investigations on the impacts of interaction terms (underwriting 
risks interacting with investment risk, both interacting with capital, and risk factors 
interacting with reinsurance) are also shown in the following sections. 




2.4.2.2 The impact of interaction with investment risk 
Cost Function 
   Table 2.8 presents the OLS fixed effects model, and estimations from the dynamic panel 
model are shown in Table 2.9. Both tables disclose the potential impact of interactions 
between underwriting risk and investment risk on an insurer’s cost efficiency. On average, 
the negative impact of investment risk can be confirmed by the results shown in both 
tables, and this is consistent with the findings in Tables 2.4 and 2.5. It confirms that 
insurers who have more risky asset may face cost disadvantages. Also, all the interaction 
impacts are significant in Table 2.9, which indicates that insurers do consider two types 
of risks together in the short-run mainly. 
 
   To be more specific, Model 1 in Tables 2.8 and 2.9 reveals the potential impacts related 
to the insurer’s product risk. It confirms that the product risk negatively impacts insurers’ 
cost efficiency. It further confirms that insurers issuing more risky businesses have lower 
cost efficiency. Surprisingly, the interaction term shows a significant positive impact, 
which may indicate that the insurer does consider investment decision based on pre-
determined underwriting strategies in the short-run, but it is unclear why the interaction 
effect is positive for cost performance. However, a potential explanation can be made 
based on the trade-off hypothesis, which assumes that the insurer’s overall risk is 
restricted. Then, by considering this together with transaction cost theory, the insurer may 
have more cost advantages when total risk tolerance is limited.  
    
   The negative interaction impacts are found in both diversification models (Models 2 
and 3) at the 10% level in short-run (Table 2.9). These results reveal that interacted 
impacts are varied. To be more specific, insurers who have more diversified businesses 
and aggressive investment strategies would have lower cost efficiency becasue the cost 
of taking investment risk offsets the benefit of business diversification. On the other hand, 
the aggressive investment strategies would amplify the adverse effects of geographic 
diversification.  
 
   Inconsistent impacts of the interaction between pricing risk and investment risk on cost 
efficiency are found in the long-run model (Table 2.8) and the short-run model (Table 
2.9). Model 4 in Table 2.8 shows a positive effect, which indicates that the insurer may 
take a reasonable level of investment risk, which can benefit its cost structure after its 
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financial decisions are continuously adjusted in the long-run. On the other hand, the 
adverse impact of taking more investment risk may take the dominant role in the short-
run.  
 
[Table 2.8: Interaction Effects with Investment risk on Cost Efficiency – OLS insert here] 
 
[Table 2.9: Interaction Effects with Investment risk on Cost Efficiency – GMM insert here] 
 
 
Table 2.8:  Interaction Effects with Investment Risk on Cost Efficiency - OLS  
 M1 M2 M3 M4 
VARIABLES Cost Eff. Cost Eff. Cost Eff. Cost Eff. 
          
Investment Risk -0.3608 -0.0229 -0.0245 -0.1218*** 
 (-1.442) (-0.194) (-0.126) (-6.206) 
Product Risk  -0.0075**    
 (-2.239)    
Product Risk * Investment Risk   0.0633    
 (0.623)    
Business Diversification  -0.0004   
  (-0.135)   
Diversified Business * Investment Risk    -0.1558   
  (-1.361)   
Area Diversification   -0.0069**  
   (-2.368)  
Diversified Area * Investment Risk     -0.1154  
   (-0.707)  
Pricing Risk    0.0049*** 
    (4.885) 
Pricing Risk * Investment Risk      0.0344*** 
    (2.674) 
Firm Size -0.0051 -0.0340* -0.0551*** -0.0277* 
 (-0.132) (-1.660) (-2.753) (-1.831) 
Square of Firm Size -0.0001 0.0016 0.0025** 0.0010 
 (-0.057) (1.498) (2.429) (1.308) 
Liquidity  0.0087** 0.0099*** 0.0114*** 0.0075*** 
 (2.440) (3.864) (3.839) (3.874) 
Market Share  -2.5070*** -0.6399** -0.2112 -0.3457** 
 (-3.026) (-2.582) (-0.746) (-2.056) 
Stock Market Return -0.0471*** -0.0294*** -0.0307*** -0.0251*** 
 (-3.830) (-3.838) (-3.356) (-4.110) 
GDP per Capita -0.0090** -0.0078*** -0.0055* -0.0052*** 
 (-2.187) (-3.114) (-1.930) (-3.697) 
Unemployment Rate -0.0038** -0.0027** -0.0026* -0.0014 
 (-2.079) (-2.160) (-1.784) (-1.082) 
Inflation Rate -0.0001 0.0005 -0.0002 -0.0026** 
 (-0.058) (0.342) (-0.098) (-2.250) 
Constant 0.9622*** 1.0182*** 1.0620*** 0.9501*** 
 (4.644) (8.944) (8.801) (13.426) 
     
     
Observations 1,009 1,858 1,334 3,009 
Number of Firms 279 477 371 632 
Adjusted R-squared 0.092 0.070 0.083 0.103 
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-test 4.25*** 4.95*** 5.39*** 17.83*** 









Table 2.9:  Interaction Effects with Investment Risk on Cost Efficiency - GMM 
  M1 M2 M3 M4 
VARIABLES Cost Eff. Cost Eff. Cost Eff. Cost Eff. 
          
L. Cost Eff. 0.6880*** 0.7653*** 0.5923*** 0.4420** 
 (4.954) (3.319) (7.796) (2.524) 
Investment Risk -3.4788** -0.4765 0.8973* -0.1782*** 
 (-2.090) (-1.002) (1.955) (-2.825) 
Product Risk  -0.0076    
 (-1.399)    
Product Risk * Investment Risk   1.0875**    
 (2.553)    
Business Diversification  0.0198*   
  (1.689)   
Diversified Business * Investment Risk    -0.9531*   
  (-1.659)   
Area Diversification   -0.0045  
   (-0.840)  
Diversified Area * Investment Risk     -0.6556*  
   (-1.695)  
Pricing Risk    0.0103*** 
    (2.906) 
Pricing Risk * Investment Risk      -0.2675* 
    (-1.812) 
Firm Size -0.0005 -0.0451 0.0044 0.0186 
 (-0.036) (-1.045) (0.158) (0.518) 
Square of Firm Size 0.0002 0.0025 -0.0001 -0.0010 
 (0.295) (1.029) (-0.043) (-0.504) 
Liquidity  0.0097* 0.0124 0.0075 0.0052 
 (1.653) (1.114) (1.298) (0.600) 
Market Share  -0.8160 -1.4985* 0.6743 1.3158 
 (-1.422) (-1.736) (0.513) (1.440) 
Stock Market Return -0.0441** -0.0495** -0.0143 -0.0236* 
 (-2.095) (-2.573) (-0.947) (-1.794) 
GDP per Capita -0.0009 -0.0027 -0.0073* -0.0014 
 (-0.287) (-0.508) (-1.695) (-0.622) 
Unemployment Rate -0.0060*** -0.0034 -0.0044*** 0.0007 
 (-4.055) (-1.587) (-2.764) (0.406) 
Inflation Rate 0.0009 -0.0025 0.0055* -0.0046** 
 (0.317) (-0.788) (1.743) (-2.185) 
Constant 0.2765 0.4589 0.4224*** 0.3312 
 (1.616) (1.120) (2.608) (1.146)      
     
Observations 834 333 1,101 1,274 
Number of Firms 236 178 315 436 
Number of Instruments 143 90 109 78 
Robust Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-test 15.60*** 8.672*** 10.86*** 8.234*** 
AR(1) -1.965** -2.532** -2.433** -2.795*** 
AR(2) 0.603 1.311 0.803 1.554 
Hansen Test (P-value) 134.1 (0.385) 85.61 (0.235) 99.75 (0.376) 57 (0.750) 














   The results of the interaction impacts on profit performance are shown in Tables 2.10 
and 2.11—the fixed effects (long-run) and dynamic panel (short-run) models, 
respectively. The significant impacts of all interaction terms found in the dynamic models 
further confirm that insurers do consider both underwriting strategies and financial 
decisions in the short-run. Further, by imposing financial decisions together with 
underwriting strategies, the amplified effect of investment risk is confirmed. 
 
   To be more specific, the interaction between product risk and investment risk hurts the 
insurer’s profit performance (Model 1 in Table 2.11). This result is logical and reasonable. 
Based on the profit incentive hypothesis, the insurer’s overall risk level increases when 
seeking more returns. As a result, it imposes further uncertainties for generating short-
term profit as the risk level increased. This logic is also true for the insurer bearing pricing 
risk, and the negative interaction effect found in Model 4 in Table 2.11 further proves the 
above explanation from profit viewpoint.  
 
   Regarding two diversification strategies, individual impacts align with the previous 
findings in Tables 2.6 and 2.7. The positive interaction effects suggest that an insurer, 
who is more diversified and willing to take more investment risk, will have better profit 
performance in short-run only (see, Table 2.11). It indicates that the benefit of 
diversification is offset the harmful effect raised from holding risky asset.  Moreover, 
there is an amplified effect of taking more investment risk, as the magnitude of interaction 
effects is more extensive than individual effects (Models 2 and 3 in Table 2.11). 
 
 
[Table 2.10: Interaction Effects with Investment risk on Profit Efficiency – OLS insert 
here] 
 















Table 2.10:  Interaction Effects with Investment Risk on Profit Efficiency - OLS 
 M1 M2 M3 M4 
VARIABLES Profit Eff. Profit Eff. Profit Eff. Profit Eff. 
          
Investment Risk 2.2371* -0.0903 0.0327 0.0404 
 (1.692) (-0.540) (0.107) (0.578) 
Product Risk  0.0017    
 (0.470)    
Product Risk * Investment Risk   -0.5683    
 (-1.527)    
Business Diversification  -0.0015   
  (-0.348)   
Diversified Business * Investment Risk    0.0401   
  (0.257)   
Area Diversification   0.0076*  
   (1.663)  
Diversified Area * Investment Risk     -0.0776  
   (-0.444)  
Pricing Risk    -0.0015 
    (-1.239) 
Pricing Risk * Investment Risk      -0.0113 
    (-0.426) 
Firm Size 0.1037** 0.0514** 0.0430 0.0250 
 (2.355) (2.083) (1.464) (1.176) 
Square of Firm Size -0.0056** -0.0025* -0.0024 -0.0015 
 (-2.061) (-1.753) (-1.362) (-1.208) 
Liquidity  -0.0016 -0.0059* -0.0066* -0.0099*** 
 (-0.323) (-1.668) (-1.920) (-3.549) 
Underwriting Income  0.0193*** 0.0103*** 0.0158*** 0.0085*** 
 (6.415) (4.427) (6.269) (5.159) 
Stock Market Return 0.0922*** 0.0761*** 0.0794*** 0.0833*** 
 (3.723) (4.105) (3.813) (5.528) 
GDP per Capita Growth -0.0049*** -0.0044*** -0.0055*** -0.0043*** 
 (-3.399) (-3.841) (-4.429) (-4.643) 
Unemployment Rate -0.0053** -0.0069*** -0.0073*** -0.0040** 
 (-2.522) (-3.835) (-3.688) (-2.519) 
Inflation Rate -0.0081** -0.0047* -0.0056* 0.0013 
 (-2.304) (-1.704) (-1.844) (0.667) 
Concentration  0.1777 0.2049 0.3312** 0.0437 
 (0.966) (1.469) (2.178) (1.055) 
Constant -0.2354 -0.0004 0.0022 0.1577 
 (-1.177) (-0.004) (0.016) (1.553) 
          
Observations 1,193 1,953 1,508 3,060 
Number of Firms 330 531 427 669 
Adjusted R-squared 0.171 0.078 0.129 0.056 
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-test 9.034 9.034 9.034 9.034 
















Table 2.11:  Interaction Effects with Investment Risk on Profit Efficiency - GMM  
 M1 M2 M3 M4 
VARIABLES Profit Eff. Profit Eff. Profit Eff. Profit Eff. 
          
L. Profit Eff. 0.2489** 0.4583*** 0.2895*** 0.1221** 
 (2.144) (5.055) (4.048) (2.249) 
Investment Risk 7.5375** -0.5031* -0.6420* -0.6447* 
 (2.147) (-1.804) (-1.711) (-1.839) 
Product Risk  0.0450*    
 (1.806)    
Product Risk * Investment Risk  -2.4069**    
 (-2.034)    
Business Diversification  0.0185*   
  (1.894)   
Diversified Business * Investment Risk   0.3365*   
  (1.655)   
Area Diversification   0.0149*  
   (1.711)  
Diversified Area * Investment Risk    0.5956*  
   (1.706)  
Pricing Risk    0.0064 
    (1.424) 
Pricing Risk * Investment Risk     -0.2871** 
    (-2.064) 
Firm Size 0.0597 0.0537 0.0449 0.1214* 
 (0.776) (1.568) (1.402) (1.854) 
Square of Firm Size -0.0046 -0.0038* -0.0035* -0.0080** 
 (-0.913) (-1.803) (-1.861) (-2.173) 
Liquidity 0.0365* -0.0099 -0.0149* -0.0017 
 (1.733) (-1.089) (-1.851) (-0.259) 
Underwriting Income level 0.0456*** 0.0063* 0.0069 0.0091*** 
 (4.504) (1.761) (1.105) (2.592) 
Stock Market Return 0.0541 0.1462*** 0.1447*** 0.0403 
 (0.895) (3.881) (4.568) (1.216) 
GDP per Capita Growth -0.0037 -0.0094*** -0.0089*** 0.0001 
 (-0.923) (-3.464) (-4.358) (0.019) 
Unemployment Rate -0.0029 -0.0064* -0.0071** 0.0068* 
 (-0.503) (-1.783) (-2.391) (1.732) 
Inflation Rate -0.0066 -0.0030 -0.0042 0.0008 
 (-0.823) (-0.634) (-0.898) (0.236) 
Concentration  1.1730*** 0.2971 0.3306* 0.2793*** 
 (2.747) (1.183) (1.746) (4.090) 
Constant -0.6060 -0.0931 0.0014 -0.3376 
 (-1.548) (-0.627) (0.009) (-1.198) 
          
Observations 232 1,535 1,176 2,404 
Number of Firms 137 455 356 568 
Number of Instruments 106 244 242 173 
Robust Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-test 5.819*** 15.46*** 9.073*** 5.789*** 
AR(1) -4.811*** -5.052*** -4.471*** -5.583*** 
AR(2) -0.726 0.316 -0.345 1.069 
Hansen Test 93.49 (0.437) 243 (0.266) 215.2 (0.719) 176 (0.168) 
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2.4.2.3 The impact of interaction with capital 
Cost Function 
   From Tables 2.12 and 2.13, the positive impact of capital, the negative impact of 
product risk and the positive impact of pricing risk on cost performance remain consistent 
with the previous findings from the individual analyses shown in Tables 2.4 and 2.5. 
Concerning the interaction effects with capital, all interactions are significant in dynamic 
panel models, as shown in Table 2.13.  
 
   To be more specific, the interaction term between product risk and capital is negative 
from both fixed effects and dynamic panel models, and it is only significant at the 10% 
level in the short-run model. This indicates that insurers, who issue more risky products 
and are willing to hold more capital to reduce insolvency risk, may face cost 
disadvantages in short-run only. This can be explained by the dominant effect of product 
risk. However, holding capital does help insurers mitigate the negative impact arising 
from issuing more risky products. The evidence is that the coefficient of the term of 
Product Risk * Capital is smaller than the coefficient of Product Risk (Model 1 in Table 
2.13). 
 
   As discussed in Section 2.4.2.1, the individual effect of business diversification on cost 
efficiency is inconclusive (Models 8 and 10 in Table 2.5). Here, a significant positive 
impact of business diversification on cost efficiency has been confirmed when this 
variable is considered together with capital in short-run (Model 2 in Table 2.13). Further, 
their interaction term is also positive; this implies that multiline insurers enjoy the benefit 
of diversification on cost structure if they have strong capital supports. It is also worth 
noting that the benefit of diversification may be reduced by imposing more capital, 
because the coefficient of the Business Diversification * Capital term is less than the 
coefficient of Business Diversification (Model 2 in Table 2.13).  
 
   Regarding geographic area diversification (Model 3 in Tables 2.12 and 2.13), a 
significant positive impact of its interaction term on cost performance is indicated by both 
fixed effects and dynamic panel analyses. This means that the insurers operate their cost 
structures more efficiently when geographic diversification is backed up by sufficient 
capital holding in both long-run and short-run. Compared to the negative effect observed 
from individual analyses, it is particularly noteworthy that the benefit of geographic 
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diversification is significant only when both capital and geographic diversification are 
jointly considered.  This indicates that insurers with a geographic diversification plan will 
have better cost performance, when the capital level is increased. 
 
   Model 4 in Tables 2.12 and 2.13 reveal the relationship related to pricing risk. Aligning 
with the results from Section 2.4.2.1, the individual impact of pricing risk remains 
positive, and the significant positive interaction effect is also confirmed at the 1% level 
from in both long-run and short-run. This highly significant result further confirms that 
the previous suggestion (in Section 2.4.2.1), which assumes that insurers always consider 
pricing risk as their primary concern and make their best efforts to mitigate further 
uncertainties via different risk management activities, such as holding more capital. The 
magnitude of the interaction effect is less than the individual effects for both capital and 
pricing risk, even though the interaction is positive. This may indicate that there might be 
cost disadvantages by imposing extra capital after pricing risk is well-controlled. 
Therefore, insurers need to consider to build up an appropriate level of capital when 
considering pricing risk, if it is well-controlled.   
 
   Apart from underwriting risks, capital can also be used to amplify or mitigate the 
impacts of investment activities. Model 5 in Tables 2.12 and 2.13 shows the impact of 
this relationship on cost efficiency. Model 5 in Table 2.12 confirms that adverse impact 
arises from taking more investment risk, while the interaction between two variables is 
not significant. However, in short-run (Table 2.13), Model 5 shows that the interaction 
impact is positive and significant, and the individual effect of investment risk is converted 
to positive in short-run. This result is in line with Hypothesis 8a (the finite-risk paradigm), 
which states that using capital is intended to limit the insurer’s overall risk level, and the 
interaction effect should be positive, when considered with the expected bankruptcy costs 
argument. It implies that insurers would hold more capital to mitigate investment risk and 
to improve its cost structure. In addition, the amplified effect associated with imposing 
extra capital is also found, as the magnitude of the interacting impact is higher than the 
individual impact arising from investment risk. 
 
 
[Table 2.12: Interaction Effects with Capital on Cost Efficiency – OLS insert here] 
 
[Table 2.13:Interaction Effects with Capital on Cost Efficiency – GMM insert here] 
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Table 2.12: Interaction Effects with Capital on Cost Efficiency - OLS 
 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 
VARIABLES Cost Eff. Cost Eff. Cost Eff. Cost Eff. Cost Eff. 
            
Capital 0.0275** 0.0072** 0.0064** 0.0075*** 0.0046* 
 (2.548) (2.179) (2.246) (2.600) (1.685) 
Product Risk  -0.0110*     
 (-1.947)     
Product Risk * Capital -0.0042     
 (-1.280)     
Business Diversification  0.0012    
  (0.248)    
Diversified Business * Capital  0.0009    
  (0.537)    
Area Diversification   0.0026   
   (0.688)   
Diversified Area * Capital   0.0066***   
   (3.118)   
Pricing Risk    0.0075***  
    (4.357)  
Pricing Risk * Capital    0.0015**  
    (2.310)  
Investment Risk     -0.0862** 
     (-2.579) 
Investment Risk * Capital     0.0846 
     (1.611) 
Firm Size 0.0040 -0.0196 -0.0353* -0.0221 -0.0337** 
 (0.107) (-1.027) (-1.729) (-1.399) (-2.073) 
Square of Firm Size -0.0005 0.0009 0.0015 0.0010 0.0014 
 (-0.263) (0.970) (1.397) (1.171) (1.614) 
Liquidity  0.0078** 0.0096*** 0.0104*** 0.0077*** 0.0080*** 
 (2.316) (3.910) (3.672) (3.816) (3.920) 
Market Share  -2.2351*** -0.5372*** -0.2192 -0.4786*** -0.5618*** 
 (-3.328) (-2.917) (-1.068) (-2.739) (-2.972) 
Stock Market Return -0.0448*** -0.0272*** -0.0278*** -0.0234*** -0.0305*** 
 (-3.915) (-3.754) (-3.250) (-3.778) (-4.863) 
GDP per Capita -0.0095** -0.0083*** -0.0059** -0.0055*** -0.0043*** 
 (-2.415) (-3.456) (-2.307) (-3.658) (-3.098) 
Unemployment Rate -0.0044** -0.0033*** -0.0033** -0.0021 -0.0007 
 (-2.561) (-2.798) (-2.515) (-1.539) (-0.513) 
Inflation Rate 0.0010 0.0016 0.0004 -0.0024** -0.0036*** 
 (0.591) (1.085) (0.224) (-2.071) (-2.953) 
Constant 0.9618*** 0.9710*** 0.9999*** 0.9344*** 0.9506*** 
 (4.785) (9.373) (8.383) (13.023) (12.965) 
      
      
Observations 1,024 1,915 1,345 2,931 2,938 
Number of Firms 268 472 363 612 610 
Adjusted R-squared 0.114 0.071 0.087 0.095 0.073 
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-test 5.60*** 5.54*** 5.94*** 9.36*** 13.16*** 
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Table 2.13: Interaction Effects with Capital on Cost Efficiency - GMM  
 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 
VARIABLES Cost Eff. Cost Eff. Cost Eff. Cost Eff. Cost Eff. 
            
L. Cost Eff. 0.4931*** 0.5033*** 0.3049* 0.4133*** 0.2495** 
 (2.872) (5.554) (1.774) (3.677) (2.455) 
Capital 0.0569* -0.0046 0.0210 0.0194*** -0.0023 
 (1.960) (-0.714) (1.082) (2.957) (-0.329) 
Product Risk  -0.0225*     
 (-1.733)     
Product Risk * Capital -0.0156*     
 (-1.773)     
Business Diversification  0.0223**    
  (1.994)    
Diversified Business * Capital  0.0083*    
  (1.915)    
Area Diversification   0.0647**   
   (2.182)   
Diversified Area * Capital   0.0415***   
   (2.629)   
Pricing Risk    0.0238***  
    (4.531)  
Pricing Risk * Capital    0.0066***  
    (3.413)  
Investment Risk     0.4842* 
     (1.673) 
Investment Risk * Capital     0.8118** 
     (2.072) 
Firm Size -0.0044 -0.0178 -0.1964** 0.0296* -0.0164 
 (-0.112) (-1.134) (-2.569) (1.765) (-0.507) 
Square of Firm Size 0.0005 0.0008 0.0107** -0.0014* 0.0008 
 (0.208) (1.026) (2.588) (-1.684) (0.454) 
Liquidity  -0.0089 0.0181*** -0.0068 -0.0071 0.0108* 
 (-0.811) (3.089) (-0.576) (-1.355) (1.765) 
Market Share  -2.4413 -0.5165* -3.6740* -0.1540 -0.6769** 
 (-1.324) (-1.915) (-1.720) (-0.321) (-2.104) 
Stock Market Return -0.0629** -0.0575*** -0.0264 -0.0081 -0.0483*** 
 (-2.091) (-3.732) (-1.607) (-0.541) (-4.026) 
GDP per Capita 0.0044 -0.0061** -0.0079* -0.0018 -0.0046*** 
 (0.692) (-2.092) (-1.821) (-0.996) (-3.088) 
Unemployment Rate -0.0042** -0.0052*** -0.0083*** -0.0040** -0.0034** 
 (-2.546) (-4.435) (-2.793) (-2.081) (-2.043) 
Inflation Rate -0.0066 0.0004 0.0036 0.0041* -0.0038* 
 (-1.510) (0.120) (0.823) (1.895) (-1.715) 
Constant 0.3369 0.5986*** 1.5681*** 0.3380** 0.7148*** 
 (1.302) (4.309) (3.977) (2.456) (3.471) 
            
Observations 491 1,480 1,079 759 1,249 
Number of Firms 185 386 307 206 425 
Number of Instruments 93 168 69 146 170 
Robust Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-test 6.259*** 25.11*** 3.918*** 8.595*** 7.277*** 
AR(1) -1.770* -3.044*** -1.850** -3.620*** -3.035*** 
AR(2) 0.234 0.928 0.144 1.631 0.960 
Hansen Test (P-value) 82.86 (0.391) 159.6 (0.383) 53.29 (0.578) 150.3 (0.145) 168.1 (0.259) 
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Profit Function 
   The results of the different interaction impacts on profit performance are shown in 
Tables 2.14 and 2.15—the fixed effects model and the dynamic panel model, respectively. 
Both models strongly confirm that holding more capital can help insurers become more 
profit efficient, as capital can use to expand the insurers’ businesses 
 
   Similar to the finding from cost analysis, Model 1 in Tables 2.14 and 2.15 indicates that 
there is a negative relationship between the Product Risk * Capital term and profit 
performance, and this relationship is significant at the 5% level in short-run only. Thus, 
insurers, who have more risky products and hold more capital may become profit 
inefficient. One possible reason is that insurers may use capital to write more risky 
businesses. Although the impact is negative, holding capital does reduce exposure arising 
from writing risky business, as the coefficient of the interaction term is smaller than the 
coefficient of the individual variable; it is the same as the finding from cost regression.  
It indicates that insurers do not only use capital to expand the business, but also use capital 
as risk buffer when the cost of capital is lower than the cost of default.  
 
   Regarding business diversification and geographic area diversification, the individual 
impacts of both on profit efficiency are significant and positive. These findings are 
confirmed by the results of Models 2 and 3 in both long-run and short-run. Similar to the 
results of the cost function, a significant, positive impact of business diversification and 
capital on profit efficiency is found in short-run. This implies that multiline insurers can 
enjoy profit advantages when they hold more capital. Meanwhile, the benefit of 
diversification is also weakened by imposing more capital, as the magnitude of interaction 
is smaller than the magnitude of individuals. On the other hand, operating in many 
different geographic markets may damage insurers’ abilities to generate profits, as the 
interaction effect of business diversification and capital is negative. This can be explained 
by the cost of capital overcoming the benefit of geographic area diversification, when 
extra capital is imposed to cover the costs of operating in different markets. It is also true 
that the extra cost needed to manage different product types is much less than the cost 
required to operate in different markets. 
 
   No indication is made regarding the impact of the interaction between pricing risk and 
capital on profit performance, as the impacts are varied between the long-run and short-
run models. A negative effect is found in the fixed effects model, as shown by Model 4 
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in Table 2.14. This may indicate that the negative effect of pricing risk (further leading 
to claim uncertainties) may take the dominant role, if this risk further leads to operating 
losses in long-run. On the other hand, the positive impact revealed in the dynamic panel 
model (Model 4 in Table 2.15) indicates that the positive effect of imposing capital to 
cover unexpected losses may dominate in the short-run. This implies that the harmful 
effect of pricing risk is offset by the benefit of holding more capital.  
 
   Although, solely, the effects of capital and investment risk are both positive and 
significant in the dynamic panel model (Model 5 in Table 2.15), their interaction effect 
on profit efficiency is negative. This result aligns with the profit incentive hypothesis and 
the excessive risk paradigm (Hypothesis 8b), and it indicates that the insurer is willing to 
take additional investment risks when extra capital is imposed. This increased risk leads 
to more uncertainties in profit earning (i.e., profit inefficiency).   
 
 
[Table 2.14: Interaction Effects with Capital on Profit Efficiency – OLS insert here] 
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Table 2.14: Interaction Effects with Capital on Profit Efficiency - OLS 
 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 
VARIABLES Profit Eff. Profit Eff. Profit Eff. Profit Eff. Profit Eff. 
      
Capital 0.0168** 0.0115*** 0.0089*** 0.0141*** 0.0159*** 
 (2.053) (2.827) (2.801) (4.423) (5.615) 
Product Risk -0.0087**     
 (-2.060)     
Product Risk * Capital -0.0022     
 (-0.875)     
Business Diversification  -0.0041    
  (-0.585)    
Diversified Business * Capital  -0.0010    
  (-0.358)    
Area Diversification   0.0150*   
   (1.722)   
Diversified Area * Capital   0.0046   
   (1.221)   
Pricing Risk    -0.0043**  
    (-2.260)  
Pricing Risk * Capital    -0.0013*  
    (-1.811)  
Investment Risk     0.0423 
     (0.960) 
Investment Risk * Capital     -0.0212 
     (-1.223) 
Firm Size 0.0965** 0.0355 0.0342 0.0176 0.0194 
 (1.969) (1.275) (0.943) (0.813) (1.149) 
Square of Firm Size -0.0052* -0.0014 -0.0019 -0.0009 -0.0010 
 (-1.771) (-0.914) (-0.918) (-0.756) (-1.046) 
Liquidity -0.0007 -0.0044 -0.0074** -0.0109*** -0.0085*** 
 (-0.139) (-1.172) (-2.182) (-3.849) (-3.174) 
Underwriting Income  0.0185*** 0.0090*** 0.0146*** 0.0074*** 0.0073*** 
 (5.747) (3.722) (5.242) (4.555) (4.476) 
Stock Market Return 0.0947*** 0.0658*** 0.0811*** 0.0782*** 0.0842*** 
 (3.625) (3.379) (3.655) (5.051) (5.412) 
GDP per Capita Growth -0.0050*** -0.0037*** -0.0054*** -0.0038*** -0.0040*** 
 (-3.213) (-3.069) (-4.047) (-4.022) (-4.197) 
Unemployment Rate -0.0056** -0.0062*** -0.0070*** -0.0041** -0.0048*** 
 (-2.433) (-3.286) (-3.352) (-2.454) (-2.884) 
Inflation Rate -0.0078** -0.0040 -0.0043 0.0011 0.0023 
 (-2.243) (-1.458) (-1.390) (0.568) (1.204) 
Concentration 0.1480 0.1459 0.2762* 0.0470 0.0395 
 (0.775) (1.075) (1.906) (1.129) (0.954) 
Constant -0.1353 0.0906 0.0725 0.2029* 0.2102** 
 (-0.619) (0.683) (0.436) (1.934) (2.565) 
      
      
Observations 1,170 1,958 1,470 2,934 2,991 
Number of Firms 331 533 424 657 665 
Adjusted R-squared 0.161 0.067 0.116 0.061 0.062 
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-test 20.21 20.21 20.21 20.21 20.21 
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Table 2.15: Interaction Effects with Capital on Profit Efficiency - GMM  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Profit Eff. Profit Eff. Profit Eff. Profit Eff. Profit Eff. 
            
L. Profit Eff. 0.2471** 0.5658*** 0.1633** 0.1148** 0.0700* 
 (2.450) (6.880) (2.373) (2.444) (1.758) 
Capital 0.0889*** 0.0439*** 0.0290*** 0.0396*** 0.0256*** 
 (2.823) (4.384) (3.037) (4.030) (2.623) 
Product Risk  -0.0295*     
 (-1.713)     
Product Risk * Capital -0.0205**     
 (-2.567)     
Business Diversification  0.0644***    
  (2.791)    
Diversified Business * Capital  0.0216**    
  (2.021)    
Area Diversification   0.0057   
   (0.270)   
Diversified Area * Capital   -0.0179*   
   (-1.759)   
Pricing Risk    0.0014  
    (0.387)  
Pricing Risk * Capital    0.0040*  
    (1.957)  
Investment Risk     0.0907*** 
     (2.972) 
Investment Risk * Capital     -0.0466*** 
     (-2.804) 
Firm Size 0.0447 0.0761** 0.0787 0.1399** 0.1041* 
 (0.836) (1.995) (1.568) (2.434) (1.812) 
Square of Firm Size -0.0035 -0.0038* -0.0048* -0.0083** -0.0068** 
 (-1.111) (-1.858) (-1.758) (-2.502) (-2.014) 
Liquidity -0.0166 -0.0084 -0.0076 0.0005 0.0046 
 (-1.221) (-0.814) (-0.886) (0.080) (0.814) 
Underwriting Income  0.0344*** -0.0048 0.0083** 0.0076** 0.0089*** 
 (4.146) (-0.888) (2.018) (2.351) (2.786) 
Stock Market Return 0.0715 0.0956** 0.1375*** 0.1295*** 0.1054*** 
 (1.345) (2.004) (3.914) (3.910) (2.885) 
GDP per Capita Growth -0.0071** -0.0051* -0.0079*** -0.0092*** -0.0086*** 
 (-2.232) (-1.797) (-3.438) (-3.738) (-3.626) 
Unemployment Rate -0.0084* -0.0023 -0.0054* -0.0052 -0.0101** 
 (-1.831) (-0.656) (-1.672) (-1.470) (-2.581) 
Inflation Rate -0.0166** -0.0070 0.0066 0.0008 0.0076 
 (-2.415) (-1.020) (1.422) (0.178) (1.642) 
Concentration  0.7868*** 0.1873 0.4150* 0.1624*** 0.0914 
 (2.906) (1.006) (1.722) (2.692) (1.609) 
Constant -0.0815 -0.1549 -0.1586 -0.2823 -0.0646 
 (-0.367) (-0.882) (-0.659) (-1.204) (-0.283) 
            
Observations 908 1,492 1,149 2,409 2,443 
Number of Firms 282 444 353 580 586 
Number of Instruments 143 175 202 239 230 
Robust Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-test 8.362*** 24.02*** 11.52*** 13.42*** 38.31*** 
AR(1) -4.406*** -5.286*** -4.361*** -5.570*** -5.932*** 
AR(2) 0.162 -0.0179 -1.034 1.380 1.255 
Hansen Test (p-value) 135.1 (0.338) 179.2 (0.155) 200.1 (0.260) 247.2 (0.148) 238.7 (0.138) 
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2.4.2.4 The impact of interaction with reinsurance 
Cost Function 
   Tables 2.16 and 2.17 show the impact of interaction with reinsurance on cost efficiency; 
the former presents OLS fixed effects models, and the latter presents dynamic panel 
models. The individual impact of reinsurance on cost performance is found to be positive 
and consistent in two models—in line with previous findings. This further proves that 
using reinsurance can enhance insurers’ cost efficiency, as it can mitigate the risk of 
default. 
 
   As expected, from Model 1, the impact of product risk remains negative and significant 
in both tables. However, the impact of the interaction between product risk and 
reinsurance on cost efficiency is not found. It is reasonable to assume that, if an insurer’s 
business nature involves writing risky products, then that firm is unlikely to use 
reinsurance to avoid inherent uncertainties, as reinsurance is costly.  
 
   Model 2 in Tables 2.16 and 2.17 further confirms that business diversification positively 
impacts cost efficiency, and this is only significant in dynamic panel model (Table 2.17). 
This implies that insurers with more diversified businesses would have better cost 
performance in short-run. A positive and significant interaction impact is observed in the 
dynamic model, which is consistent with the findings when considering the interaction 
with capital. This result should not be surprising because reinsurance does share some of 
capital’s functions. Another similar point is that the benefit of diversification may be 
weakened by purchasing more reinsurance, due to the cost of reinsurance. this indicates 
that insurers with multiline businesses can be cost effieint if they are supported by 
reinsurance contracts in short-run.  
 
   In addition to the first diversification strategy, the impact of the interaction between 
geographic diversification and reinsurance is negative and significant concerning cost 
efficiency (Model 3 in Table 2.17). This implies that insurers with more geographic area 
diversified business would have a lower cost efficiency if they use reinsurance to mitigate 
exposures in short-run. This negative effect contrasts with the positive effect observed in 
capital regression (Model 3 in Table 2.13). As mentioned, the cost/risk of operating in 
various geographic markets is much higher than the cost/risk associated with writing 
multiple businesses. Thus, using reinsurance to reduce the uncertainties arising from 
operating in various geographic markets would incur much higher premiums. However, 
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it is also worth noting that using reinsurance could reduce the adverse effects stemming 
from geographic diversification, as the negative magnitude of the interaction term is much 
smaller than the negative magnitude of geographic diversification.  
 
   The individual pricing effect on cost efficiency remains positive and significant for 
Model 4 in Tables 2.16 and 2.17, and it is consistent with previous findings. Also, the 
coefficient of the Pricing Risk * Reinsurance term is positive in both tables, but only 
significant in the dynamic model. Therefore, these positive signs further confirm that 
insurers always consider pricing risk as their primary concern. Again, due to the cost of 
reinsurance, purchasing additional reinsurance may reduce cost efficiency when pricing 
risk has been well-adjusted. 
 
   Model 5 in Tables 2.16 and 2.17 reveals the impact of investment risk and its interaction 
on cost efficiency. As expected, the individual effect of investment risk remains 
significantly negative, as in the preceding models. Then, the impact of the interaction 
between reinsurance and investment risk is also negative and significant concerning the 
insurer’s cost efficiency in both long-run and short-run. This negative interaction impact 
is mainly created by the dominant-negative effect arising from investment risk. It 
indicates that insurer with more investment risk may have a lower cost performance, even 
they use reinsurance to mitigate the exposure. This can be explained by the relationship 
between reinsurance and difference risk sources. There is a direct relationship between 
underwriting risk and reinsurance, while the relationship between reinsurance and 
investment risk is indirect. The aim of purchasing reinsurance is that the primary insurer 
is willing to transfer part of its underwriting risk directly to reinsurers. However, it is 
unlikely to shift investment risk in this way unless the promised claim payment is closely 
related to investment return (for example, the promised benefit with unit-linked products). 




[Table 2.16: Interaction Effects with Reinsurance on Cost Efficiency – OLS insert here] 
 
 









Table 2.16:  Interaction Effects with Reinsurance on Cost Efficiency - OLS 
 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 
VARIABLES Cost Eff. Cost Eff. Cost Eff. Cost Eff. Cost Eff. 
      
Reinsurance 0.0058** 0.0049*** 0.0047*** 0.0024** 0.0025** 
 (2.209) (3.521) (3.019) (2.092) (2.235) 
Product Risk  -0.0087**     
 (-2.209)     
Product Risk * Reinsurance 0.0000     
 (0.020)     
Business Diversification  0.0022    
  (0.610)    
Diversified Business * Reinsurance  0.0033**    
  (2.311)    
Area Diversification   -0.0050*   
   (-1.896)   
Diversified Area * Reinsurance   0.0009   
   (0.808)   
Pricing Risk    0.0048***  
    (3.687)  
Pricing Risk * Reinsurance    0.0005  
    (1.251)  
Investment Risk     -0.2778*** 
     (-4.762) 
Investment Risk * Reinsurance     -0.0513** 
     (-2.366) 
Firm Size -0.0090 -0.0297 -0.0408 -0.0113 -0.0269 
 (-0.218) (-1.242) (-1.443) (-0.576) (-1.479) 
Square of Firm Size 0.0004 0.0014 0.0018 0.0003 0.0010 
 (0.179) (1.114) (1.211) (0.307) (1.046) 
Liquidity  0.0084** 0.0100*** 0.0108*** 0.0082*** 0.0082*** 
 (2.270) (3.693) (3.585) (4.365) (4.371) 
Market Share  -2.3093*** -0.4628*** -0.1736 -0.3569* -0.4534** 
 (-3.361) (-2.679) (-1.133) (-1.830) (-2.146) 
Stock Market Return -0.0333*** -0.0243*** -0.0276*** -0.0241*** -0.0298*** 
 (-3.401) (-3.458) (-3.354) (-3.913) (-4.859) 
GDP per Capita -0.0128*** -0.0092*** -0.0045 -0.0061*** -0.0055*** 
 (-3.115) (-3.527) (-1.471) (-4.101) (-3.918) 
Unemployment Rate -0.0039** -0.0031** -0.0015 -0.0023* -0.0012 
 (-2.126) (-2.365) (-0.942) (-1.879) (-1.009) 
Inflation Rate 0.0010 0.0015 -0.0014 -0.0037*** -0.0048*** 
 (0.526) (0.923) (-0.759) (-2.728) (-3.546) 
Constant 1.0657*** 1.0368*** 0.9769*** 0.9009*** 0.9519*** 
 (5.142) (8.536) (6.861) (9.789) (11.058) 
            
Observations 933 1,673 1,193 2,489 2,491 
Number of Firms 260 436 341 564 562 
Adjusted R-squared 0.142 0.099 0.094 0.101 0.100 
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-test 5.34*** 5.98*** 6.01*** 7.68*** 23.98*** 














 Table 2.17:  Interaction Effects with Reinsurance on Cost Efficiency - GMM 
 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 
VARIABLES Cost Eff. Cost Eff. Cost Eff. Cost Eff. Cost Eff. 
            
L. Cost Eff. 0.5411*** 0.6495*** 0.5309*** 0.5406*** 0.5229*** 
 (4.815) (6.801) (6.239) (8.913) (3.174) 
Reinsurance 0.0034 0.0059* 0.0084*** 0.0057** 0.0154* 
 (0.295) (1.710) (2.663) (2.583) (1.749) 
Product Risk  -0.0151*     
 (-1.740)     
Product Risk * Reinsurance -0.0012     
 (-0.342)     
Business Diversification  0.0147*    
  (1.804)    
Diversified Business * Reinsurance  0.0065**    
  (2.086)    
Area Diversification   -0.0137***   
   (-2.909)   
Diversified Area * Reinsurance   -0.0043*   
   (-1.916)   
Pricing Risk    0.0069***  
    (4.344)  
Pricing Risk * Reinsurance    0.0013**  
    (2.147)  
Investment Risk     -3.0552* 
     (-1.966) 
Investment Risk * Reinsurance     -1.1064* 
     (-1.737) 
Firm Size -0.0729** -0.0265 0.0471** 0.0216* -0.0883 
 (-2.213) (-1.477) (2.069) (1.755) (-1.066) 
Square of Firm Size 0.0040** 0.0014 -0.0023* -0.0013* 0.0045 
 (2.286) (1.508) (-1.875) (-1.957) (1.138) 
Liquidity  0.0030 0.0052 0.0056 0.0027 -0.0139 
 (0.539) (0.897) (1.215) (0.867) (-1.327) 
Market Share  -1.1761** -0.4549 0.0271 -0.2685 -0.5059 
 (-2.131) (-0.595) (0.057) (-1.010) (-1.045) 
Stock Market Return -0.0196 0.0031 -0.0370*** -0.0080 0.0035 
 (-1.184) (0.265) (-2.779) (-1.054) (0.112) 
GDP per Capita -0.0034 -0.0078** -0.0028 -0.0040*** -0.0028 
 (-0.612) (-2.201) (-0.901) (-3.159) (-1.101) 
Unemployment Rate -0.0043** -0.0059*** -0.0041*** -0.0032*** -0.0075*** 
 (-2.461) (-4.003) (-2.946) (-2.930) (-3.356) 
Inflation Rate 0.0051 0.0073* -0.0029 -0.0005 0.0024 
 (0.951) (1.890) (-0.932) (-0.380) (0.475) 
Constant 0.7627*** 0.5649*** 0.1873 0.3452*** 0.8485* 
 (3.495) (3.348) (1.232) (3.799) (1.963) 
      
      
Observations 440 1,311 914 1,463 1,138 
Number of Firms 173 362 268 416 421 
Number of Instruments 82 112 111 206 64 
Robust Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-test 8.685*** 16.55*** 18.12*** 17.52*** 4.115*** 
AR(1) -3.088*** -3.930*** -3.374*** -5.302*** -3.143*** 
AR(2) -1.051 0.745 0.0197 1.418 -0.0297 
Hansen Test (P-value) 78.09 (0.212) 116.8 (0.107) 101.3 (0.390) 214 (0.143) 53.52 (0.378) 















      Tables 2.18 and 2.19 (the fixed effects model and the dynamic panel model, 
respectively) show the impact of interaction with reinsurance on profit efficiency. First, 
Model 1 considers the impact of the interaction between product risk and reinsurance. 
The individual effects of reinsurance and product risk are negative and significant—
consistent with findings from the previous sections. However, their interaction effect is 
significantly positive for the insurer’s profit efficiency in both fixed effects and dynamic 
models. This indicates that insurers, who issue more risky products, would like to use 
reinsurance to reduce potential uncertainties and expand their underwriting abilities. The 
combination can further improve insurers' profit efficiency. It is, however, worthwhile to 
remember the question asked of the cost model, in which no significant impact was 
observed from the interaction term on cost efficiency. By considering both the cost and 
profit models, it is reasonable to conclude that an insurer, who prefers to issue more risky 
products, would like to use reinsurance to make its operations efficient from the profit 
side. 
 
   Models 2 and 3 disclose the impact of the combination of diversification and 
reinsurance—the former revealing business diversification and the latter focusing on 
geographic diversification. Generally speaking, the individual effects from two 
diversification variables and reinsurance are in line with previous findings. The 
interaction between business diversification and reinsurance has a negative impact, while 
the coefficient of the Diversified Area * Reinsurance term is positive. The insurer with 
various types of businesses indicates that it has a complex business portfolio, and the cost 
of reinsurance tends to be high due to this complexity. Thus, the cost of reinsurance may 
dominate the benefit of business diversification, and further lead to lower insurer’s profit. 
 
   Regarding geographic diversification, as previously mentioned, writing business in 
different geographic markets is more costly and associated with more unexpected, 
uncontrollable risks than issuing various types of business. Thus, it is more effective and 
efficient to use reinsurance to mitigate the uncertainties arising from operating in different 
geographic markets because reinsurers provide not only risk-shifting services but also 
offer extra information about the primary insurer’s portfolio. In other words, insurers 
would use capital to manage diversified businesses, but use reinsurance to manage 
geographically diversified businesses which may require more information and harder to 
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mitigate the risk exposures. Moreover, these discussions can be further proved by 
comparing them with the capital-profit table (Table 2.15), in which Model 2 reveals a 
positive impact and Model 3 a negative impact. 
 
   Model 4 shows a straightforward relationship. The primary purpose of using 
reinsurance is to reduce the risks from the mismatch (or the gap) between premiums 
collected and promised claim/benefit payments. This is the pricing risk. Therefore, it is 
not surprising that the interaction effect between pricing risk and reinsurance positively 
impacts profit efficiency in both long-run and short-run. The cost model (Model 4 in 
Table 2.17) also confirms this point.  
 
   As discussed above, there is an indirect link between reinsurance and investment risk. 
This link would be more stable if insurance products were unit-linked types, in which an 
investment return is promised. Similar to the cost models (Model 5 in Tables 2.16 and 
2.17), investment risk potentially takes the dominant role. It indicates that insurers may 
accept to take more risky investment to achieve a higher return, when they have 
reinsurance contract to mitigate the harmful effects from risky investment. Thus, the 
impact of the interaction between reinsurance and investment risk on profit efficiency is 




[Table 2.18: Interaction Effects with Reinsurance on Profit Efficiency – OLS insert here] 
 
 





















Table 2.18:  Interaction Effects with Reinsurance on Profit Efficiency - OLS 
 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 
VARIABLES Profit Eff. Profit Eff. Profit Eff. Profit Eff. Profit Eff. 
            
Reinsurance -0.3279** 0.0289 -0.0301*** 0.0005*** 0.0004*** 
 (-2.309) (1.086) (-5.222) (12.167) (9.428) 
Product Risk  -0.0056*     
 (-1.878)     
Product Risk * Reinsurance 0.0726**     
 (2.180)     
Business Diversification  -0.0021    
  (-0.494)    
Diversified Business * Reinsurance  0.0254    
  (0.996)    
Area Diversification   0.0066*   
   (1.651)   
Diversified Area * Reinsurance   0.0303***   
   (5.657)   
Pricing Risk    -0.0017  
    (-1.289)  
Pricing Risk * Reinsurance    0.0001***  
    (7.403)  
Investment Risk     0.0739*** 
     (4.372) 
Investment Risk * Reinsurance     0.0524*** 
     (6.492) 
Firm Size 0.1094** 0.0558** 0.0724*** 0.0380* 0.0360 
 (2.399) (2.250) (2.765) (1.662) (1.586) 
Square of Firm Size -0.0060** -0.0028* -0.0042** -0.0024* -0.0023* 
 (-2.143) (-1.947) (-2.537) (-1.812) (-1.787) 
Liquidity  -0.0015 -0.0040 -0.0052* -0.0108*** -0.0093*** 
 (-0.311) (-1.072) (-1.692) (-3.704) (-3.204) 
Underwriting Income  0.0185*** 0.0110*** 0.0173*** 0.0095*** 0.0095*** 
 (6.476) (4.788) (7.020) (5.433) (5.472) 
Stock Market Return 0.0922*** 0.0678*** 0.0726*** 0.0817*** 0.0813*** 
 (3.757) (3.532) (3.520) (5.053) (5.038) 
GDP per Capita Growth -0.0050*** -0.0040*** -0.0050*** -0.0045*** -0.0043*** 
 (-3.522) (-3.374) (-4.084) (-4.507) (-4.390) 
Unemployment Rate -0.0052*** -0.0061*** -0.0071*** -0.0042** -0.0048*** 
 (-2.603) (-3.416) (-3.769) (-2.577) (-2.844) 
Inflation Rate -0.0083** -0.0051* -0.0067** 0.0013 0.0022 
 (-2.428) (-1.828) (-2.274) (0.651) (1.078) 
Concentration  0.1750 0.2079 0.3779*** 0.0755* 0.0640 
 (0.913) (1.506) (2.627) (1.775) (1.477) 
Constant -0.2204 -0.0166 -0.1293 0.1090 0.1258 
 (-1.071) (-0.142) (-1.129) (1.008) (1.138) 
            
Observations 1,222 1,969 1,503 2,848 2,850 
Number of Firms 339 526 423 633 632 
Adjusted R-squared 0.165 0.079 0.157 0.060 0.061 
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-test 174.9 174.9 174.9 174.9 174.9 












Table 2.19:  Interaction Effects with Reinsurance on Profit Efficiency - GMM  
 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 
VARIABLES Profit Eff. Profit Eff. Profit Eff. Profit Eff. Profit Eff. 
            
L. Profit Eff. 0.2170** 0.3415*** 0.1733** 0.1022** 0.0780* 
 (2.061) (5.422) (2.488) (2.305) (1.751) 
Reinsurance -1.5012* -0.0820*** -0.1854* 0.0007*** -0.0002 
 (-1.948) (-2.684) (-1.725) (5.828) (-1.451) 
Product Risk  -0.0046     
 (-0.348) 
    
Product Risk * Reinsurance 0.3721*     
 (1.748) 
    
Business Diversification  0.0430***    
 
 (2.723)    
Diversified Business * Reinsurance  -0.0746**    
 
 (-2.461)    
Area Diversification   0.0142   
 
  (1.223)   
Diversified Area * Reinsurance   0.1814*   
 
  (1.668)   
Pricing Risk    -0.0036**  
 
   (-2.138)  
Pricing Risk * Reinsurance    0.0001**  
 
   (2.118)  
Investment Risk     0.1801*** 
 
    (4.778) 
Investment Risk * Reinsurance     0.0748** 
 
    (2.392) 
Firm Size -0.0352 -0.0913 -0.0684 0.0883** 0.1268*** 
 (-0.507) (-1.353) (-0.813) (2.151) (3.409) 
Square of Firm Size 0.0013 0.0044 0.0025 -0.0063*** -0.0086*** 
 (0.313) (1.288) (0.509) (-2.744) (-4.384) 
Liquidity 0.0124 -0.0009 -0.0083 -0.0034 0.0009 
 (1.126) (-0.085) (-0.509) (-0.544) (0.166) 
Underwriting Income  0.0249** -0.0042 0.0199*** 0.0104*** 0.0116*** 
 (2.254) (-0.602) (4.454) (3.628) (3.641) 
Stock Market Return 0.0603 0.1825*** 0.1445*** 0.0863*** 0.0769** 
 (1.067) (3.629) (3.465) (2.651) (2.332) 
GDP per Capita Growth -0.0030 -0.0112*** -0.0090*** -0.0062** -0.0050** 
 (-0.935) (-2.939) (-3.595) (-2.505) (-2.100) 
Unemployment Rate -0.0010 -0.0113*** -0.0114*** -0.0060 -0.0067* 
 (-0.241) (-3.176) (-3.498) (-1.599) (-1.776) 
Inflation Rate -0.0086 -0.0033 -0.0134*** 0.0050 0.0068 
 (-1.095) (-0.471) (-2.741) (1.290) (1.620) 
Concentration  0.5329 0.4176 0.7242*** 0.2230*** 0.1174** 
 (1.525) (1.359) (2.718) (3.664) (1.975) 
Constant 0.2215 0.6109** 0.4192 -0.1055 -0.2073 
 (0.653) (2.072) (1.267) (-0.584) (-1.161)       
      
Observations 279 1,467 1,138 2,296 2,291 
Number of Firm 146 434 349 558 554 
Number of Instruments 100 183 120 209 209 
Robust Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-test 6.065*** 10.28*** 6.467*** 12.08*** 11.94*** 
AR(1) -4.103*** -5.580*** -3.796*** -5.867*** -5.917*** 
AR(2) 0.319 0.186 -1.087 1.549 1.329 
Hansen Test 78.31 (0.710) 185.1 (0.188) 116.3 (0.233) 210 (0.219) 205 (0.297) 
t-statistics in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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2.4.2.5 The impact of control variables 
   Regarding control variables, the impacts of economic maturity (gross domestic product 
(GDP) per Capita in the cost model and GDP per Capita Growth in the profit model), 
unemployment and inflation are negative in most of the cost and profit models. The result 
observed from economic maturity variables is inconsistent with results from Eling and 
Schaper (2017), who expected and found a positive relationship between GDP per Capita 
and cost efficiency. However, Huang and Eling (2013) confirmed a negative impact and 
explained that efficiency was not the primary consideration of insurers when the market 
demand was expanding. The negative results from both unemployment and inflation are 
straightforward. Unemployment increases the surrendered/lapse rate, and inflation 
changes directly influence product pricing and asset-liability management; thus, these 
two would hurt firm performance.  
 
   The relationships between stock market return and performance are inconsistent in cost 
and profit models. Stock market return enhances profit efficiency but weakens cost 
efficiency. The latter point does not align with Eling and Schaper’s (2017) finding. This 
indicates that insurers tend to operate more efficiently when generating profit rather than 
optimising cost structure if the stock market is performin well. Similar inconsistent results 
are also found in both cost and profit models when the competition variable is considered. 
Specifically, this is likely to suggest that insurers would have better profit performance 
in a more concentrated market. 
 
   Considering other firm-specified variables, results from Profit Tables 2.10, 2.11, 2.14, 
2.15, 2.18 and 2.19 suggest a significant, non-linear relationship, the inverted U-shape, 
between firm size and profit performance. On the other hand, a weak U-shape relationship 
between size and cost efficiency is only found in Tables 2.8, 2.10, 2.13 and 2.17. The 
impact of liquidity contributes differently to cost and profit performance, as well. Holding 
more liquid assets increases the insurer’s cost efficiency but decreases its profit efficiency. 
As expected, the coefficient of underwriting income is positive in the profit model, and it 
indicates that better underwriting ability enhances insurers’ profit efficiency. 
 
2.4.2.6 The model’s validity  
   The F-test and the value of adjusted R-squared are reported to show the validity of all 
OLS fixed effects models. The F-test confirms the validity of the model, and the value of 
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adjusted R-squared across all the models is in a reasonable range, consistent with Shim’s 
(2011)’s results. 
 
   To check the validity of all models’ specifications and the instrument variables used in 
the GMM-SYS model, the F-test, AR(1), AR(2) and the Hansen test of overidentification 
restriction are reported in each of the tables. First, the significance of the F-test confirms 
the validity of the model. Then, the Arellano-Bond test confirms the significant AR(1) 
serial correlation and the lack of AR(2) serial correlation across all models. Further, the 
results of the Hansen test indicate that none of the GMM-SYS models are overidentified.   
 
2.4.3 Robustness checks and Sensitivity  
 
2.4.3.1 Aggregated Model for Interactions 
   There are significant differences between life and non-life business regarding 
operations, investments and duration of liabilities (Hoyt and Trieschmann, 1991; Brockett 
et al., 1994; Pottier and Sommer, 1997; Kasman and Turgutlu, 2009). For life insurers, 
Boose (1993) found that only one-third of the profits were generated from investment 
activities. The level of capitalisation is also different between the two sectors (Cummins 
and Sommer, 1996). Zou et al. (2012) also states that life insurers’ future 
obligations/claims should be more predictable than those of non-life insurers due to the 
use of mortality tables in the life sector. These differences make it safe to assume that 
potential impacts on performance will vary between the life and non-life sectors. Thus, a 
dummy variable Life, which indicates life type business by assigning a value of 1, is 
included for this study’s sensitivity and robustness check. 
 
   Managerial control mechanisms also differ between stock insurers and mutual insurers, 
such as the managerial discretion hypothesis and the expense preference hypothesis 
(Mayers and Smith, 1988, 1994). Thus, difference in ownership is likely to significantly 
affect firm performance. Stock insurers separate the functions of managers, owners and 
policyholders and face more conflict of interest issues on operating strategies. In contrast, 
mutual insurers are better able to control conflicts between owners and policyholders 
because they are merged into mutual firms, but their control over owner-manager 
conflicts is much weaker. This may indicate that mutual insurers (managers) have less 
incentives to improve their performance due to limited managerial discretion (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983). Thus, Stock is also included and measured through a dummy variable, 
which assigns a value of 1 for stock insurers and 0 otherwise.   
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   Apart from controlling for the type of business and organisational forms, all individual 
risk factors are also included in the robustness models to check the sensitivity of the 
interactions’ impacts on insurers’ cost and profit efficiencies at an aggregated risk level. 
Tables 2.20, 2.21 and 2.22 show the results from dynamic panel models for the mentioned 
purposes, and the lowercase letters a and b in the headings of the tables represent the cost 
model and profit model, respectively. 
 
   As shown in Tables 2.20 through 2.22, most findings concerning the interaction terms 
are significant and remain constant with the previous results and discussions from section 
2.4.2. However, the exemptions (in bold font) are found in Models 4 and 6 in Table 2.21a 
and Model 2 in Table 2.22b. When all risk factors are considered together, the coefficient 
of Pricing Risk * Capital becomes negative in the cost model (Models 4 and 6 in Table 
2.21a). This contradicts the results from Model 4 in Table 2.15. In turn, the coefficient of 
the interaction between business diversification and reinsurance is insignificant and 
negative in Model 2, Table 2.22b.          
 
   Furthermore, it is worth remembering that Section 2.4.2.4 poses a question when 
considering the impact of Product Risk * Reinsurance on cost efficiency (Tables 2.16 and 
2.17), as no clear indications were confirmed from either the fixed effects or the dynamic 
models. However, this question can now be answered by Table 2.22a, in which Model 1 
confirms that insurers, who are willing to offer more risky products, also tend to use 
reinsurance to optimise their cost structures in the short-run. Neither dummy variable—
business type or organisational form—significantly impacts cost performance. On the 
other hand, they have significant adverse effects on profit function. 
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Table 2.20a: Aggregated Interaction Effects with Investment Risk on Cost Efficiency - GMM   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Cost  Cost  Cost  Cost  Cost  
            
L. Cost Eff. 0.5019*** 0.4773*** 0.5003*** 0.5874*** 0.6153*** 
 (3.390) (2.872) (5.110) (5.147) (5.671) 
Product Risk * Investment Risk  0.7995**    -0.8641 
 (2.050)    (-1.597) 
Diversified Business * Investment Risk   -0.6420***   -0.8763* 
  (-2.767)   (-1.830) 
Diversified Area * Investment Risk    -0.5193*  -0.3326 
   (-1.716)  (-1.069) 
Pricing Risk * Investment Risk     -0.4149* 0.1989 
    (-1.855) (0.714) 
Product Risk  -0.0199** -0.0067 -0.0061 -0.0048 0.0105 
 (-2.279) (-0.778) (-0.678) (-0.577) (1.554) 
Business Diversification 0.0091 0.0209** 0.0195* 0.0009 0.0161 
 (0.853) (2.252) (1.796) (0.135) (1.653) 
Area Diversification -0.0067 0.0031 -0.0002 0.0094** 0.0117* 
 (-1.336) (0.366) (-0.020) (2.008) (1.753) 
Pricing Risk 0.0099*** 0.0116*** 0.0069** 0.0137*** 0.0106** 
 (3.195) (3.301) (2.115) (3.782) (2.590) 
Investment Risk -2.8702** 0.7459** 0.2586 -0.7346 4.4901** 
 (-2.080) (2.381) (0.771) (-1.345) (2.059) 
Firm Size -0.0333 -0.0290 -0.0104 -0.0208 -0.0019 
 (-0.731) (-0.708) (-0.219) (-1.116) (-0.076) 
Square of Firm Size 0.0022 0.0020 0.0005 0.0010 0.0003 
 (0.811) (0.850) (0.181) (0.939) (0.185) 
Liquidity  -0.0033 0.0109 0.0079 0.0083 0.0118 
 (-0.387) (1.110) (1.108) (1.318) (1.519) 
Market Share  -7.0811** -7.5595** -4.1174 -0.6795 -1.2401 
 (-2.338) (-2.178) (-1.545) (-0.433) (-0.611) 
Stock Market Return -0.0360 -0.0330 -0.0359* -0.0248 -0.0198 
 (-1.346) (-1.259) (-1.873) (-1.560) (-1.131) 
GDP per Capita -0.0097** -0.0121** -0.0045 -0.0049 -0.0090** 
 (-1.990) (-2.117) (-1.041) (-0.994) (-2.161) 
Unemployment Rate -0.0062*** -0.0066*** -0.0036** -0.0061*** -0.0041** 
 (-3.235) (-3.271) (-2.256) (-3.545) (-2.018) 
Inflation Rate 0.0050 0.0079* 0.0024 0.0025 0.0053 
 (1.291) (1.827) (0.706) (0.721) (1.246) 
Life -0.0252 -0.0016 0.0464 0.0015 -0.0047 
 (-0.567) (-0.030) (0.315) (0.077) (-0.262) 
Stock 0.0164 0.0090 0.0023 0.0109 -0.0186 
 (1.363) (0.730) (0.065) (1.482) (-1.029) 
Constant 0.7808*** 0.7980*** 0.5200** 0.5594*** 0.4739*** 
 (3.231) (2.761) (2.193) (3.669) (2.720) 
      
Observations 438 438 678 683 438 
Number of Firms 170 170 198 200 170 
Number of Instruments 111 95 103 140 134 
F-test 10.48*** 7.319*** 11.60*** 18.91*** 12.75*** 
AR(1) -1.757* -1.807* -1.905* -1.741* -1.698* 
AR(2) 0.416 0.271 0.419 0.428 0.295 





Table 2.20b: Aggregated Interaction Effects with Investment Risk on Profit Efficiency - GMM 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Profit  Profit  Profit  Profit  Profit  
            
L. Profit Eff. 0.1140* 0.0945* 0.2311* 0.1263* 0.2605* 
 (1.748) (1.659) (1.862) (1.824) (1.839) 
Product Risk * Investment Risk  -0.6661**    -1.6947** 
 (-2.169)    (-1.995) 
Diversified Business * Investment Risk   1.0694**   0.8236 
  (2.118)   (0.737) 
Diversified Area * Investment Risk    0.6779**  -2.2160 
   (2.008)  (-1.111) 
Pricing Risk * Investment Risk     -0.3339* -0.9323* 
    (-1.819) (-1.721) 
Product Risk  0.0108 -0.0113 -0.0211 -0.0204* 0.0122 
 (1.195) (-1.265) (-1.504) (-1.947) (0.816) 
Business Diversification 0.0250 -0.0087 0.0125 0.0029 -0.0198 
 (1.247) (-0.529) (0.841) (0.313) (-0.672) 
Area Diversification 0.0213** 0.0220* 0.0059 0.0024 0.0238 
 (1.998) (1.917) (0.681) (0.219) (0.744) 
Pricing Risk -0.0061 0.0006 -0.0033 0.0012 0.0095 
 (-1.532) (0.106) (-0.608) (0.233) (1.293) 
Investment Risk 2.6738*** -0.6556 -0.4893 -0.9916* 3.8612* 
 (2.749) (-1.074) (-0.662) (-1.946) (1.829) 
Firm Size 0.1447 0.0184 0.0044 -0.0205 0.0339 
 (1.197) (0.368) (0.052) (-0.297) (0.337) 
Square of Firm Size -0.0102 -0.0009 -0.0017 0.0013 -0.0027 
 (-1.364) (-0.307) (-0.332) (0.319) (-0.466) 
Liquidity  0.0070 -0.0046 -0.0249 -0.0081 0.0018 
 (0.492) (-0.568) (-1.221) (-0.758) (0.125) 
Underwriting Income level 0.0261*** 0.0175*** 0.0313** 0.0206*** 0.0429*** 
 (4.836) (2.752) (2.203) (2.771) (3.983) 
Stock Market Return 0.0434 0.1222*** 0.0509 0.1058*** -0.0553 
 (0.924) (3.049) (0.867) (2.642) (-0.802) 
GDP per Capita Growth -0.0061** -0.0071*** -0.0068* -0.0054** -0.0032 
 (-2.096) (-3.093) (-1.673) (-1.974) (-0.885) 
Unemployment Rate -0.0042 -0.0075** -0.0121** -0.0104** -0.0013 
 (-0.892) (-2.185) (-2.316) (-2.385) (-0.199) 
Inflation Rate -0.0147** -0.0092 -0.0128* -0.0116** -0.0236*** 
 (-2.215) (-1.487) (-1.909) (-2.117) (-3.231) 
Concentration  0.6224** 0.7042*** 0.6014* 0.8024*** 0.6218 
 (2.491) (2.741) (1.831) (2.728) (1.591) 
Life -0.0684 -0.1683 -0.1678*** -0.3017*** -0.3646** 
 (-0.228) (-0.898) (-3.215) (-3.786) (-2.226) 
Stock -0.0295 -0.0578* 0.0081 -0.0060 -0.0210 
 (-0.522) (-1.695) (0.370) (-0.219) (-1.030) 
Constant -0.4953 0.0429 0.1440 0.1820 -0.1768 
 (-1.027) (0.194) (0.432) (0.557) (-0.449) 
      
Observations 830 830 827 822 822 
Number of Firms 261 261 260 257 257 
Number of Instruments 117 144 82 166 65 
F-test 5.173*** 4.928*** 12.41*** 11.94*** 11.68*** 
AR(1) -4.112*** -4.245*** -3.898*** -3.993*** -3.290*** 
AR(2) -0.158 0.103 0.351 0.0338 -0.0670 
Hansen Test 98.76 (0.460) 130.3 (0.354) 73.55 (0.171) 142.2 (0.596) 38.77 (0.655) 
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Table 2.21a: Aggregated Interaction Effects with Capital on Cost Efficiency - GMM  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Cost  Cost Cost Cost Cost Cost 
              
L. Cost Eff. 0.4897*** 0.4186*** 0.3646*** 0.4841*** 0.3419*** 0.3737*** 
 (3.593) (3.276) (3.207) (2.836) (3.142) (3.080) 
Product Risk * Capital -0.0137**     -0.0017 
 (-2.013)     (-0.176) 
Diversified Buss * Capital  0.0093*    0.0019 
  (1.868)    (0.200) 
Diversified Area * Capital   0.0214**   0.0169* 
   (2.199)   (1.667) 
Pricing Risk * Capital    -0.0171***  -0.0079** 
    (-3.211)  (-2.224) 
Investment Risk * Capital     1.3030* 0.8288 
     (1.857) (1.236) 
Product Risk  -0.0218** -0.0031 -0.0091 -0.0012 0.0028 -0.0058 
 (-2.231) (-0.650) (-1.039) (-0.128) (0.361) (-0.468) 
Buss Diversification 0.0102 0.0226* -0.0022 0.0098* 0.0074 0.0090 
 (1.093) (1.710) (-0.205) (1.870) (0.845) (0.475) 
Area Diversification -0.0014 -0.0000 0.0356*** 0.0018 -0.0102 0.0304* 
 (-0.195) (-0.007) (2.698) (0.208) (-1.459) (1.768) 
Pricing Risk 0.0074*** 0.0101*** 0.0090*** -0.0161** 0.0100** -0.0026 
 (2.673) (3.511) (2.843) (-2.087) (2.565) (-0.435) 
Investment Risk -0.0534 0.2397 0.3341 0.7922* 1.2359* 0.1021 
 (-0.126) (0.624) (0.695) (1.802) (1.884) (0.164) 
Capital 0.0455 -0.0114* -0.0096 -0.0141 -0.0119 -0.0270 
 (1.478) (-1.788) (-0.930) (-1.255) (-1.060) (-0.751) 
Firm Size -0.0152 -0.0334 -0.0456 0.0318 -0.1236** -0.0389 
 (-0.503) (-0.969) (-1.561) (0.615) (-2.394) (-0.772) 
Square of Firm Size 0.0007 0.0018 0.0023 -0.0017 0.0071** 0.0023 
 (0.424) (0.896) (1.350) (-0.668) (2.456) (0.752) 
Liquidity  0.0201*** 0.0020 0.0139** -0.0011 0.0096 0.0088* 
 (2.955) (0.339) (2.033) (-0.162) (1.556) (1.745) 
Market Share  -2.4141 -4.9524 -2.5819 -3.0904** -3.5101 -4.9485* 
 (-1.506) (-1.415) (-1.259) (-2.150) (-1.545) (-1.700) 
Stock Market Return -0.0284 -0.0654** -0.0017 -0.0184 -0.0150 -0.0240 
 (-1.207) (-2.426) (-0.108) (-1.464) (-0.877) (-1.198) 
GDP per Capita -0.0091** 0.0009 -0.0133*** -0.0014 -0.0145*** -0.0082* 
 (-2.256) (0.187) (-3.857) (-0.259) (-2.683) (-1.797) 
Unemployment Rate -0.0056*** -0.0044** -0.0062*** -0.0024 -0.0066** -0.0053** 
 (-2.845) (-2.409) (-3.748) (-1.113) (-2.599) (-2.459) 
Inflation Rate 0.0090** -0.0020 0.0033 0.0002 0.0078* 0.0019 
 (2.075) (-0.491) (1.104) (0.068) (1.795) (0.413) 
Life 0.0603 -0.0186 -0.0534 0.0340 -0.0571* -0.0375 
 (0.970) (-0.797) (-1.281) (0.640) (-1.964) (-0.992) 
Stock -0.0404 0.0185 0.0167 -0.0231 0.0245* 0.0085 
 (-1.465) (0.619) (1.535) (-0.403) (1.885) (0.734) 
Constant 0.7654*** 0.5250** 1.0161*** 0.2334 1.3037*** 0.7874*** 
 (3.944) (2.316) (5.782) (0.648) (4.990) (2.674) 
       
Observations 665 426 660 665 660 660 
Number of Firms 192 161 190 192 190 190 
Number of Instruments 119 132 118 75 138 119 
F-test 8.136*** 15.78*** 8.125*** 11.88*** 5.471*** 11.15*** 
AR(1) -1.745* -1.654* -1.666* -1.746* -1.681* -1.651* 
AR(2) 0.201 0.149 0.0570 0.550 0.356 0.149 








 Table 2.21b: Aggregated Interaction Effects with Capital on Profit Efficiency - GMM  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Profit Profit Profit Profit Profit Profit 
              
L. Profit Eff. 0.2247* 0.1481* 0.0894* 0.0947* 0.0979* 0.1407* 
 (1.770) (1.748) (1.666) (1.668) (1.659) (1.842) 
Product Risk * Capital -0.0142*     -0.0078 
 (-1.711)     (-1.417) 
Diversified Buss * Capital  0.0185**    0.0154* 
  (2.088)    (1.690) 
Diversified Area * Capital   -0.0155*   -0.0079 
   (-1.713)   (-0.805) 
Pricing Risk * Capital    0.0073*  -0.0013 
    (1.702)  (-0.279) 
Investment Risk * Capital     -2.1046** -1.5288** 
     (-2.034) (-2.158) 
Product Risk  -0.0778** -0.0017 0.0040 -0.0055 0.0088 -0.0114 
 (-2.202) (-0.162) (0.262) (-0.585) (0.964) (-1.032) 
Buss Diversification -0.0326 0.0313* 0.0068 -0.0007 -0.0044 0.0365** 
 (-1.068) (1.707) (0.515) (-0.061) (-0.465) (1.992) 
Area Diversification 0.0176 0.0108 -0.0237 0.0049 0.0019 -0.0160 
 (0.575) (1.484) (-1.188) (0.510) (0.164) (-0.735) 
Pricing Risk 0.0036 0.0000 -0.0014 0.0118 0.0014 -0.0008 
 (0.619) (0.011) (-0.248) (1.328) (0.352) (-0.110) 
Investment Risk -0.7448 -0.0179 0.0525 -0.3284 -1.8200* -1.8293** 
 (-0.580) (-0.044) (0.072) (-0.539) (-1.667) (-2.287) 
Capital 0.0609** 0.0113 0.0160* 0.0335*** 0.0260* 0.0590** 
 (2.094) (0.802) (1.662) (2.854) (1.867) (2.252) 
Firm Size -0.0496 0.1213 0.0760 0.0980 0.0629 0.0778 
 (-0.341) (1.407) (0.890) (1.334) (1.132) (0.828) 
Square of Firm Size 0.0046 -0.0075 -0.0053 -0.0055 -0.0034 -0.0053 
 (0.509) (-1.491) (-1.027) (-1.226) (-0.983) (-0.931) 
Liquidity  0.0313 -0.0094 -0.0122 -0.0088 -0.0032 -0.0357* 
 (1.073) (-1.363) (-1.476) (-1.051) (-0.293) (-1.969) 
Underwriting Income level 0.0303** 0.0261*** 0.0192*** 0.0177*** 0.0234*** 0.0254*** 
 (2.268) (3.006) (2.743) (3.247) (4.040) (4.080) 
Stock Market Return -0.0247 0.0677 0.1074*** 0.1121** 0.0812** 0.0853* 
 (-0.350) (1.491) (2.750) (2.404) (2.179) (1.780) 
GDP per Capita Growth 0.0002 -0.0046* -0.0063** -0.0059** -0.0032 -0.0057* 
 (0.051) (-1.675) (-2.457) (-2.156) (-1.316) (-1.955) 
Unemployment Rate -0.0022 -0.0080** -0.0108*** -0.0082** -0.0059 -0.0104** 
 (-0.348) (-2.202) (-2.703) (-2.321) (-1.561) (-2.585) 
Inflation Rate -0.0173* -0.0183*** -0.0079 -0.0100* -0.0089* -0.0099* 
 (-1.905) (-3.551) (-1.364) (-1.756) (-1.692) (-1.842) 
Concentration  0.9418** 0.7036** 0.6326** 0.8663*** 0.4758* 0.6817** 
 (2.181) (2.208) (2.485) (3.081) (1.899) (2.458) 
Life -0.6130 -0.2380** -0.1548*** -0.2154*** -0.2408*** -0.1526*** 
 (-1.379) (-2.246) (-2.740) (-4.980) (-5.867) (-2.715) 
Stock -0.1305* -0.0336** -0.0250* -0.0312** -0.0327** -0.0084 
 (-1.662) (-2.278) (-1.676) (-1.984) (-2.497) (-0.408) 
Constant 0.3780 -0.4032 -0.1524 -0.3191 -0.1645 -0.1686 
 (0.627) (-1.277) (-0.410) (-1.016) (-0.737) (-0.483) 
       
Observations 206 802 794 802 802 799 
Number of Firms 119 252 248 252 252 251 
Number of Instruments 84 132 143 161 144 148 
F-test 3.874*** 11.13*** 11.48*** 12.48*** 17.67*** 9.693*** 
AR(1) -3.283*** -4.034*** -4.305*** -4.118*** -4.160*** -4.487*** 
AR(2) -0.539 -0.0879 0.172 0.0215 0.304 0.278 
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 Table 2.22a : Aggregated Interaction Effects with Reinsurance on Cost Efficiency - GMM  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Cost  Cost  Cost  Cost  Cost  Cost  
              
L. Cost Eff. 0.6037*** 0.3945*** 0.5161*** 0.5840*** 0.3923*** 0.6563*** 
 (5.242) (3.399) (4.682) (6.585) (4.117) (5.264) 
Product Risk * Reinsurance 0.0060**     0.0025 
 (2.253)     (0.983) 
Diversified Buss * Reinsurance  0.0101*    0.0028 
  (1.665)    (0.739) 
Diversified Area * Reinsurance   -0.0059**   -0.0041** 
   (-1.984)   (-2.077) 
Pricing Risk * Reinsurance    0.0047**  -0.0004 
    (2.028)  (-0.258) 
Investment Risk * Reinsurance     -0.6093** 0.0060 
     (-1.979) (0.013) 
Product Risk  0.0075 -0.0085 -0.0043 -0.0045 -0.0007 0.0066 
 (0.903) (-1.151) (-0.578) (-0.575) (-0.089) (1.181) 
Buss Diversification -0.0121 0.0101 0.0100 -0.0085 -0.0071 0.0014 
 (-1.438) (0.791) (1.209) (-0.941) (-0.810) (0.138) 
Area Diversification -0.0024 -0.0010 -0.0042 0.0131* 0.0039 -0.0071*** 
 (-0.466) (-0.111) (-0.591) (1.728) (0.631) (-2.620) 
Pricing Risk 0.0039 0.0074* 0.0151*** 0.0103*** 0.0080** 0.0092** 
 (1.257) (1.658) (3.252) (3.318) (2.455) (2.289) 
Investment Risk -0.1474 0.1944 0.3257 0.2013 -0.0203 -0.0234 
 (-0.312) (0.384) (0.551) (0.405) (-0.021) (-0.034) 
Reinsurance -0.0161 0.0140*** 0.0107** 0.0124** 0.0120*** -0.0017 
 (-1.442) (2.625) (2.099) (2.538) (2.891) (-0.180) 
Firm Size 0.0189 -0.0346 -0.0168 0.0529 -0.0183 0.0076 
 (0.331) (-0.592) (-0.383) (1.481) (-0.390) (0.203) 
Square of Firm Size -0.0009 0.0018 0.0010 -0.0028 0.0004 -0.0000 
 (-0.275) (0.512) (0.394) (-1.370) (0.140) (-0.018) 
Liquidity  0.0053 0.0098 0.0038 0.0061 0.0039 0.0056 
 (0.782) (1.649) (0.577) (0.867) (0.546) (0.771) 
Market Share  0.1675 -3.8656 -4.6409* -2.6257 -0.7153 -1.5511 
 (0.076) (-1.183) (-1.788) (-1.647) (-0.509) (-0.566) 
Stock Market Return -0.0380** -0.0127 -0.0010 -0.0315*** -0.0009 -0.0057 
 (-2.409) (-0.803) (-0.057) (-2.641) (-0.054) (-0.419) 
GDP per Capita -0.0069 -0.0090** -0.0068 -0.0017 -0.0082** -0.0090** 
 (-1.224) (-2.223) (-1.210) (-0.439) (-2.481) (-2.192) 
Unemployment Rate -0.0042** -0.0046** -0.0041* -0.0036* -0.0019 -0.0049*** 
 (-2.204) (-2.518) (-1.831) (-1.828) (-1.127) (-2.621) 
Inflation Rate -0.0016 0.0057 0.0020 -0.0044 0.0033 0.0043 
 (-0.370) (1.391) (0.414) (-1.568) (0.813) (1.524) 
Life -0.0595 0.0083 -0.0026 0.0471 0.0306 -0.0258 
 (-0.934) (0.206) (-0.085) (0.844) (1.109) (-0.636) 
Stock -0.0283 0.0419 0.0068 -0.0032 0.0087 -0.0369* 
 (-0.815) (1.072) (0.561) (-0.322) (0.901) (-1.734) 
Constant 0.3880 0.8213*** 0.6182*** 0.1468 0.7427*** 0.4431** 
 (1.394) (2.797) (2.664) (0.671) (2.967) (2.195) 
       
Observations 600 600 250 596 600 389 
Number of Firms 182 182 122 180 182 154 
Number of Instruments 101 101 87 100 101 135 
F-test 7.798*** 12.05*** 16.64*** 12.68*** 6.704*** 13.96*** 
AR(1) -2.929*** -2.663*** -2.884*** -3.117*** -2.701*** -2.935*** 
AR(2) -1.167 -1.126 -0.771 -0.964 -0.770 -0.795 





 Table 2.22b: Aggregated Interaction Effects with Reinsurance on Profit Efficiency - GMM  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
VARIABLES Profit Profit Profit Profit Profit Profit 
              
L. Profit Eff. 0.0956* 0.2149** 0.1442* 0.1404* 0.2035* 0.1305** 
 (1.967) (2.127) (1.967) (1.788) (1.819) (1.998) 
Product Risk * Reinsurance 0.4691*     0.5890* 
 (1.897)     (1.960) 
Diversified Buss * Reinsurance  -0.3683    -0.0992 
  (-1.562)    (-0.355) 
Diversified Area * Reinsurance   0.2169*   0.1507* 
   (1.838)   (1.957) 
Pricing Risk * Reinsurance    0.1308*  -0.0514 
    (1.744)  (-0.759) 
Investment Risk * Reinsurance     12.1673* 31.7499 
     (1.800) (1.580) 
Product Risk  -0.0133 -0.0341** -0.0055 -0.0062 -0.0222** -0.0042 
 (-1.262) (-2.038) (-0.704) (-0.715) (-2.007) (-0.321) 
Buss Diversification -0.0015 0.0070 -0.0076 -0.0109 -0.0108 -0.0001 
 (-0.087) (0.435) (-0.577) (-0.933) (-1.044) (-0.009) 
Area Diversification 0.0168 -0.0038 0.0084 0.0124 0.0159 0.0169* 
 (1.491) (-0.284) (0.653) (1.389) (1.634) (1.821) 
Pricing Risk 0.0012 -0.0094 -0.0031 0.0006 -0.0055 0.0007 
 (0.304) (-1.316) (-0.719) (0.159) (-1.450) (0.158) 
Investment Risk 0.3361 -0.3898 0.1008 -0.1277 0.1060 0.0788 
 (0.515) (-0.396) (0.294) (-0.336) (0.286) (0.125) 
Reinsurance -1.7709** 0.2537 -0.0649*** 0.3274 -0.1234*** -2.4613** 
 (-1.997) (1.303) (-2.666) (1.275) (-2.665) (-1.981) 
Firm Size -0.0607 -0.0337 -0.0099 -0.0789 0.0546 0.0440 
 (-0.951) (-0.250) (-0.215) (-1.332) (1.307) (0.564) 
Square of Firm Size 0.0036 0.0016 0.0002 0.0042 -0.0048* -0.0023 
 (0.835) (0.202) (0.075) (1.189) (-1.752) (-0.436) 
Liquidity  -0.0072 0.0039 -0.0013 -0.0066 0.0012 -0.0028 
 (-0.845) (0.265) (-0.091) (-0.755) (0.134) (-0.332) 
Underwriting Income level 0.0244*** 0.0286*** 0.0241*** 0.0274*** 0.0260*** 0.0154** 
 (4.351) (3.571) (3.261) (3.832) (3.777) (2.122) 
Stock Market Return 0.1143*** -0.0854 0.0662 0.0885* 0.0526 0.0923** 
 (2.598) (-1.335) (1.407) (1.843) (1.310) (2.151) 
GDP per Capita Growth -0.0062** 0.0007 -0.0029 -0.0039 -0.0024 -0.0032 
 (-2.308) (0.177) (-1.024) (-1.618) (-0.980) (-1.263) 
Unemployment Rate -0.0102*** 0.0004 -0.0081** -0.0073** -0.0049 -0.0067** 
 (-2.857) (0.079) (-2.374) (-2.273) (-1.307) (-2.027) 
Inflation Rate -0.0082 -0.0244*** -0.0171*** -0.0180*** -0.0177*** -0.0127** 
 (-1.232) (-2.689) (-3.113) (-3.022) (-3.174) (-2.156) 
Concentration  0.9209*** 0.7197* 0.8957*** 1.0775*** 0.5246** 0.7991*** 
 (3.277) (1.763) (3.616) (4.050) (2.105) (2.836) 
Life -0.2930*** -0.2557 -0.2773** -0.3038*** -0.2553*** -0.2430*** 
 (-4.593) (-0.959) (-2.471) (-5.488) (-4.678) (-2.649) 
Stock -0.0209 -0.0189 -0.0261 -0.0121 -0.0371 -0.0287* 
 (-1.255) (-0.364) (-0.666) (-0.323) (-1.099) (-1.901) 
Constant 0.2696 0.2397 0.0766 0.2839 0.0334 -0.1453 
 (1.149) (0.406) (0.410) (1.230) (0.180) (-0.511) 
       
Observations 801 373 799 799 795 799 
Number of Firms 250 169 249 249 247 249 
Number of Instruments 116 99 111 124 116 121 
F-test 13.61*** 3.401*** 11.46*** 20.39*** 9.920*** 22.92*** 
AR(1) -4.421*** -3.308*** -4.040*** -3.933*** -3.382*** -4.171*** 
AR(2) 0.289 -0.263 0.142 0.181 0.0534 0.321 
Hansen Test 106.6 (0.216) 87.72 (0.235) 107.5 (0.114) 101.6 (0.550) 103.8 (0.275) 104.7 (0.278) 
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Section 2.5 Conclusion  
 
As mentioned by Kielholz (2000), underwriting and investment strategies are 
fundamental factors affecting insurer performance. Starting from this view, the present 
research discusses how these two strategies influence UK insurers’ performance from the 
risk perspective. Four indicators are used to represent underwriting strategies (risks), and 
the uncertainty of investment return indicates the level of investment risk. The 
summarised results from Panel A in Table 2.23 confirm that both underwriting and 
investment strategies are crucial determinants of insurer performance from both cost and 
profit perspectives. Specifically, issuing more risky business will damage both cost and 
profit efficiencies, while the positive impact is observed from business diversification. 
The impacts from geographic diversification and investment risk are mixed for both the 
cost and profit performance.  
 
   The impacts of interaction between underwriting and investment strategies are also 
determined in this research, and the results reveal that short-term investment volatility 
takes the dominant role in cost function. On the other hand, from the profit point of view, 
the benefit of diversification can overcome short-term investment volatility. Further, the 
effect of accepting investment risk is positive for the insurer’s profit efficiency, and this 
beneficial impact is amplified by taking additional investment risk. 
 
    To manage the individual impacts (risks/benefits) arising from underwriting and 
investment activities, building adequate capital and purchasing reinsurance are likely to 
be the primary choices for insurers. The beneficial effects of holding capital and using 
reinsurance on cost performance are determined here, as shown in Table 2.30. However, 
these two risk-management tools have contradictory impacts on profit performance. 
Meanwhile, the significant effects arising from the interplay between risk-taking 
activities (underwriting and investment) and risk management (using capital and 
reinsurance) on the insurer’s performance are also proved, as presented in Panels C and 
D. These findings further indicate that using capital would be more helpful for improving 
the insurer’s cost performance, and the usage of reinsurance may be more beneficial for 
enhancing profit efficiency.  Apart from the above results, further cautions must be made: 
there is a difference between long-term and short-term behaviours associated with some 
of the factors, as revealed by the results of the OLS fixed effects and dynamic models. 
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Table 2.23: Summary of Hypotheses and Results 
Hypotheses 
Expected Sign  
on Cost  
Result   
Expected Sign  
on Profit  
Results 
Panel A: Hypotheses 1-6 
Product Risk - -  + - 
Diversified Business + +  + + 
Diversified Area + -  + + 
Pricing Risk - +  - - 
Investment Risk - -  + + 
Capital - +  N/A + 
Reinsurance  - +  + -       
Panel B: Hypothesis 7 – Interactions with Investment Risk 
Product Risk * Investment Risk  N/A +  N/A - 
Diversified Business * Investment Risk  N/A -  N/A + 
Diversified Area * Investment Risk  N/A -  N/A + 
Pricing Risk * Investment Risk  N/A -  N/A -       
Panel C: Hypothesis 8 – Interactions with Capital  
Product Risk * Capital N/A -  N/A - 
Diversified Business * Capital N/A +  N/A + 
Diversified Area * Capital N/A +  N/A - 
Pricing Risk * Capital N/A +  N/A + 
Investment Risk * Capital N/A +  N/A -       
Panel D: Hypothesis 8 - Interactions with Reinsurance  
Product Risk * Reinsurance N/A +  N/A + 
Diversified Business * Reinsurance N/A +  N/A - 
Diversified Area * Reinsurance N/A -  N/A + 
Pricing Risk * Reinsurance N/A +  N/A + 
Investment Risk * Reinsurance N/A -   N/A + 
 
   Thus, this study can provide insights for managers and regulators on the driving forces 
of performance in the UK insurance market. In particular, managers can set up appropriate 
operational strategies to achieve better developments. It is also suggested that the links 
between strategies play a vital role, and this should be considered by the regulators when 
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CHAPTER 3: What Drives the U.K. Insurers’ Capital Structure? The 





   This chapter determines the factors affecting on the insurers’ capital structure in the UK 
market, concerning both internal and external factors. To be more specific, the insurers’ 
behaviours – i.e. the past level of leverage, retained earnings, operating volatilities and 
the usage of reinsurance – are considered as internal factors, while different concepts of 
market structure are the external factors. Three measurements, the Boone indicator, the 
Lerner index and the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI), represent the features of market 
structure from different perspectives, i.e. the market competition, the pricing power (or 
the market power) and the market concentration. First, the result of these measurements 
reveal that the UK insurance market is competitive; and further suggest that either the 
strength of pricing power or the intensity of market concentration might be originated 
from the intensity of competition.  
 
   By focusing on the UK insurance market from 1998 to 2017, the OLS fixed-effect and 
two-step system GMM dynamic panel estimators have applied to exam the impacts of 
both internal and external factors on the insurer’s capital structure. The results from 
estimations not only confirm the significant influences from the targeted factors, but also 
reveal that different market structure indicators represent various concepts of the market, 
and they are not mutually exclusive. Unlike previous studies, the interaction terms 
between the internal factors and three market structure indicators (separately) are 
included in the regressions to confirm that the impacts of internal behaviours on capital 
structure vary according to the changes in market structure. In order words, the market 
structure has different impacts on the insurers’ capital structure via different channels 
(insurers’ behaviour). In addition, there are evidences to support that a non-linear 
relationship exists between the individual concept of market structure and the insurers’ 
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Section 3.1 Introduction 
 
   Since the early 1990s, the European insurance market has adopted a series of financial 
reforms, such as the 1994 Deregulation, the 2002 Solvency I, the 2004 Financial 
Conglomerates Directive, the 2007 Reinsurance Directive and the 2016 Solvency II.1 The 
primary goal is to stimulate economic growth and improve individual welfare. One 
consequence of these European Union (EU)-wide regulatory changes, is a wave of 
mergers and acquisitions (M&As) in the European insurance industry since deregulation 
(Fenn et al., 2008), indicating a change in market structure. From another perspective, a 
dramatic environmental change resulting from these regulatory developments is that 
competition is higher in systems with more freedom (Schaeck and Cihák, 2014).  
 
   Liberalisation—which is generally associated with increasing foreign rivals, the new 
presence of large firms and improved diversification ability—also results in an 
increasingly competitive market (e.g., Turk Ariss (2008); Delis (2012); Alhassan and 
Biekpe (2017). Thus, it has a further, positive effect on customers by offering various 
choices for insurance products (Cummins and Rubio-Misas, 2006). Eventually, insurers 
must improve their business/management practices and become more prudent due to 
these external pressures and further provide momentum to the economic system.2 From 
the supervision perspective, the issues of market structure (e.g., the degree of competition 
or concertation) have attracted significant attention in the financial sectors, not only 
because of the recent financial crisis but because they are a useful regulatory tool 
influencing individual players and the financial system.  
 
   Extensive literature investigates the importance of market structure in the financial 
industry from different perspectives. 3  For example, the relationship between market 
competition and firm performance (profitability), a well known structure-performance 
hypothesis, is much discussed in both banking and the insurance industry (Joskow, 1973; 
 
1 A brief introduction of some of these reforms is presented in Appendix 3. 
2 By studying the relationship between the growth in insurance and the economic system, Hou, Cheng and 
Yu (2012) use fixed effects to argue that both life business and banking activity can predict economic 
growth in the Euro zone. Lee, Lee and Chiu (2013) and Chang, Lee and Chang (2014) also confirm that 
there iinsurance activities enhance economic growth, which is in line with Ward and Zurbruegg’s (2000) 
major findings.  
3 Claessens (2009) provides a detailed review of competition in financial sectors. He discusses the nature 
of competition in the financial market, the importance of competition and its relativity with other factors 
(e.g., firm specific or policy-related), etc. 
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Lloyd-Williams, Molyneux and Thornton, 1994; Choi and Weiss, 2005; De Jonghe and 
Vennet, 2008; Pope and Ma, 2008; Njegomir and Stojić, 2011; Bikker, 2016). 
 
   Another actively debated topic is the impact of market structure on individual stability,1 
which can be described by the competition-fragility hypothesis and the competition-
stability hypothesis. The former indicates that higher competition damages a firm’s 
stability, while the latter expresses the opposite. Schaeck, Cihák and Wolfe (2009) and 
Liu, Mirzaei and Vandoros (2014) study the impact of banking competition on the 
aggregated market level and indicate that competition boosts systemic stability (e.g., in 
banking) and economic growth, respectively.   
 
   Apart from the competitive effects arising from deregulations, Solvency II, which was 
launched in 2016 across the EU and is an international type of regulatory regime, also 
aims at creating a uniform playing field by establishing identical rules for all joining 
members—enabling a fair, cross-board competitive environment. Indeed, the primary 
goal of Solvency II is to strengthen the insurers’ soundness via maintaining capital 
adequacy matched to insurers’ risk levels, thereby fulfilling future obligations conducted 
at the enterprise level. Staking and Babbel (1995) share a similar view, arguing that 
increasing the level of capitalisation should be one of the important signals of having 
abilities to meet long-term commitments. Cummins and Nini (2002) state that insurers 
hold equity capital because they face uncertainties from future cash flows—either inflows 
or outflows from written business and investment. A similar view is expressed by 
Brockett et al. (2004b, 2005) and Kasman and Turgutlu (2011), who mention that equity 
capital serve as a cushion against unexpected losses that might exceed collected premiums. 
Then, policyholders may face a lower default rate when they purchase policies from 
insurers with more capital (Brockett et al., 2005). 
 
   Academic researchers have also long paid much attention to various topics related to 
financial firms’ capital from different perspectives—revealing the importance of the 
capital structure.2 As suggested by Jensen (1986), financing debt capital might allow 
managers to manage a firm’s future free cash flows effectively and reduce agency cost 
 
1 Studies investigating the impact of competition on financial firms’ stability include Berger, Klapper and 
Turk-Ariss (2009); Ye et al. (2009); Hakenes and Schnabel (2011); Fu, Lin and Molyneux (2014); Kasman 
and Kasman (2015); Fernández, González and Suárez (2016); and Cummins, Rubio-Misas and Vencappa 
(2017). 
2 Kielholz (2000) and Dhaene et al. (2017) provide detailed reviews of insurers’ capital structure.  
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by setting restrictions on the manager’s ability to spend free cash flows. Adams and 
Buckle (2003) and Luhnen (2009) confirm this free-cash-flow hypothesis in insurance 
markets, whilst Alhassan and Biekpe (2015) and Biener, Eling and Wirfs (2016) find 
evidence to support Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) conflicts of interest hypothesis,1 which 
indicates a negative relationship between debt capital and insurer performance. The 
adverse impact of capital (leverage) on firms’ franchise (market) value has also 
determined by Staking and Babbel (1995) in the property-liability (PL) insurance industry, 
and they explain that this effect depends on the trade-off between tax advantage and the 
cost of default associated with increased leverage. From another perspective, Cummins 
and Lamm-Tennant (1994) suggest that insurers’ leverage should be considered when 
using the cost of equity to determine premium levels, as the cost of equity is sensitive to 
leverage.  
 
   It is also true that insurers may face debt overhang2 and asset substitution3 issues if they 
hold too much debt (too little equity) because of the merger of debtholders and 
policyholders in the insurance industry (Dhaene et al., 2017). Cheng and Weiss (2012) 
also point out that overhang issues (or conflicts between shareholders and policyholders) 
are detrimental for insurance business strategies, such attracting new business. In fact, 
Cummins and Nini (2002) find that most insurers overutilise equity capital in the US 
market. However, the cost of taxation is incurred by holding equity (Cummins and Grace, 
1994; Cheng and Weiss, 2012a). Kielholz (2000) also notes that holding too much equity 
could be expensive due to transaction costs (e.g., commission fees for issuing equity), 
agency costs and taxation. Therefore, one of the major concerns of insurers is determining 
the optimal capital structure and discovering the factors affecting it. 
 
 
1 Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that the optimal capital structure is determined by a trade-off between 
owner-manager conflict and owner-policyholder conflict. They indicate a negative relationship between 
leverage and performance relationship due to disputes between debtholders (policyholders) and 
shareholders (owners). This implies that higher leverage leads to lower performance. 
2 Due to conflict between debtholders and shareholders, in which debtholders’ claims to assets have priority 
over shareholders’ claims, two problems may arise. The manager is unable to make new investments, or 
the shareholders are unlikely to add extra capital because of the leverage position and the increased amounts 
paid to debtholders. This is the debt overhang issue (or underinvestment problem) (Myers, 1977).  
3 Asset substitution, or the problem of risk shifting, is the second agency issue arising from increasing the 
leverage level (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). It indicates that both managers and shareholders have 
incentives to take more risky investments associated with a high rate of return but a low rate of success. 
Thus, in the case of investment fails, debtholders bear most of the losses—e.g., loss of interest and 
principle—whereas shareholders reap most of the returns if investments succeed.  
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Regarding an insurer’s optimal capital structure and the factors affecting its capital 
structure, two popular theories, trade-off theory and pecking order theory,1 can be used to 
explain the choice of the insurer’s capital structure. Testing the existence of trade-off 
theory can indicate whether the insurer is seeking to build up an optimal capital structure. 
On the other hand, the pecking order theory assumes no optimal capital structure and 
further indicates that the external financing is more costly than internal financing sources 
due to information asymmetries. Cheng and Weiss (2012) are the first to directly test both 
trade-off and pecking order theories in the PL insurance market. Then, Dhaene et al. 
(2017) provide a detailed discussion and review on the applicability of these theories to 
the insurance industry. 
 
     Apart from the above theory, Cummins and Doherty (2002) also provide evidence that 
both firm-specific factors and regulatory factors are essential to determining capitalisation. 
Cummins and Lamm-Tennant (1994) and Zanjani (2002) denote that insurers’ business 
natures impact the cost of equity and amount of capital holding, respectively. Cummins 
and Sommer (1996), Baranoff and Sager (2002, 2003) and Baranoff, Papadopoulos and 
Sager (2007) study the relationship between capital holding and different risk factors. Hu 
and Yu (2015) investigate the significant interplay among capital, risk and firm efficiency 
in Taiwan’s life market, and a similar study is developed by Mankaï and Belgacem (2016), 
who establish the triangular relationship between risk, capital and reinsurance level in the 
US PL insurance market. The reason for including reinsurance purchased is that it can be 
treated as a substitute for insurer capital (Berger, Cummins and Tennyson, 1992; Plantin, 
2006; Shiu, 2011). 
 
   Note that the definition of capital is ambiguous or unclear in the insurance market. One 
source of capital can be called the traditional type, such as funds raised from both 
shareholders and debtholders; on the other hand, based on the way insurers’ operatins run, 
 
1 Based on Modigliani and Miller’s (1958) irrelevance proposition, the trade-off theory predicts that a firm 
can achieve optimal capital structure by considering the trade-off between the benefit and cost associated 
with holding capital. In contrast, Myers (1984) develops the pecking order theory based on Donaldson’s 
(1961) work, discovering that the preference of financing sources was raised because of informational 
asymmetries between firms’ managers and external investors. Although there are other theories for 
explaining a firm’s capital structure, such as market timing theory (Baker and Wurgler, 2002) or stock 
return theory (Welch, 2004), these are not applicable in the UK insurance industry because the market value 
associated with firms’ elements are not available as most insurers are not publicly traded. 
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policyholders are also dominant suppliers of capital, 1  providing insurance leverage 
(Cummins and Lamm-Tennant, 1994; Pope and Ma, 2008). Therefore, it is reasonable to 
assume that there is a connection between market structure and an insurer’s capital 
structure. To be more specific, the insurer’s underwriting ability (or performance) will be 
affected by the level of competition,2 which further affects a firm’s capital structure. 
 
   Brander and Lewis (1986), Maksimovic (1988) and Showalter (1999) provide a 
theoretical framework connecting a firm’s capital structure and market behaviour. The 
impact of market structure on a firm’s capital structure (leverage, in most of the studies) 
has been found in product market studies, including Chevalier (1995); Phillips (1995); 
Rathinasamy, Krishnaswamy and Mantripragada (2000); Pandey (2004); Guney, Li and 
Fairchild (2011); and Sarkar (2014), among others. 
 
   Claessens (2009) suggests that competition could be facilitated, not only by 
liberalisation, but also by removing barriers, such as lowering costs for consumers and 
small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). One of the significant costs insurers 
consider originates from the capital structure; the cost of capital is essential for both 
investors and insurance managers. Kielholz (2000) also recognises that deregulation 
should have a substantial effect on capital cost, and Fenn et al. (2008) share a similar 
presumption, which assumes that a competitive market, resulting from deregulation, 
drives down costs via increasing insurers’ efficiency. 
 
   However, this specific relationship shared by the market structure and the firm’s capital 
structure has received far less attention in the financial market, and the banking industry 
has typically been the major investigated target (Berger, Klapper and Turk-Ariss, 2009; 
Allen, Carletti and Marquez, 2011; Soedarmono, Machrouh and Tarazi, 2011; Schaeck 
and Cihák, 2012; Beck, De Jonghe and Schepens, 2013a; Schaeck and Cihák, 2014; Akins 
 
1 The premiums paid by policyholders are pooled together to pay future qualified claims or benefits. 
Therefore, within the context of policyholder roles, he/she is not only a product buyer but also a supplier 
of capital to be used to pay claims or write more businesses.  
2 The relationship between market structure and firm performance can be tested by the concentration-profit 
hypothess developed by Bain (1951), the collusion theory formalised by Stigler (1964) or the most 
commonly known framework, the structure-conduct-performance hypothesis. See studies from Joskow 
(1973); Chidambaran, Pugel and Saunders (1997); Bajtelsmit and Bouzouita (1998); Choi and Weiss (2005); 
Hussels, Ward and Zurbruegg (2005); Pope and Ma (2008); and Alhassan, Addisson and Asamoah (2015), 
among others. 
P a g e  | 129 
 
et al., 2016). 1  Only Cummins, Rubio-Misas and Vencappa (2017), when studying 
insurers’ stability, indirectly focus on exploring this relationship in the European life 
insurance industry. 
 
   This chapter mainly contributes to ongoing discussions on insurers’ capital structure  
(Campello, 2003; Shiu, 2011; Cheng and Weiss, 2012a; Altuntas, Berry-Stölzle and 
Wende, 2015; Dhaene et al., 2017). The main aim of this chapter is to reveal the impacts 
of potential factors on insurers’ capital structure. To be more specific, Internal factors 
include insurer’s past leverage level, retained earnings, volatilities and the use of 
reinsurance, while external factor is the market structure. Moreover, both internal factors 
and external factor will be simultaneously considered to test the interaction effects. The 
expected results will help the regulator and insurers to consider their behaviours when the 
market structure is changed. Cummins, Rubio-Misas and Vencappa (2017)use the Boone 
indicator to measure the degree of competition from 1999 to 2011, and they find that the 
competition level actually deteriorated in the EU life market. Nearly two decades after 
the adoption of the Third Insurance Directive, it is important to reconsider the market 
structure status in the UK insurance market due to both its global significance and the 
most recent political change. 
 
   Then, several contributions can be made to the literature. Firstly, in contrast to the 
financial studies on capital structure, such as those focusing on the banking industry, there 
is relatively little investigation on determinants of insurers’ capital structure. Secondly, 
the impact of market structure (e.g., competition) on an insurer’s capital structure is 
ambiguous. It is important to fill the gap. Therefore, the main contribution of this study 
is to determine how market structure affects UK insurers’ capital structure directly and 
indirectly—for example, considering the individual effect of market structure and its 
interactions with firm-specific characteristics on the UK insurance market’s capital 
structure. Third, this chapter responds to measurement issues and employs Boone 
indicator, Lerner Index and HHI as market structure measures. By implying three 
different indicators, it provides a comprehensive picture of market structure in the UK 
insurance industry. Fourth, in comparison to other capital studies related to the UK market, 
 
1 Among these studies, only Schaeck and Cihák (2012) and Allen, Carletti and Marquez (2011) provide 
detailed discussions and tests directly concerning the impact of competition on banks’ capital ratios. 
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the sample used in this chapter can be considered the largest, and its acquired data are 
also the most recent and the widest in coverage regarding time (from 1998 to 2017). 
 
   The results confirm the significant influences from the targeted factors, and further 
suggest that different market structure indicators represent various concepts of the market. 
Moreover, it is worth to note that the impact of internal behaviours on capital structure 
varies according to the changes in market structure. Thus, these findings will have 
meaningful significance for both individual participants and national policymakers. For 
example, policymakers can use these results to develop effective regulations, which 
consider various concepts of market structure and its potencial influences on insurers’ 
behaviours. Insurers can develop more effective strategies by considering the aggregated 
effects arising from external pressures and capital requirements, especially when making 
plans related to firms’ cost structures and stability. As a result, the insurance industry can 
be expected to be more beneficial to both customers and the economic system.  
 
   The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 outlines the literature on 
relevant topics and develops the key hypotheses. Section 3.3 presents data and 
methodology and specifically discuss how to measure market competition. The UK’s 
degree of insurance competition will be reported in the first part of Section 3.4, and the 
second part will illustrate the empirical results. Section 3.5 will conclude the chapter. 
 
Section 3.2 Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
 
3.2.1 Capital Structure: Trade-Off and Pecking Order Theories 
   First, to better understand the choice of capital structure in the UK insurance market,  
two prevailing theories, the trade-off and the pecking order theories, are tested (see 
surveys on both theories from Harris and Raviv (1991), Frank and Goyal (2008) and 
Dhaene et al. (2017).  
 
   The trade-off theory has been developed based on Modigliani and Miller’s (1958) logic, 
which argues that a firm’s value (i.e., the total value of equity and debt) and its capital 
structure are irrelevant to each other under friction-free assumptions.1 It assumes that the 
firm’s capital structure is defined by predetermined investment decisions. Thus, the 
available free cashflow to be paid to the financial provider is fixed, after considering all 
 
1 For example, the market is perfect and efficient, with no tax costs or transaction costs involved. 
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other stakeholders. Therefore, a firm’s value is irrelevant to its capital structure. However, 
these friction-free assumptions are not realistic, and capital structure affects the available 
amount of free cashflow, which can be distributed to different capital suppliers.  
 
   Considering the above logic together with Modigliani and Miller’s (1963) tax shield 
effect and Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) agency cost theory,1 the trade-off theory posits 
that a firm seeks to balance the benefits against the cost of holding leverage to achieve 
maximised value, and the firm takes actions to return to this optimum balanced level when 
it deviates from it. Thus, a firm should have an optimal capital structure (Cagle and 
Harrington, 1995; Cummins and Danzon, 1997). 
    
   On the other hand, Myers’s (1984) pecking order theory presumes no optimal capital 
structure and is developed based on Donaldson’s (1961) results. According to this theory, 
the firm prefers internal financing sources over external sources for two reasons. First, 
the cost of external financing is greater than the cost of internal financing, due to 
information asymmetries that arise from differences in understanding the true value of 
assets between the managers (the firm) and external investors. Secondly, managers must 
act in the interests of current shareholders, and annoucning new issuing is harmful to 
current shareholders. Under the pecking order theory, firms would first like to use up 
retained earnings, followed by debts, and use equity as a last resort (Dhaene et al., 2017).   
 
In the extant empirical literature, Pandey (2004) indicates that both behaviours exist in 
his study. Jacques and Nigro (1997) find a very slow adjustment for capital ratios to a 
bank’s desired level, with an adjusting speed of approximately 0.035. Flannery and 
Rangan (2006) find the existence of trade-off behaviour, as they present evidence that 
nonfinancial firms identify and pursue the target capital structure. Although Huang and 
Ritter (2009) find support for firms adjusting their leverage levels to the target, they have 
stronger evidence to support the market timing hypothesis. Chang et al. (2015) also state 
that firms operated in a competitive industry quickly adjust their leverage towards 
targeted levels.  
 
   In contrast, Fama and French (2002) find evidence to support the pecking order theory. 
By comparing the UK and Italian markets, Panno (2003) also confirms the existence of 
 
1 The former indicates that there is a beneficial tax treatment, and the latter complements the viewpoint 
concerning the tax-bankruptcy balance. 
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the pecking order theory and further reveals that firms might have a long-term leverage 
ratio in the UK market. Later, by testing French manufacturing firms, Margaritis and 
Psillaki (2010) also reveal signs of the pecking order theory. Lemmon and Zender (2010) 
prove this behaviour as well. as well, and they also argue that undercapitalised firms must 
raise equity because they are unable to borrow further from the market. Mitani, (2014) 
analyses the relationship between profitability and leverage, and supports the pecking 
order hypothesis. 
 
   From studies related to the insurance market, Shiu (2011) confirms the trade-off 
hypothesis from a growth opportunity point of view. Cheng and Weiss (2012) test both 
the trade-off and pecking order theories in the US PL insurance market and indicate that 
the former dominates the latter when both behaviours exist. Studying the cyclical 
behaviour in French PL insurance, Bruneau and Sghaier, (2015) also present evidence 
that the trade-off theory is prioritised over the pecking order theory. Further, by reviewing 
other studies on the relationship between price and insolvency risk, Sommer (1996), 
Phillips, Cummins and Allen (1998) and Cummins and Weiss (2016) conclude that most 
of the insurance evidence supports the trade-off hypothesis. Thus, the following 
hypotheses can be developed:1 
H1a: The trade-off behaviour exists in the UK insurance market. 
H1b: The pecking order behaviour exists in the UK insurance market. 
 
3.2.2 Market Structure on Capital Structure 
   Regarding studies on the product market (or industrial companies), conclusions about 
the relationship between the effect of market structure and firms’ capital structure are not 
unanimous. The hypotheses associated with this relationship can be considered or 




1  Shiu (2011) uses a positive tax convexity-leverage relation, a positive firm size-leverage relation and a 
negative growth opportunities-leverage relation to define the trade-off hypothesis, while using a negative 
profitability-leverage relation and a negative firm size-leverage relation to define pecking order theory. 
Mitani (2014) assumes that the pecking order hypothesis will be supported when a negative relationship is 
found between profitability and leverage; otherwise, the trade-off theory will be supported, and profitability 
will be expressed as EBITDA/Total Asset. Titman and Wessels (1988) and Frank and Goyal (2009) also 
find profit to be negatively related to debt.. Therefore, it is reasonable to use profitability or profit 
performance to test the pecking order hypothesis, and profit performance should be negatively related to 
leverage, while positively related to equity capital as retained earning. However, it is questionable to use 
firm size or growth opportunities to identify trade-off theory because neither would be able to explain the 
existence of a targeted capital lever.  
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   On the one hand, there is a postive relationship between firms’ market power and debt 
levels. The firm’s objective is to maximise shareholder wealth by increasing the firm’s 
output level. Based on Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) agency cost theory, managers (on 
behalf of shareholders) are willing to take more borrowings1 (i.e., leverage) because the 
risks shift from shareholders to debtholders. In other words, the poorer outcomes (e.g., 
decline in profitability in unfavourable conditions) will be ignored by shareholders and 
passed to creditors (Pandey, 2004).2 The shareholders will receive the rewards when the 
outcome is beneficial. Further, Brander and Lewis (1986) suggest that the oligopoly firm 
(i.e., those with more market power) should have advantages for enhancing profitability 
by maximising output level. Also, according to Modigliani and Miller’s (1963) tax shield 
effect, firms with higher profit like to borrow bacause of tax deductible interest. After all 
these comprehensive considerations, it can be assumed that firms operating in a less 
competitive market or having higher market power would like to maximise output levels 
by holding more debts. 
 
   On the other hand, as described by Pandey (2004), Guney, Li and Fairchild (2011) and 
Fosu (2013), the predatory strategy3 explains the negative relationship between firms’ 
market power and capital structure (using leverage). According to the expected 
bankruptcy costs argument, a firm with a higher leverage ratio faces a greater likelihood 
of being financially distressed (Shiu, 2011; Saona, 2016). Then, it is reasonable to predict 
that a low-leveraged firm with high profitability will easily eliminate its rivals by adopting 
the predatory strategy of maximising its production or cutting prices in a concentrated 
market. To be more specific, a firm with more market power should reduce its leverage 
ratio to maintain its current competitive advantage4 or to drive its competitors out of the 
market.5 Moreover, according to pecking order theory (Myers, 1984), internal financing 
is preferred to external debt due to asymmetric information, if the greater market power 
potentially leads a greater profitability. Thus, a negative relationship between a firm’s 
market power and its leverage level can be expected.  
 
1 More risky businesses/investments/projects can be taken by using borrowing to maximize output level.   
2 Pandey, (2004) uses the term ‘shareholders’ limited liability status’ to explain the siuation. 
3 The predatory strategy assumes that a low-leveraged firm is likely to plunder benefits from a high-
leveraged firm.  
4 Competitive advantage will be waived when the agency costs outweigh the benfits associated with holding 
more leverage.  
5 Fosu (2013) suggests that the incumbent firm with greater market power should set the market price below 
the monopoly price to keep new entrants (i.e., those with less market power or more vulnerable financial 
structures) out of the market. 
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   Based on the above discussion of industrial capital structure, Pandey (2004) not only 
provides evidence that market power positively affects debt ratio but also supports a 
prediction that there is a cubic relationship in the Malaysia market. Moreover, this cubic 
relation indicates that firms with either higher or lower market power enjoy holding more 
debt, while firms in the intermediate range try to reduce leverage. Later, Guney, Li and 
Fairchild (2011) confirm that companies with more market power would like to have 
more leverage in China. They also point out that the approved relationship changes when 
they adopt different analytical approaches to example it. For example, they only find a 
non-linear relationship in some industries when using OLS regression.  
 
   Among others, Istaitieh and Rodríguez (2003), MacKay and Phillips (2005), Smith, 
Chen and Anderson (2010) and Sarkar (2014) provide evidence for the positive 
relationship between firms’ market power and capital structure. In contrast, Mitani (2014) 
suggests that firms with high market shares hold a lower level of debt. Rathinasamy, 
Krishnaswamy and Mantripragada (2000) find supports for both relationships in different 
industries. 
 
   Due to the difference in nature between general product markets and financial industries, 
both banks and insurance companies, for example, are highly leveraged firms. 
Researchers are, therefore, more likely to use equity to identify a firm’s capital structure 
and adopt approaches such as the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), the Lerner index 
and the Boone indicator to directly measure the degree of competition. As noted, only a 
few studies make a direct investigation of the relationship between market structure and 
individual capital decisions in financial sectors.  
 
   From banking studies, Allen, Carletti and Marquez’s (2011) framework predicts that 
competition incentivises banks to have more equity. Consistent with this prediction, 
Schaeck and Cihák (2012) confirm that market competition, measured by H-Statistic, 
enhances banks’ capital holding. For example, a bank’s capital level would be increased 
by 3.7% (3.9%) for commercial banks (all banks in the sample) when market competition 
increased by 1%. 
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   From other relevant literature, the market structure-capital relationship is observed 
indirectly when the authors consider the impact of competition on individual stability.1 
For example, by using HHI to measure the degree of market power in both deposit and 
loan markets, Berger, Klapper and Turk-Ariss (2009) indicate that banks enjoy high 
equity levels when they have more market power. Further, a non-linear relationship, an 
inverted-U shape, is found between market power for loans and equity. Consistent with 
this positive market power-equity relation, Akins et al. (2016) explain that banks in a 
more concentrated market build up equity because the profitability is greater. In contrast, 
Schaeck, Cihák and Wolfe (2009) reveal that banks holding more capital are less likely 
to suffer from systemic crises in a competitive market. 
 
   Soedarmono, Machrouh and Tarazi (2011) and Beck, De Jonghe and Schepens (2013a) 
use the Lerner index to represent banks’ market power, and the latter authors believe that 
market power contributes to bank stability through holding more capital. On the other 
hand, the former authors suggest that, although firms with more market power would like 
to have more equity capital, these amounts are still not sufficient to cover the uncertainties 
arising from bank risk-taking. 
   
   Schaeck and Cihák (2014) also present evidence to support the idea that competition 
could enhance European bank stability by encouraging banks to build up capital. Similar 
investigations appear in the insurance market. Using HHI to represent the market structure 
in Cananda, Guidara and Lai (2015) state that the insurers’ capital level increases in a 
concentrated market. Cummins, Rubio-Misas and Vencappa (2017) study the impact of 
market competition, measured by the Boone indicator, on insurer stability in the European 
life market. At the same time, they test the effect of competition on three components of 
Z-score, and their results suggest that competition encourages insurers to hold less capital, 




1 Berger, Klapper and Turk-Ariss (2009), Soedarmono, Machrouh and Tarazi (2011), Schaeck and Cihák 
(2012, 2014) and Beck, De Jonghe and Schepens (2013a) use Z-score as the proxy of bank stability. As 
expected, a higher Z-score indicates lower probability of insolvency and a more stable firm. In most cases, 
the researchers test, not only the impact of market structure on Z-score, but also on its components—
profitability (return on assets), equity (equity/total asset) and return volatility (s.d. of ROA). 
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   As discussed, the impact of different concpets of market structure on insurers’ capital 
structure is inconclusive from previous studies. Thus, the following hypothesis is 
developed. 
H2: Market Structure affects the insurer’s capital structure 
 
3.2.3 Volatility on Capital Structure 
   According to Williamson’s (1988) transaction-cost economics theory, firms that face 
greater risk (higher volatility) are expected to carry more (equity) capital because it is 
harder to raise debt capital due to greater uncertainty of meeting further obligations. By 
estimating the simultaneous equations, Shrieves and Dahl (1992) find a positive impact 
of changes in asset risk on adjustment in the capital-to-asset ratio in banking. They further 
attribute this positive relationship to regulatory and bankruptcy costs. A similar 
conclusion was reached by Jacques and Nigro (1997), after considering the Tier 1 capital 
requirement in banking.  
 
   However, evidence of the impact of a firm’s volatility on capital structure is inconsistent 
in the financial industry. Kwan and Eisenbeis (1997) reveal that there is a negative 
relationship between banks’ credit risk and capital amounts, in line with the moral hazard 
hypothesis (Cummins, 1988). For example, the existence of deposit insurance in banking 
or guaranty funds for insurers encourages firms to take more risks (Lee, Mayers and Smith, 
1997).1 
 
   From insurance literature, studying the US PL market from 1797 to 1990, Cummins 
and Sommer (1996) also apply simultaneous equation methodology and indicate that 
insurers with higher portfolio risk hold more equity capital. Meanwhile, their results also 
support early findings from Hammond, Melander and Shilling (1976) and Harrington and 
Nelson (1986), who hypothesise a negative relationship between insurers’ portfolio risk 
and leverage ratio (i.e., the ratio of premium to equity). Zanjani (2002) proves that 
insurers with more risky business, such as policies to cover natural disasters, tend to build 
more capital. In line with capital buffer theory, 2  Mankaï and Belgacem (2016) also 
 
1 The explanation for the moral hazard hypothesis is that external guaranty funds can encourage firms to 
engage in more risky behaviours because the shortfall between capital and liabilities can be covered (Downs 
and Sommer, 1999). Lee, Mayers and Smith (1997) also express the idea of moral hazard as a risk-subsidy 
hypothesis applicable to stock insurers.   
2 Insurers tend to hold excess capital beyond regulatory requirements against unexpected losses and to avoid 
regulatory cost. 
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support the positive relationship. In comparison to monitoring hypotheses,1 Downs and 
Sommer (1999) find evidence to support the moral hazard hypothesis, which assumes that 
insurers facing higher volatility would tend to have less capital, for listed insurers with 
insider ownership.2 Furthermore, by dividing insurers’ volatilities into asset risk and 
product risk, Baranoff and Sager (2002) note that the asset risk-capital relation is positive 
and confirm a negative product risk-capital connection. Cheng and Weiss (2013) present 
evidence showing that the relationship between capital and two volatility components 
(underwriting and investment risk) were both positive in the PL insurance market from 
1993 to 2007. Hu and Yu (2014, 2015) provide similar research in the Taiwanese life 
market, but opposing results are found, indicating that (undercapitalised) insurers tend to 
reduce capital level as investment risks increase, whereas medium- and well-capitalised 
insurers increase their capital holding when underwriting risks are raised. 
 
    In sum, there are two conflicting pieces of logic regarding the relationship between an 
insurer’s volatility and its capital position. The first, supported by the bankruptcy-cost-
avoidance hypothesis (Orgler and Taggart, 1983), the transaction-cost economics theory 
(Williamson, 1988) and the capital buffer theory (see, Shim (2010)), indicates that 
insurers with a higher level of volatility should hold more (equity) capital. In contrast, the 
second piece of logic posits a negative relationship, assuming that the presence of external 
guaranty funds encourages insurers to take more risks when capital is reduced, as 
demonstrated by Cummins (1988) and Lee, Mayers and Smith (1997). Moreover, as 
argued by Cheng and Weiss (2013), it is theoretically possible that this negative 
relationship may be due to the ‘mispricing’ of certain types of risks in the risked based 
capital (RBC) formula, which may further encourage insurers to increase the aggregated 
risk while decreasing capital. Thus, the hypothesis for insurers’ business volatility can be 
stated as follows. 
H3: Insurers’ volatility affects the insurer’s capital structures. 
 
3.2.4 Reinsurance usage on Capital Structure 
   Staking and Babbel (1995) state that firms use hedging strategies to increase their value 
when the cost of hedging is lower than the cost of bankruptcy. They further mention that 
 
1 The monitoring hypothesis asserts that insurers would like to reduce their risk to avoid increased guarantee 
fund assessments because market players would like to monitor and follow their competitors’ actions, 
leading to an act of unity (Lee, Mayers and Smith, 1997). In sum, the aggregated risk level may remain the 
same or even lower, because the cost of the guaranty funds might offset their risk-taking incentives. 
2 Lee, Mayers and Smith’s (1997) ownership hypothesis states that managers with stock ownership, in stock 
insurance companies, have incentives to take more risks. 
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firms will still choose hedging strategies, even when they are costly, because the insurer’s 
franchise value1 would be lost in the event of insolvency. Graham and Rogers (2002) 
suggest that there might be two-way causality between hedging strategies and leverage. 
Using reinsurance and using derivatives2 can both be categorised as hedging strategies in 
the insurance market. Specifically, regarding reinsurance, their role in defining and 
determining capital requirements has been well recognized (Hoerger, Sloan and Hassan, 
1990; Garven and Lamm-Tennant, 2003; Eling and Holzmüller, 2008; Scordis and 
Steinorth, 2012). 
 
   The primary functions associated with using (re)insurance are to mitigate a firm’s 
insolvency risks (Berger, Cummins and Tennyson, 1992) and to enhance its underwriting 
(debt) capacities (Chen, Hamwi and Hudson, 2001; Cole and McCullough, 2006; 
Cummins et al., 2008; Zou and Adams, 2008). Due to the difficulty of adjusting capital 
structure in the short-run, as well as the cost of raising capital, the advantage of using 
reinsurance should be greater to insurers with solvency problems; less solvent insurers 
may take more reinsurance (Chen, Hamwi and Hudson, 2001). The other benefits of 
reinsurance, summarised by Liu, Shiu and Liu (2016), are reducing expected tax 
payments3 and obtaining real services4 from reinsurers.  
 
   By considering the risk-capital relationship (see previous section) alongside Lee, 
Mayers and Smith’s (1997) risk-subsidy hypothesis, it is reasonable to presume that using 
reinsurance may impact the insurer’s capital structure. Specifically, according to the 
expected bankruptcy cost theory, highly leveraged insurers have a greater likelihood of 
becoming insolvent, and, thus, they bear massive bankruptcy costs. However, reinsurance 
can prevent insurers from suffering huge losses and further reduce the chance of 




1 Franchise value includes intangible assets, such as reputation, agency force and various types of licensing. 
This concept has been widely studied in the banking industry, but only marginally researched in the 
insurance industry. Ren and Schmit (2009) investigate the interplay among insurers’ franchise values, risk 
taking and competition. 
2 The main difference between the two is that derivatives can be used for speculation (Adams, Hardwick 
and Zou, 2008). Due to data availability, only the reinsurance use from primary insurers is considered in 
this study. 
3 The reinsurance-tax relation is studied by Adams, Hardwick and Zou (2008). 
4 According to Liu, Shiu and Liu (2016), real services include underwriting advice and claims handling.  
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   Although investigations considering the impact of reinsurance on insurers’ capital 
structures are finitely demonstrated, the results are relatively consistent. Cummins and 
Nini (2002) state that the degree of diversification in an insurer’s portfolio could be 
increased via reinsurance because of a better spread of risks; then, less equity capital is 
needed. Consistent with the renting capital hypothesis, reinsurance can function as an 
essential, off-balance-sheet financing source for primary insurers (Mayers and Smith, 
1990; Adiel, 1996; Stulz, 1996; Dror and Armstrong, 2006). Thus, the substitutive effect 
(or the renting capital hypothesis)—a negative (positive) relationship between equity 
(leverage) and reinsurance—can be expected (Cummins et al., 2008; Shiu, 2011; Mankaï 
and Belgacem, 2016). However, Mankaï and Belgacem (2016) further split the sample 
into affiliated and non-affiliated insurers and find that the substitutive effect only 
appeared in the former group. The exception is presented by Cheng and Weiss (2012), 
whose results indicate that the leverage is actually reduced by increased reinsurance use. 
This unexpected result could be due to the increase in insurers’ risk levels because of their 
high dependence on reinsurer financial health. That is, higher reinsurance levels lead to 
higher risk (see Kim et al. (1995) and Pottier and Sommer (1999)). Then, the above 
discussion leads to the following hypothesis: 
H4: Reinsurance ceded affects the insurer’s capital structure. 
 
3.2.5 Market Structure and its interactions  
   In addition to the hypotheses mentioned above, those associated with each firm-specific 
factor, and the interplay between competition and those factors, are briefly reviewed here. 
The aim of including these interactions is to test whether there is an impact of interference 
and amplification resulting from the competition in the above hypotheses (Tabak, Fazio 
and Cajueiro, 2012; Fosu, 2013).  
 
   The structure-conduct-performance (SCP) hypothesis and the efficiency-structure (ES) 
hypothesis are widely used to reveal the interplay between market structure and individual 
performance (see Fenn et al. (2008); Pope and Ma (2008); Tabak, Fazio and Cajueiro 
(2012); and Alhassan, Addisson and Asamoah (2015)). The former assumes that insurers’ 
behaviours are affected by market structure, such as collusive behaviour leading to higher 
market profit (or more market share) in less competitive conditions. Studying the US life 
insurance market, Cummins, Denenberg and Scheel (1972) not only find a negative 
relationship between market concentration and competition, but also confirm that market 
concentration boosts firm performance. The ES hypothesis expects that more efficient 
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insurers, who have lower marginal costs, should perform better than their counterparts in 
a competitive market. 
 
   Apart impacting individual performance, market structure also influences individual 
stability or risk-taking behaviours. As previously noted, two famous hypotheses explain 
the impact of competition on a firm’s stability in the financial sector.1 The first is the 
competition-fragility hypothesis, which proposes that competition promotes a firm’s risk-
taking behaviours (such as writing risky business or making risk investments) and erodes 
its stability (Leroy and Lucotte, 2017). The second is the competition-stability view, 
which argues that intense competition may enhance a firm’s soundness because of the 
effect of profit reallocation (Cummins, Rubio-Misas and Vencappa, 2017). Schaeck and 
Cihák (2014) suggest and confirm that competition enhances a bank’s stability via 
improved efficiency. Cummins, Rubio-Misas and Vencappa (2017) find a similar 
transmission mechanism in the EU life market. Investigating the connection between 
competition and a bank’s credit risk, Soedarmono and Tarazi (2016) determine that banks 
operating in a market with weaker competition immediately accept more credit risks. 
However, these firms tend to reduce their levels of risk-taking after a one-year time lag.    
 
   If the competitive environment encourages insurers to accept more risks, then two types 
of strategies can be used to manage these excessive amounts of risk in the insurance 
industry. One is the external scheme, which can be provided or encouraged by the 
government or other regulatory bodies. 2 Another way to achieve the goal is via internal 
management—for example, management decisions about using reinsurance. Claessens 
(2009) suggests that the interaction between competition and consumer protection 
schemes is an essential consideration in the financial sector because too little or too much 
competition may damage customer benefits. 
 
1 The ‘competition-fragility/stability’ nexus is not well debated in insurance sectors but is widely discussed 
and applied in the banking sector—e.g., Berger, Klapper and Turk-Ariss (2009); Hong Liu et al., (2010); 
Jiménez, Lopez and Saurina (2013); Kasman and Kasman (2015); Kabir and Worthington (2017); Leroy 
and Lucotte (2017), among others. Due to the similarty between banking and the insurance industry, it is 
reasonable to use the same logic for both. However, the traditional ‘competition-stability’ view, from 
banking, argues that the market power of banks (concentrated market) leads to charging higher interest 
ratees and further increases in loan default rates, subsequently resulting in a less stable position (Boyd and 
Nicoló, 2005). Obviously, this explanation is inappropriate for application in the insurance industry. This 
is why the profit-reallocation effect is used to explain the competition-stability hypothesis (see Cummins, 
Rubio-Misas and Vencappa (2017)).  
2 For example, guaranty funds protect policyholders in the US. In the UK, a similar protection, the Financial 
Services Compensation Scheme (FSCS), prevents both customers and SMEs from suffering unexpected 
financial losses. 
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   Due to the abovementioned interconnections between market structure and various 
firm-specific factors (performance, an insurer’s stability and internal risk management) 
and their complexities, it is worth to reveal the impact of the interactions on the insurer’s 
capital structure. Thus, the hypothesis can be developed as followed: 
H5: The interaction between market structure and firm-specific factors affects the 
insurer’s capital structure. 
 
Section 3.3 Data and Methodology 
    
   This section describes the empirical approach employed to examine the discussed 
hypotheses. The partial adjustment model that is employed to test the impact on capital 
structure is first described. Then, three key competition indicators are discussed, and the 
definitions of both explanatory and control variables follow. The database used in this 
chapter is built on information from financial statements of individual insurers, which 
included balance sheet and income statement, collected from Orbis, Fame and ISIS (or 
Insurance Focus), and provided by Bureau van Dijk. The World Bank database is the 
main source for those macro-economic data. The sample covers at least 90% of the market 
capacity in the UK market from 1998 to 2017. There is no required data for all years; 
therefore, unbalanced panel data is accepted. To ensure all monetary values are directly 
comparable, we deflate each year’s value by the consumer price index to the base year 
2015. 
 
3.3.1 Data: Capital structure variable and Competition indicators  
   One of the critical contributions of this chapter is to test the impact of competition on 
the insurer’s capital structure, and it is represented by Hypotheses 2 and 5. The 
choices/definitions of these two key measurements, capital structure and competition 
degree, are discussed here. 
 
Capital structure variable 
   Two popular proxies are widely used to represent the insurer’s capital structure. One is 
measured by the ratio of premium written to surplus, indicating insurer’s leverage (e.g. 
Cummins and Lamm-Tennant, 1994; Shiu, 2011; Cheng and Mary A Weiss, 2012; Liu, 
Shiu and Liu, 2016). Another represents insurer’s equity; it is measured by the ratio of 
surplus to the total asset (e.g. Cummins and Sommer, 1996; Baranoff, Papadopoulos and 
Sager, 2007; Mankaï and Belgacem, 2016). Because most of the U.K. insurers are not 
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publicly traded, it is not available to use market value to define these measurements. 
Dhaene et al. (2017) pointed out that studies, which tested the logic of the trade-off and 
pecking order theories, are most likely to use leverage ratio to represent the insurer’s 
capital structure. Following Dhaene et al. (2017) and Shiu (2011), the leverage ratio is 
adopted to test the discussed hypotheses. In line with Cheng and Mary A Weiss (2012) 
and Mankaï and Belgacem (2016), the traditional leverage ratio is calculated as the ratio 
of Net Premium to Surplus. 
 
Market Structure indicators 
   Market structure (competition) can be measured by two approaches, named as a 
structural and non-structural approach. 1  By investigating the connection between 
structural method (HHI) and the non-structural one (Boone indicator) in container liner 
shipping industry, Sys (2000) find a conflicting result on the direction of change in 
competition between two methods. Creusen, Minne and Wiel (2006) achieve a similar 
conclusion by using four indicators from these two approaches to measure competition in 
the Netherlands. Among different non-structural models, on the one hand, Doan and 
Stevens (2012) and Clerides, Delis and Kokas (2015) show that a consistent result could 
be achieved from different non-structural indexes on measuring the degree of competition. 
On the other hand, Degryse, Kim and Ongena (2009) suggest that different models would 
carry different information on competition in the banking industry from various aspects. 
By comparing P-R H statistic and Boone indicator, Schaeck and Cihák (2014) also find 
that two measures are far from perfect negative correlation,2 it may indicates different 
methods measure the competition concept in various ways.  
 
   As discussed in Appendix 3, all approaches have their own feaures, and face pros and 
cons. Similar to many previous studies (e.g. Mrabti, 2010; Delis, 2012; Kasman and 
Kasman, 2015; Leon, 2015; Tan, 2016), three different indicators, which are HHI, Lerner 
index and Boone indicator, are adopted to measure competition/concertation in the 
present study. By using multiple methods allows us to capture different concepts of 
market structure and to achieve a more robust result. 
 
 
1 Appendix 3 presents a discussion on various approaches to measure market structure. 
2 If two measures represent the same thing, it can be assumed that the correlation between them should be 
perfectly negative (at least, nearly). Because, the higher H statistic values in the range between negative 
infinity and one indicates that the more intense competition in the market, while, a more negative value 
signals more competition if the Boone indicators located between negative infinity and zero.  
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   First, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is used to proxy the structure of the U.K. 
insurance market. This HHI calculates as the sum of squares of the individual insurer’s 
market share in the industry, thus  





where 𝑚𝑠𝑖𝑡 is the market share of an insurer at time t, it is proxied as the ratio of an 
insurer’s gross premium written to gross market premium. The index tells us that the 
higher the index, the more concentrated the market is. As a benchmark, an index that 
overs 1800 represents a highly concentrated market.  
 
   Secondly, the Lerner index is determined by adopting Kumbhakar, Baardsen and Lien's 
(2012) approach, which is based on stochastic frontier analysis, so-called “Stochastic” 
Lerner index. Coccorese (2014) also summaries some advantages concerning the usage 
of this approach, two of them are vital in this study. First, it provides a simple estimation, 
which originates from efficiency theory, avoids outside manipulation arose from the 
conventional two-step procedure1; second, non-negative Lerner index can be achieved. 
To be more specific, the SFA-Lerner index is defined as 











in the fraction, the denominator is equal to 
𝜕𝑇𝐶𝑖𝑡
𝜕𝑄𝑖𝑡
; and the numerator decribes the degree 
of mark-up, which can be estimated as the inefficiency term (𝑢𝑖𝑡  in “composed error 
term”) by the stochastic frontier approach, as discussed below.  
 
 
1 In the conventional Lerner index approach, it contains two componets, which are prices and marginal cost. 
The first step is estimating the price and marginal costs separately. Then, to find the Lerner index calculated 
as the ratio of the mark-up (the difference between price and marginal cost) to price. By using the stochastic 
frontier approach to estimate Lerner index, the information on output prices is not required as the mark-ups 
is gathered from the stochastic frontier analysis.   
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   According to Kumbhakar, Baardsen and Lien (2012) and Coccorese (2014), the strategy 
starts from the interpretation of the insurer’s revenue-cost relationship 1  by using a 
stochastic cost frontier model, thus writing 
𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝐶𝑖𝑡





+ 𝜈𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 
Equation (3.3) 




𝑔 + 𝜈𝑖𝑡  is the minimum 
level 𝑅𝐶𝑖𝑡 can achieve, it is the frontier. Of which, 𝜈𝑖𝑡 represents a noise term that catches 




𝑔 is referred as cost elasticity 
















= 𝛼𝑞 + 𝛼𝑞𝑞 ∑ ln 𝑄𝑖𝑡
2
𝑖





+ 𝜇𝑡𝑞𝑇 + 𝜈𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 
Equation (3.5) 
   Equation 3.5 now looks like the stochastic frontier model, then maximum likelihood 
estimation techniques and related distributional assumption of both 𝜈𝑖𝑡  and 𝑢𝑖𝑡 
 
1  Coccorese (2014) exhibited a transformation from the mark-up relationship (i.e., 𝑃𝑖𝑡 ≥ 𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑡) to revenue-
cost relationship (i.e.,𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡 𝑇𝐶𝑖𝑡⁄ ≥ 𝜕 ln 𝑇𝐶𝑖𝑡 𝜕 ln 𝑄𝑖𝑡⁄  ), and explained why the mark-up can be derived from 
revenune-cost relationship by using stochastic frontier approach.  
2 The cost function with three input prices and two outputs takes the following the translog form: 
ln 𝑇𝐶𝑖𝑡 = α0 + ∑ 𝛼𝑔 ln 𝑄𝑖𝑔𝑡
2
𝑔




                        +
1
2






















2 + ∑ 𝜌𝑔𝑇 ln 𝑄𝑖𝑔𝑡
2
𝑔




where, TCit represents insurer’s total cost at time t. Consistence with value-added approach and insurance 
litertures (e.g. Cummins, Rubio-Misas and Zi, 2004; Hao and Chou, 2005; Cummins and Rubio-Misas, 
2006; Yaisawarng, Asavadachanukorn and Yaisawarng, 2014), the outputs, 𝑄𝑖𝑔𝑡, is defined as net claims 
paid (claims incurred net of reinsurance) and total investment; and 𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡 measures the three input prices, i.e. 
labor, capital and technical reserves. The time trend variable (T) captures the changes over time in 
technology and underwriting cycle. In the function, the symmetry property requires that 𝛼𝑔𝑘 = 𝛼𝑘𝑔, 𝛽𝑗ℎ =
𝛽ℎ𝑗  and 𝛿𝑔𝑗 = 𝛿𝑗𝑔 . Also, the linear homogeneity conditions are satisfied by imposing the restrictions 
as:∑ 𝛽𝑗 = 1, ∑ ∑ 𝛽𝑗ℎ = 0, ∑ ∑ 𝛿𝑔𝑗 = 0, ∑ ∑ 𝜉𝑗 = 0. The procedure amounts to using one of the input prices 
(e.g., 𝑃3𝑖𝑡) to normalized total cost and other input price. 






2), ) are used to estimate the equation. 𝑢𝑖𝑡 is estimated 
by using Jondrow et al.'s (1982) approach and it is able to capute the mark-up (and market 
power) of insurer i at time t, rather than cost inefficiency. A smaller estimated value of 
𝑢𝑖𝑡 indicates a lower amount of mark-up. Next, the resulting parameters from Equation 
3.5 are substituted back to Equation 3.4 to generate 𝐸𝑇𝐶,?̂?. Then both 𝐸𝑇𝐶,?̂? and 𝑢𝑖𝑡 are 
used to calculate 𝜃𝑖?̂? that can be used to find the SFA-Lerner index shown in Equation 3.1.  
 
   The last, in line with the theoretical work developed by (Boone, 2008) and the other 
empirical studies from Schaeck and Cihák (2010), (2014), Bikker and Popescu (2014), 
Liu, Mirzaei and Vandoros (2014) and Cummins, Rubio-Misas and Vencappa (2017), the 
indicator is constructed from the following basic form as: 
ln 𝜋𝑖𝑡  𝑜𝑟 ln 𝑀𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽 ln 𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Equation (3.6) 
where 𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑡 is the mariginal cost of an insurer i at time t. The coefficienct of 𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑡, which 
is expected to be negative1, that is 𝛽, so-called Boone indicator; it indicates a relationship 
that an insurer with higher marginal cost will have less potentical ability to gain benefit 
relative to its counterparties, in a compeititve envirment. A larger 𝛽 in absolute terms 
indicates a stronger competitive effect. The paramenter 𝛽, which is estimated by using a 
dynamic GMM panel model, is then used as one of the key regressors in the empirical 
investigation. The adoption of the GMM-style estimator is due to the fact that insurer’s 
performance and cost are jointly determined; and one-year lags of explanatory variables 
and the GDP per capital are selected as instruments, see a similar adoption from Schaeck 
and Cihák (2014) and Cummins, Rubio-Misas and Vencapp (2017). As suggested by 
Kasman and Kasman (2015), the log-log function is used to deal with the issue of 
heteroscedasticity. 
    
   As shown in Equation 3.6, the dependent variable can be selected as either the insurer’s 
profit 𝜋𝑖𝑡 or its market share 𝑀𝑆𝑖𝑡 at time t. Canton et al. (2005) argue that any one of 
these is reasonable to choose because both would react stronger on marginal cost as the 
competition strengthened. Although the relative profit is originally used to develop the 
theory by Boone, observations with negative profit need to be dropped due to the 
 
1 According to van Leuvensteijn et al. (2011) and Tabak, Fazio and Cajueiro (2012), there is a possibility 
that the β can be positive, which means increasing firm’s marginal cost will earn more market share. van 
Leuvensteijn et al. (2011) offered two reasons, (1) the level of collusion is exceptionally high in the market; 
(2) preventing new entrants by increasing the marginal cost in the market as a whole.  
P a g e  | 146 
 
logarithms function form of the model. However, working with market share provides 
two advantages as mentioned by van Leuvensteijn et al. (2011); first, there is a clear 
visible relation between an individual’s efficiency and market share. Secondly, market 
share only provides positive value. And another difference between these is that the profit 
represents the profitability of past businesses while the latter reflects the current business 
(Canton et al., 2005). 
 
   Therefore, by following Bikker and Popescu (2014) and Bikker (2016), and the 
discussed advantages with using market share, the Equation 3.6 is modified as:  








where 𝑀𝑆𝑖𝑡, which is the market share of insurer i at at time t, equals the ratio of an 
individual’s premium written to the market premium at a time point. By involving both 
time dummy variables (𝐷𝑡, for year 1 to T) and their interactions in the Equation 3.7, it is 
able to capture the time effect. And, 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the error term.  
 
   The primary challenge of adopting Boone's (2008)’s approach is that the marginal cost 
needs to be constructed as it is not directly gatherable. The conventional method adopts 
to obtain marginal cost1, which is derived from the translog cost function as showed on 
Page 150 and estimated it by using stochastic frontier analysis (Koetter, Kolari and 
Spierdijk, 2012). Then, the marginal cost can be expressed as the following form: 


















            = ∑
𝑇𝐶𝑖𝑡
𝑄𝑖𝑔𝑡
(𝛼𝑔 + 𝛼𝑞𝑔 ln 𝑄𝑖𝑔𝑡 +
1
2
















1 Two methods are widely used to determine marginal cost in financial studies. First, an average cost, 
defines as the ratio of total cost (or management cost) to total premium (income), that is an easy calculated 
proxy of marginal cost (e.g., Schaeck and Cihák, 2010, 2014; Mirza, Bergland and Khatoon, 2016; 
Cummins, Rubio-Misas and Vencappa, 2017). Second, a marginal cost can be derived from a translog cost 
function, while it is a complex process (e.g., van Leuvensteijn et al., 2011; Tabak, Fazio and Cajueiro, 2012; 
Kasman and Kasman, 2016). By using both methods, Bikker and van Leuvensteijn (2008) point out that 
outcomes from both a similar. However, average cost is less accurate due to the fact that no distinguish 
between variable and fixed costs (Canton et al., 2005).  
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   Following Pandey (2004), Guney, Li and Fairchild (2011) and Soedarmono, Machrouh 
and Tarazi (2013), the square term of competition is included to capture the non-linearity 
effect of competition on the insurer’s capital structure. In addition, to test the other 
hypotheses on pecking order theory (H1b), firm’s volatility (H3), the usage of reinsurance 
(H4) and their interactions with competition (H5), the key variables are defined below.  
 
   According to the pecking order theory, firms prefer to use internal sources to raise 
capital rather than external sources. Park and Pincus (2001) explain that using internal 
funding should be more efficient, and the cost of it should be lower than external sources. 
Therefore, the Retained Earnings, the primary source of internal funding, is collected 
from insurers’ financial statements to verify Hypothesis 1b 1. A negative relationship 
between Retained Earning is expected if the pecking order hypothesis is satisfied.  
 
   Firms with a higher level of volatility (lower stability) generally lower the leverage ratio 
to maintain financial soundness. According to Cummins, Rubio-Misas and Zi (2004) and 
Eling and Jia (2018), business volatility is one of the fundamental indicators to determine 
an insurer's failure, as a higher the business volatility would lead to a higher likelihood of 
insolvency. Therefore, it can be expected that there is a negative relationship between the 
insurer’s volatility and its leverage level. Following both Eling and Marek (2014) and 
Eling and Jia (2018), Income Volatility is measured by the standard deviation of return on 
shareholder’s fund (ROSF) with a three year rolling window. This indicator measures an 
insurer’s return volatility at the firm’s aggregated risk level. A higher figure represents 
that the insurer has less certainty of its future returns, and it may face a higher likelihood 
of failure. Thus, the insurer may need to pay more attention to monitor its risk-tolerance 
and capital position.   
 
   Eling and Marek (2014) also suggest that an insurer’s volatilities come from various 
sources, not only its asset holdings but also its issued products, etc. Then, from this 
perspective, the insurer’s volatility may also be raised from claim uncertainty associated 
with business written. To be more specific, the insurer has more uncertainties about the 
future value of losses (from claim/benefit payments), and thus contributes to the insurer’s 
 
1 Alternatively, it is also reasonable to assume that the insurers with better abilities to generate profits 
should have sufficient internal funds that can be converted into capital as in the form of retained earnings. 
Thus, the insurer’s profit efficiency, which is found by Stochastic Frontier Analysis, that is also adopted 
to make the robustness check. 
P a g e  | 148 
 
aggregate level of risks, damaging its stability, when the loss ratio is highly volatile. Both 
Hoerger, Sloan and Hassan (1990) and Mankaï and Belgacem (2016) support that the 
increased loss (claim) volatility of claims would have an impact on the insurer’s 
aggregated risk-level. Therefore, Bussiness Volatility is also involved to represent the 
insurer’s volatility from another prespective, and it is approximated by the standard 
deviation of the loss ratio1 with a three-year rolling window. So the expected impact of 
claim volatility is negative on the leverage ratio. 
 
   Regarding Hypothesis 4 - the impact of reinsurance uasge on the insurer’s capital 
structure - the traditional ratio of Reinsurance Ceded to Gross Premium Written is used 
to denote the usage of Reinsurance. This measurement is widely used by Fecher et al. 
(1993), Lin, Lai and Powers (2014), Alhassan and Biekpe (2015), Liu, Shiu and Liu 
(2016), Cummins, Rubio-Misas and Vencappa (2017) and Sheikh, Syed and Ali Shah 
(2018), and among others. Then, Hypothesis 4 can be verified by concerning the 
coefficient of this variable, and a positive sign would be expected. 
 
Control Variables 
   The cost of either raising or holding capital is a vital factor of the capital level 
(Modigliani and Miller, 1958; Kielholz, 2000). It is difficult to measure the cost of capital 
directly in practice. For example, Cummins and Lamm-Tennant (1994) suggested that the 
cost of equity capital should be estimated by using the CAPM. However, due to the lack 
of market data, the CAPM is not suitable to use. Following Mankaï and Belgacem (2016), 
the cost of equity capital is approximated by the most recent three-year average of positive 
return on shareholder’s fund (ROSF).  
 
   Following both Shiu (2011) and Mankaï and Belgacem (2016), the insurer’s size is 
included as one of the control variables. For instance, Shiu (2011) assumed a positive 
relationship between the firm size and leverage under trade-off theory, while a negative 
one appeared under the pecking order theory. The rationale for this relationship is that 
larger firms have easier access to capital markets and is easier to borrow at a favourable 
intereste rate (Ferri and Jones, 1979). The natural logarithm of total assets is used to 
measure the insurer’s size. 
 
 
1 The loss ratio measures the total incurred losses in relation to the total gross premium written.  
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   The insurer’s liquidity is a widely used indicator to represent the ability to fulfill its the 
short-term obligations. Panno (2003) suggest two possible effects on capital structure.  
First, the postive relationship existes when the liquid assets are used to support a relative 
higher debt ratio. Second, if the liquid assets are used to finance finance the firm’s 
investment,then a negative relationship can be expected. Current ratio, defined as the ratio 
of liquid asset to total liability, is used to represent the insurer’s liquidity level.  
 
   In line with preceding literture from Pandey (2004), Chen et al. (2009), Najjar and 
Petrov (2011), Fier, McCullough and Carson (2013) and Chang et al. (2015), profitability 
is also chosen as a control variable. In this study, Investment Return, is measured as return 
on investment assets, denotes the insurer’s profitability. In addition, according to 
Modigliani and Miller's (1963) tax shield effect, the insurer would like to use more debt 
when the tax rate is higher. Thus, the amount of tax payment is used and a positive 
relationship should be expected. 
 
   Following Sheikh, Syed and Ali Shah (2018), the interest rate and inflation are closely 
related to the insurer’s capital structure. For example, an increase in the interest rate 
would result in bond price falling, and insurers then face questions of whether to issue 
new equity capital. However, issuing equity is costly due to various costs.1 And inflation 
also has direct impact on premium pricing and bond pricing. For instance, higher inflation 
rates reduce the insurer’s profit margins. Therefore, these two variables are included to 
control the cost of borrowing at the market level. Finally, growth in GDP is also included 
to control the overall economic condition.  
 
3.3.4 Empirical Models and Estimation Techniques 
   Following Shrieves and Dahl (1992), Cummins and Sommer (1996), Baranoff and 
Sager (2002), Flannery and Rangan (2006), Cheng and Weiss (2012a), Lin, Lai and 
Powers (2014) and Mankaï and Belgacem (2016), a partial adjustment model is used to 
determine whether insurers have a target capital structure and the speed of adjustments, 
and then to test the discussed hypotheses related to different explanatory factors. In a 
frictionless world, the insurers would always maintain their target capital structure. 
However, the optimal capital structure is unobservable in the real world, and it is easy to 
 
1 For example, the transaction costs arising from underwriting and the adverse selection costs due to 
information asymmetry 
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vary across individual insurers and over time. The general target capital structure equation 
is estimated: 
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡
∗ = α𝑋𝑖,𝑡 
Equation (3.9) 
where 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡
∗  represents the measure of target capital structure, the leverage 
ratio is adopted in this study, for insurer i at time t. 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 is a vector of the insurer’s specific 
factors that influence the insurer’s capital structure. α is the coefficients corresponding to 
the vactor of insurer’s specific factors, and indicates a long-run impact of firm-specific 
factors on capital strcuture. And Equation (3.9) is an unbiased relationship (an 
equilibrium relation) in which the error term is not required. Then, the standard partical 
adjustment model is expressed as:  
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡−1
= 𝛿[𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡
∗ − 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡−1] + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
Equation (3.10) 
in Equation (3.10), the difference in the capital ratio on the left-hand side indicates the 
actual change in capital from time t-1 to t, that can be expressed as a fraction 𝛿 of the 
desired change for the same period, as shown on the right-hand side. According to Cheng 
and Weiss (2012a), 𝛿 is the short-run adjustment speed; if 𝛿 = 1, it indicates that there 
are effective and instantaneous adjustments on capital towards the desired capital ratio in 
the same period. On the other hand, if 𝛿 = 0, it means that there is no observable changed 
in capital from the previous time period t-1. And 𝛿 has the range between these two 
extreme values.  
 
   Then, substituting Equation (3.9) into Equation (3.10), the standard model becomes: 
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡 = (1 − 𝛿)[𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡−1] + (𝛿𝛼)𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
Equation (3.11) 
   Equation (3.11) implies that insurers take steps to reduce the gap between the actual 
capital level and the desired level at each stage. As noticed, the short-run adjustment 
speed 𝛿 is caculated as 1 minus the coefficient of 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡−1; and the long-run 
impacts from firm-specific factors on capital structure are given by the coefficient of 𝑋𝑖𝑡 
divided by 𝛿. And Hypothesis 1a will be supported if (1 − 𝛿) is siginificant and less than 
1.  
 
   By considering the above discussions on both the theoretical model and data definition, 
Equation 3.11 can be re-written as: 
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   𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑖,𝑡 = (1 − 𝛿)[𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑖,𝑡−1] + (𝛿𝛼1)𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡
+ (𝛿𝛼2)𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + (𝛿𝛼3)𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡
+ (𝛿𝛼4)𝑅𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + (𝛿𝜆𝑛)𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖,𝑡,𝑛 + (𝛿𝜙𝑚)𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡,𝑚
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
Equation (3.12) 
where 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 = 𝑁𝑃𝑊𝑖 𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖⁄ . Three different proxies of market stucture (ie. 
concentration, pricing power and competition), which are HHI, SFA-Lerner index and 
Boone indicator, are run separately. The 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖,𝑡,𝑛  show the interacted terms 
between the proxies of market structure and the nth regressor1. The purpose of including 
the interaction terms is to exam the combined effect on the insurer’s capital structure. To 
be more specific, the interaction term is of key interest as the siginifcant coefficient (𝛿𝜆𝑛) 
should be indicative of either the potential effect of the market structure on the 
relationships between capital structure and four regressors, or the joint effect of market 
structure and four regressors on the insurer’s capital structure. Similar approaches, in 
which a interaction term between the proxy of market structure and another regressor is 
involved to determine the joint impact, can be found from Schaeck and Cihák (2012), 
Tabak, Fazio and Cajueiro (2012), Soedarmono, Machrouh and Tarazi (2013), Ryan, 
O’Toole and McCann (2014) and Saadaoui (2014).  
 
   Nevertheless, apart from determining the driving force on the insurer’s capital structure, 
testing the dominance between trade-off theory and pecking order theoty is essential. As 
indicated by Cheng and Weiss (2012a), it is useful to test the impacts on change in capital 
structure (i.e., change in leverage) because it is not only providing further evidence on 
pecking order theory but also testing the relative importance of two theories. Thus, based 
on this purpose, Equation 3.12 will re-run with the dependent variable of  Δ𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡.
2 
Under the pecking order theory, the coefficient of Retained Earnings is expected to be 
negative and siginificant. 3  The relative importance of two theories can be tested by 
comparing the economic impact of a one-standard-deviation change in the leverage and 
 
1 Regressors includes the variables of the leverage ratio, retained earnings, volatilities and reinsurance.  
2 Then, the change in capital structure equation can be expressed as: 
Δ𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = (𝛿)[𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑖,𝑡−1] + (𝛿𝛼1)𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡  + (𝛿𝛼2)𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖,𝑡
+ (𝛿𝛼3)𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + (𝛿𝛼4)𝑅𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + (𝛿𝜙𝑚)𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡,𝑚 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
where Δ𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1, and the other variables are defined as before. 
3 Cheng and Weiss (2012a) used the variable of financial deficit to test pecking order theory and expected 
a siginificant positive sign. However, a more direct indicator – retained profit – is used in this study. Then, 
the coefficient 𝛿𝛼2 is expected to be negative under pecking order theory.  
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retained earnings variables.1 According to Cheng and Weiss (2012a), the trade-off theory 
is more important than pecking order theory if the economic impact of leverage is larger 
than the economic impact of retained earning; otherwise, the pecking order theory 
dominants the trade-off theory. The results from Cheng and Weiss's (2012a) insurance 
study indicates the trade-off is more important.  
 
   Then, in the first step, the main regression model (i.e. Equation 3.12) are estimated 
using the OLS fixed effect estimator.2 Because of the inclusion of a lagged dependent 
variable, the problem of endogeneity could be another important econometric issue need 
to be considered. Then, the dynamic panel Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) 
model3, which was developed by Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995), 
and Blundell and Bond (1998), is used to control the bias raised from endogeneity. The 
one-year lags of the explanatory variables are chosen as instrument variables; this 
approach is in line with the literature on dynamic panel models, such as Koetter, Kolari 







1 Following Flannery and Rangan (2006) and Cheng and Weiss's (2012a) approaches, the the economic 
impact (E.I.) of a one-standard-deviation change in the Leverage is computed as: 
 E. I. of Leverage =
coefficient for 𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑑 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 × s. d. of 𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 
standard deviation of the 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 for Δ𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒
  
where the coefficient for lagged Leverage (i.e., 𝛿) and the predicted value for Δ𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 can be caputed 
from Eqaution 3.12 and Equation shown in Footnote 1 by using OLS regressions, respectively; and the 
target Leverage can be found using Equation 3.1. In order to test the relative importance of two theories, 
the regression is run without interaction terms. Similarly, the economic impact of Retained Earning (E.I. of 
RE) variableis found by caculating : 
E. I. of RE =
coefficient for Retained Earning × s. d. of Retained Earning 
standard deviation of the 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 for Δ𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒
 
2 The null hypothesis of Hausman's (1978) test is rejected, suggesting that the fixed effect estimator is 
prefered.  
3 The Difference-GMM model, which is developed by Arellano and Bond's (1991), uses the differencing 
in regressors. The DIF-GMM method specifies the model as a system of equations and it allows instruments 
(e.g., lags value of the endogenous variables) applicable to each equation to vary. However, the weakness 
of this method is that the lagged levels will be poor instruments if the first-differenced variables are close 
to a random walk. A System-GMM was modified by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond 
(1998) based on Arellano and Bond's (1991) model. They assumed that the first differences of instrument 
variables are uncorrelated with the fixed effects, and both lagged levels as well as lagged value of the 
difference are included in SYS-GMM estimations. Thus, these allow more instruments to be introduced 
and improve efficiency of estimation. In this paper, the STATA command “xtabond2”, written by Roodman 
(2009), is adopted. He summed up the above discussions and apply the “Windmeijer finite-sample 
correction” to the two-step standard errors that tend to be downward; this can make two-step estimations 
more efficient than one-step, especially for SYS-GMM. And the details of this correction could be found 
in (Windmeijer, 2005)’s study. Then, the two-step SYS-GMM is adopted in this chapter.  
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Section 3.4 Results and Discussions 
    
   Table 3.1 shows the descriptive statistics of the firm-specific and market-specific 
variables used to test hypotheses 1-5. Table 3.2 presents the correlation between the 
discussed variables. The highest correlation coefficient of 0.50 is observed between 
Retained Earnings and Firm Size. It may lead to the potential issue of multicollinearity. 
Then, the variance inflation factor (VIF) analysis is computed for all independent 
variables. The highest individual score is 1.79 from Inflation Rate, and the overall score 
is 1.32; these are well below the commonly accepted threshold value of 10 (see, Kennedy 
(1998)). Thus, multicollinearity is unlikely to be a serious issue in this study. 
 
[Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics insert here] 
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Function  Observations Mean Median Standard Deviation Min Max 
Leverage Dependent Variable 7193 2.6406 0.8576 5.2286 0.0000 25.2320 
Retain Earning Hypothesized Variable 9555 232.5543 13.7694 884.6509 -1395.3488 3804.9587 
Boone Indicator Hypothesized Variable 24820 0.6939 0.7359 0.3039 -0.1214 1.1439 
Lerner Index Hypothesized Variable 4501 0.1142 0.0823 0.0897 0.0052 0.8536 
HHI Hypothesized Variable 24820 0.0347 0.0327 0.0062 0.0283 0.0508 
Income Volatility Hypothesized Variable 8942 2.1957 2.2800 1.4377 -6.7639 5.0513 
Business Volatility Hypothesized Variable 7942 1.6966 0.0867 5.6678 0.0000 38.8700 
Reinsurance Hypothesized Variable 7569 0.3540 0.2272 0.3614 0.0000 1.5158 
Cost of Equity Control Variable - Firm  10889 19.0959 9.7950 36.0308 -77.3371 143.5897 
Firm Size Control Variable - Firm  10625 7.9381 7.9312 2.4717 2.9716 12.9566 
Liquidity Control Variable - Firm  9923 0.5761 0.6259 0.3170 0.0000 19.2411 
Investment Return Control Variable - Firm  9398 0.3430 0.0310 9.5262 -34.9300 784.0000 
Tax Payment Control Variable - Firm  7535 142.1947 6.4440 1256.0476 -36015.5039 44446.2810 
Interest rate Control Variable - Market  27302 3.1222 3.8750 2.4203 0.2500 7.2500 
Inflation Rate Control Variable - Market  27302 1.9144 1.8891 0.8303 0.3680 3.8561 
GDP Growth Control Variable - Market  27302 2.1064 2.4102 1.6518 -4.1878 4.0382 
Notes: Leverage is the ratio of Net Premium Written to Surplus. Retain Earnings is the retained profit shown on the income statement. Boone Indicator is calculated by using 
firm’s market share and marginal cost, and the negative coefficient β denotes the Boone indicator; hence, a larger negative value of β is indicating a more competitive market. 
In this study, a positive Boone Indicator is adopted by timing the negative β with -1. Thus, the larger the value of the Boone indicator denotes that a more competitive market. 
Lerner Index is calculated by using Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) involved with two outputs and three inputs. The larger the Lerner index indicates that the firm has 
more mark-up power, then the market is more (less) concentrated (competitive). HHI is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is based on market share. A higher index (beyond 
1800) means the market is concentrated. Income Volatility is the the standard deviation of return on shareholder’s fund (ROSF) with a three year rolling window. Bussiness 
Volatility is the standard deviation of the loss ratio with a three-year rolling window. Reinsurance is the ratio of reinsurance ceded to gross premium written. Cost of Equity 
is measured as the most recent three-year average of return on shareholder’s fund. Firm Size is the natural logarithm of the insurer’s total assets. Liquidty is the ratio of liquid 
asset to total liability. Investment Return is the return on investment assets. Tax Payment is the amount of tax payment shown on financial statement. Market variables - 
Interest Rate, Inflation Rate and GDP Growth -  are collected from World-Bank database. To mitigate the confounding effects of outliers, some firm-specific variables are 
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Table 3.2: Correlation Coefficient Matrix 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1. Leverage  1.00                
2. Retained Earning -0.07*  1.00               
3. Boone Indicator -0.05*  0.09*  1.00              
4. Lerner Index -0.19*  0.04*  0.05*  1.00             
5. HHI -0.05*  0.03  0.32*  0.01  1.00            
6. Income Volatility  0.23* -0.00 -0.04* -0.00 -0.06*  1.00           
7. Business Volatility -0.06* -0.01  0.04  0.15*  0.00 -0.02  1.00          
8. Reinsurance -0.13* -0.10*  0.03  0.17*  0.02  0.05*  0.01  1.00         
9. Cost of Equity   0.35*  0.04  0.02  0.06* -0.08*  0.24* -0.04 -0.03  1.00        
10. Firm Size  0.12*  0.50*  0.08* -0.25*  0.05*  0.07*  0.00 -0.11*  0.05*  1.00       
11. Liquidity  0.06* -0.11* -0.01 -0.14*  0.02  0.06* -0.07* -0.07*  0.02 -0.06*  1.00      
12. Investment Return  0.06*  0.05* -0.08*  0.06* -0.07*  0.04* -0.02 -0.06*  0.03  0.01 -0.02 1.00     
13. Tax Payment -0.02  0.38*  0.05* -0.04  0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.08*  0.05*  0.31* -0.05* 0.02 1.00    
14. Interest rate  0.05* -0.01 -0.27* -0.01 -0.29*  0.01 -0.07* -0.02  0.07* -0.00  0.13* 0.17* 0.04  1.00   
15. Inflation Rate  0.04  0.06* -0.38* -0.03 -0.44*  0.08*  0.00 -0.01  0.10* -0.02 -0.09* 0.02 0.00 -0.17*  1.00  
16. GDP Growth -0.02 -0.04 -0.09* -0.02  0.03 -0.11* -0.04 -0.02 -0.04*  0.02  0.04* 0.06* 0.02  0.44* -0.30* 1.00 
Notes: The highest correlation coefficient is 0.50, observed between Retain Earnings and Firm Size, raising the potential issue of multicollinearity.  
The variance inflation factor (VIF) analysis is computed for all the independent variables.  
The highest individual score is 1.79 from Inflation Rate, and the overall score is 1.32.  
These are well below the commonly accepted threshold value of 10 (see, (Kennedy, 1998)). Thus, multicollinearity is unlikely to be a serious issue in this study. 
A positive Boone Indicator is adopted by timing the negative β with -1. Thus, the larger the value of this positive Boone indicator denotes that the market is more competitive. 
* represent statistical significance at 5% level at least. 
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3.4.1 Market Structure Estimations 
   Table 3.3 presents, by year, the results of three proxies for market structure over the 
study period, from three different perspectives—the Boone indicator, the Lerner index 
and the HHI. The Boone indicator is estimated by regressing the marginal cost on the 
insurer’s market share, as discussed in Section 3.3. The negative coefficient of the 
marginal cost is the Boone indicator, as shown in Table 3.3; increasingly negative figures 
indicate that the insurance market is more competitive. The second proxy of market 
structure is the non-negative Lerner index, which is estimated by SFA; the higher the 
index, the more pricing power (or market power) the individual insurer has. This also 
indirectly denotes that the level of competition (concentration) is low (high) in the market. 
The HHI is a direct measurement of market concentration; the higher the value, the more 
concentrated the market. Figures 3.1 and 3.2 are the graphic representations of the values 
presented in Table 3.3; with the former indicating the trends of market structure from 
1998 to 2017 and the latter representing annual fluctuations.  
 
   Figure 3.1 suggests that there is a trend of growth from all three market structure 
measurements over the studied period. Specifically, this trend in the (positive) Boone 
indicator represents competition become more intense in the UK insurance market. 
However, the increasing trend in both the Lerner Index and the HHI suggests that the 
market is becoming less competitive (or more concentrated) over time. These 
contradictory results further confirm Claessens and Laeven’s (2004) and Sekkat’s (2009) 
suggestions, which reveal highly competitive behaviour in a concentrated market. This 
finding is also confirmed by the significant and positive correlation between the Boone 
indicator and the Lerner index (or the HHI), as shown in Table 3.2. 
 
   Apart from the smoothed trend shown in Figure 3.1, Figure 3.2 represents how the 
market structure changes from different perspectives by year, without the smoothing 
effect. From both Table 3.3 and Figure 3.2, the Boone indicator and the Lerner index 
begin to increase around 2000 to 2001; then, the increasing trend stops around 2008 and 
begins to decrease significantly. The movement suggests that the intensities of market 
competition and concentration (or mark-up power) were reduced during the most recent 
financial crisis and reached the least intensity around 2011. Although the direct 
measurement of market concentration—HHI—does not have a similar movement pattern, 
it still shows that the degree of concentration is being affected by the financial crisis, and 
there are frequent fluctuations during a similar period. Furthermore, the intensity of all 
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three measurements begins to raise with small fluctuations around 2012 and achieves the 
most intensive level in 2016. From Table 3.3, it is also worth mentioning that the HHI 
value across the study period is far below the threshold value of 1,800, which is used to 
identify whether the market is concentrated. This suggests that the degree of market 
concentration is low. 
 
 
Table 3.3: Market Structure Indicators 
Year Boone Indicator Lerner Index HHI 
1998 -0.44491 0.11646 0.02888 
1999 -0.53710 0.10019 0.02906 
2000 -0.27441 0.08909 0.03028 
2001 -0.40755 0.08563 0.03932 
2002 -0.50831 0.08961 0.03920 
2003 -0.51145 0.09969 0.04123 
2004 -0.62805 0.09875 0.02987 
2005 -0.73718 0.10958 0.02961 
2006 -0.94905 0.10142 0.03213 
2007 -0.76229 0.11128 0.03328 
2008 -0.73455 0.12995 0.03136 
2009 -0.83528 0.12853 0.03355 
2010 -0.84924 0.12785 0.03215 
2011 0.12143 0.10986 0.03330 
2012 -0.81878 0.11667 0.02831 
2013 -0.64621 0.11565 0.03018 
2014 -1.14392 0.11974 0.03398 
2015 -1.07683 0.11000 0.04199 
2016 -1.10279 0.12948 0.05085 
2017 -1.03182 0.12675 0.04633 
Average -0.69391 0.11360 0.03507 
Notes: Boone Indicator is calculated by using firm’s market share and marginal cost, and the negative 
coefficient β of marginal cost denotes the (negative) Boone indicator as shown in this table; hence, a larger 
negative value of β is indicating a more competitive market. In the following, a positive Boone Indicator 
is adopted by timing the negative β with -1, as shown in Figure 3.1 and 3.2. Thus, the larger the value of 
the positive Boone indicator denotes that the market is more competitive. Lerner Index is calculated by 
using Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) involved with two outputs and three inputs. The larger the Lerner 
index indicates that the firm has more mark-up power; it further presumes the market is more (less) 
concentrated (competitive). HHI is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is a traditional measurement of market 
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Figure 3.1: Changing of Market Structure in the UK insurance Market  
with Smoothing Effect 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Changing of Market Structure in the UK insurance Market  
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   Clearly, the indications raised from these three different proxies of market structure 
contradict each other in some respects. The possible explanation for this might be found 
in the fact that these measurements enclose different information, as discussed in Section 
3.3.1. To be more specific, the Boone indicator presents the degree of competition directly 
after considering the reallocation effect; the Lerner index denotes an individual’s pricing 
power as suggested by Beck, De Jonghe and Schepens (2013a); and the traditional HHI 
is a direct proxy of market concentration. More carefully, the Boone indicator takes a 
leading role, with one to two years’ lead-time, in terms of evolution, compared to the 
Lerner index and the HHI. This may indicate that competition leads to an increase in 
insurers’ market power and market concentration. Therefore, it is inappropriate to explain 
these three measurements with only one unique definition, such degree of competition. 
In the rest of this study, market structure will be represented by three different concepts—
competition, pricing power and concentration—as these are not mutually exclusive. 
Moreover, the impact of market structure on individuals’ capital structure is also revealed 
from these three perspectives.  
 
3.4.2 Panel Estimations 
   By following Goddard, Molyneux and Wilson (2004) and Mamatzakis and Bermpei 
(2016), the main regression model is estimated using both OLS fixed effect estimation 
and the dynamic panel Generalized Method of Moment (GMM) model. The former not 
only eliminate the impact of time-invariant effect and to capture unobserved firm-specific 
characteristics (heterogeneity across firms), but also represents the long-run relationship. 
The GMM model is used to address the potential endogeneity issue that may arise in the 
OLS estimation; meanwhile, it can be used to further estimate the dynamic features of the 
model, which is the short-run relationship. Therefore, a comprehensive story, in which 
variabilities existed between the long-run relationship and the short-run relationship are 
considered, can be provided by comparing the results from these two models. 
 
   This section presents the results of the main model—Equation (3.12). To be more 
specific, Tables 3.4 and 3.5 illustrate the estimations of Equation (3.12), which reveals 
the impact of individual factors on an insurer’s leverage ratio. Hypothesis 1 to Hypothesis 
4 can be verified by the results in these two tables. Regarding Hypothesis 5, the results 
from Tables 3.6 to 3.11 disclose the impacts of the interactions between individual factors 
and market structure on insurers’ capital structures.   
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3.4.2.1 Trade-off Theory, Pecking order Theory, Market Structure, Volatilities and 
Reinsurance 
   Tables 3.4 and 3.5 present the results of the OLS fixed effects and the GMM dynamic 
panel regressions, respectively. Models 1 and 9-11 show that the coefficient of the lagged 
leverage is significantly positive and less than one. Thus, Hypothesis 1a is supported. It 
indicates that insurers should have a target capital structure and continuously adjust it 
toward its optimal level. Then the trade-off theory is supported, it indicates that the UK 
insurers seek to balance the benefit against the cost of holding leverage to achieve 
maximized value and the firm takes actions to try to return to the optimum balanced level.  
 
   Hypothesis 1b is also valid because the coefficient of retained earnings is negative and 
significant, as shown in Models 2 and 9-11. The validity of Hypothesis 1b indicates that 
insurers may prefer internal financing over external financing. As discussed in the 
introduction, it is reasonable for two reasons: 1. Cost of external financing is higher than 
cost of internal financing; 2. Issuing new shares harm the value of current shareholders. 
These results are valid in both OLS fixed effects and GMM models and are consistent 
with findings from Cheng and Weiss (2012), who also reveal the existence of both trade-
off and pecking-order behaviour in the US insurance market. 
 
 Overall, the results suggest that insurers prefer internal financing to achieve an optimal 
capital structure. Apart from testing the appearance of these two theories, the regression 
models, with the dependent variable of changing the leverage ratio, are estimated to test 
the relative importance between two fundamental theories.1 The result indicates that the 
pecking-order theory dominates the trade-off theory in the UK insurance market.  
 
   To verify Hypothesis 2, in which the impact of market structure on insurers’ capital 
structure is discussed, three proxies are used to represent market structure from different 
concepts. Although these proxies explain the concept of market structure from different 
perspectives, their impacts on insurers’ capital structures are consistent and negative. 
 
1 Adopting the methodology described by Cheng and Weiss (2012) alongside the regression results from 
Models 9-11 in Table 3.4, the economic impact of change in leverage and retained earnings is found. (Table 
A3.1 in Appendix 3 shows the results of OLS regression on change in leverage, and the summaries of the 
economic impacts are shown in Table A3.2). Across all models, the economic impacts of retained earnings 
are larger than the economic impacts of leverage. Thus, it is reasonable to suggest that the pecking-order 
theory dominates the trade-off theory in the UK insurance market. This result further confirms that insurers 
would like to use internal sources to achieve target capital structures.  
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Evidence can be found from Models 4-5 and 9-10 in Tables 3.4 and 3.5. The negative 
coefficients mean that the corresponding market structure variables are inversely related 
to the insurers’ leverage ratios. Specifically, insurers may reduce the use of leverage when 
it has greater -pricing power, as indicated by the negative coefficient of Lerner index. On 
the other hand, the negative coefficient of Boone indicator suggests that the insurers’ 
leverage ratio can be reduced when the market is competitive. It is also worth to know 
that these two results do not conflict with each other, because the increased pricing power 
can be a result of intensive competition. The coefficient of market concentration—HHI—
is negative, but it is not strongly significant. That is, weak significance can be found only 
in Model 11 in Table 3.5. The observed negative relationship is consistent with findings 
from Soedarmono, Machrouh and Tarazi (2011); Beck, De Jonghe and Schepens (2013b); 
Schaeck and Cihák (2014); and Guidara and Lai (2015). These authors used different 
proxies to represent various concepts of market structure. However, Cummins, Rubio-
Misas and Vencappa (2017) suggest that insurers hold less equity capital (more leverage) 
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 Table 3.4: Individual Effect of Factors on Capital Structure – OLS  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
 H1a H1b H2a H2b H2c H3a H3b H4 Boone Lerner HHI 
VARIABLES Leverage  Leverage  Leverage  Leverage  Leverage  Leverage  Leverage  Leverage  Leverage  Leverage  Leverage  
                        
Lagged Leverage 0.2799***        0.1939*** 0.2401*** 0.1961*** 
 (3.724)        (3.066) (3.765) (3.080) 
Retained Earnings  -0.2002***       -0.1221*** -0.1269** -0.1336*** 
  (-3.916)       (-2.587) (-2.572) (-2.704) 
Boone Indicator   -0.4959***      -0.3856**   
   (-2.613)      (-2.131)   
Lerner Index     -2.5377***      -1.8258***  
    (-3.530)      (-2.702)  
HHI     -0.0097      0.0068 
     (-1.012)      (1.039) 
Income Volatility      0.1827***   0.1604** 0.0940** 0.1674*** 
      (3.609)   (2.491) (2.020) (2.599) 
Business Volatility       -0.0548***  -0.0369** -0.0182 -0.0409** 
       (-3.488)  (-2.015) (-1.005) (-2.195) 
Reinsurance         -0.4280*** -0.2796*** -0.1487** -0.2826*** 
        (-4.824) (-4.015) (-2.427) (-4.023) 
Cost of Equity  -0.0084* 0.0011 -0.0017 0.0192** -0.0022 -0.0036 -0.0040 -0.0009 -0.0042 0.0128* -0.0046 
 (-1.649) (0.208) (-0.321) (2.578) (-0.421) (-0.581) (-0.675) (-0.157) (-0.648) (1.944) (-0.712) 
Firm Size -0.2455* -0.1382 -0.1695 -0.0740 -0.1805 -0.1996 -0.3235** -0.2499 -0.4203** -0.0247 -0.4508** 
 (-1.762) (-1.098) (-1.235) (-0.548) (-1.329) (-1.393) (-2.322) (-1.635) (-2.232) (-0.253) (-2.420) 
Liquidity  0.0546 0.0814 0.0878 -0.0054 0.0889 0.0888 0.0444 -0.0031 0.0034 -0.0314 -0.0025 
 (0.940) (1.406) (1.463) (-0.107) (1.456) (1.443) (0.668) (-0.044) (0.057) (-0.567) (-0.040) 
Investment Return 0.1151*** 0.1128*** 0.1130*** 2.8898*** 0.1132*** 0.1137*** 0.1073*** 0.2562*** 0.2378*** 7.8786*** 0.2331*** 
 (2.789) (2.838) (2.768) (3.217) (2.815) (2.855) (2.725) (6.675) (6.318) (2.693) (6.167) 
Tax Payment -0.0154 0.0014 -0.0201 -0.0433 -0.0223 -0.0250 -0.0215 -0.0198 -0.0031 -0.0359 -0.0017 
 (-0.945) (0.108) (-1.266) (-0.865) (-1.368) (-1.353) (-1.254) (-1.532) (-0.319) (-0.866) (-0.170) 
Interest rate 0.1206*** 0.1631*** 0.1455*** 0.0815*** 0.1510*** 0.1550*** 0.1444*** 0.1015*** 0.0543* 0.0110 0.0724** 
 (5.154) (5.915) (5.574) (2.891) (5.604) (5.220) (4.343) (3.332) (1.900) (0.421) (2.452) 
Inflation Rate -0.0213 -0.0115 -0.1062 -0.0054 -0.0431 -0.0263 -0.0378 -0.0477 -0.1405** -0.0261 -0.0460 
 (-0.395) (-0.211) (-1.415) (-0.122) (-0.839) (-0.439) (-0.677) (-0.947) (-2.263) (-0.732) (-0.936) 
GDP Growth -0.0133 -0.0394** -0.0472*** -0.0132 -0.0368** -0.0267 -0.0426** -0.0237 0.0009 0.0091 0.0063 
 (-0.836) (-2.321) (-2.818) (-0.682) (-2.187) (-1.431) (-2.330) (-1.128) (0.044) (0.466) (0.318) 
Constant 3.4079*** 2.9585*** 3.8647*** 2.3248** 3.7866*** 3.0811** 4.9365*** 3.3744** 4.9605*** 0.7681 4.4707*** 
 (2.763) (2.735) (3.593) (2.099) (3.008) (2.484) (3.949) (2.458) (3.052) (0.847) (2.839) 
                        
Observations 4,677 5,398 5,120 3,082 5,120 4,860 4,485 4,452 3,511 2,281 3,511 
Number of Firms 630 664 642 540 642 638 608 594 533 447 533 
Adjusted R-squared 0.153 0.073 0.074 0.055 0.071 0.083 0.087 0.120 0.210 0.189 0.208 
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-test 8.47*** 7.1*** 5.95*** 10.82*** 5.88*** 8.34*** 6.83*** 13.61*** 14.71*** 5.84*** 14.73*** 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
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 Table 3.5: Individual Effect of Factors on Capital Structure - GMM 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
 H1a H1b H2a H2b H2c H3a H3b H4 Boone Lerner HHI 
VARIABLES Leverage Leverage Leverage Leverage Leverage Leverage Leverage Leverage Leverage Leverage Leverage 
                        
Lagged Leverage 0.3976*** 0.4381*** 0.5144*** 0.3860*** 0.3807*** 0.4505*** 0.2982*** 0.2081*** 0.2784*** 0.3344*** 0.2750*** 
 (4.616) (4.436) (4.003) (4.896) (4.453) (3.814) (3.008) (2.698) (3.735) (3.831) (3.471) 
Retained Earnings  -0.7552***       -0.0889* -0.2761** -0.2694* 
  (-3.461)       (-1.711) (-2.001) (-1.679) 
Boone Indicator   -0.3971***      -0.5454***   
   (-3.077)      (-2.750)   
Lerner Index     -1.5088**      -2.6762*  
    (-1.999)      (-1.898)  
HHI     -0.0019      -0.0120* 
     (-0.363)      (-1.695) 
Income Volatility      0.2169**   0.2961*** 0.2860* 0.3914*** 
      (2.262)   (3.322) (1.881) (3.282) 
Business Volatility       -0.0314*  -0.0325 -0.0736* -0.1958* 
       (-1.884)  (-0.916) (-1.732) (-1.893) 
Reinsurance         -0.3659** -0.3173** -0.4241*** -0.3114*** 
        (-2.373) (-2.559) (-3.404) (-2.796) 
Cost of Equity  0.0031 0.0038 -0.0041 0.0023 0.0061 0.0058 -0.0020 -0.0004 0.0015 0.0138* 0.0055 
 (0.483) (0.609) (-0.379) (0.311) (0.667) (0.778) (-0.204) (-0.048) (0.125) (1.691) (0.796) 
Firm Size 0.2669** 0.3190** 0.3001** 0.3010 0.3904** 0.2577* 0.3259** -0.2275 0.0409 0.1924 0.0260 
 (1.993) (2.065) (2.322) (1.519) (2.339) (1.688) (2.026) (-0.994) (0.191) (0.912) (0.136) 
Liquidity  0.2308* 0.0111 0.1156 0.1639* 0.1051 0.0636 0.0988 0.0978 0.2807 0.0619 -0.0242 
 (1.901) (0.045) (0.386) (1.758) (0.882) (0.603) (0.158) (0.769) (1.147) (0.500) (-0.154) 
Investment Return 0.1917** 0.2624** 0.1292** 2.2950* 0.1485* 0.1099* 0.2826* 0.3005*** 0.3360*** -3.2517 0.2607** 
 (2.105) (2.272) (2.010) (1.929) (1.916) (1.656) (1.908) (7.094) (3.435) (-1.201) (2.370) 
Tax Payment -0.2891* 0.0811** -0.0093 0.0066 -0.0159 0.0029 -0.5443 -0.0346 -0.0115 0.1317 0.0126 
 (-1.724) (2.226) (-0.764) (0.073) (-0.666) (0.089) (-0.997) (-1.514) (-1.034) (0.966) (0.181) 
Interest rate 0.0460* 0.0286 0.0072 0.0198 0.0243 0.0330 0.0506 0.0735* -0.0259 0.0066 -0.0174 
 (1.840) (0.803) (0.225) (0.629) (0.733) (1.000) (1.603) (1.807) (-0.637) (0.154) (-0.521) 
Inflation Rate -0.0279 0.0013 -0.0977* 0.0320 -0.0070 -0.1260* -0.0354 -0.1109 -0.1245* -0.0234 -0.0881** 
 (-1.376) (0.031) (-1.956) (0.468) (-0.097) (-1.790) (-0.620) (-1.177) (-1.920) (-0.326) (-2.208) 
GDP Growth -0.0036 -0.0068 -0.0143 -0.0235 0.0095 -0.0025 -0.0004 -0.0770** 0.0361* 0.0152 0.0223 
 (-0.335) (-0.308) (-0.991) (-0.847) (0.874) (-0.075) (-0.031) (-2.265) (1.846) (0.384) (1.286) 
Constant -1.2497 -1.7838 -1.1957 -1.6012 -2.3816* -1.5652 -1.5654 2.9051 0.4766 -1.7214 0.2180 
 (-1.148) (-1.402) (-1.088) (-0.986) (-1.857) (-1.237) (-1.177) (1.536) (0.283) (-0.869) (0.119)             
            
Observations 4,677 4,624 4,519 2,749 4,519 4,651 4,308 3,813 3,354 1,748 3,215 
Number of Firms 630 628 616 511 616 629 601 562 503 385 479 
Number of Instruments 108 95 106 157 148 147 116 160 166 176 182 
Robust Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-test 7.825*** 7.583*** 11.90*** 9.749*** 7.790*** 12.68*** 5.015*** 13.34*** 6.139*** 10.54*** 5.228*** 
AR(1) -3.5*** -3.595*** -3.249*** -2.701*** -3.360*** -3.251*** -3.090*** -3.108*** -2.993*** -2.240** -2.998*** 
AR(2) 1.038 0.500 1.203 0.655 1.110 1.175 0.388 1.209 0.658 -0.214 0.569 
Hansen Test (P-value) 110.8 (0.177) 95.62 (0.182) 110.8 (0.128) 165.8 (0.0.125) 145.9 (0.286)) 157 (0.106) 114.7 (0.244) 156.5 (0.320)) 169 (0.150) 167.9 (0.338)) 183.2 (0.185) 
t-statistics in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1          
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   Concerning the hypothesis on the relationship between an insurer’s volatilities and 
capital structure, both income volatility and business volatility are tested. Income 
volatility has a positive relationship with leverage usage, while business volatility is 
negatively related to leverage ratio. The positive effect of income volatility supports the 
suggestions from Lee, Mayers and Smith (1997) and Cheng and Weiss (2013), while the 
negative impact associated with business volatility is consistent with the bankruptcy-cost-
avoidance hypothesis (Orgler and Taggart, 1983), the transaction-cost economics theory 
(Williamson, 1988) and the capital buffer theory (Shim, 2010). In other words, insurers 
who face more income volatilities are likely to take more leverage due to using external 
guaranty funds (Lee, Mayers and Smith, 1997) or the existence of mispricing (Cheng and 
Weiss, 2013). Another explanation for the positive relationship is that insurers may 
potentially write more business when they face more income uncertainties, which 
increases the business leverage as the written net premium increases.  
 
   On the other hand, the coefficient of business volatility is negative in both long-run and 
short-run. It indicates that insurers are willing to reduce leverage use or raise equity 
capital (i.e. to avoid imposing extra bankruptcy cost) when they issue more risky products. 
Therefore, the results also suggest that different types of volatility may have various 
impacts on insurers’ capital structures. It is not surprising to have such contradictory 
results because both Baranoff and Sager (2002) and Hu and Yu (2014) confirm that 
uncertainties from different sources have varied impacts on insurers’ capital structures. 
 
   Inconsistent with most of the previous findings (e.g., Shiu, 2011; Liu, Shiu and Liu, 
2016; Mankaï and Belgacem, 2016), the impact of reinsurance on leverage ratio is found 
to be significantly negative, as presented by Models 8-11 in both the long-run (OLS fixed 
effects) and the short-run (dynamic GMM) tables. The negative coefficient indicates that 
insurers who accept more reinsurance protections should have a lower leverage ratio, and 
it is different from what expected. Although Cheng and Weiss (2012) are the only authors 
also confirming a negative relationship between reinsurance and leverage ratio, they do 
not provide further explanations. On one hand, reinsurance that provides extra protection 
can act as a substitute of capital (renting capital), then taking more reinsurance may 
indicate two things: 1) the primary insurer’s original risk level is very high; or 2) the 
primary insurer may highly rely on reinsurers’ health status, then face more credit risks. 
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Thus, the behaviour of taking more reinsurance may potentially meant that the primary 
insurer is high risk. It is reasonable, therefore, to reduce the likelihood of insolvency at 
the enterprise level via lowering the leverage.  
 
3.4.2.2 Interaction with Market Structure: Boone Indicator 
   The Boone indicator presents the degree of competition in the UK insurance market. A 
higher (positive) Boone indicator means the degree of market competition is high. This 
section seeks to determine how internal factors influence capital structure due to the 
impact of the competition. Table 3.6 presents the OLS fixed effects model, and 
estimations from the dynamic panel model are shown in Table 3.7. Both tables disclose 
the potential impacts of the interactions between the Boone indicator and internal factors 
in the insurer’s capital structure. From both the long-run and the short-run tables, the 
negative impact of competition on leverage ratio can be confirmed across most of the 
models; the expected individual effects of all key variables also remain significant. 
Regarding the interaction terms, most effects are significant, except for those of the 
Retained Earnings * Boone term in the long-run table (Table 3.6) and the Reinsurance * 
Boone term in both tables. The other significant results imply that the degree of 
competition influences insurers’ behaviours, which are relevant to their capital structures.  
 
   To be more specific, the negative coefficients for the Lagged Leverage * Boone term 
(Model 1) suggest that insurers, who have a higher leverage ratio from the past, are willing 
to reduce the use of leverage when the market is competitive. Based on the ‘competition-
stability’ theory, insurers would like to maintain their stability in a competitive market. 
Therefore, they should lower their leverage ratios when the inherent risks are high. Then, 
a similar interpretation can be used to explain the negative of the coefficient for the 
Income Volatility * Boone term (Model 3). In a competitive market, insurers who face 
more income volatility should choose to lower the use of leverage to maintain at a 
relatively stable position. 
 
   On the other hand, the positive effects raised from the other interaction terms indicate 
that insurers may increase the level of leverage in a competitive market when they have 
more retained earnings (Model 2) or issue more risky policies (Model 4). Based on the 
competition-fragility theory, intensive competition increases insurers’ risk-taking 
incentives, such as issuing riskier policies to attract more customers, which further 
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increases the amount of business leverage. Under competition, insurers not only maintain 
their soundness but also try to attract more customers and issue more policies 
continuously. Retained earnings contribute to insurers’ equity and provide them with the 
opportunity to expand their business, which further increases the leverage ratio (if the 
increase in business leverage is more significant than the contribution from retained 
earnings).  
 
Furthermore, it’s interesting to know that tha impacts of two interaction terms related to 
different volatilities (Model 3 and 4) on capital structure are contradicted. The possible 
explanation is that insurers try to seek limit the overall risk level, adjusted their capital 
structures by balancing risk portfolios from different perspectives, in line with the ‘finite 
risk paradigm’ or the ‘capital buffer theory’. 
 
   Regarding the interaction between competition and reinsurance usage (Model 5), the 
impact is positive, but insignificant in both long-run and short-run. Although the positive 
coefficient indicates the renting capital hypothesis and denotes that primary insurers, who 
take more reinsurance protections, should require less equity capital and have a higher 
leverage ratio in a competitive market, the result is not significant. 
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Table 3.6: Interacted Effects with Market Structure (Boone) on Capital Structure - OLS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Leverage Leverage Leverage Leverage Leverage Leverage 
              
Lagged Leverage  0.4670*** 0.2961*** 0.2840*** 0.1808*** 0.1874*** 0.2437** 
 (4.520) (3.524) (3.630) (2.618) (3.152) (2.274) 
Boone Indicator -0.0879 -0.5320*** 0.3518 -0.4712** -0.4469* 0.7976 
 (-0.601) (-2.828) (1.260) (-2.428) (-1.963) (1.515) 
Lagged Leverage * Boone -0.2508***     -0.0672 
 (-3.510)     (-0.603) 
Retained Earnings  -0.2629***    -0.1543* 
  (-2.864)    (-1.752) 
Retained Earnings * Boone  0.1246    0.0536 
  (1.179)    (0.594) 
Income Volatility   0.4487***   0.4984** 
   (3.388)   (2.516) 
Income Volatility * Boone   -0.4039***   -0.4860** 
   (-2.629)   (-2.084) 
Business Volatility    -0.0800***  -0.0704 
    (-2.831)  (-1.431) 
Business Volatility * Boone    0.0376*  0.0376 
    (1.706)  (0.769) 
Reinsurance     -0.3335*** -0.3073*** 
     (-3.159) (-2.993) 
Reinsurance * Boone     0.0104 0.0445 
     (0.141) (0.576) 
Cost of Equity  -0.0085* -0.0067 -0.0076 -0.0071 -0.0054 -0.0036 
 (-1.659) (-1.222) (-1.385) (-1.352) (-0.848) (-0.554) 
Firm Size -0.2599* -0.2356 -0.2744* -0.3843** -0.3676** -0.4252** 
 (-1.817) (-1.589) (-1.852) (-2.382) (-2.027) (-2.299) 
Liquidity  0.0608 0.0533 0.0722 0.0385 -0.0242 0.0083 
 (1.095) (0.903) (1.324) (0.587) (-0.340) (0.138) 
Investment Return 0.1140*** 0.1131*** 0.1156*** 0.1072*** 0.2408*** 0.2381*** 
 (2.737) (2.708) (2.745) (2.628) (6.126) (6.495) 
Tax Payment -0.0130 0.0038 -0.0143 -0.0140 -0.0160 -0.0032 
 (-0.819) (0.263) (-0.977) (-0.920) (-1.356) (-0.343) 
Interest rate 0.1066*** 0.1133*** 0.1024*** 0.1007*** 0.0506* 0.0593** 
 (4.210) (4.405) (3.934) (3.794) (1.879) (2.113) 
Inflation Rate -0.0889 -0.1183 -0.1106 -0.1344* -0.1518** -0.1213** 
 (-1.307) (-1.530) (-1.456) (-1.886) (-2.335) (-1.996) 
GDP Growth -0.0231 -0.0208 -0.0191 -0.0268* -0.0029 -0.0080 
 (-1.503) (-1.345) (-1.122) (-1.662) (-0.160) (-0.396) 
Constant 3.7546*** 3.9044*** 3.2508*** 5.6611*** 4.8021*** 4.1212*** 
 (3.134) (3.239) (2.642) (4.045) (3.111) (2.605) 
       
       
Observations 4,519 4,471 4,495 4,151 3,665 3,511 
Number of Firms 616 613 615 587 548 533 
Adjusted R-squared 0.175 0.172 0.172 0.138 0.190 0.216 
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-test 12.15*** 7.39*** 9.23*** 6.39*** 13.39*** 12.03*** 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
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 Table 3.7: Interacted Effects with Market Structure (Boone) on Capital Structure - 
GMM 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Leverage Leverage Leverage Leverage Leverage Leverage 
              
Lagged Leverage  1.0680*** 0.4737*** 0.4529*** 0.2861*** 0.2641*** 0.4425** 
 (5.398) (4.308) (3.960) (3.115) (3.625) (2.134) 
Boone Indicator 0.6702* -1.1000*** 1.5555* -0.9698*** -0.5419** -0.1791 
 (1.814) (-3.484) (1.737) (-4.076) (-2.044) (-0.159) 
Lagged Leverage * Boone -0.9836***     -0.4295* 
 (-5.581)     (-1.859) 
Retained Earnings  -0.4982*    -0.5248** 
  (-1.918)    (-2.493) 
Retained Earnings * Boone  0.3128*    0.2959** 
  (1.860)    (2.170) 
Income Volatility   0.9899***   0.1465 
   (3.059)   (0.270) 
Income Volatility * Boone   -1.1295**   0.1512 
   (-2.446)   (0.265) 
Business Volatility    -0.0605**  0.0016 
    (-1.976)  (0.034) 
Business Volatility * Boone    0.0685*  -0.0334 
    (1.694)  (-0.716) 
Reinsurance     -0.2640* -0.1370 
     (-1.763) (-0.628) 
Reinsurance * Boone     0.0458 0.1922 
     (0.398) (0.917) 
Cost of Equity  0.0245 0.0420** 0.0057 0.0008 -0.0038 0.0157* 
 (1.281) (2.348) (0.823) (0.111) (-0.445) (1.767) 
Firm Size 0.4434*** 0.3747** 0.3276** 0.3914** 0.3734 0.5173* 
 (2.994) (2.070) (2.144) (2.457) (1.305) (1.962) 
Liquidity  0.4439 0.1366 0.0201 0.0378 1.0598** 0.2907* 
 (1.132) (0.498) (0.187) (0.307) (2.284) (1.764) 
Investment Return 0.2214* 0.3167*** 0.1417** 0.0692 0.3349*** 0.2828*** 
 (1.867) (3.283) (2.036) (0.843) (6.723) (4.733) 
Tax Payment 0.0197 0.0039 0.0169 -0.2861 -0.0164 0.0022 
 (0.605) (0.149) (0.470) (-0.854) (-0.726) (0.049) 
Interest rate -0.0419 -0.0941* 0.0210 0.0084 0.0201 -0.0263 
 (-0.632) (-1.816) (0.666) (0.165) (0.577) (-0.624) 
Inflation Rate -0.1015 -0.3773** -0.1709** -0.2150*** -0.1497*** -0.2368** 
 (-0.772) (-2.500) (-2.053) (-3.123) (-2.658) (-2.062) 
GDP Growth -0.0530* -0.0923** -0.0571** -0.0711*** 0.0073 0.0084 
 (-1.806) (-2.260) (-2.033) (-2.612) (0.411) (0.209) 
Constant -2.9554** -0.8918 -3.1089* -0.7931 -1.1357 -2.9468 
 (-2.343) (-0.588) (-1.945) (-0.621) (-0.539) (-1.102) 
       
       
Observations 4,519 4,471 4,495 4,151 3,499 3,511 
Number of Firms 616 613 615 587 517 533 
Number of Instruments 88 71 147 112 164 194 
Robust Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-test 12.67*** 5.862*** 10.32*** 9.520*** 10.94*** 8.315*** 
AR(1) -3.331*** -3.431*** -3.244*** -3.339*** -3.291*** -2.370*** 
AR(2) 1.562 0.687 0.993 0.771 1.334 0.205 
Hansen Test (P-value) 81.39 (0.32) 65.70 (0.23) 140.2 (0.34) 112.5 (0.17) 172.4 (0.11) 194.1 (0.14) 
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3.4.2.3 Interaction with Market Structure: Lerner Index 
   Tables 3.8 and 3.9 (the fixed effects model and the dynamic panel model) reveal the 
impacts of interactions via the Lerner index on insurers’ capital structures. As discussed, 
the Lerner index directly represents insurers’ pricing power (or market power) and 
indirectly shows the degree of market concentration. The coefficient on the Lerner index 
itself is consistently significant and negative in most of the models, implying that more 
pricing power enables insurers to reduce their leverage ratios. Most of the interactions via 
the Lerner index are significant in both tables, indicating that pricing power influences 
insurers’ capital structures through different behaviours and channels in both long-run 
and short-run. 
 
   Although the Lerner index and the Boone indicator represent different concepts of the 
market structure, it is surprising to realise that the interactions via the Lerner index have 
the same influences as the interactions via the Boone indicator on insurers’ capital 
structures, except for the interaction term regarding reinsurance. From Models 1 and 3, 
the negative coefficients indicate that insurers, whose existing leverage ratio is high or 
who face more return uncertainties, tend to reduce leverage use when they have more 
pricing power.  
 
A negative coefficient for the Reinsurance * Lerner term in short-run model (Table 3.9) 
denotes that insurers adopting more reinsurance may lessen their leverage ratios if their 
pricing power is enhanced in the short-run. A plausible reason is that firms with more 
pricing power can adopt more substantial proportions of reinsurance protection when 
their risk tolerance is beyond the limit in the short-run, to reduce bankruptcy cost. 
 
   On the other hand, the impacts of interactions in cases of retained earnings (Model 2) 
and business volatility (Model 4) on insurers’ capital structures are positive, similar to the 
results observed from the case of competition (the Boone indicator). The results suggest 
that insurers, who have more retained earnings or issue more risky businesses, may 
increase leverage when they have significant pricing power. As previously discussed, 
increased retained earnings may encourage insurers to write more businesses and, hence 
increase the leverage ratio. Insurers who have greater pricing power are willing to adjust 
the product price, corresponding to the riskiness of the product—affecting the amount of 
business leverage. 
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   Similar to section 3.4.2.2, the contradicted results from two interaction terms related to 
volatilities (Model 3 and 4) also confirm that the insurers seek to limit the overall risk, as 
described by the ‘finite risk paradigm’ or ‘capital buffer theory’. 
 
 Table 3.8: Interacted Effects with Market Structure (Lerner) on Capital Structure - OLS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Leverage Leverage Leverage Leverage Leverage Leverage 
              
Lagged Leverage  0.5287*** 0.3085*** 0.2762*** 0.2749*** 0.2053*** 0.4510*** 
 (3.792) (3.918) (4.334) (4.430) (3.479) (4.162) 
Lerner Index 0.2853 -1.4508** -0.3610 -1.6848** -1.6211** 0.8173 
 (0.426) (-2.514) (-0.517) (-2.020) (-2.151) (0.829) 
Lagged Leverage * Lerner -3.4639*     -2.7230 
 (-1.901)     (-1.500) 
Retained Earnings  -0.2539***    -0.1473** 
  (-2.682)    (-1.974) 
Retained Earnings * Lerner  1.0574*    0.2840 
  (1.806)    (0.682) 
Income Volatility   0.1576*   0.1861** 
   (1.878)   (2.425) 
Income Volatility * Lerner   -0.4931   -0.7520 
   (-0.805)   (-1.237) 
Business Volatility    -0.1121*  -0.0520 
    (-1.754)  (-1.588) 
Business Volatility * Lerner    0.2592*  0.2075* 
    (1.838)  (1.922) 
Reinsurance     -0.2098*** -0.1294 
     (-2.885) (-1.513) 
Reinsurance * Lerner     0.2675 -0.1878 
     (0.776) (-0.464) 
Cost of Equity  0.0129** 0.0110** 0.0118** 0.0116** 0.0131* 0.0141** 
 (2.441) (2.298) (2.312) (2.261) (1.865) (2.161) 
Firm Size -0.0924 -0.0784 -0.0857 -0.0997 -0.0422 -0.0306 
 (-0.671) (-0.575) (-0.641) (-0.695) (-0.435) (-0.318) 
Liquidity  0.0124 -0.0024 0.0031 -0.0066 -0.0255 -0.0225 
 (0.294) (-0.053) (0.072) (-0.134) (-0.463) (-0.454) 
Investment Return 2.6845** 2.8110*** 2.7423*** 3.1463*** 7.9329*** 8.2437*** 
 (2.510) (2.801) (2.745) (2.637) (2.671) (2.797) 
Tax Payment -0.0100 -0.0259 -0.0422 -0.0522 -0.0453 -0.0227 
 (-0.162) (-0.430) (-0.669) (-0.800) (-1.063) (-0.544) 
Interest rate 0.0269 0.0374* 0.0226 0.0242 0.0025 0.0051 
 (1.293) (1.743) (1.117) (1.132) (0.098) (0.199) 
Inflation Rate -0.0273 -0.0124 -0.0295 -0.0223 -0.0355 -0.0285 
 (-0.835) (-0.359) (-0.867) (-0.633) (-0.994) (-0.838) 
GDP Growth 0.0009 0.0023 0.0086 -0.0016 0.0071 0.0121 
 (0.053) (0.135) (0.516) (-0.094) (0.365) (0.627) 
Constant 1.7627 1.7735 1.5597 2.1089* 1.0847 0.4996 
 (1.575) (1.620) (1.339) (1.769) (1.157) (0.551) 
              
Observations 2,749 2,715 2,743 2,667 2,330 2,281 
Number of Firms 511 508 510 499 452 447 
Adjusted R-squared 0.201 0.206 0.178 0.190 0.163 0.207 
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-test 9.34*** 7.66*** 7.59*** 5.35*** 7.23*** 6.622*** 










 Table 3.9: Interacted Effects with Market Structure (Lerner) on Capital Structure - GMM 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Leverage Leverage Leverage Leverage Leverage Leverage 
              
Lagged Leverage  0.9758*** 0.4562*** 0.3544*** 0.2840*** 0.2803*** 0.6637*** 
 (3.311) (5.541) (2.750) (3.283) (3.156) (3.921) 
Lerner Index 2.0740 -2.3426** 2.8860 -2.9450*** -3.9887** 4.2478** 
 (0.713) (-2.356) (0.544) (-3.087) (-2.143) (2.010) 
Lagged Leverage * Lerner -5.8890*     -4.0728* 
 (-1.922)     (-1.795) 
Retained Earnings  -0.3188***    -0.2226** 
  (-2.892)    (-2.035) 
Retained Earnings * Lerner  1.0982**    -0.1101 
  (2.059)    (-0.181) 
Income Volatility   0.8528***   0.3816** 
   (3.135)   (2.461) 
Income Volatility * Lerner   -3.4912**   -2.2284** 
   (-2.373)   (-2.519) 
Business Volatility    -0.0693*  -0.0345 
    (-1.905)  (-0.904) 
Business Volatility * Lerner    0.1726*  -0.1320 
    (1.696)  (-0.944) 
Reinsurance     0.0549 0.0956 
     (0.267) (0.520) 
Reinsurance * Lerner     -2.5775** -1.6889* 
     (-2.027) (-1.827) 
Cost of Equity  0.0066 0.0079 0.0126* -0.0196* -0.0037 0.0002 
 (0.795) (1.151) (1.768) (-1.728) (-0.399) (0.015) 
Firm Size 0.0769 0.2107 0.0333 -0.1982 0.5998** 0.3325** 
 (0.522) (1.526) (0.126) (-0.672) (2.357) (2.279) 
Liquidity  0.0668 0.1714** 0.0120 0.1138 -0.0065 0.2580 
 (0.633) (2.036) (0.101) (0.431) (-0.017) (1.446) 
Investment Return 2.6752* 2.2903** 0.9128* 4.5823** 7.8568*** 8.7963*** 
 (1.664) (2.011) (1.675) (2.133) (3.022) (2.965) 
Tax Payment 0.3505 -0.0137 -0.1263 0.0327 -0.0655 0.0172 
 (0.476) (-0.295) (-0.162) (0.551) (-0.495) (0.269) 
Interest rate -0.0157 0.0019 0.0062 0.0913 0.0352 -0.0456 
 (-0.612) (0.057) (0.169) (1.545) (0.724) (-1.160) 
Inflation Rate -0.0984* -0.0360 -0.0834 0.0765 0.0354 0.1448* 
 (-1.784) (-0.466) (-1.216) (0.852) (0.545) (1.713) 
GDP Growth 0.0133 -0.0214 0.0164 -0.0576 -0.0926** -0.0211 
 (0.498) (-0.748) (0.536) (-1.487) (-2.242) (-0.854) 
Constant -0.2351 -0.6626 -0.6349 3.2001 -4.3597* -2.9275** 
 (-0.172) (-0.638) (-0.216) (1.156) (-1.837) (-2.111)        
       
Observations 2,749 2,715 2,743 2,667 2,330 2,281 
Number of Firms 511 508 510 499 452 447 
Number of Instruments 133 199 147 128 157 302 
Robust Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-test 18.44*** 10.21*** 13.55*** 4.434*** 5.018*** 6.452*** 
AR(1) -2.596*** -2.844*** -2.409** -2.291** -2.310** -2.638*** 
AR(2) 0.998 -0.106 0.408 0.588 1.038 0.604 
Hansen Test 124.9 (0.39) 196.3 (0.29) 143.1 (0.28) 118 (0.4) 145.9 (0.44) 267.7 (0.72) 
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3.4.2.4 Interaction with Market Structure: HHI 
   The effects of interactions via the HHI on insurers’ capital structures are presented in 
Tables 3.10 and 3.11, the OLS fixed effects regression and the GMM dynamic panel 
regression, respectively. The HHI is a direct proxy of market concentration; the higher 
the index, the greater the market concentration. However, the HHI is relatively low in the 
UK market. It indicates that the UK market is competitive. The HHI coefficient is 
significant and positive from the GMM regressions (Table 3.11), indicating that an 
increase in market concentration enables insurers to enlarge their leverage ratio in the 
short-run. From the traditional point of view, if both the Lerner index and the HHI 
represent the same concepts of market structure (i.e.m the degree of concentration), the 
impact raised from these two measurements and their interaction terms should be 
consistent. However, positive coefficient is found with the HHI, but the coefficient of the 
Lerner index is negative. Regarding the interaction terms, the significant interaction 
effects are only found in the dynamic regressions (Table 3.11), implying that the effects 
are only significant in the short-run. Comparing the results from Tables 3.10 and 3.11 
with the findings in the previous section (Lerner index), contradictory results also exist 
in the interaction terms for business volatility and reinsurance. 
 
   To be more specific, insurers, who have a higher past leverage ratio (Model 1) or face 
significant income volatility (Model 3), tend to reduce their leverage ratio when the 
degree of market concentration is intensified, while insurers with a higher level of 
retained earnings (Model 2) may accept more leverage. These results are consistent with 
the findings from Models 1, 2 and 3 in Tables 3.8 and 3.9, where the interactions via the 
Lerner index are considered. Nevertheless, the results from Models 4 and 5 are 
inconsistent with the findings observed in the Lerner index section. Model 4 shows that 
the coefficient of the Business Volatility * HHI term is significantly negative, implying 
that insurers with more risky policies try to reduce the leverage ratio if concentration is 
enhanced. At the same time, adopting more reinsurance protections enables insurers to 
accept more leverage, as shown in Model 5.  
 
   Further, considering Models 3 and 4 together, the signs for the two interaction terms in 
the case of volatilities are both negative, which differs from the contradictory results 
observed with the Boone indicator and the Lerner index. However, the negative 
coefficients can still confirm the appearance of the ‘finite risk paradigm’ or the ‘capital 
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buffer theory.’ The negative coefficient indicates that insurers limit overall risk levels by 
imposing more equity capital (i.e., lowering the leverage) when volatilities associated 




  Table 3.10: Interacted Effects with Market Structure (HHI) on Capital Structure - OLS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Leverage Leverage Leverage Leverage Leverage Leverage 
              
Lagged Leverage  0.4286* 0.2970*** 0.2855*** 0.1822*** 0.1905*** 0.0208 
 (1.658) (3.520) (3.607) (2.616) (3.178) (0.123) 
HHI 0.0011 -0.0089 -0.0118 0.0035 0.0126 0.0056 
 (0.123) (-0.999) (-0.938) (0.514) (1.192) (0.318) 
Lagged Leverage * HHI -0.0043     0.0053 
 (-0.594)     (0.910) 
Retained Earnings  -0.4697*    -0.1555 
  (-1.800)    (-1.115) 
Retained Earnings * HHI  0.0083    0.0006 
  (1.107)    (0.176) 
Income Volatility   0.0458   0.0685 
   (0.175)   (0.243) 
Income Volatility * HHI   0.0035   0.0029 
   (0.445)   (0.379) 
Business Volatility    -0.0533  -0.0399 
    (-0.942)  (-0.565) 
Business Volatility * HHI    0.0001  -0.0000 
    (0.043)  (-0.027) 
Reinsurance     -0.4518** -0.5211*** 
     (-2.463) (-2.868) 
Reinsurance * HHI     0.0035 0.0071 
     (0.695) (1.498) 
Cost of Equity  -0.0092* -0.0074 -0.0085 -0.0077 -0.0060 -0.0043 
 (-1.675) (-1.361) (-1.580) (-1.454) (-0.957) (-0.671) 
Firm Size -0.2671* -0.2473* -0.2876* -0.4018** -0.4050** -0.4548** 
 (-1.833) (-1.683) (-1.957) (-2.526) (-2.248) (-2.439) 
Liquidity  0.0625 0.0528 0.0774 0.0351 -0.0282 -0.0048 
 (1.052) (0.880) (1.385) (0.522) (-0.392) (-0.079) 
Investment Return 0.1145*** 0.1135*** 0.1153*** 0.1068*** 0.2352*** 0.2319*** 
 (2.780) (2.765) (2.775) (2.667) (5.956) (6.116) 
Tax Payment -0.0160 0.0081 -0.0181 -0.0150 -0.0166 -0.0025 
 (-0.980) (0.514) (-1.176) (-0.977) (-1.378) (-0.242) 
Interest rate 0.1175*** 0.1257*** 0.1070*** 0.1190*** 0.0714** 0.0705** 
 (4.897) (5.202) (4.380) (4.356) (2.574) (2.394) 
Inflation Rate -0.0329 -0.0365 -0.0486 -0.0383 -0.0443 -0.0499 
 (-0.640) (-0.719) (-0.965) (-0.732) (-0.883) (-0.988) 
GDP Growth -0.0125 -0.0123 -0.0035 -0.0199 0.0034 0.0068 
 (-0.796) (-0.776) (-0.205) (-1.259) (0.189) (0.338) 
Constant 3.5938*** 3.7354*** 3.8815*** 5.1181*** 4.1057*** 4.5558*** 
 (2.872) (2.670) (2.826) (3.509) (2.676) (2.690) 
              
Observations 4,519 4,471 4,495 4,151 3,665 3,511 
Number of Firms 616 613 615 587 548 533 
Adjusted R-squared 0.160 0.169 0.166 0.135 0.187 0.209 
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-test 7.58*** 8.05*** 9.37*** 6.74*** 11.49*** 11.58*** 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
 
 




 Table 3.11: Interacted Effects with Market Structure (HHI) on Capital Structure - GMM 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Leverage Leverage Leverage Leverage Leverage Leverage 
              
Lagged Leverage  1.2243*** 0.3568*** 0.4225*** 0.1816* 0.2287*** 0.7041* 
 (3.459) (3.419) (3.666) (1.879) (2.819) (1.787) 
HHI 0.0257** -0.0137 0.0669* 0.0065 0.0555* 0.0309 
 (2.053) (-1.615) (1.670) (0.393) (1.673) (1.049) 
Lagged Leverage * HHI -0.0240**     -0.0151 
 (-2.395)     (-1.201) 
Retained Earnings  -0.5922***    -0.4700** 
  (-2.848)    (-2.021) 
Retained Earnings * HHI  0.0124**    0.0113* 
  (2.558)    (1.704) 
Income Volatility   1.3736*   0.1307 
   (1.964)   (0.298) 
Income Volatility * HHI   -0.0346*   0.0057 
   (-1.654)   (0.434) 
Business Volatility    0.2028*  0.1874* 
    (1.821)  (1.665) 
Business Volatility* HHI    -0.0058**  -0.0057** 
    (-2.023)  (-2.041) 
Reinsurance     -1.3722*** -1.0208*** 
     (-2.700) (-2.869) 
Reinsurance * HHI     0.0315** 0.0200** 
     (2.070) (1.992) 
Cost of Equity  -0.0135* 0.0130 -0.0087 -0.0095 0.0228 0.0028 
 (-1.877) (1.123) (-1.269) (-0.989) (1.159) (0.333) 
Firm Size -0.1583 0.5184*** 0.3955*** -0.3041 -0.3488 -0.2810 
 (-1.176) (2.634) (2.819) (-1.470) (-1.247) (-1.201) 
Liquidity  0.1694** 0.1416 0.1472 0.1838* 0.0826 0.1113 
 (1.994) (1.427) (1.568) (1.665) (0.677) (0.774) 
Investment Return 0.1351*** 0.1193** 0.1255* 0.1192** 0.2849*** 0.2950*** 
 (2.765) (2.085) (1.760) (2.447) (4.634) (6.653) 
Tax Payment -0.0239 0.0006 -0.0011 -0.0356 -0.0166 -0.0172 
 (-0.895) (0.043) (-0.070) (-1.106) (-0.208) (-0.745) 
Interest rate 0.1093*** 0.0839* 0.0513* 0.1999*** 0.0536 0.0210 
 (3.168) (1.715) (1.701) (2.952) (1.159) (0.372) 
Inflation Rate 0.0821 -0.2176** 0.0220 -0.0499 -0.0936 -0.0456 
 (1.492) (-2.131) (0.389) (-0.392) (-0.990) (-0.799) 
GDP Growth -0.0215 -0.0880** 0.0431* -0.0841** -0.0645** 0.0090 
 (-1.448) (-2.480) (1.703) (-2.291) (-2.062) (0.313) 
Constant 1.1461 -2.4778 -5.1921** 3.8849** 1.8948 1.6224 
 (1.084) (-1.483) (-2.541) (2.098) (0.912) (0.735)        
       
Observations 4,519 4,471 4,495 3,975 3,499 3,354 
Number of Firms 616 613 615 560 517 503 
Number of Instruments 155 110 168 180 113 292 
Robust Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-test 7.556*** 3.884*** 8.508*** 6.974*** 8.094*** 10.71*** 
AR(1) -3.223*** -3.390*** -3.213*** -2.911*** -2.971*** -2.994*** 
AR(2) 1.422 0.470 1.062 0.649 1.237 0.617 
Hansen Test 161.4 (0.14) 104 (0.30) 158 (0.42) 188.6 (0.12) 112.4 (0.19) 299.3 (0.12) 
t-statistics in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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3.4.2.5 The impact of control variables 
   Regarding control variables, the impacts of investment return are positive in most of 
the models, indicating that firms with higher investment returns tend to increase their 
leverage ratios. The impact of firm size varies between the long-run and the short-run. In 
general, the negative impact appears in the long-run, while there is a positive impact in 
the short-run. These results suggest that larger firms can accept more leverage in the short-
term and adjust their leverage ratios back to an acceptable level in the long-run. 
Concerning macro-economic factors, the coefficients of the inflation rate and GDP 
growth are positive in most cases, and the opposite impact arises from increased interest 
rates. 
 
3.4.2.6 The model’s validity  
   The validity of all OLS-fixed effect models is verified by the result of the F-test and the 
value of adjusted R-squared. To check the validity of all models’ specification and the 
instrument variables used in GMM-SYS model, the F-test, AR(1), AR(2) and the Hansen 
test of overidentification restriction are reported in each of the tables. The results from all 
these tests indicate that all dynamic panel models are valid.   
 
3.4.3 Sensitivity and Robustness Checks 
   As discussed in Section 3.4.1, market structure can be explained via different concepts, 
such as the degree of competition, the individual’s pricing power and the level of 
concentration in the market. As further noted, the results from Section 3.4.2 verify the 
differences among these measurements. The effects on capital structure observed from 
the interactions via the Lerner index (Tables 3.8 and 3.9) and the Boone indicator (Tables 
3.6 and 3.7) are similar from the perspectives of individuals’ pricing power and market 
competition. On the other hand, there are contradictory results between pricing power 
(i.e.m the Lerner index) and market concentration (i.e. HHI), as shown in Tables 3.10 and 
3.11). These results suggest that it is inappropriate to use different measurements to define 
the unique concepts of market structure, such as competition. In other words, three 
measurements—the Boone indicator, the Lerner index and the HHI—carry different 
information about market structure. Then, following Claessens and Laeven’s (2004) 
suggestion, it is reasonable to assume that these concepts are not mutually exclusive, and 
the following scenarios may exist: (1) insurers with more pricing power survive in a 
competitive market; (2) insurers compete when the degree of market concentration is 
intensified; and (3)  insurers should have more pricing power in a concentrated market. 
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   In this section, the existence of the above scenarios and their impacts on insurers’ capital 
structure are estimated by adding various interactions between different concepts of 
market structure, such as the Boone * Lerner term (Scenario 1), the Boone * HHI term 
(Scenario 2) and the Lerner * HHI term (Scenario 3). The relevant results in Tables 3.12 
to 3.14 illustrate whether there is a difference between the impacts of a single concept of 
market structure and the impacts of the abovementioned scenarios on insurers’ capital 
structures.   
 
3.4.2.4 Interactions with Market Structure: Boone*HHI, Boone*Lerner and 
Lerner*HHI 
   Tables 3.12-3.14 report the results of two-step GMM dynamic panel models, in which 
the interaction terms of Boone * Lerner, Boone * HHI, and Lerner * HHI are respectively 
utilised. Overall, the results from Model 1 (in all three tables) verify the existence of the 
abovementioned scenarios and further suggest that their impacts are significant and 
positive. To be more specific, the positive coefficient for the Boone * Lerner term (Table 
3.12) implies that insurers with more pricing power (or market power) tend to accept more 
leverage in a competitive market. The positive impact arising from Boone * HHI (Table 
3.13) indicates that insurers have a higher leverage ratio when the degree of concentration 
is increased due to market competitiveness. Finally, the results from Model 1 (i.e. Lerner 
* HHI) in Table 3.14 suggest that insurers with more pricing power (or market power) 
tend to accept more leverage when the level of concentration is intensified.  
 
   There are two possible explanations for the consistency of these positive results. First, 
the UK insurance market is competitive, and either the strength of pricing power or the 
intensity of market concentration might originate from increased competition. This 
assumption can be verified by considering the smaller value of HHI with the significant, 
positive correlations found between the Boone indicator and the Lerner index or the HHI. 
Another common trend is shown in Table 3.3 and Figures 3.1 and 3.2; the Boone indicator 
takes a leading role with one to two years lead-time, in terms of evolution, compared to 
the Lerner index and the HHI. Mirzaei and Moore (2014) also find a similar pattern in 
their banking study. Under this assumption, intensive competition may encourage 
insurers to take more business leverage (i.e. issuing more policies), to maximise output 
level and fulfil shareholders’ expectation (i.e. maximising shareholders’ wealth), as 
discussed in Section 3.2.2. Second, as previously noted, these three measurements 
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individually represent part of the information on market structure. Thus, combining two 
of the three measurements might present the full picture of the market structure, which 
consistently impacts the insurers; capital structures. In fact, the second explanation is 
developed through the first assumption; otherwise, the three measurements might be 
considered mutually exclusive. 
 
   To test whether the postulated scenarios can affect insurers’ capital structures 
differently via various channels, the interaction terms of two proxies for market structure 
further interact with the variables of interest. The results of estimations are presented in 
Models 2 through 6 in Tables 3.12 to 3.14.  
 
    Considering the three-variable interaction terms via lagged leverage, retained earnings 
and income volatility, the significant results from Models 2 to 4 not only support the 
existence of impacts on insurers’ capital structures but also confirm that impacts are 
coincident under different scenarios (see Tables 3.12 to 3.14). Further, as evidenced in 
Tables 3.7, 3.9 and 3.11, the coefficients of the interactions for these three variables do 
not vary under different concepts of market structure, and they are consistent with the 
results in this section. 
 
   To be more specific, coefficients of the interaction terms in cases of lagged leverage 
and income volatility are significant and negative. The results imply that insurers, who 
have a higher past leverage ratio or face more income uncertainties, may reduce the 
leverage ratio when there are remarkable external pressures or when they want to maintain 
their competitive advantage. The positive coefficient associated with the interaction in 
cases of retained earnings means that insurers tend to accept more leverage if there are 
higher levels of internal funds contributing to equity capital. It is, therefore, worthwhile 
to ask why consistent impacts are raised from these interaction terms, even though 
different proxies are used to represent varied features of market structure. One reasonable 
explanation is that there must be ‘something in common’ among the three measurements, 
and that this common factor, which represents the prevailing nature of the market, might 
further significantly impact insurers’ capital structures. This explanation is also based on 
the suggested assumption, which states that changes in pricing power and market 
concentration might be due to increased competition.   
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   Nevertheless, two coefficients associated with the interaction terms in cases of business 
volatility (Model 5) and reinsurance (Model 6) vary differently under each scenario. The 
results from Table 3.12 indicate that insurers with higher levels of business volatility tend 
to increase their leverage ratios when they have more pricing power in a competitive 
market, while their leverage ratios will be reduced by adopting more reinsurance. The 
negative coefficients of the interactions (Table 3.13) suggest that insurers, who operate 
in the market where levels of concentration are increased due to competition, may reduce 
their leverage via purchasing more reinsurance to maintain competitive advantage. At the 
same time, insurers facing more business volatilities would also reduce their leverage 
ratios.  
 
   In contrast, the behaviours of insurers change if they have more pricing power (or 
market power), in which the level of concentration is increased. For example, insurers 
would tend to increase leverage ratios to maximise shareholders’ wealth, if they want to 
adopt more reinsurance or issue more risky businesses. Consequently, these results 
indicate that the impact on the insurers’ leverage ratios can change via different channels 
(i.e., the variables of interest) under varied market scenarios. 
 
   It is worth recalling that the impacts of market structure on insurers’ capital structure 
via different channels (i.e., the variables of interest) can be classified as invariant (Models 
2 to 4) and variant effects (Models 5 and 6), implying that market structure is a 
combination of various concepts. In order words, the impacts arising from some concepts 
of market structure might be consistent, while other natures of the market structure might 
affect insurers’ capital structure differently. The variations further suggest that market 
structure must be considered along with insurers’ behaviours—for example, the upper 
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Table 3.12: Interacted Effects with Boone * Lerner on Capital Structure - GMM 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Leverage Leverage Leverage Leverage Leverage Leverage 
              
Lagged Leverage  0.4612*** 0.9157*** 0.4307*** 0.3506*** 0.4684*** 0.2773*** 
 (3.821) (6.084) (3.105) (4.949) (3.858) (2.964) 
Boone Indicator -0.6865*** 0.4046 -0.4618*** -0.3459 -0.4425*** -0.9009*** 
 (-2.947) (1.277) (-3.084) (-1.384) (-3.121) (-3.057) 
Lerner Index -5.1353** -1.1754 -4.9971*** 2.3863 -2.6878 -3.2460*** 
 (-2.567) (-0.537) (-2.633) (1.213) (-1.065) (-2.604) 
Boone*Lerner 2.8449*      
 (1.830)      
L. Leverage* Boone*Lerner  -7.6045***     
  (-3.481)     
Retained Earnings    -0.3773***    
   (-3.229)    
R. Earnings *Boone*Lerner   1.6068**    
   (2.494)    
Income Volatility    0.2987**   
    (2.324)   
I. Volatility*Boone*Lerner    -2.4407**   
    (-2.178)   
Business Volatility      -0.0535*  
     (-1.766)  
B. Volatility*Boone*Lerner     0.2441*  
     (1.759)  
Reinsurance      0.1909 
      (1.027) 
Rein.* Boone* Lerner      -1.9426** 
      (-2.285) 
Cost of Equity  0.0048 0.0034 0.0117* 0.0005 0.0024 -0.0153 
 (0.762) (0.586) (1.691) (0.064) (0.322) (-1.204) 
Firm Size 0.0388 0.0165 0.0960 0.4058* 0.0795 0.4123** 
 (0.346) (0.161) (0.853) (1.677) (0.673) (2.045) 
Liquidity  0.2350** 0.2396* 0.1853 0.7696** 0.1951* 0.1657* 
 (2.366) (1.795) (1.378) (2.273) (1.742) (1.721) 
Investment Return 2.2865*** 0.1574 1.4761*** 1.2853*** 4.0710* 7.2796*** 
 (2.617) (0.256) (3.093) (2.839) (1.729) (2.633) 
Tax Payment -0.0174 0.0578 0.0094 0.0148 -0.1812 -0.0044 
 (-0.154) (0.414) (0.089) (0.122) (-1.225) (-0.042) 
Interest rate 0.0024 0.0035 0.0152 0.0283 0.0077 0.0129 
 (0.109) (0.123) (0.486) (1.244) (0.216) (0.442) 
Inflation Rate -0.1101** -0.1009* -0.0664 -0.1569** -0.1464** 0.0397 
 (-2.559) (-1.786) (-1.128) (-2.440) (-2.530) (0.675) 
GDP Growth 0.0078 -0.0100 0.0104 0.0163 0.0059 -0.0063 
 (0.513) (-0.405) (0.474) (1.008) (0.260) (-0.281) 
Stock 0.7415 0.5536 0.0498 3.3237** 1.2360 0.4970 
 (1.079) (1.164) (0.052) (2.065) (1.424) (0.686) 
Constant 0.8287 0.3006 0.9275 -4.6549* 0.0374 -1.8355 
 (0.754) (0.276) (0.821) (-1.741) (0.026) (-1.078)        
       
Observations 2,634 2,540 2,605 2,743 2,553 2,330 
Number of Firms 495 481 493 510 483 452 
Number of Instruments 161 186 219 182 174 171 
Robust Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-test 13.11*** 22*** 37.94*** 7.618*** 7.577*** 4.404*** 
AR(1) -2.578*** -2.633*** -2.565** -2.814*** -2.491** -2.320** 
AR(2) 0.715 0.909 -0.199 0.577 0.739 1.050 
Hansen Test (P-value) 144.3 (0.55) 180.1 (0.32) 204.5 (0.48) 178.8 (0.25) 165.5 (0.35) 152.3 (0.57) 
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Table 3.13: Interacted Effects with Boone * HHI on Capital Structure - GMM 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Leverage Leverage Leverage Leverage Leverage Leverage 
              
Lagged Leverage  0.4987*** 0.5543*** 0.3713*** 0.4035*** 0.2187** 0.2566* 
 (4.170) (4.184) (3.738) (2.967) (2.523) (1.947) 
Boone Indicator -3.9462** -0.1458 -0.3605* 0.5337 -1.1315*** -1.5981*** 
 (-2.384) (-0.610) (-1.860) (0.922) (-3.019) (-2.951) 
HHI -0.1084** 0.0027 -0.0058 0.0125 -0.0273** -0.0361** 
 (-2.126) (0.402) (-0.911) (0.802) (-2.046) (-2.283) 
Boone*HHI 0.0922*      
 (1.919)      
L. Leverage*Boone*HHI  -0.0065**     
  (-2.511)     
Retained Earnings    -0.4952***    
   (-2.650)    
R. Earnings *Boone*HHI   0.0121**    
   (2.008)    
Income Volatility    0.5421***   
    (2.592)   
I. Volatility*Boone*HHI    -0.0153*   
    (-1.832)   
Business Volatility      0.0558  
     (1.367)  
B. Volatility*Boone*HHI     -0.0019*  
     (-1.817)  
Reinsurance      0.2385 
      (1.124) 
Rein.*Boone*HHI      -0.0131** 
      (-2.257) 
Cost of Equity  0.0035 0.0413** 0.0003 -0.0040 -0.0041 0.0050 
 (0.402) (2.267) (0.047) (-0.782) (-0.479) (0.692) 
Firm Size 0.3840** -0.1589 -0.2025 0.3246** -0.1694 0.1460 
 (2.391) (-0.871) (-1.014) (2.156) (-0.834) (0.690) 
Liquidity  0.7171 0.1519* 0.2907** 0.5148 0.2794 0.4690 
 (1.249) (1.748) (2.298) (1.568) (0.582) (1.142) 
Investment Return 0.0715 0.1243** 0.1225** 0.1227** 0.1169** 0.2183* 
 (1.005) (2.152) (2.581) (2.154) (2.060) (1.913) 
Tax Payment -0.0105 -0.0780** 0.0107 -0.0110 -0.0526* 0.0029 
 (-0.324) (-2.428) (0.135) (-0.630) (-1.732) (0.148) 
Interest rate -0.0727* -0.0179 0.0931*** 0.0125 0.0302 -0.0172 
 (-1.694) (-0.451) (2.842) (0.471) (0.525) (-0.424) 
Inflation Rate -0.2641*** -0.0984 0.0070 -0.1805** -0.7061*** -0.1451* 
 (-2.919) (-1.238) (0.069) (-2.016) (-3.371) (-1.694) 
GDP Growth 0.0107 -0.0117 -0.0160 0.0155 -0.0140 0.0039 
 (0.666) (-0.890) (-1.302) (0.937) (-0.298) (0.169) 
Stock -0.9713 -2.4932 -0.3795 0.6425 -0.1126 -2.3669* 
 (-0.886) (-1.560) (-0.400) (0.583) (-0.063) (-1.814) 
Constant 3.6752 3.9300* 3.2896* -2.7173 6.3923*** 4.5988** 
 (1.330) (1.908) (1.649) (-1.307) (2.646) (2.565)        
       
Observations 4,186 4,519 4,148 4,320 3,975 3,354 
Number of Firms 565 616 563 588 560 493 
Number of Instruments 115 152 158 168 161 110 
Robust Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-test 11.09*** 6.596*** 5.311*** 7.995*** 5.254*** 4.661*** 
AR(1) -3.336*** -3.248*** -3.399*** -3.043*** -3.236*** -2.699*** 
AR(2) 1.255 1.259 0.554 0.945 0.783 1.289 
Hansen Test (P-value) 111.3 (0.23) 156.9 (0.13) 163.4 (0.12) 174 (0.12) 165 (0.14) 99.80 (0.35) 
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Table 3.14: Interacted Effects with Lerner * HHI on Capital Structure - GMM 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Leverage Leverage Leverage Leverage Leverage Leverage 
              
Lagged Leverage  0.3276*** 0.7732*** 0.4355*** 0.2861** 0.3797*** 0.3406*** 
 (4.957) (3.896) (5.263) (1.983) (2.907) (4.241) 
HHI -0.0452** 0.0018 -0.0193** -0.0036 -0.0296** -0.0101 
 (-2.508) (0.199) (-2.097) (-0.324) (-2.374) (-0.868) 
Lerner Index -7.5679*** 0.2135 -1.8540* -0.0856 -4.7660** -0.1044 
 (-2.986) (0.171) (-1.840) (-0.044) (-2.002) (-0.068) 
Lerner*HHI 0.1957**      
 (2.441)      
L. Leverage*Lerner*HHI  -0.1686**     
  (-2.188)     
Retained Earnings    -0.3389***    
   (-2.879)    
R. Earnings*Lerner*HHI   0.0325**    
   (2.100)    
Income Volatility    0.5594**   
    (2.289)   
I. Volatility*Lerner*HHI    -0.0549*   
    (-1.679)   
Business Volatility      -0.0922**  
     (-2.095)  
B. Volatility*Lerner*HHI     0.0078*  
     (1.912)  
Reinsurance      -0.2898* 
      (-1.769) 
Rein.*Lerner*HHI      0.0322* 
      (1.701) 
Cost of Equity  -0.0006 0.0000 0.0042 0.0087 0.0050 0.0051 
 (-0.080) (0.006) (0.675) (0.898) (0.697) (0.657) 
Firm Size 0.4389** 0.1894 0.1909 0.1340 0.2075 0.2090 
 (2.234) (1.170) (1.265) (1.005) (1.091) (1.377) 
Liquidity  0.0795 -0.0381 0.2125** -0.0160 0.5727* 0.1123 
 (0.627) (-0.310) (2.144) (-0.136) (1.866) (1.036) 
Investment Return 4.6739* 4.5367* 2.3933** 1.2810*** 4.7065* 7.7224** 
 (1.684) (1.770) (1.987) (3.360) (1.948) (2.088) 
Tax Payment 0.1264 -0.3435 -0.0467 -0.2865 -0.0746 -0.8054** 
 (0.262) (-0.973) (-1.006) (-1.643) (-0.457) (-2.305) 
Interest rate -0.0322 0.0321 0.0150 0.0332 -0.0194 -0.0113 
 (-0.780) (1.461) (0.569) (1.236) (-0.494) (-0.330) 
Inflation Rate -0.0595 -0.0773* -0.0774 -0.1269* -0.1278* -0.1754*** 
 (-1.050) (-1.740) (-1.077) (-1.920) (-1.899) (-2.692) 
GDP Growth -0.0275 -0.0080 -0.0071 0.0059 0.0041 -0.0112 
 (-0.864) (-0.465) (-0.291) (0.279) (0.123) (-0.416) 
Stock 0.2537 0.6239 1.1281* 0.2136 1.5000 1.0084 
 (0.331) (1.011) (1.903) (0.311) (1.235) (1.205) 
Constant -1.1534 -1.3588 -0.5584 -0.6747 -0.0393 -1.3519 
 (-0.709) (-0.888) (-0.529) (-0.483) (-0.019) (-0.872)        
       
Observations 2,100 2,634 2,605 2,743 2,553 2,330 
Number of Firms 446 495 493 510 483 452 
Number of Instruments 131 128 224 193 185 221 
Robust Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-test 5.553*** 7.472*** 8.068*** 10.23*** 6.691*** 5.278*** 
AR(1) -2.517** -2.646*** -2.804*** -2.231** -2.346** -2.426** 
AR(2) 0.573 0.947 -0.166 0.359 0.619 0.965 
Hansen Test 114.7 (0.54) 110.4 (0.58) 222 (0.26) 193.3 (0.21) 181.8 (0.25) 224.1 (0.18) 
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Section 3.5 Conclusion  
 
   The purpose of this chapter is to determine the factors affecting UK insurers’ choices 
of the capital structure. Apart from confirming the influences of insurers’ internal factors 
(behaviours), attention has also been paid to the impacts of market structure (external 
factors). Although there are several studies concerning the impact of market structure on 
firms’ capital structures in the product market and the banking industry, the literature has 
not fully developed this issue in the insurance industry. One issue that cannot be avoided 
is market structure (e.g., competition). Because market structure is complex and cannot 
be measured directly, this chapter uses three measurements—the Boone indicator, the 
Lerner index and the HHI—to represent the different concepts of UK market structure in 
this chapter. Further, the interaction terms between the internal factors and these three 
indicators (separately) are included in the regressions to determine how the impacts of 
internal factors change according to varied market structure. First, the market structure 
measurements show that there are upward trends associated with all three indicators over 
the study period, implying that increase in the market competition (the Boone indicator) 
might lead to enhancing insurers’ pricing power (the Lerner index) and the degree of 
market concentration (the HHI). 
 
   Second, the summary of the hypotheses and relevant results are shown in Table 3.15. 
Panel A indicates that both internal factors and external market structure influence 
insurers’ capital structures (the leverage ratio) differently. There is evidence to support 
both trade-off and pecking-order behaviour, while the pecking-order theory takes the 
dominant position. This suggests that UK insurers might prefer using internal sources of 
funding to adjust capital structure towards the target level. Further, Panel B confirms that 
there are changes in the impacts of insurers’ internal decisions or behaviours under 
different market structures. These results not only suggest that the impacts of internal 
factors change due to the external pressures but also reveal that different indicators 
represent different concepts of market structure. Thus, these concepts are not mutually 
exclusive, and there is overlapping and non-overlapping information shared among the 
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Table 3.15: Summary of Hypotheses and Results 
Panel A: Hypotheses 1-4 
Trade-off Theory (Lagged Leverage) + 
Pecking-order Theory (Retained Earnings) - 
Income Volatility + 
Business Volatility - 
Reinsurance - 
Boone Indicator - 
Lerner Index - 
HHI - 
Panel B: Hypothesis – Interactions with Boone 
    
Lagged Leverage*Boone  - 
Retained Earnings*Boone  + 
Income Volatility*Boone  - 
Business Volatility*Boone  + 
Reinsurance*Boone  ? 
Panel C: Hypothesis – Interactions with Lerner 
    
Lagged Leverage* Lerner  - 
Retained Earnings*Lerner  + 
Income Volatility*Lerner  - 
Business Volatility*Lerner  + 
Reinsurance*Lerner  -      
Panel D: Hypothesis - Interactions with HHI 
    
Lagged Leverage* HHI  - 
Retained Earnings*HHI  + 
Income Volatility*HHI  - 
Business Volatility*HHI  - 
Reinsurance*HHI  + 
Panel E: Hypothesis - Interactions with Boone*Lerner 
Boone*Lerner + 
Lagged Leverage*Boone*Lerner - 
Retained Earnings*Boone*Lerner + 
Income Volatility*Boone*Lerner - 
Business Volatility*Boone*Lerner + 
Reinsurance*Boone*Lerner - 
Panel F: Hypothesis - Interactions with Boone*HHI 
Boone* HHI + 
Lagged Leverage*Boone* HHI - 
Retained Earnings*Boone*HHI + 
Income Volatility*Boone*HHI - 
Business Volatility*Boone*HHI - 
Reinsurance*Boone*HHI - 
Panel G: Hypothesis - Interactions with Lerner*HHI 
Lerner * HHI + 
Lagged Leverage* Lerner * HHI - 
Retained Earnings*Lerner*HHI + 
Income Volatility*Lerner*HHI - 




   In addition, Panels E through G show that the impact of market structure on insurers’ 
capital structures is consistent when at least two indicators are combined, suggesting that 
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the interactions between two individual concepts can disclose a relatively complete 
picture of market structure. Findings from Panels E through G further suggest that the 
choice of the capital structure depends on both internal factors and external pressures.  
 
   In sum, this chapter confirms that both internal behaviours and external pressures 
arising from market structure influence insurers’ capital structures. Other relevant results 
further reveal the importance of considering the various concepts of market structure. 
These developments contribute to the current discussion on capital requirements, such as 
Solvency II. The required amount of capital should not only be based on insurers’ internal 
decisions but should also bear in mind market influences. On the other hand, insurers also 
must adjust their capital structures or operational decisions to correspond to changes in 
market structure so that they maintain competitive advantage. 
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CHAPTER 4: Key Determinants of the UK Non-life Insurer’s Financial 




It is essential to ensure that insurers can maintain and enhance their financial 
soundness, to meet the promised obligations. This chapter addresses the impacts of some 
particular factors on insurers’ financial soundness (stability). Specifically, four factors — 
performance, leverage position, reinsurance and liquidity — are identified as significant 
driving forces, as they are the top-four internal issues that potentially relate to insurers’ 
solvency. As one of the special characteristics of the non-life insurance market is the 
existence of a cyclical pattern, the impacts of the underwriting cycle on insurers’ stability 
have also received particular attention. Furthermore, another main contribution of this 
research is to disclose the interacted effects on insurers’ stability when the interactions 
between internal factors and external pressures are taken into account. It provides insight 
as to whether there are any mechanisms through which the external pressures affect 
insurers’ stability indirectly. Therefore, this empirical study focuses on the U.K. non-life 
market from 1996 to 2017 and is conducted in two steps. First, the second-order 
autoregressive AR(2) model is used to dete the existence of the underwriting cycle. 
Second, the OLS fixed-effect model and dynamic GMM estimator are adopted to test the 
influence of both internal and external factors on insurers’ financial stability, (i.e. Z-score 
and its efficiency). 
 
The result from the AR(2) model first confirms the existence of the underwriting 
cycle in the U.K. non-life market; the length is about five years on average. The finding 
from the main regression model then discloses the importance of both internal factors (i.e. 
performance, leverage, and reinsurance and liquidity) and the external factor (i.e. 
underwriting cycle) on insurers’ financial soundness. An insurer’s performance and 
liquidity risk level are positively related to its soundness, while the firm’s leverage level 
and the market underwriting cycle contain negative influences on stability. The use of 
reinsurance enhances non-life insurers’ soundness in the short-term only. Further, it is 
reasonable to conclude that the underwriting cycle jointly determines the effect of internal 
factors on stability. It implies that the underwriting cycles influence insurers’ operational 
strategies and financial health. Last, there is evidence to support the view that competition 
is one potential driving factor of the underwriting cycle in the non-life market. 
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Section 4.1 Introduction 
 
   During the savings and loan crises in the U.S. in the 1980s, concerns for the financial 
stability of financial institutions initially received more attention and public scrutiny 
(Brockett et al., 2004b). Since the famous case of the London Market Excess (LMX) 
reinsurance spiral in the early 1990s, this concern further infiltrated the insurance industry 
because it acted as a vita financial intermediary and had systemic relevance within the 
financial system (Acharya et al., 2009; Cummins and Weiss, 2014; Weiß and Mühlnickel, 
2014). As noted, the primary function of the insurance sector is to provide protection 
and mobilise industries’ participation in development by providing additional funding; a 
healthy and well-developed insurance sector can further enhance stability of financial 
market (Rothstein, 2011; Lee, 2013; Lee and Chang, 2015; Eling and Jia, 2018). Thus, it 
is crucial to ensure that an insurer maintain and enhance its financial soundness to meet 
the promised obligations to policyholders and investors (Brockett et al., 2004b; Zou et 
al., 2012). The financial crisis that occurred in 2007 has further raised regulatory 
authorities’, researchers’, and insurers’ concerns regarding the insurer’s solvency, i.e. the 
insurer’s overall stability (Dhaene et al., 2017). 
 
   Investigating the influence of the 2007–2009 financial crisis on the global insurance 
market, Baluch, Mutenga, and Parsons (2011) point out that, in comparison to the losses 
in the banking sector, the negative impact of the financial crisis on the insurance sector 
was much less. However, the severe decline within the insurance sector remained large 
enough to merit attention (Baluch, Mutenga and Parsons, 2011). The impact of an insurer 
becoming distressed or insolvent can be extensive, as it becomes more engaged with 
banks and acts as the ultimate carrier of risks. Das, Davies, and Podpiera (2003) also 
mention that harmful contagion effects of the failures of insurers might influence the 
financial system and economy. Baranoff and Sager (2011) further reveal that insurers 
moved from a finite-risk mode toward an excessive-risk mode during the 2007–2009 
financial crisis period, meaning that insurers engaged in an excessive level of risk as they 
were not able to adjust their risk management strategies according to the increased risk-
taking (e.g. asset risk). 
 
Previous studies on the financial soundness (or insolvency) of insurance companies 
mainly follow two paths. One is to predict an insurer’s insolvency by using different 
econometric techniques, such as the neural network models and support vector machines 
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(Brockett et al., 1994, 2006; Huang, Dorsey and Boose, 1994; Salcedo-Sanz et al., 2004; 
Ibiwoye, Ajibola and Sogunro, 2012; Benali and Feki, 2015), the logit regression (BarNiv 
and Hershbarger, 1990; Chen and Wong, 2004; Sharpe and Stadnik, 2007; Cheng and 
Weiss, 2012b; Zhang and Nielson, 2015), the hazard models (Lee and Urrutia, 1996; 
Brockett et al., 2006; Dang, 2014; Caporale, Cerrato and Zhang, 2017), the generic 
programming approach (Salcedo-Sanz et al., 2005), and the CAMEL-S model (Hsiao and 
Whang, 2009; Yakob et al., 2012). Most studies on these techniques tend to use a large 
sample size and a massive number of variables (i.e. the firm’s financial ratios, in most 
cases) to establish an early warning system. Moreover, a further purpose is to compare 
the accuracy and effectivity of the forecasted outputs from different approaches. 
 
   Analysing the determinants of an insurer’s financial instability (or risk-taking) is 
another line of study in which the sample of insolvent firms is not essential criteria, but 
the targeted hypotheses are specified. The fundamental idea is that increased incentives 
to take more risks are expected to increase the likelihood of instability (Ren and Schmit, 
2006). In other words, the researcher only considers the impact of some specific factors 
on the insurer’s instability or risk-taking behaviour (see Browne and Hoyt, 1995; Ren and 
Schmit, 2006; Shim, 2015; Pasiouras and Gaganis, 2013; Mankaï and Belgacem, 2016; 
Cummins, Rubio-Misas and Vencappa, 2017; Alhassan and Biekpe, 2018; and Eling and 
Jia, 2018). The advantage of focusing on some particular factors is not only to clarify the 
potential influences, but also to allow attention to be paid to some specific strategies, 
behaviours, and movements, which may not have direct impacts on an insurer’s 
soundness.  
 
   Regarding the determinates of an insurer’s financial soundness, Benali and Feki (2015) 
analysed insurer solvency in the Tunisian market and found that profit performance, 
leverage position, and liquidity problems are the top-three issues relevant to insolvent 
companies. This result is similar to the previous findings of Lee and Urrutia (1996) and 
Chen and Wong (2004), who applied the logit and hazard models to identify the critical 
factors on insurer’s insolvency prediction.1 Using a large sample, including data from 515 
 
1 From Lee and Urrutia’s study (1996), the logit model detects four key factors: leverage ratio (the ratio of 
net premiums written to surplus), profitability (ROE), risky business and long term bond investment. The 
hazard model detects four additional variables: operating margin, liquidity ratio, rate of growth of surplus, 
and rate of growth in premiums written. Chen and Wong (2004) found the significant factors for general 
insurers are investment performance, liquidity, surplus growth, combined growth, operating margin and 
size. 
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U.K. general insurers for 30 years, Caporale, Cerrato and Zhang (2017) found that 
leverage, profitability, liquidity, reinsurance, and organisational form are the driving 
factors of insolvency risk. Previous studies on the connection between insurers’ risk-
taking and various corporate governance mechanisms include Cheng (2008), Boubakri 
(2011), and Ho, Lai and Lee (2013), among others. 
 
   Apart from the factors that internally affect an insurer’s financial health, exogenous 
factors — economic and market factors — are also crucial in influencing an insurer’s 
financial health (Brockett et al., 2006; Wang, 2010; Zhang and Nielson, 2015). Focusing 
on the U.S. market, Browne and Hoyt (1995) confirmed this view by testing the influence 
of six exogenous variables on a property-liability insurer’s insolvency rate. Browne, 
Carson and Hoyt (1999) further found that interest rate, personal income and real estate 
returns influence the life-health insurer’s stability and insolvency. Chen and Wong (2004) 
and Caporale, Cerrato and Zhang (2017) also explored the impact of market and economic 
factors (together with other internal factors) on insurers’ health in the Asia market and 
the U.K. market, respectively. Based on data from 66 countries, Fields, Gupta and Prakash 
(2012) investigated the effects of external factors (e.g. investor protection, government 
quality and contract enforcement) on an insurer’s risk-taking. Specifically, competition 
was one of the external factors that had essential effects on a firm’s soundness in the 
financial markets (Ren and Schmit, 2006). Its impact has been massively debated and 
developed by policymakers and academics (Keeley, 1990; Berger et al., 2004; Beck, 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, 2006; Schaeck, Cihák and Wolfe, 2009; Schaeck and Cihák, 
2010; 2014; Cheng and Weiss, 2012; Fields, Gupta and Prakash, 2012; Cummins, Rubio-
Misas and Vencappa, 2017; Alhassan and Biekpe, 2018).  
 
   With the exception of competition, a unique characteristic of the non-life (general) 
insurance market is the existence of a cyclical pattern of underwriting results, called 
underwriting cycles. 1 The underwriting cycle can be defined as repeating, regular phases 
of soft and hard markets in the non-life sector (Niehaus and Terry, 1993; Harrington and 
Niehaus, 2000; Weiss, 2007); it is considered to have encompassing influence on an 
insurer’s operations. Insurers act differently in soft and hard markets. For example, in a 
hard market, insurance coverage is restricted due to the tightened underwriting standards, 
 
1 Chen, Wong and Lee (1999) state that there are differences between the underwriting cycle and business 
cycle in the non-life sector. First, the underwriting cycle may not necessarily synchronize with the business 
cycle. Second, the underwriting cycle occurs more frequently than the business cycle. 
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and the insurance price is higher due to a lower degree of competition. On the other hand, 
insurers set a lower price for their products and services due to the relatively high 
insurance supply in a soft market with intense competition and less stringent underwriting 
standards.1 
 
   Thus, the existing underwriting cycle can be seen as one of the external pressures that 
adds uncertainty to non-life insurers’ practices in the form of pricing strategies (i.e. 
premium rate level), claims payments, revenues and profit generation (see Cummins and 
Outreville, 1987; Eling and Luhnen, 2009; Zhang and Tang, 2012; and Jakov and Žaja, 
2014). Elango (2009) illustrates that a larger number of insurers perform closer to the 
average industry level in a hard market, relative to a soft market. Further, the underwriting 
cycle is also incorporated into insurers’ enterprise risk management and solvency analysis 
(Kaufmann, Gadmer and Klett, 2001). Malinovksii (2010) presumes that claim size varies 
at different phases of the insurance cycle. The risk managers should keep this cycle in 
mind; then they can predict when the underwriting will be tight or loose, and when the 
external pressure will be increased or reduced. Similar to the underwriting cycle in the 
insurance market, the business cycle has been widely used to represent a general cyclical 
pattern appearing in the financial industry. For example, the state of the business cycle 
can explain an insurer’s time-varying relationship between size and growth (Hardwick 
and Adams, 2002). From non-insurance literature, some studies have investigated the 
effect of the cyclical pattern on firms’ behaviour and reaction to the cycle in various 
perspectives (see Rampini, 2004; Vander Vennet, De Jonghe and Baele, 2004; Angeletos 
and Calvet, 2006; Saadaoui, 2014; and Ben Bouheni and Hasnaoui, 2017). 
 
   However, compared to the number of studies on the relationship between competition 
and stability, investigations on the impact of the cyclical pattern on an insurer’s financial 
soundness is relatively limited. Guidara and Lai (2015) state that the actuarial pricing 
approach is designed to deal with the rates, but the market pricing approach is used to set 
the selling price, for which external factors (such as the underwriting cycle) need to be 
considered as well. Simmons and Cross (1986), Jones and Ren (2006) and Jakov and Žaja 
 
1  In terms of accounting profitability, Trufin, Albrecher and Denuit (2009) define four stages of the 
underwriting cycle. The first stage is when the insurers remain at a low profitability level for several years. 
Then, insurers’ profitability increases suddenly and rapidly during the second stage. This is followed by a 
high level of profitability, while it is no longer increasing. During the fourth stage, insurers’ profitability 
starts to decline until it returns to a phase of low profitability.  
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(2014) suggest that this cycle indirectly influences general insurers’ risk-taking 
behaviours and solvency situations. Browne and Hoyt (1995) also argue that the 
underwriting cycle can be a significant predictor of insurers’ insolvency. From the past 
few decades, the insolvency rate in the U.K. market has been relatively low compared to 
the U.S. market. However, this does not necessarily mean the financial stability is high. 
According to Shiu (2005), U.K. insurers operate in a low solvency environment. Thus, 
although the cost of financial distress might be less than the cost of insolvency of a 
troubled firm,1 the effect of instability is still significant and is a significant concern 
(Sharpe and Stadnik, 2007). 
 
   Weiss (2007) states that regularity is the key reason why this cyclical pattern has piqued 
the interest of different researchers because this regularity can potentially influence the 
rationality of insurers’ operations.2 Numerous prior studies have tested its appearance in 
different insurance markets and tried to explain the presence and causes of the 
underwriting cycle (see Venezian, 1985; Cummins and Outreville, 1987; Winter, 1994; 
Doherty and Garven, 1995; Cummins and Danzon, 1997; Lamm-Tennant and Weiss, 
1997; Fung et al., 1998; Chen, Wong and Lee, 1999; Harrington, 2004; Meier, 2006a; 
Leng and Meier, 2006; Meier, 2006b; Lazar and Denuit, 2011; and Zhang and Tang, 
2012). 
 
   The explanations of the cause of the underwriting cycle follow two leading schools of 
thought: irrational behaviour hypotheses and rational expectations. The former suggests 
that the insurance market operates irrationally or imperfectly (Venezian, 1985; Gron, 
1994). The relevant hypotheses include the cash-flow underwriting hypothesis (Gron, 
1994), the naive rate-making process (Venezian, 1985), the capacity-constraint 
hypothesis (Winter, 1994), the risky-debt hypothesis (Cummins and Danzon, 1997), and 
the competitor-driving pricing hypothesis (Berger, 1988; Harrington and Danzon, 1994; 
Malinovksii, 2010). The assumption that uncontrollable external factors and market 
 
1 According to Financial Sevices Compensation Scheme, there are 33 insolvent cases have occurred in the 
non-life sector since 1985. Althrough there are clear differences between insolvency and financial 
distressed, the terms of “insolvency”, “instability” and “financial distressed” are interchangeable, i.e. do 
not distinguish between insolvency and fianncial instability in this chapter. 
2 Weiss (2007) suggests that there are diverse concerns associated with different phases of the cycle for 
various parties. For example, policyholders and regulators may pay attention to insurers’ financial health 
in the soft market, as a higher insolvency rate is likely to occur in the soft market. In the hard market, the 
potencial clients may be concerned with the price of insurance coverages, and the manager of the insurance 
firm may need to strike a balance between the cost of insurance and the ability to write new businesses. 
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characteristics cause the underwriting cycle is known as the rational expectation, also 
called the institutional intervention hypothesis (Lamm-Tennant and Weiss, 1997). These 
factors include: (1) institutional, regulatory, and accounting characteristics, i.e. the feature 
of time-lags (Cummins and Outreville, 1987; Outreville, 1990); (2) pricing policies and 
regulatory requirements (Winter, 1991a); (3) exogenous shocks related to claim and loss 
distributions, e.g. catastrophic losses (Harrington and Niehaus, 2000); (4) interest rate 
fluctuations (Doherty and Kang, 1988; Doherty and Garven, 1995; Fung et al., 1998); (5) 
general business cycle and economic growth (Grace and Hotchkiss, 1995; Chen, Wong 
and Lee, 1999); (6) the availability of reinsurance and reinsurers’ capacity (Meier and 
Outreville, 2006); (7) internal risk factors (Jakov and Žaja, 2014); and (8) other external 
uncertainties, e.g. the possibility of extreme discontinuities in insurer policy offers 
(Berger and Cummins, 1992).1 
 
   Indeed, there is a potential connection between insurers’ stability and underwriting 
cycles. As introduced, the insurers will adjust their premium (price of policies) level 
corresponding to the cyclical pattern, either increasing or decreasing. Thus, the insurer 
can strengthen its financial stability (soundness) if it can adjust the premium more 
efficiently and precisely to reflect the latest market information (Cummins and Outreville, 
1987). However, much less is known on the relationship between stability and 
underwriting cycles. In the previous literature, Nelson (1970) observed that the number 
of insolvencies in the industry roughly follows the underwriting cycle. Malinovksii (2010) 
provides some numerical examples to show that there are connections between the 
insurance cycle and insolvencies of insurers. He further argues that it is essential to 
recognise the impact of the competition-originated cycle on an insurer’s financial health. 
From earlier, Pentikäinen (1988) and Daykin, Pentikäinen and Pesonen (1996) studied 
the relationship between the underwriting cycle and the probability of ruin. Wang (2010)  
reveal that the economic and industry cycles influence the distribution of an insurer’s 
(credit) rating in the U.S. property-liability insurers’ rating over the 1995 – 2006 period. 
The result indicates that insurers usually have better performance in an economic peak 
year. Regarding the underwriting cycle, Wang (2010) also finds that insurance ratings are 
more stable in the soft market, and more down-graded in the hard market. Using dynamic 
 
1 Studies that provide useful summaries on the rationale of the underwriting cycle include Lamm-tennant 
and Weiss (1997), Chen, Wong and Lee (1999), Harrington (2004), Meier and Outreville (2006), Weiss 
(2007) and Eling and Luhnen (2009). 
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financial analysis, Kaufmann, Gadmer and Klett (2001) later studied the relationship 
between the underwriting cycle and ruin probability. Similarly, Marek and Eling (2012) 
adopted the Ornstein Uhlenbeck process to confirm the influence of the underwriting 
cycle on risk and return. The cyclical pattern can also be seen as the periodic risk (see 
theoretical literature from Asmussen and Rolski, 1994; Dimitrov, Chukova and Garrido, 
2000; Morales, 2004; and Lu and Garrido, 2005). Compared to the case of no cyclical 
pattern, Trufin, Albrecher and Denuit (2009) agree that the underwriting cycle increases 
the probability of ruin.  
 
   The underwriting cycle is an essential topic in research, but somewhat neglected in the 
U.K. insurance market, one of the most mature and developed insurance markets in the 
world. The purpose of this chapter is not to seek an explanation as to why the underwriting 
cycle exists.1 Instead, the aim is to examine the influence of underwriting cycles on an 
insurer’s strategies, especially within the U.K. context. Specifically, this chapter first 
contributes to the literature by testing the occurrence of underwriting cycles in the U.K. 
non-life market. Then, the second step explores a rarely discussed topic: the influence of 
underwriting cycles on an insurer’s soundness (or stability). One particular interest is, 
therefore, to test whether this cyclical pattern affects the relationship between an insurer’s 
internal factors and its financial soundness; this can be achieved by including an 
interaction term that is between the proxy of the underwriting cycle and different driving 
forces. 
 
   This chapter mainly contributes to ongoing discussions on insurers’ financial soundness 
(Cummins, Rubio-Misas and Vencappa, 2017; Alhassan and Biekpe, 2018; Eling and Jia, 
2018). The main purpose of this chapter not simply identify early warning signs of insurer 
instability, but also essential to determine some particular driving factor on insurers’ 
financial health. On top of that, the direct and indirect influences of underwriting cycle 
on insurers’ soundness are considered, as the cycle influences the insurers’ risk-taking 
behaviours (Jones and Ren, 2006; Jakov and Žaja, 2014). 
 
1 This chapter does not try to define the factors that influence the underwriting cycle. From previous 
literature, the results with respect to the cycle lengths or driving factors are not consistent and robust 
because of the chosen estimation menthods, the variables, or the extent of available data (Meier, 2006b). 
This is not an issue in this chapter because the primary aim is to test the existence of the cycle and its 
influences. 
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   Then, several contributions can be made to the literature. Firstly, the question of how 
the underwriting cycle may interact with insurers’ stability has not been well-studied. The 
relationship will provide insight into how to improve a firm’s stability in response to 
pricing restrictions (caused by underwriting cycle). Furthermore, the potential impacts of 
underwriting cycle are important for all stakeholders. For example, policyholders are the 
ultimate beneficiaries, so they are keen to know whether their potential compensation is 
secure during different phases. They can adjust their purchase decisions according to the 
market conditions. Investors also need to know the influence of changes in an insurer’s 
stability on the value of their investments due to exogenous factors.  
 
   Additionally, it is vital to pay attention to changes in an insurer’s financial soundness 
after changes in an insurer’s risk-related behaviour. Thus, it is worth discussing the 
potential factors that lead to such changes, both internal factors and external pressures. 
Therefore, the expected results can provide insights to answer the following questions: 
What are the internal determinants that drive U.K. insurers’ stability (soundness)? Do 
insurers adjust their riskiness in response to external pressures stemming from the 
underwriting cycle? Are there any mechanisms through which external pressures affect 
stability, i.e. disclosing interacted effects on insurers’ stability when considering the 
interactions between internal factors and external pressures? This chapter contributes to 
the literature by incorporating the influence of the underwriting cycle on an insurer’s 
financial soundness (stability or risk-taking behaviour), including the interaction term 
between both internal and external factors in consideration of their joint effects. 
Answering the abovementioned questions can help regulators endorse supervisions to 
reduce insolvency risk and promote financial stability in the market. 
 
   The rest of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 4.2 develops the hypotheses 
based on the empirical literature. Section 4.3 presents the methodology adopted to test 
the existence of the underwriting cycle in the U.K. non-life insurance market; the 
theoretical model and the variables used to test the hypotheses are then discussed. Section 
4.4 presents the empirical results related to the hypotheses. Finally, Section 4.5 presents 
the conclusion 
 
Section 4.2 Literature Review and Hypotheses Developments 
   This section discusses the empirical evidence of the determinants of the firm’s 
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soundness (stability), i.e. both internal and external driving forces, in the insurance 
industry. Due to inadequate empirical studies on the expected relationship in the 
insurance market, the discussion is extended to cover studies on risk determinants in the 
financial market, including evidence from the banking sector. 
 
4.2.1 Insurer’s Performance 
   An insurer’s financial soundness is related to its long-term management quality, such 
as its operational performance. Based on previous studies, the link between a financial 
firm’s performance and its stability is inconclusive. For example, the moral hazard 
hypothesis (or bad-management hypothesis) assumes that inefficient firms, i.e. the 
underperformers, are more prone to risk-taking than efficient firms (Kwan and Eisenbeis, 
1997; Altunbas et al., 2007; Fiordelisi, Marques-Ibanez and Molyneux, 2011). Allen, 
Carletti and Marquez (2011) confirm that efficient monitoring allows banks to attract 
better credit risks. Although Altunbas et al. (2007) provide some evidence from the sub-
group of less efficient banks to support the positive relationship between performance 
and stability, they also found that banks’ inefficiency and risk-taking are negatively 
related in the full sample (i.e. inefficiency reduces banks’ risk-taking). 
 
   In terms of the insurance business, the fact that inefficient insurers accept an excessive 
or unexpected amount of risk (e.g. inaccurate pricing), taking more risky businesses and 
making inappropriate investments, can explain the positive relationship (between 
performance and stability). BarNiv and McDonald (1992) agree that high profitability 
may indicate a lower risk of being financially distressed. In line with this, Zhang and 
Nielson (2015) state that profitability (return on equity) is negatively related to insurers’ 
insolvency.  
 
   From a cost perspective, Kim et al. (1995) used a firm’s combined ratio to represent 
underwriting losses and confirm that there is a positive impact on insurers’ insolvency 
rates. Berger and DeYoung (1997) confirmed that the cost efficiency reduces (enhances) 
firms’ riskiness (soundness). They refer to this relationship as the “cost skimping” 
hypothesis. In studying the Australian general insurance market, Sharpe and Stadnik 
(2007) revealed that an insurer with better profitability will have a lower likelihood of 
experiencing financial instability. However, the authors also found that the combined 
ratio is negatively related to insurer’s insolvency; this result is inconsistent with previous 
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findings by Kim et al. (1995) and Chen and Wong (2004), who revealed a positive 
relationship. 
 
   Recently, Schaeck and Cihák (2014) and Cummins, Rubio-Misas and Vencappa (2017) 
further discovered a competition-efficiency-stability nexus in which efficiency is as a 
channel through which competition strengthens a firm’s stability in banking and 
insurance markets, respectively. In a later study, using a large sample from the EU 
between 2006 and 2013, Eling and Jia (2018) illustrated that an insurer’s technical 
efficiency is negatively related to its likelihood of failure. These findings indicate that 
efficiency (performance) enhances insurers’ financial soundness (stability). 
 
   In contrast, the profit-incentive hypothesis posits a positive relationship between a 
firm’s performance and risk-taking (Tan and Anchor, 2016). More specifically, efficient 
insurers should have better financial ability to engage in more risky activities than those 
inefficient firms (Borde, Chambliss and Madura, 1994). Lee and Urrutia (1996) 
confirmed this view using data from the U.S. property-liability insurance market. By 
studying banking across the EU from the mid-1990s to 2008, Poghosyan and Cihák (2009) 
identified a set of indicators that define distressed banks. Indeed, they found that some 
distressed banks have better cost performance (low cost). Hu and Yu (2015) noted that 
Taiwanese insurers’ inefficiency is positively related to product risks and negatively to 
asset risk when different specified risks are considered. These results suggest that 
efficiency (performance) damages insurers’ financial soundness. 
 
   As discussed above, the impact of an insurer’s performance on its financial soundness 
is ambiguous. Thus, a hypothesis can be developed as: 
H1: An insurer’s performance affects its stability. 
 
4.2.2 Insurer’s Leverage (Capital Structure) 
   The connection between a firm’s capital structure and risk-taking has been well studied 
in the financial industry. Brunnermeier (2009) argues that more leveraged (less equity) 
firms are more likely to suffer from loss spirals. Shrieves and Dahl (1992), Jacques and 
Nigro (1997), Aggarwal and Jacques (2001) and Altunbas et al. (2007) argue that the 
banks that increase equity capital (reduce leverage) increase their risk appetites. This 
positive relationship between equity and risk-taking can be explained by the regulatory-
cost hypothesis, which indicates that financial firms are willing to take more risks to 
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balance the cost raised from the capital requirement. Thus, there is evidence to support a 
positive relationship between banks’ leverage and financial stability. 
 
   However, Kwan and Eisenbeis (1997) point out that banks with more equity capital 
(lower leverage) may have less credit risk. Based on the monitoring theory, Allen, Carletti 
and Marquez (2011) and Mehran and Thakor (2011) also suggest that holding more 
capital (less leverage) allows banks to have better screening and monitoring, thereby 
enhancing financial stability. Further, Caccioli et al. (2014) found that there is a critical 
threshold for leverage, above which banks’ financial stability decreases. Focusing on 
American and European banks between 2001 and 2009, Vazquez and Federico (2015) 
studied the impact of leverage on financial distress. They found that larger banks with 
higher leverage are more likely to fail. Thus, there is a potential negative connection 
between leverage and stability. 
 
   Although relevant studies are relatively limited in the insurance market, conflicting 
results also exist in the insurance world. According to the expected bankruptcy cost 
argument, insurers that have less equity capital, higher policyholder liabilities or higher 
leverage are expected to have more difficulty meeting future obligations and be more 
likely to experience financial distress (Shim, 2010; 2015; Shiu, 2011). This idea is 
corroborated by Carson and Hoyt (1995), who found that insurers with a low leverage 
ratio (i.e. the ratio of premium written to surplus) are less likely to be insolvent. Chen et 
al. (2009) suggest that more conservative operational strategies (e.g. holding less leverage) 
reduce the operational risk. Weiß and Mühlnickel (2014) indicate that insurers who carry 
more leverage are more exposed to systemic risk. Similarly, Zhang and Nielson (2015) 
prove that higher leverage firms tend to have a higher probability of being financially 
distressed. Recently, Caporale, Cerrato and Zhang (2017) found that highly leveraged 
insurers have a higher default probability in the U.K. general insurance market. Thus, the 
evidence from the insurance market supports a negative relationship between leverage 
and stability. 
 
   In comparison, because highly capitalised (low leveraged) insurers have the superior 
risk tolerance, they may have more of an incentive to write riskier businesses or make 
more risky investments (Hu and Yu, 2015); these impose further uncertainties on the firm. 
IN studies analysing the property-casualty insurer in the U.S. market, Cummins and 
Sommer (1996) and Zou et al. (2012) revealed that an insurer’s risk position increases 
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when it holds more capital. Nevertheless, Cheng and Weiss (2013), who also studied the 
connection between insurers’ capital and these two specified risks, found the impacts on 
underwriting and asset risk were both positive in the U.S. property-liability market 
between 1993 and 2007. Thus, evidence of a positive relationship between an insurer’s 
leverage and its soundness exists. 
 
   By decomposing the overall instability into different specified risk factors, Baranoff 
and Sager (2002; 2003) investigated the interplay between an insurer’s capital position 
and some specified risks (e.g. product risk and asset risk) in the U.S. life market. Baranoff 
and Sager (2002) observed that the capital ratio significantly and negatively influenced a 
life insurer’s product risk, while the positive impact on asset risk was not significant. 
Later, Baranoff and Sager (2003) further confirmed that the influence of capital on asset 
risk is insignificant. 
 
   Recently, in line with transaction-cost theory and regulatory-cost hypothesis, Hu and 
Yu (2014; 2015) found that higher capital levels encourage insurers to take more product 
risks, due to the higher expenses that originate from the regulatory capital requirement. 
In other words, the higher cost associated with the capital requirement may encourage 
insurers to make more risky business decisions in order to achieve a higher risk-return. 
Further, in the same study, the authors also found that capital had a significantly negative 
effect on asset risk. In terms of leverage, this result lends support to the moral hazard 
hypothesis, whereby highly leveraged insurers may take more asset risks. Indeed, Hu and 
Yu’s (2014; 2015) findings are contrary to Baranoff and Sager’s (2002) evidence; the 
former suggests that this may be due to the difference in regulatory cultures between the 
U.S. market and the Taiwanese market. Later, Alhassan and Biekpe (2018) also found 
that increasing equity (lowering the leverage level) can reduce underwriting risk but 
damages insurers’ overall financial stability. 
 
   To sum up, two possible reasons can explain these inconclusive results, as suggested 
by Tabak, Fazio and Cajueiro (2012). First, operating with a certain level of capital can 
discipline firms through the capital-at-risk effect (i.e. capital is adjusted with respect to a 
firm’s risk-bearings). So, increasing capital (or lowering the leverage) may enhance a 
firm’s financial stability. Second, as holding capital is costly, firms may be more 
motivated to take extra risk to restore future profit. A higher equity level (lower leverage) 
may damage a firm’s soundness. 
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   Thus, the hypothesis on the impact of the leverage position on an insurer’s soundness 
can be stated as: 
H2: Insurer’s leverage position affects its stability. 
 
4.2.3 Reinsurance  
   As noted, non-life insurers are riskier than life insurers because of their characteristic 
short duration of policy life, which is the uncertainty in the claim amount and the timing. 
It is vital to adopt an effective and efficient risk management system to maintain financial 
soundness in a non-life insurance company. Reinsurance is a risk-shifting tool that 
reduces the exposures to underwriting and liquidity risks. Except for holding more capital 
or liquid assets to maintain solvency, insurers may choose to take reinsurance if the cost 
of hedging risk is less than the cost of financial distress. The primary objective of using 
reinsurance is to allow the primary insurer to transfer a certain amount of risk to the 
reinsurer (Shiu, 2011); this may suggest the usage of reinsurance can enhance an insurer’s 
financial stability (Doherty and Tinic, 1981; Adams, 1996; Liu, Shiu and Liu, 2016). 
Mayers and Smith (1990) also report that reinsurance can lower the expected costs of 
financial distress. Moreover, Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993) suggest that risk 
management techniques (e.g. reinsurance) can enhance an insurer’s market value. Upreti 
and Adams (2015) underline that reinsurance plays a significant role in helping insurers 
achieve a larger market share in the U.K. non-life market. 
 
   Apart from providing “emergency funding” directly to an insurer when it cannot keep 
a promise, reinsurance can also influence insurers’ stability indirectly via other channels, 
such as capital and liquidity.1 For example, according to the renting capital hypothesis,2 
the purchase of reinsurance may allow insurers to expand their underwriting capacity and 
 
1 Studies of the relationship between reinsurance and insurers’ capital structures can be found in MacMinn 
(1987), Plantin (2006), Shiu (2011), Mankaï and Belgacem (2016) and Sheikh, Syed and Ali Shah (2018). 
Regarding liquidity, Liu, Shiu and Liu (2016) found that the interplay between insurers’ liquidity and the 
usage of reinsurance was positive. In addition, Rochet and Villeneuve (2011) focused on firms facing cash-
flow risks and concluded that the usage of (re)insurance helped firms to maintain liquidity level, stabilize 
investment spending and lower the cost of capital. These results confirm that insurers can use reinsurance 
to maintain their capital or liquidity position, which further influences insurers’ financial stability. 
2 The rent capital hypothesis assumes that reinsurance may serve as a substitute, to some degree, for equity 
capital, and can potencially increase the primary insurer’s surplus level (Hoerger, Sloan and Hassan, 1990; 
Adiel, 1996; Chen, Hamwi and Hudson, 2001; Garven and Lamm-Tennant, 2003; Shiu, 2011). The primary 
insurer may prefer to use reinsurance to transfer its risks if the cost of reinsurance is lower than the cost of 
issuing equity capital. 
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maintain capital at a relatively low level without increasing the risk of default (Mankaï 
and Belgacem, 2016; Caporale, Cerrato and Zhang, 2017). 
 
   In addition to the mentioned advantages, Liu, Shiu and Liu (2016) provide two other 
reasons why general insurers should use reinsurance. First, reinsurance can reduce an 
insurer’s pre-tax income volatility, and thus, its expected tax payments. Second, 
reinsurers provide extra information or real services to primary insurers’ operations, 
thereby maintaining the primary insurer’s financial soundness. Based on U.S. market data 
from 1980 to 1987, Garven and Lamm-Tennant (2003) also suggest that using reinsurance 
can mitigate insolvency risk. Looking at the Australian general insurance market, Sharpe 
and Stadnik (2007) note that insurers’ with more reinsurance expenses tend to be more 
stable. Studying the relevance between the insurance sector and the financial system in 
the U.S., Weiß and Mühlnickel (2014) argue that insurers who purchase more reinsurance 
protections are less likely to become the top systemic risk contributors. After conducting 
a worldwide study, Fields, Gupta and Prakash, (2012) confirmed that there is a positive 
relationship between an insurer’s soundness and the use of reinsurance by life insurers, 
while finding no evidence for non-life insurers. Besides, Kramer (1996) found no 
evidence to support the idea that reinsurance influences the financial stability of Dutch 
non-life insurers. 
 
   Although the traditional view suggests a positive relationship between the use of 
reinsurance and an insurer’s stability, an alternative view indicates that an insurer may 
increase its risk-taking if it depends heavily on a reinsurer’s financial health (Kim et al., 
1995; Pottier and Sommer, 1999). This negative relationship can be referred as the moral 
hazard hypothesis, which implies that the usage of external protections (e.g. reinsurance 
or guaranty funds) may encourage insurers to accept more risks (Lee, Mayers and Smith, 
1997). Also, insurers may face more counterparty risk while they are enjoying the benefits 
of using more reinsurance (Caporale, Cerrato and Zhang, 2017). 
 
   Contrary to the Shim's (2015) expectation, he found that insurers with more reinsurance 
were not necessarily more stable. This finding is consistent with the results of Aunon-
Nerin and Ehling (2008), Shiu (2011) and Mankaï and Belgacem (2016), who found that 
heavy use of reinsurance resulted in higher risk-taking. Caporale, Cerrato and Zhang 
(2017) studied the U.K. general insurance market, and their findings first suggested that 
insurers accepting reinsurance had a higher probability of default than those without 
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reinsurance protections, especially when natural disasters occurred. They further argued 
that the ceded amount was critical because insurers could choose whether they wanted to 
cede all or part of their businesses (Berger, Cummins and Tennyson, 1992). Recently, 
Alhassan and Biekpe (2018) confirmed a complex relationship that indicates that taking 
more reinsurance may increase underwriting risk and reduce an insurer’s stability. 
 
   The above discussion is inconclusive as to the impacts of the use of reinsurance; 
therefore, the hypothesis can be stated as: 
H3: Insurer’s reinsurance ceded affects its stability. 
 
4.2.4 Insurer’s Liquidity 
   Apart from holding capital or purchasing (re)insurance to avoid insolvency, a firm’s 
liquidity (or liquidity risk) is related to its solvency in financial institutions. From another 
perspective, a firm’s liquidity position also indirectly influences its stability via 
performance, capital structure and risk management. 1  Additionally, a strong capital 
position may not be sufficient to address the financial difficulties raised by liquidity risk; 
firms that face more short-term obligations are willing to hold liquidity buffers to 
maintain their financial soundness. Ratnovski (2013) suggests that holding higher 
liquidity buffers and imposing transparency are two methods of managing liquidity risk 
(in banking), while Ratnovski also argues that adopting these methods is costly. 
 
   In terms of insurance, insurers with more liquid assets are exposed to less liquidity risk. 
Liquidity risk is defined as the probability that policymakers’ need for cash exceeds the 
amount held by the insurer. The asset-liability mismatch is the primary source of liquidity 
risk. Insurers should maintain a certain level of liquidity to meet their expected 
obligations when they are due. Billio et al. (2012) not only confirmed the importance of 
the insurance industry in the financial sector but also pointed out that illiquidity may be 
one of the sources of systemic risk. 
 
   Lee and Urrutia (1996) argue that current liquidity ratio is a significant indicator of 
financial stability. Benali and Feki (2015) also express that an insurer’s ability to meet its 
 
1 The relationship between a firm’s liquidity and performance can be found in Molyneux and Thornton 
(1992), Adams and Buckle (2003), Athanasoglou, Brissimis and Delis (2008), Fresard (2010), and Tan 
(2016). The potencial connections between a firm’s liquidity and capital structure can be found in Kim, 
Mauer and Sherman (1998), Opler (1999), Najjar and Petrov (2011) and Chiaramonte and Casu (2017). 
Liu, Shiu and Liu (2016) also provide a detailed study on the interlinks between liquidity and reinsurance. 
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short-term liabilities and obligations is the key to distinguishing solvent and insolvent 
firms. This is particularly true for non-life insurers. In comparison to life insurers, non-
life insurers require more liquidity than life firms due to the short-term nature of its 
businesses (Fields, Gupta and Prakash, 2012). Thus, the non-life insurers are exposed to 
more liquidity risks and tend to maintain higher liquidity levels (Liu, Shiu and Liu, 2016). 
 
   Myers and Rajan (1998) revealed the strengths and weaknesses of maintaining certain 
levels of liquidity. From an insurer’s point of view, the benefit is that insurers can be in 
a better position to avoid financial distress during periods of high demand for claims; 
the drawback is that it makes it hard to commit the firm to another course of action 
(Najjar and Petrov, 2011). Apart from these two outcomes, Weiß and Mühlnickel 
(2014) present a third possible consequence of holding more liquid assets. They argue 
that insurers with more liquid assets may be more likely to be liquidated when the 
market experiences a downturn. 
   
   By investigating credit ratings in the insurance market, Carson and Scott (1997) and 
Bouzouita and Young (1998) identified a negative correlation between credit rating and 
liquidity risk. In the same line, Sharpe and Stadnik (2007) studied insurers’ financial 
health in the Australian market and confirmed that holding an adequate level of liquid 
assets can reduce the likelihood of experiencing financial distress. Later, Zhang and 
Nielson (2015) found that property-casualty insurers with sufficient cash flow were less 
likely to become insolvent in the U.S. market. In line with these, Caporale, Cerrato and 
Zhang (2017) confirmed that a high liquidity ratio (i.e. the cash ratio) represents a good 
claims-paying ability, which is associated with a lower default probability in the U.K. 
general insurance market. 
 
   Further, Fields, Gupta and Prakash (2012) use liquidity ratio (i.e. the ratio of liquid asset 
to net technical reserves) to represent exposure from investments. They provide evidence 
for the positive relationship between this liquidity ratio and life insurers’ risk-taking (or 
insolvency). Similarly, Mankaï and Belgacem (2016) argue that insurers with more liquid 
assets may decide to hold less capital and accept more risks. 
 
   Similar to the insurance industry, Wagner (2007) also suggests that liquid banks may 
be riskier. In contrast, using the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) to represent banks’ 
liquidity, Vazquez and Federico (2015) found that (smaller) banks with weaker liquidity 
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positions were more likely to suffer failures. Chiaramonte and Casu (2017) confirmed a 
similar result. However, Hong, Huang and Wu (2014) found that liquidity has only 
limited effects on bank failures. Liu, Molyneux and Nguyen (2012) and Leroy and 
Lucotte (2017) also found no evidence that a bank’s liquidity influences its risk-taking. 
 
 
   Based on the previous findings, the following hypothesis can be developed from the 
point of liquidity risk: 
H4: Insurer’s liquidity risk affects its stability. 
 
4.2.5 Underwriting cycle on Soundness 
   Apart from the discussed internal factors, macroeconomic and industry variables also 
significantly influence insurers’ financial soundness (Cheng and Weiss, 2012b). For 
example, Rampini (2004) identified the business cycle as one of the factors related to 
firms risk-taking. As one of the special characteristics of the general insurance market, 
the underwriting cycle potentially affects non-life insurers’ financial soundness. Using 
loss ratio to represent the underwriting cycle, Ren and Schmit (2006) found that the 
influence of competition and the franchise value on insurers’ solvency (risk-taking) are 
affected by the underwriting cycle. 
 
   As mentioned, the non-life market follows a hard and soft market cycle. A period of 
higher premiums, lower supply of coverages and sizeable underwriting profit characterize 
the hard market; by a period of lower premiums, a higher level of competition and 
considerable underwriting losses characterize the soft market (Venezian, 1985; Winter, 
1991b). When the premium charged is below the discounted losses and expenses in the 
soft market, an insurer’s likelihood of insolvency increases due to the deterioration of 
surplus level and reserve inadequacy (Jones and Ren, 2006). 
 
   If the industry-wide combined ratio is used to represent the underwriting cycle, a higher 
ratio would indicate unfavourable underwriting results, which would likely be found in a 
soft market; a lower combined ratio may indicate a hard market. The financial health of 
insurers who have excessive risk-taking strategies should be considerably weaker in a soft 
market (or during a period of peaks in the cycle) because of the combination of a low 
premium due to competition and high claims due to loose underwriting. Thus, it is 
reasonable to assume that there is a positive (negative) relationship between insurers’ 
insolvency (soundness) and the industry-wide combined ratio. 
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   Doherty and Garven (1995) suggest that changes in interest rates may influence the 
value of the capital stock, which may further affect insurers’ underwriting and pricing 
strategies. Fields, Gupta and Prakas (2012) used the lending interest rate to control the 
underwriting cycle and found evidence that the mean is negatively related to risk-taking, 
while the variance is positively related. To be more specific, an insurer in the hard market 
will tend to increase prices and reduce supply levels when its equity decreases due to 
fluctuation in interest rates in order to maintain its financial stability. Thus, this 
assumption supports the hypothesised positive relationship between the industry 
combined ratio (i.e. the proxy of the underwriting cycle) and insurers’ insolvency. In other 
words, the insolvency rate will be higher in the soft market, when the industry combined 
ratio increases or when the underwriting cycle peaks. Browne and Hoyt (1995) confirmed 
that the industry combined ratio is positively related to the insolvency rate. Sommer (1996) 
also found that the price of insurance is negatively related to insurers’ instability. 
 
   Ren et al. (2011) studied the impact of the underwriting cycle on insurers’ risk-taking 
from 1960 to 2008. They found that insurers tend to reduce (enhance) the amount of 
investment risk taken in the hard (soft) market,1 while insurers face higher insolvency 
risks in the hard market than in the soft market. Furthermore, a difference of reaction to 
the underwriting cycle between stock and mutual insurers with respect to investment risk 
was found. For example, stock firms actively adjust their investment risk across the 
underwriting cycle (Ren et al., 2011). Zhang and Nielson (2015) also demonstrated a 
significant relationship between the underwriting cycle and insurers’ financial 
performance and insolvency. The authors confirmed the underwriting cycle hypothesis; 
that is, the probability of instability increases when the industry has poor underwriting 
results on average due to the higher competition in the soft market. 
 
   Cheng and Weiss (2012) also found that insolvency propensity is significantly related 
to the underwriting cycle. However, in contrast with others, their results indicate that there 
may be more insurer insolvencies in the hard market, i.e. when the supply of insurance is 
 
1 Ren et al.'s (2011) results indirectly indicate that an insurer seeks an optimal level of stability by balancing 
underwriting risk and investment risk. Staking and Babbel (1995) and Cummins and Sommer (1996) also 
achieved a similar conclusion by studying the relationship between investment risk and underwriting risk 
directly. 
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low, as there is a negative link between industry-wide combined ratio and insurers’ 
insolvency. Thus, these results partial support Ren et al.’s (2011) findings. 
 
   In addition to the direct impacts on insurers’ stability, the underwriting cycle may 
influence insurers’ soundness indirectly. For example, Huang and Eling (2013) state that 
non-life insurers in the BRIC bloc of countries would have a lower level of efficiency 
when the overall market condition is favourable. In line with this, Eling and Schaper 
(2017) found that insurance market conditions are one of the driving factors of efficiency 
in the European market. Further, the underwriting cycle also influences insurers’ M&A 
and IPO decisions, as suggested by Chamberlain and Tennyson (1998) and Yu et al. 
(2004). 
    
   Cummins and Danzon (1997) provide evidence that insurers are willing to raise capital 
in hard markets. Moreover, Gron and Lucas (1998) argue that insurers should be more 
comfortable raising capital in hard markets, as the capital market provides positive and 
favourable feedback to insurers’ financing decisions. Regarding insurers’ capital 
adjustments, Guidara and Lai (2015) found that the adjustment is higher in a soft market. 
In banking studies, Delechat et al. (2012) also found a potential connection between the 
credit cycle (business cycle) and liquidity buffer. Brei and Gambacorta (2016) also state 
that the business cycle influences the bank capital ratio. 
 
   As discussed by Cummins et al. (2008), the event of losses that lead to a capital shortage, 
re-evaluation of pricing strategies or re-assessment of risk management can trigger a hard 
phase. In order to adapt to the new surroundings, insurers may choose to reduce coverage 
capacity, to accept a higher level of insolvency or to transfer the risk to reinsurers. The 
underwriting cycle characterizes both primary insurers and reinsurers equally because 
they share unexpected losses from the same sources (Meier and Outreville, 2006). Thus, 
the cost of reinsurance will be higher in the hard market, while it is less costly in the soft 
market. Thus, the underwriting cycle will potentially influence a primary insurer’s 
decision to use reinsurance. 
 
   In summary, the direct impact of the underwriting cycle is explicit, as most of the 
findings from previous studies indicate that insurers may face higher insolvency risks in 
a soft market. Thus, the hypothesis can be developed as: 
H5a: The underwriting cycle directly affects an insurer’s stability. 
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   An indirect impact can also be expected, as the underwriting cycle may influence other 
risk management decisions, such as capital structure, reinsurance and liquidity. Thus, 
another hypothesis can be stated as: 
H5b: The interaction between underwriting cycle and firm-specific factors affects an 
insurer’s stability. 
 
Section 4.3 Data and Methodology 
    
   This section describes the empirical approach employed to examine the discussed 
hypotheses. In order to test the influence of the underwriting cycle on insurers’ financial 
stability, test on determining whether the cycle exists in the UK non-life insurance market 
is first performed. After establishing the presence of the underwriting cycle in the UK 
non-life market, the discussed hypotheses will be tested by using the different estimation 
models. The database used in this chapter is built on information from financial 
statements of individual insurers, which included the balance sheet and the income 
statement, collected from Orbis, Fame and ISIS (or Insurance Focus), and provided by 
Bureau van Dijk. The World Bank database is the main source for those macro-economic 
data. The sample only covers the non-life insurers in the UK market from 1996 to 2017 1. 
There is no required data for all years; therefore, unbalanced panel data is accepted. To 
ensure all monetary values are directly comparable, we deflate each year’s value by the 
consumer price index to the base year 2015. 
 
4.3.1 Determine the Presence of the Underwriting Cycle in the UK Market 
   From previous studies, various methodologies can be used to test the existence of 
underwriting cycle2, for example, direct observation by using charts (Elango, 2009), the 
spectral analysis/cointegration techniques (Grace and Hotchkiss, 1995; Meier, 2006a; 
Venezian and Leng, 2006), Christiano-Fitzgerald filter analysis (Zhang and Tang, 2012), 
vector autoregressive (VAR) processes (Chung et al., 1994; Fung et al., 1998), financial 
models, etc. Among these different methods, the second-order autoregressive AR(2) 
process is the one that has been widely used to determine the presence of the underwriting 
cycle and the length of the cycle, see studies from  Venezian (1985), Cummins and 
Outreville (1987), Lamm-tennant and Weiss (1997), Chen, Wong and Lee (1999), Fenn 
 
1 According to Outreville, (1990) and Eling and Luhnen, (2009), at least 12 years of data are required to 
determine the underwriting cycle. 
2 Meier, (2006a) provides a good discussion on different methods used to detemine the underwriting cycle. 
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and Vencappa (2005) Leng and Meier (2006), Meier and Outreville (2006), Lazar and 
Denuit (2011), Zhang and Tang (2012) and Bruneau and Sghaier (2015), among others. 
 
   Venezian's (1985) model assumes that insurers may use past loss level to predict their 
future losses, which can be further used to set premiums; and this is further confirmed by 
Lamm-tennant and Weiss (1997). Thus, the second-order autoregression model and the 
parameters needed to measure the length of the cycle can be obtained by estimating the 
following model1 with ordinary least squares:  
Π𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1Π𝑡−1 + 𝛼2Π𝑡−2 + 𝜔𝑡 
Equation (4.1) 
where 𝜔𝑡 is a random error term, the parameter 𝛼1 and 𝛼2 are used to calculate the length 
of the cycle period. An underwriting cycle will be present if 𝛼1 > 0 , 𝛼2 < 0  and 
𝛼1
2 + 4𝛼2 < 0, then the length of the cycle period can be expressed as follows in Equation 
(4.2):  
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 (𝑃) = 2𝜋 / cos−1(𝛼1/2√−𝛼2) 
Equation (4.2) 
   Regarding Π𝑡, it represents the insurer’s underwriting performance at year t. There are 
various variables can be chosen. For example, Cummins and Outreville (1987) use the 
ratio of premiums-to-claims represents the underwriting profit in the U.S. market. Chen, 
Wong and Lee (1999) and Trufin, Albrecher and Denuit (2009) apply the second-order 
autoregression model and use the ratio of premiums-to-claims to estimate the presence of 
the underwriting cycle in Asia non-life market and Canadian motor insurance market, 
respectively. The ratio of premiums-to-claims, which can be seen as the inverse loss ratio, 
that is a price indictor2.  Besides, Lamm-tennant and Weiss (1997) use two ratios - the 
underwriting results (profits) or the loss ratio3 - to estimate the cycle period; and they find 
significant results from both models. By using the loss ratio, Meier (2006b) test the 
 
1  The AR(2) analysis may be misleading if the underlying variable Π𝑡  is not stationary. Thus, the 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test (Dickey and Fuller, 1979) and Phillips-Perron test (Phillips and Perron, 1988) 
are used to examine whether the variable is stationary, i.e. there is no unit root. If the variable has a unit 
root (i.e. it is non-stationary), the variable is expressed as a form of first differences. Following Eling and 
Luhnen (2009), a time trend may be included in the equation, to reflect control for the downward trend in 
expenses over time. However, Eling and Luhnen (2009) state that the results from model with trend and 
without trend are not significantly different; the same conclusion applied to model with level series or 
differenced series. Then, the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) is used to determine the number of lags 
for the lagged terms, and to confirm that the underlying variable Π𝑡 satisfies a AR(2) process. 
2 The inverse loss ratio represents the unit price for each unit of claim paid from an insurer. 
3 The underwriting results is defined as underwriting profit divided by premium earned. The loss ratio is 
expressed as the ratio of losses incurred to premium Written.  
P a g e  | 207 
 
existence of the cycle in Switzerland, the U.S. and Japan. Later, Eling and Luhnen (2009) 
choose the loss ratio to study the underwriting cycle in German property-liability market, 
and find the cycle length is about 5.3 years on average. Similar to the loss ratio, Browne 
and Hoyt (1995), Grace and Hotchkiss (1995) and Bruneau and Sghaier (2015) use 
industry combined ratio to indicate the underwriting cycle1. A high combined ratio means 
an unfavourable underwriting result, which is likely to be found in a soft market.  
 
   By focusing the UK market, Fenn and Vencappa (2005) use a dynamic model to 
confirm that the existence of a second-order autoregressive structure to economic loss 
ratio in the motor insurance line, and the cycle length is between eight to nine years2.    
Thus, following Fenn and Vencappa's (2005) UK study, the AR(2) model can be rewritten 
as3:  
𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑡−1 + 𝛼2𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑡−2 + 𝜔𝑡 
Equation (4.3) 
 
4.3.2 Empirical Models and Estimation Techniques 
    
   At the second step, in order to estimate the effects of both internal and external factors 
on the insurer’s financial stability (Tabak, Fazio and Cajueiro, 2012; Shim, 2015), and to 
test the hypotheses described in section 4.2, a baseline model is formulated as below: 
 
𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + (𝛼1)𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + (𝛼2)𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + (𝛼3)𝑅𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡
+ (𝛼4)𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + (𝛼5)𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐶𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + (𝜆𝑛)𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖,𝑡,𝑛
+ (𝜙𝑚)𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡,𝑚 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
Equation (4.4) 
where Stability represents an insurer’s financial health or soundness or the risk-taking at 
the aggregated level at time t. Performance, Leverage, Reinsurance and Liquidity are the 
key variables used to test the Hypotheses 1-4, while Underwriting Cycle is the external 
factor that is used to test Hypothesis 5a. The 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖,𝑡,𝑛 show the interacted terms 
between the underwriting cycle and the nth regressor4. The purpose of including the 
 
1 The combined ratio is equal to (Incurred Claims + Expenses) / Gross Premium Written. 
2 From the other earlier literature, the average cycle length across different countries is about five to eight 
years, see, Venezian (1985), Simmons and Cross (1986), Cummins and Outreville (1987), Lamm-tennant 
and Weiss (1997) and Chen, Wong and Lee (1999). 
3 In this chapter, the aim is only to test whether the underwriting cycle appear in the UK market. So, the 
second order autoregression model remain in a simplest form, excluding other independent variables. Here, 
the panel data approach is taken as it combines advantages from both time series and cross-sectional 
approaches, such as: it does not only identifies the dynamic short-run features of the individual firm, but 
also identidy the differentiations of the short-run features among different firms. 
4 Regressors includes internal factors, i.e., Performance, Leverage, Reinsurance and Liquidity.  
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interaction terms is to exam the joint effect on the insurer’s financial soundness. To be 
more specific, the interaction term is of key interest as the significant coefficient (𝜆𝑛) 
should be indicative of either the potential effect of the underwriting cycle on the 
relationships between financial stability and four regressors, or the joint effect of the cycle 
and four regressors on the insurer’s stability. Similar approaches, in which the interaction 
term between the cyclicality and another regressor is involved to determine the joint 
impact, can be found from Dionne and Wang (2013), Saadaoui (2014) and Ben Bouheni 
and Hasnaoui (2017). 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡,𝑚  is a set of control variables. 𝛼0  and 𝜀𝑖𝑡  are the 
constant term and error term, respectively. The detail of definition for each of the 
variables will be decribed in the next section.  
 
   Then, the main regression model, Equation (4.4), is estimated using both the OLS fixed 
effect estimation1 and the dynamic panel Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) model. 
The former not only represents the long-term relationship, but also eliminate the impact 
of time-invariant effect and to capture unobserved firm-specific characteristics 
(heterogeneity across firms). The two-step SYS-GMM 2  is then used to estimate the 
dynamic features of the model. In addition to that, the econometric issue that can not be 
addressed by the OLS estimation is the potential endogeneity. In the above model, there 
are high odds that some of the independent and control variables may influence the 
underwriting cycle, i.e. independent variables are endogenously determined. Then, the 
use of the GMM model can wipe out inconsistent and biased estimates of the coefficients.  
 
 
4.3.3 Data: Dependent and Independent variables and other Control Variables  
 
Dependent variables: Financial Soundness (Stability) 
   Z-score is a well-known accounting measurement that is widely used as the proxy of 
the financial institution’s soundness. Following insurance literature from Shim (2011), 
(2015), Pasiouras and Gaganis (2013), Mühlnickel and Weiß (2015), Cummins, Rubio-
Misas and Vencappa (2017) and Alhassan and Biekpe (2018) and baking studies from 
 
1 The null hypothesis of Hausman's (1978) test is rejected, suggesting that the fixed effect estimator is 
prefered. 
2 A System-GMM was modified by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) based on 
Arellano and Bond's (1991) model, and it allows more instruments to be introduced and improve efficiency 
of estimation. Because the SYS-GMM estimations assume that the first differences of instrument variables 
are uncorrelated with the fixed effects, and both lagged levels and lagged value of the difference are 
included in the estimation. The two-step estimations are more efficient than one-step, because the 
“Windmeijer finite-sample correction” to the two-step standard errors is applied.  
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Mamatzakis and Bermpei (2014), Kabir and Worthington (2017) and Leroy and Lucotte 
(2017), the financial stability can be measured as: 
 
Z − score𝑖𝑡 = (𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 +
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡
) 𝜎𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡⁄  
Equation (4.5) 
where 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 is insurer i‘s the return on asset at time t. 𝜎𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 represents the standard 
deviation of the return on asset, and a three-year rolling window is used to calculate this 
standard deviation. Therefore, the z-score is a function of the insurer’s profitability, the 
variation in profitability, and the equity capital available to sustain the variation. In other 
words, this Z-score represents the number of standard deviations of an insurer’s return 
(ROA) that the insurer must decrease to deplete its capital (Cummins, Rubio-Misas and 
Vencappa, 2017). Therefore, the relationship between the Z-score and an insurer’s 
likelihood of default is inversed. The higher the Z-score indicates that the lower the 
probability of default, and the higher the stability.  
 
Independent variables 
   Based on the hypothesis developed in Section 4.2, five key variables are required to be 
defined: performance, leverage, reinsurance, liquidity and the underwriting cycle. 
 
Performance variable 
   As discussed by Eling and Jia (2018), an insurer’s efficiency is a good predictor of 
business failure. So, the efficiency is used to represent the insurer’s performance, and to 
reflect its relative position in the market. The Equation (A4.1), in Appendix 4, can be 
adopted to estimate this measurement, but with Total Profit1 as the dependent variable.  
 
 Leverage variable 
   In this chapter, following Shim (2015) and Alhassan and Biekpe (2018), the ratio of net 
premium written to surplus is adopted to represent an insurer’s leverage position, because 
it not only represents the capital structure but also indicates insurer’s leverage risk. A 
higher ratio assumes that the insurer faces more leverage risk.  
 
Reinsurance variable 
   Similar to Garven and Lamm-Tennant (2003), Cole and McCullough (2006), Powell 
and Sommer (2007) and Mankaï and Belgacem (2016) and Alhassan and Biekpe (2018), 
 
1 Total profit is the simple operating profit, profit before tax, presented in financial statement. 
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   Following Zhang and Nielson (2015) and Mankaï and Belgacem (2016), the ratio of 
liabilities to liquid assets shows the insurer’s liquidity risk. A larger ratio indicates a 
higher level of liquidity risk in the insurance company.  
 
Underwriting Cycle variable 
   Regarding the proxy of the underwriting cycle, the industry-wide loss ratio is adopted 
(Browne and Hoyt, 1995; Cheng and Weiss, 2012b), as this ratio is consistent with the 
discussion in Section 4.3.1. A higher industry-wide ratio indicates unfavourable 
underwriting results, which will be likely found in a soft market; then a lower ratio may 
indicate a hard market. Thus, it is reasonable to assume a negative relationship between 
industry-wide loss ratio and an insurer’s stability 
 
Control variables 
   Both firm characteristics and environmental factors are included as control variables. 
Among internal factors, firm size is one of the concerns when examing the financial firm’s 
stability. For example, the large scale represents that the insurer has a better 
diversification ability and higher franchises values (Sharpe and Stadnik, 2007). Some 
other studies also find that smaller insurers are more likely to suffer insolvency issues, 
because the regulators are less likely to liquidate larger firms, see, BarNiv and 
Hershbarger (1990), Cummins, Harrington and Klein (1995), Adams and Buckle (2003), 
Chen and Wong (2004) and Kleffner and Lee (2009). However, the potential effect of 
size on financial stability is still ambiguous. Shim (2011), Weiß and Mühlnickel (2014), 
Guidara and Lai (2015) and Cummins, Rubio-Misas and Vencappa (2017) find that firm 
size negatively connects to financial soundness. And, the negative relationship is also 
found in banking literature, (chaeck and Cihák (2010) reveal that size is inversely related 
to stability. Alhassan and Biekpe (2018) also reveal that the effects of size on both 
underwriting risk and z-score are positive and significant; this indicates that larger firms 
tend to take more underwriting risks, while being characterised by greater stability. Here, 
the natural logarithm of total assets represents the insurer’s size. 
 
   Further, Shim (2015) and Eling and Jia (2018) confirms that there is a non-linear 
(inverted U-shape) relationship between insurer’s size and its financial soundness; it 
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implies that an extreme increase in firm size may erode the insurer’s financial stability. 
Therefore, the square of firm size is included to control for the potential non-linear 
relationship.  
 
   Premium growth, measures the rate of market penetration, has been widely used to 
determine/represent the insurer’s financial condition (either stability or insolvent) in 
insurance literature, see Kim et al. (1995), Chen and Wong (2004) and Kleffner and Lee 
(2009). In general, the growth represents that the insurer is in a soundness condition. 
However, rapidly writing more new business may indicate a substantial potential future 
loss, and an unexpected growth may also indicate that there is a potential mispricing 
pricing issue (Niehaus and Mann, 1992; Caporale, Cerrato and Zhang, 2017). Borde, 
Chambliss and Madura (1994), Lee and Urrutia (1996) and Chen and Wong (2004) use 
the rate of growth of gross premium to indicate the insurer’s instability, because they 
believe that rapid growth of business should attribute to the loose of underwriting 
standards, and then further lead to financial instability. However, Sharpe and Stadnik 
(2007) find no significant evidence on this relationship in the Australian market. Then, 
this measurement can be defined as (gross premium written in year t – gross premium 
written t-1) / gross premium written in year t-1.  
 
   Following Eling and Marek (2014) and Eling and Jia (2018), business volatility is also 
included to control for the long-term fluctuations in the insurer’s business results. The 
standard deviation of the return on equity with a 3-year rolling window is used to capture 
the uncertainties of return at the aggregated level (Pasiouras and Gaganis, 2013).  
 
   Organisational form is also controlled as following Cummins and Sommer (1996), who 
exam the impact of agency theory on the insurer’s risk-taking. They argue that a larger 
separation between manager and policyholders (or owners) in mutual firms leads to lower 
the risk-taking. A similar view is also confirmed by Lee, Mayers and Smith (1997), who 
suggests that incentives to increase risk are better controlled in a mutual firm. Later, Ho, 
Lai and Lee (2013), Shim (2015) and Eling and Jia (2018) all confirm that mutual insurers 
are more stable than stock insurers. From previous literature, two main reasons are given. 
First, the incentive conflict is better controlled in mutual insurers (Lee, Mayers and Smith, 
1997). Second, Eling and Jia (2018) suggest that mutual insurers are more willing to 
maximise the policyholders’ interest, and then less likely to take more risks (Lamm-
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Tennant and Starks, 1993). Thus, a dummy variable, which equals to one for stock firms, 
is included to control for organisational form. A negative coefficient can be expected.  
 
   In line with the fact that changes of macroeconomic factors may directly affect firm’s 
risk-taking (Browne, Carson and Hoyt, 1999; Chen and Wong, 2004; Wang, 2010; Zhang 
and Nielson, 2015; Caporale, Cerrato and Zhang, 2017), change in interest rate and GDP 
growth are included as exogenous control variables. 
 
Section 4.4 Results and Discussions 
    
   Table 4.1 shows the descriptive statistics of the firm-specific and market-specific 
variables used to test hypotheses 1 to 5. Table 4.2 presents the correlation between the 
discussed variables. Apart from the correlation between two variables related to firm size, 
the highest correlation coefficient of 0.51 is between the underwriting cycle and interest 
rate change. The second-highest correlation coefficient (-0.41) is between business 
volatility and two stability variables. These may lead to a potential issue of 
multicollinearity. The variance inflation factor (VIF) analysis was computed for all 
independent variables. The highest individual score is 1.58 for the underwriting cycle, 
and the overall score is 1.14; these scores are well below the commonly accepted 
threshold value of 10 (Kennedy, 1998). Thus, multicollinearity is unlikely to be a severe 
issue in this study. It is safe to assume that interest rate and competition are potential 
driving factors of the underwriting cycle in the non-life market because of the significant 
correlation coefficients among the variables. 
 
 
[Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics insert here] 
 
 
[Table 4.2 Correlation Coefficient Matrix insert here] 







Table 4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Function  Observations Mean Median Standard Deviation Min Max 
Stability Independent Variable 6499 3.0563 1.0559 21.6536 -42.0766 1089.7417 
Stability Efficiency Independent Variable (Robust Test) 3612 0.3668 0.3699 0.1049 0.0229 0.6705 
Performance Hypothesized Variable 4001 0.4533 0.4718 0.1075 0.0029 0.8243 
Leverage Hypothesized Variable 5559 2.1814 0.8264 3.9984 0.0000 19.0833 
Reinsurance Hypothesized Variable 5910 0.3822 0.2512 0.3689 0.0009 1.6000 
Liquidity Risk Hypothesized Variable 7365 6.7925 1.7862 16.1980 1.0142 85.6310 
Underwriting Cycle Hypothesized Variable 21954 3.4311 3.4277 0.5146 2.5166 4.0692 
Competition Hypothesized Variable (Robust Test) 19890 0.4171 0.4311 0.2500 -0.2452 0.7937 
Firm Size Control Variable 8062 7.4163 7.4820 2.0608 2.9848 11.4692 
Squared Firm Size Control Variable 8062 59.2471 55.9797 30.4660 8.9092 131.5432 
Premium Growth Rate Control Variable 2512 -1.7213 -1.7898 1.8929 -8.7130 10.9893 
Business Volatility Control Variable 6998 2.2268 2.2941 1.6309 -31.6820 5.1468 
Stock Control Variable 18162 0.4484 0.0000 0.4973 0.0000 1.0000 
Interest Rate Change Control Variable 21953 2.2536 0.0000 4.9193 -0.9655 28.0000 
GDP Growth Control Variable 21954 2.1403 2.4560 1.6295 -4.1878 4.0382 
Notes: Stability is measured by Z-score, which is (Return on Asset + Equity to Asset Ratio) / Standard Deviation of ROA. A higher Z-score value corresponds to the lower 
probability of insolvency and higher level of stability. Stability Efficiency is an alternative proxy of the insurer’s financial soundness, and make robustness check on the 
discussed hypotheses, and it is estimated by using Stochastic Frontier Analysis. Performance is the insurer’s profit efficiency, which is also found by adopting Stochastic 
Frontier Analysis. Leverage is the ratio of net premium written to surplus. Reinsurance is the ratio of reinsurance ceded to gross premium written. Liquidity Risk is the ratio 
of liability to liquid asset; a larger value indicates the insurer may face liquidity issues. The industry-wide loss ratio represents the underwriting cycle in the non-life market; 
a higher ratio potentially implies a soft market condition. As another proxy of underwriting cycle, the intensity of competition is measured by the Boone indicator. Chapter 
three provides details on how to capture the Boone index. Firm Size is the natural logarithm of the insurer’s total assets. Premium Growth Rate is defined as (gross premium 
written in year t – gross premium written t-1) / gross premium written in year t-1. Business Volatility is the standard deviation of the return on equity with a 3-year rolling 
window, and captures the uncertainties of return at the aggregated level. In addition, a dummy variable, which equals to one for STOCK firms, is also included in the dynamic 
GMM models. Two macroeconomic factors - Interest Rate Change and GDP Growth - are collected from World-Bank database. To mitigate the confounding effects of 
outliers, some firm-specific variables are winsorized at 3% level at each tail, and further take natural logarithm to ensure the distribution is normally skewed. 
 
 











Table 4.2 Correlation Coefficient Matrix 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1. Stability  1.00               
2. Stability Efficiency  0.42*  1.00              
3. Performance  0.11*  0.30*  1.00             
4. Leverage -0.03 -0.06 -0.02  1.00            
5. Reinsurance -0.05  0.13*  0.10*  0.00  1.00           
6. Liquidity Risk  0.06  0.05  0.03 -0.00 -0.02  1.00          
7. Underwriting Cycle -0.16* -0.04  0.07  0.01 -0.01  0.04  1.00         
8. Competition  0.00  0.01  0.04  0.04 -0.01 -0.04  0.17*  1.00        
9. Firm Size   0.05 -0.35*  0.00  0.00 -0.11*  0.04 -0.04  0.03  1.00       
10. Squared Firm Size  0.05 -0.38* -0.01 -0.00 -0.13*  0.04 -0.04  0.03  0.99*  1.00      
11. Premium Growth Rate  0.00 -0.02  0.02 -0.05 -0.09*  0.10  0.14*  0.02  0.15*  0.15*  1.00     
12. Business Volatility -0.41* -0.41*  0.05  0.07 -0.08 -0.05  0.15* -0.08 -0.10* -0.11  0.01  1.00    
13. Stock  0.11*  0.11*  0.01 -0.09*  0.09*  0.03  0.02  0.03  0.16*  0.17*  0.02 -0.32*  1.00   
14. Interest Rate Changed  0.03  0.04 -0.01 -0.01 -0.05 -0.02 -0.51* -0.18*  0.03  0.03 -0.05 -0.07 -0.01  1.00  
15. GDP Growth  0.06  0.00 -0.06  0.01 -0.00  0.01 -0.39*  0.18* -0.02 -0.01 -0.08 -0.14*  0.04  0.20*  1.00 
Notes: The highest correlation coefficient is -0.51, observed between Underwriting Cycle and Interest Rate Change, raising the potential issue of multicollinearity. 
The variance inflation factor (VIF) analysis is computed for all the independent variables.  
The highest individual score is 1.58 from Underwriting Cycle, and the overall score is 1.14.  
These are well below the commonly accepted threshold value of 10 (see, (Kennedy, 1998)). Thus, multicollinearity is unlikely to be a serious issue in this study. 
A positive Boone Indicator is adopted by timing the negative β with -1. Thus, a larger value of this positive Boone indicator denotes that the market is more competitive. 
* represent statistical significance at 5% level at least. 
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4.4.1 The Length of the Underwriting Cycle in the Non-life Market 
   As discussed, one of the main contributions of this chapter is to determine the impact 
of the underwriting cycle on insurers’ financial soundness (stability). Therefore, the first 
step is to confirm the existence of the underwriting cycle in the non-life market. Following 
Venezian (1985) and Lamm-Tennant and Weiss (1997), the AR(2) model (e.g. Equation 
4.1 and 4.3) — most widely used method — was adopted to measure the length of the 
underwriting cycle, if it exists. 
 
   The model found the coefficient of lagged-one loss ratio (0.257) and the coefficient of 
lagged-two variable (-0.1847). Both coefficients are significant and conform to the 
requirements discussed in Section 4.3.1. Equation 4.2 can be used to calculate length; the 
length of the underwriting cycle is about five years (actually, 4.95 years) in the U.K. non-
life market. This result is mainly consistent with the previous findings for various 
countries (see Lamm-Tennant and Weiss, 1997; Chen, Wong and Lee, 1999; and Eling 
and Luhnen; 2009). However, compared to Fenn and Vencappa’s (2005) investigation for 
the U.K. market, the resulted length is shorter than the length of eight to nine years 
observed by them, i.e. half of their estimated length. One possible reason for this is that 
Fenn and Vencappa (2005) split the non-life market into several sub-markets, and each 
of the sub-markets had a longer underwriting cycle. Another reason could be that the 
resulted cycle lengths may have varied due to the length of the investigation period (Eling 
and Luhnen, 2009). Last, Fenn and Vencappa (2005) studied the market from 1985 to 
2002, while the present study focuses on the market from 1996 to 2017. A short length 
may indicate that the U.K. insurers adapt to the market more effectively due to the 
technique development. 
 
4.4.2 Panel Estimation 
   By following Goddard, Molyneux and Wilson (2004) and Mamatzakis and Bermpei 
(2016), the main regression model is estimated using both OLS fixed effect estimation 
and the dynamic panel Generalized Method of Moment (GMM) model. The former not 
only eliminate the impact of time-invariant effect and to capture unobserved firm-specific 
characteristics (heterogeneity across firms), but also represents the long-run relationship. 
The GMM model is used to address the potential endogeneity issue that may arise in the 
OLS estimation; meanwhile, it can be used to further estimate the dynamic features of the 
model, which is the short-run relationship. Therefore, a comprehensive story, in which 
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variabilities existed between the long-run relationship and the short-run relationship are 
considered, can be provided by comparing the results from these two models. 
 
   As the existence of the underwriting cycle has been determined in the U.K. non-life 
market, estimating the main model, i.e. Equation 4.4, can verify the discussed hypotheses; 
this section presents the results. To be specific, reviewing the results shown in Tables 4.3 
and 4.4, in which the estimated results reveal the impacts of individual hypothesised 
factors — performance, leverage, reinsurance, liquidity risk and the underwriting cycle 
— on insurers’ financial soundness (stability), can verify Hypothesis 1 to Hypothesis 5a. 
Tables 4.5 and 4.6 disclose the impacts of the interactions between individual factors and 
the underwriting cycle on financial stability. Last, Tables 4.7 to 4.9 present the results of 
the robustness checks. 
 
4.4.2.1 Performance, Leverage, Reinsurance, Liquidity Risk and the Underwriting 
Cycle  
   Tables 4.3 and 4.4 present the results for the OLS fixed-effect and the GMM dynamic 
panel regressions, respectively. Regarding the impact of performance, Hypothesis 1 is 
valid because of the significant and positive coefficient shown in Model 1 and Model 6. 
The positive result indicates that the insurers that have better profitability may face a 
lower likelihood of being financially distressed. This result remains consistent in both the 
long-run model (i.e. the fixed model) and the short-run model (i.e. the GMM dynamic 
model). It is also in line with the previous findings of BarNiv and McDonald (1992), 
Sharpe and Stadnik (2007) and Eling and Jia (2018). Thus, it is reasonable to conclude 
that performance (profit efficiency) enhances insurers’ financial soundness in the U.K. 
non-life market. 
 
   To verify Hypothesis 2, which discusses the impact of an insurer’s leverage on its 
soundness, the ratio of premium written to surplus represents the insurer’s leverage 
position. As discussed in Chapter 3, the definition of leverage is ambiguous in the 
insurance market. On the one hand, it related to the funds raised from both shareholders 
and debtholders; on the other hand, the policyholders are the dominant supplier of 
insurance leverage (Cummins and Lamm-Tennant, 1994; Pope and Ma, 2008). Therefore, 
the advantage of using the ratio of premium written to surplus is that it allows us to explain 
the insurer’s capital structure from the point of the insurer’s underwriting ability. For 
example, a larger ratio indicates that the insurer may issue too many policies or businesses 
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compared to its underwriting ability (i.e. the equity level). In line with the expected 
bankruptcy cost argument, the results from Model 2 show that the leverage negatively 
influences insurers’ stability, and the impact remains significant in both Tables 4.3 and 
4.4. It indicates that an insurer who faces higher leverage has an increased probability of 
being insolvent when the firm writes a number of businesses beyond its underwriting 
ability. Carson and Hoyt (1995), Shiu (2011), Shim (2010; 2015) and Caporale, Cerrato 
and Zhang (2017) share similar conclusions. 
 
   Concerning the hypothesis on the relationship between the use of reinsurance and 
insurers’ stability, the results from Model 3 vary between the long-run model (Table 4.3) 
and the short-run model (Table 4.4). Specifically, the results from Table 4.3 indicate that 
using more reinsurance may damage an insurer’s financial health in the long-run, though 
the coefficient is not significant. In the dynamic model, by contrast, Model 3 confirms 
the significant and positive impact of using reinsurance on stability. These results suggest 
that the insurer can treat reinsurance as essential protection to enhance the firm’s stability 
in the short-run. The positive influence has been widely accepted (see Adams, 1996; 
Garven and Lamm-Tennant, 2003; Sharpe and Stadnik, 2007; Liu, Shiu and Liu, 2016; 
and Mankaï and Belgacem, 2016). Although the harmful impact of reinsurance in the 
OLS fixed-effect model is not significant, Kim et al. (1995), Lee, Mayers and Smith 
(1997) and Pottier and Sommer (1999) provide some explanation for the negative 
relationship between the use of reinsurance and stability. 
 
   Surprisingly, Model 4 from Tables 4.3 and 4.4 suggests that the insurer who accepts 
more liquidity risk is less likely to become insolvent. This is inconsistent with both the 
expectation of Hypothesis 4 and the previous findings of Carson and Scott (1997), 
Bouzouita and Young (1998), Sharpe and Stadnik (2007) and Caporale, Cerrato and 
Zhang (2017). 
 
   As noted in the introduction, determining the impact of the underwriting cycle on 
insurers’ soundness (i.e. Hypothesis 5a) is one of the most important contributions of this 
study. The industry-wide loss ratio represents the underwriting cycle from the point of an 
insurer’s underwriting profits or losses. A higher ratio indicates that the market is soft, 
while a negative or decreased ratio represents a hard market. In line with Hypothesis 5a, 
the results (see, Models 5 and 6 in both Tables 4.3 and 4.4) show that the coefficients of 
underwriting cycle (i.e. the industry-wide loss ratio) are significant and negative. This 
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confirms that insurers tend to be riskier in the soft market (as the industry-wide loss ratio 
increased), as discussed in Section 4.2.5. 
    
   Among the above discussions, one question needs to be addressed regarding the positive 
impact of liquidity risk on insurers’ stability, as most of the previous findings support a 
negative one. In order to address this issue, following Schaeck and Cihák (2010) and 
Cummins, Rubio-Misas and Vencappa's (2017) procedures, we established the impacts 
of the critical factors on the three different components of the Z-score; Appendix 4, Tables 
A4.1 to A4.3, show the estimated results. Model 4 in Tables A4.1 and A4.3 indicates that 
the insurer who has more liquidity risk may generate higher returns and is willing to hold 
more capital. Thus, these connections may further contribute to a positive influence on 
the insurer’s stability. 
 
   In addition, the results (Model 1) also reveal that well-performed firms tend to have a 
higher return on asset (ROTA) and a larger standard deviation of return (S.D. ROTA). 
The former is positively related to Z-score, while the latter has negative influences; thus, 
both can enhance financial stability. High leveraged insurers usually face more instability 
issues, mainly because they have a lower level of ROTA and hold less capital (see Models 
2 and 6). Last, Model 5 discloses that the insurers tend to generate fewer returns with 


























Table 4.3: Individual effects on Financial Stability -OLS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 H1 H2 H3 H4 H5 H1-5 
VARIABLES Stability Stability Stability Stability Stability Stability 
              
Performance 8.1690***     9.3119*** 
 (4.512)     (4.570) 
Leverage  -0.0015***    -0.0012*** 
  (-3.568)    (-2.690) 
Reinsurance   -0.8639   -2.0069 
   (-0.706)   (-0.704) 
Liquidity Risk    0.0386***  0.0359*** 
    (17.354)  (9.423) 
Underwriting Cycle     -1.8151* -2.6537* 
     (-1.801) (-1.916) 
Firm Size 5.0629 14.3291*** 14.1530*** 11.7208*** 11.6621*** 4.3153 
 (1.184) (3.270) (3.202) (2.938) (2.841) (0.869) 
Squared Size -0.3156 -0.7615*** -0.7480*** -0.6107*** -0.6065*** -0.2756 
 (-1.235) (-3.338) (-3.197) (-2.878) (-2.795) (-0.941) 
Premium Growth Rate 0.0435 0.0661 0.0624 0.0546 0.0780 0.0413 
 (0.571) (1.057) (1.090) (0.965) (1.351) (0.492) 
Business Volatility -2.8064*** -2.7525*** -2.3462*** -2.2572*** -2.2764*** -3.1368*** 
 (-6.315) (-7.129) (-6.130) (-6.352) (-6.403) (-6.163) 
Interest Rate Change 0.0972 0.0532 0.0551 0.0563 -0.0087 0.0030 
 (1.413) (0.833) (0.989) (1.007) (-0.160) (0.032) 
GDP Growth -0.0633 -0.0042 -0.0174 -0.0022 -0.0753 -0.2343* 
 (-0.586) (-0.046) (-0.217) (-0.028) (-0.840) (-1.797) 
Constant -13.0358 -55.8794*** -56.1157*** -46.2305** -38.9998* 1.2339 
 (-0.733) (-2.670) (-2.680) (-2.469) (-1.941) (0.059) 
              
Observations 666 859 950 994 1,007 583 
Number of Insurers 325 377 390 413 423 285 
Adjusted R-squared 0.254 0.250 0.209 0.204 0.208 0.291 
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-test 8.43*** 9.87*** 8.09*** 5978.07*** 7.99*** 207787*** 



























Table 4.4: Individual effects on Financial Stability - GMM 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 H1 H2 H3 H4 H5 H1-5 
VARIABLES Stability Stability Stability Stability Stability Stability 
              
Lagged Stability 0.1928** 0.2020** 0.1947** 0.2218*** 0.2905* 0.2082** 
 (2.396) (2.516) (2.257) (2.629) (1.958) (2.568) 
Performance 6.8163***     9.1620*** 
 (3.974)     (3.932) 
Leverage  -0.0023***    -0.0005 
  (-4.009)    (-1.454) 
Reinsurance   0.0924**   4.1985 
   (2.339)   (1.372) 
Liquidity Risk    0.0310***  -0.0045 
    (2.608)  (-0.083) 
Underwriting Cycle     -2.2437* -3.3969* 
     (-1.760) (-1.679) 
Firm Size 2.5570 4.9316 3.5102 6.1666 5.1561 -4.0256 
 (0.376) (0.667) (0.319) (0.840) (0.432) (-0.639) 
Squared Size -0.1487 -0.3055 -0.2155 -0.3600 -0.3777 0.2348 
 (-0.387) (-0.719) (-0.359) (-0.862) (-0.558) (0.677) 
Premium Growth Rate 0.1644*** 0.1178* 0.1153** 0.1014* 0.2810** 0.2911** 
 (3.051) (1.802) (2.058) (1.846) (2.581) (2.557) 
Business Volatility -2.7853*** -2.5680*** -2.6449*** -2.7111*** -2.4058*** -1.9758*** 
 (-4.932) (-6.366) (-4.561) (-5.481) (-3.600) (-3.997) 
Stock -2.0021** -0.9758* -1.8823*** -1.7138** 5.7449 -1.4716** 
 (-2.395) (-1.754) (-2.704) (-2.465) (0.644) (-2.154) 
Interest Rate Change -0.0174 -0.0392 0.0598 0.0610 -0.1098 -0.2972* 
 (-0.275) (-0.647) (0.523) (0.595) (-1.121) (-1.676) 
GDP Growth -0.1116 -0.0043 -0.0557 -0.0676 -0.0023 -0.1615 
 (-0.732) (-0.052) (-0.486) (-0.493) (-0.011) (-1.133) 
Constant -3.6619 -10.7096 -4.4924 -16.2694 -2.8740 31.5020 
 (-0.124) (-0.347) (-0.093) (-0.521) (-0.056) (1.059)        
       
Observations 594 767 847 884 895 519 
Number of Insurers 293 339 347 371 379 256 
Number of Instruments 101 125 87 85 42 120 
Robust Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-test 17.77*** 7.991*** 3.830*** 69.53*** 8.984*** 51.53*** 
AR(1) -1.836* -1.833* -1.839* -1.895* -1.981** -1.828* 
AR(2) -0.824 -0.687 -1.198 -1.192 -0.799 -0.499 
Hansen/Sargan Test (P-value) 87.13 (0.56) 117.4 (0.42) 78.25 (0.44) 76.72 (0.42) 31.42 (0.50) 94.35 (0.78) 
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4.4.2.2 Interaction with the Underwriting Cycle: Industry-wide Loss Ratio 
   Another main contribution of this study is to determine the joint effects of interactions 
between internal factors and external pressure on insurers’ soundness. The findings in 
Tables 4.5 and 4.6 provide evidence that the underwriting cycle can influence an insurer’s 
operational strategies and financial soundness. To be specific, Table 4.5 shows the OLS 
fixed-effect model, and Table 4.6 shows the estimations from the dynamic panel model. 
The former represents the long-term effect, and the latter shows the short-term effect. 
 
   Concerning the interaction term of performance * underwriting cycle (see Models 1 and 
5), the coefficient is negative. This implies that well-performed insurers may easily suffer 
instability issue in the soft market, especially in the short-run (because the coefficient is 
only significant in Table 4.6). There are two reasonable explanations for this negative 
impact. First, the majority of the market players will suffer underwriting losses in the soft 
market. This is the nature of the soft phases. In other words, a relatively well-performed 
insurer may still face more underwriting losses in the soft market, compared to the hard 
market. Second, these relatively well-performing insurer firms may believe that they have 
an advantage in executing high-risk strategies when the external environment is 
unfavourable, such as investing in risky assets, writing more risky businesses or adopting 
loose monitoring standards. 
 
   The impact of the interaction, which is between leverage and the underwriting cycle, 
on a firm’s stability is positive, while it is only significant in the dynamic model, as 
presented in Models 2 and 5. The results suggest that highly leveraged insurers tend to 
have a lower insolvency risk in the soft market. This contradicts the observed negative 
coefficients of two individual variables, i.e. leverage and the underwriting cycle. 
However, it is not surprising to have such a positive joint effect. According to the 
expected bankruptcy cost argument, highly leveraged firms are expected to be riskier. 
The managers in such firms may need to take the initiative and adjust the operational 
strategies to maintain stability when the market condition is unfavourable, for example, 
in the soft market. In simpler terms, managers in highly leveraged firms already pay 
sufficient attention to the status of the market and their firm’s health. A similar 
interpretation can also be applied to discuss the circumstances which have left insurers 
with a higher level of liquidity risk, as the coefficients of interaction terms of “liquidity 
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risk * underwriting cycle” are positive and significant in both long-run and short-run (see 
Model 4). 
 
   In addition, Model 3 shows the coefficients of the interaction term “reinsurance * 
underwriting cycle” are also positive and significant in both long-term and short-term 
cases. This implies that the use of reinsurance can enhance an insurer’s stability in a soft 
market. The positive coefficients also contradict the negative coefficients of two 
individual variables. Thus, this further confirms that insurers pay particular attention to 
the harmful effects raised by external market conditions. 
 
Table 4.5: Interacted Effects with Underwriting Cycle on Financial Stability -OLS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 H5b H5b H5b H5b H5b 
VARIABLES Stability Stability Stability Stability Stability 
            
Profit Efficiency 52.5501    63.1340 
 (1.329)    (1.432) 
Performance * Underwriting Cycle -11.7777    -14.2805 
 (-1.152)    (-1.253) 
Leverage  -0.1741   -0.1795 
  (-1.197)   (-0.707) 
Leverage * Underwriting Cycle  0.0446   0.0464 
  (1.187)   (0.703) 
Reinsurance   -31.1721*  -42.9121* 
   (-1.851)  (-1.698) 
Reinsurance * Underwriting Cycle   8.1974*  10.9999 
   (1.779)  (1.635) 
Liquidity Risk    -3.2831 -8.6551** 
    (-1.525) (-1.969) 
Liquidity Risk * Underwriting Cycle    0.9496* 2.3273** 
    (1.794) (2.154) 
Underwriting Cycle 3.1157 -2.1307** -5.0333*** -2.6359** -1.3808 
 (0.647) (-2.170) (-2.902) (-2.352) (-0.257) 
Firm Size 3.5978 14.5491*** 15.7174*** 11.3136*** 5.3350 
 (0.841) (3.123) (3.313) (2.856) (1.111) 
Squared Size -0.2215 -0.7694*** -0.8585*** -0.5882*** -0.3706 
 (-0.837) (-3.191) (-3.407) (-2.840) (-1.267) 
Premium Growth Rate 0.0638 0.0855 0.0785 0.0659 0.0148 
 (0.825) (1.331) (1.326) (1.171) (0.176) 
Business Volatility -2.8197*** -2.7710*** -2.3546*** -2.2623*** -3.1302*** 
 (-6.439) (-7.193) (-6.291) (-6.383) (-6.304) 
Interest Rate Change 0.0076 -0.0148 -0.0254 -0.0043 -0.0201 
 (0.101) (-0.233) (-0.441) (-0.075) (-0.201) 
GDP Growth -0.1696 -0.0905 -0.1170 -0.0763 -0.2854** 
 (-1.417) (-0.895) (-1.294) (-0.842) (-2.068) 
Constant -19.2238 -48.9834** -42.2988** -34.7124* -5.0168 
 (-0.907) (-2.192) (-2.017) (-1.728) (-0.192)       
      
Observations 666 859 950 994 583 
Number of Insurers 325 377 390 413 285 
Adjusted R-squared 0.268 0.257 0.237 0.214 0.315 
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-test 8.11*** 7.46*** 7.35*** 7.13*** 8.103*** 











Table 4.6: Interacted Effects with Underwriting Cycle on Financial Stability -GMM 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Performance  Leverage Reinsurance Liquidity Risk All 
VARIABLES Stability Stability Stability Stability Stability 
            
Lagged Stability 0.1847** 0.1194* 0.1818*** 0.2157*** 0.1999* 
 (2.510) (1.769) (2.650) (3.136) (1.775) 
Profit Efficiency 77.8206*    138.5053** 
 (1.933)    (2.037) 
Performance * Underwriting Cycle -18.1537*    -32.9593* 
 (-1.749)    (-1.864) 
Leverage  -0.4984**   -2.8486* 
  (-2.194)   (-1.765) 
Leverage * Underwriting Cycle  0.1281**   0.7406* 
  (2.179)   (1.765) 
Reinsurance   -21.2372**  -25.4913 
   (-1.994)  (-0.705) 
Reinsurance * Underwriting Cycle   5.3930**  8.4814 
   (1.996)  (0.893) 
Liquidity Risk    -11.6770* 1,909.80 
    (-1.759) (0.660) 
Liquidity Risk * Underwriting Cycle    2.8279* -469.3388 
    (1.729) (-0.660) 
Underwriting Cycle 7.3020 -2.9381* -2.4452* 3.3674*** 8.8057 
 (1.487) (-1.822) (-1.701) (3.251) (1.083) 
Firm Size -2.1063 7.2725 4.9338 1.9404 -9.3241* 
 (-0.449) (0.909) (0.662) (0.379) (-1.901) 
Squared Size 0.1219 -0.3361 -0.2507 -0.1084 0.5008* 
 (0.459) (-0.765) (-0.600) (-0.371) (1.694) 
Premium Growth Rate 0.1727* 0.1029 0.0363 0.2669*** 0.3057*** 
 (1.885) (1.466) (0.541) (5.766) (3.136) 
Business Volatility -2.3919*** -2.4022*** -2.2129*** -1.7707*** -2.0413*** 
 (-6.914) (-3.168) (-5.499) (-6.525) (-4.735) 
Stock -1.4317** -2.0151** -1.3628** -0.8487* -2.7013 
 (-2.315) (-1.994) (-2.549) (-1.707) (-0.443) 
Interest Rate Change -0.1938 -0.1193** -0.0499 0.4739*** -0.3872** 
 (-1.229) (-1.984) (-0.682) (3.066) (-1.997) 
GDP Growth -0.0370 -0.1066 -0.0031 0.0190 -0.3142 
 (-0.327) (-0.845) (-0.041) (0.253) (-1.315) 
Constant -14.4692 -16.6678 -5.7518 -15.7639 9.1497 
 (-0.477) (-0.471) (-0.189) (-0.746) (0.267) 
            
Observations 594 767 847 884 358 
Number of Insurers 293 339 347 371 188 
Number of Instruments 153 102 156 122 137 
Robust Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-test 8.544*** 2.553*** 6.020*** 79.22*** 101.9*** 
AR(1) -1.694* -1.701* -1.833* -1.825* -1.664* 
AR(2) -0.760 -0.803 -1.229 -1.223 -0.403 
Hansen/ Sargan Test (P-value) 131.2 (0.71) 86.49 (0.59) 136.6 (0.66) 104.8 (0.62) 123.2 (0.38) 
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4.4.3 Sensitivity and Robustness Check 
 
4.4.3.1 Competition as an alternative proxy of the Underwriting Cycle 
   As discussed in both the introduction and hypotheses development sections, one theory 
suggests that destructive competition may be one factor that causes the presence of the 
underwriting cycle (Berger, 1988; Harrington and Danzon, 1994; Malinovksii, 2010; 
Malinovskii, 2014). Although, Fenn and Vencappa (2005) emphasize that it is difficult to 
explain why insurers choose to compete and collaborate at a point in time (i.e. generally 
five to eight years apart), it cannot be disclaimed that the strength of competition varies 
across the underwriting cycle (Malinovskii, 2014). To be more specific, a lower degree 
of competition can be observed in the hard market, while the competition is more 
intensive in the soft market. Thus, in this section, competition is treated as a proxy for the 
underwriting cycle for robustness and sensitivity tests; the aim is to examine whether the 
competition can represent some features of the underwriting cycle. If the effects of 
interactions between competition and those internal factors are similar (or identical) to 
the impacts observed in the previous sections, then it is reasonable to claim that 
competition can represent the underwriting cycle. 
 
   Apart from treating competition as a driving force of the underwriting cycle in the non-
life market, there are differences between these two external factors. The impact of 
competition on stability itself is also a critical question in the financial industry. Although 
the effect of market competition on firms’ stability has been well discussed in the banking 
industry, it has yet to reach a consensus. While the debate of whether the effect of 
competition on stability in the banking sector is beneficial or harmful continues, the same 
question has also been raised in the insurance market. Compared to the massive 
investigations into banking, relevant studies on the insurance market are limited. Two 
conflicting hypotheses describe the potential relationships: the competition-fragility 
hypothesis and the competition-stability hypothesis. The former represents a traditional 
view that assumes there is a negative relationship between competition and stability.1 In 
 
1  Alhassan and Biekpe (2018) summarise three transmission mechanisms to explain the negative 
relationship as applied to insurance market. First, increasing competition makes it difficult for insurers to 
monitor claim behaviours and pricing policies (i.e. increasing the future uncertainties), due to the high 
frequency of policyholders switching insurance suppliers in a competitive market. Second, supervision of 
an insurer’s risk-taking behviours will be affected by the increased competition (Allen and Gale, 2004). 
Finally, as stemming from Keeley (1990), profit-maximisation is one of an insurer’s main incentives for 
excessive risk-taking in a competitive market. 
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other words, increasing competition erodes a firm’s charter values or profitability and 
contributes to higher instability because of the incentives for excessive risk-taking 
behaviours (Keeley, 1990). 
 
   Rhoades and Rutz (1982) and Demsetz, Saidenberg and Strahan (1996) express a 
similar view that firms with higher market power would tend to reduce risk-taking. 
Repullo (2004) also states the view that more competition leads to more risk-taking in the 
absence of regulation. Later, several international studies found evidence to support a 
negative relationship between competition and stability in banking sectors (Beck, 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, 2006; Yeyati and Micco, 2007; Turk-Ariss, 2010). Further, 
when considering the impact of banking stability on the economy, Fernández, González 
and Suárez (2016) used a large amount of data from 110 countries and found that the 
banking stability contributed more to stabilising economic volatility in a less competitive 
market. Chiaramonte and Casu (2017) state that banks had a lower risk of insolvent in a 
concentrated market when they used the data from EU-28 member states from 2004 to 
2013. By investigating a sample of European-listed banks for the same period, Leroy and 
Lucotte (2017) confirmed the competition-fragility view at firm-level, while they also 
suggest that competition may improve financial stability by reducing systemic risk at the 
macro-level.1 
 
   On the other hand, the competition-stability hypothesis indicates that competition can 
enhance firms’ stability. Uchida and Tsutsui (2005), Schaeck, Cihák and Wolfe (2009), 
Allen, Carletti and Marquez (2011), Liu, Molyneux and Nguyen (2012) and Schaeck and 
Cihák (2010; 2014) provide evidence that supports this stability-enhancing effect in the 
banking sector. Using the Boone indicator to represent the market competition, Schaeck 
and Cihák (2010) further confirmed that competition might enhance banks’ soundness 
via efficiency. Soedarmono and Tarazi (2016) suggest that banks in the Asia-Pacific 
region may face higher credit risk and income volatility when they have more market 
power (i.e. potentially operate in a less competitive market). This confirms the previous 
findings of Soedarmono, Machrouh and Tarazi (2011; 2013). Recently, Clark, Radić and 
 
1 These conflicted results can be explained by the different features of the risk indicators, such as the 
individual stability that can be refered to as internal risk, while systemic risk corresponds with externalized 
risk. Leroy and Lucotte (2017) provide a detailed explaination regarding the dual relationship between 
competition and stability.  
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Sharipova (2018) further confirmed this positive relationship in the Commonwealth of 
Independent State (CIS). 
 
In terms of the insurance industry, the rationale may be that insurers in a more competitive 
market tend to monitor its risk-taking (e.g. an insurer’s underwriting process) more 
efficient and careful than those in a less competitive market. Then, greater competition 
may increase a firm’s stability as it boosts insurers to increase monitoring and improve 
its selection of policyholders. Moreover, the reduction in competition may lead to an 
adverse-selection of high-risk policyholders and the moral hazard problem, as the 
dominant insurers charge a higher premium (Alhassan and Biekpe, 2018). Fields, Gupta 
and Prakash (2012) state that higher barriers (lower competition) increase both life and 
non-life insurers’ risk-taking (i.e. instability). Thus, increasing competition may enhance 
an insurer’s financial soundness (Boyd and Nicoló, 2005). Consistent with the 
competition-stability hypothesis, Cheng and Weiss (2012) used the logistic model to 
confirm that the probability of insolvent is high in a more concentrated market. Using 
data from 1999 to 2011 in ten EU life insurance markets, Cummins, Rubio-Misas and 
Vencappa (2017) also found that competition enhances insurers’ soundness. 
 
   Further, by using both concentration ratio and the Lerner index to represent market 
competition, Fu, Lin and Molyneux (2014) found that higher concentration (less 
competition) and lower market power (stemming from intensive competition) lead to 
higher instability in the banking sector. This confirms the Martinez-Miera and Repullo 
(MMR) hypothesis that indicates a non-monotonic relationship,1 which can be referred to 
as the third view of the connection between competition and a firm’s risk-taking (Berger, 
Klapper and Turk-Ariss, 2009; Martinez-Miera and Repullo, 2010; Jiménez, Lopez and 
Saurina, 2013). Using the Lerner index and Z-score, Alhassan and Biekpe (2018) found 
evidence that supports the MMR hypothesis, which suggests an inverted U-shaped 
relationship between competition and insurers’ solvency in the non-life insurance market 
in South Africa. Therefore, due to the unique feature of the non-life market and the 
inconclusive results raised in the previous literature, it is worth re-examing the 
relationship between competition and financial stability at the first step. 
 
 
1  The direction of the net marginal effect between competition and stability defines the non-linear 
relationship as either a U-shape or an inverted U-shape (Alhassan and Biekpe, 2018). 
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   In this section, the Boone indicator is used to capture the impact of competition on 
insurers’ stability. One of the advantages of using this measurement is that it further 
considers the competition-efficiency-stability nexus; the nexus suggests that efficiency is 
the channel through which competition enhances stability (Schaeck and Cihák, 2010; 
2014). This confirms the importance of a firm’s efficiency to enhancing its stability. 
 
   Models 1 and 2 from Table 4.7 study the impact of competition on insurers’ soundness 
(i.e. Z-score). Model 1 first confirms that intensive competition will damage a firm’s 
stability. This result not only confirms the competition-fragility view but also discover an 
impact that is observable from the underwriting cycle (i.e. the insurers are less stable in 
the soft market, see Tables 4.3 and 4.4). Furthermore, the results shown in Model 2 
support the MMR hypothesis, which indicates there is a non-linear relationship between 
competition and stability. Specifically, the results suggest a U-shaped relationship, which 
implies that an extreme increase in market competition can enhance the financial stability 
of an insurer. This contradicts to the inverted U-shaped relationship found by Alhassan 
and Biekpe (2018). 
 
Table 4.7: Robustness - Competition on Financial Stability - GMM 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 R1: Competition R2: Competition^2 R1: Competition R2: Competition^2 
VARIABLES Stability Stability Stability Efficiency Stability Efficiency 
          
Lagged Stability 0.1698** 0.1946* 0.3005*** 0.3009*** 
 (2.255) (1.827) (7.279) (5.376) 
Competition -1.7856* -3.5890* -0.0249* -0.0546* 
 (-1.657) (-1.802) (-1.757) (-1.685) 
Competition^2  4.3647*  0.0773* 
  (1.927)  (1.839) 
Firm Size 2.9200 3.9696 0.1209 0.1719** 
 (0.464) (0.835) (1.489) (2.202) 
Size^2 -0.1909 -0.2535 -0.0087* -0.0118** 
 (-0.500) (-0.937) (-1.789) (-2.561) 
Premium Growth Rate -0.0835 -0.0078 0.0016 0.0013 
 (-0.399) (-0.084) (0.792) (1.109) 
Business Volatility -2.5789*** -2.4083*** -0.0452*** -0.0249*** 
 (-6.018) (-4.759) (-6.640) (-2.848) 
Stock -1.4258* 0.9223 -0.0030 0.0170 
 (-1.891) (0.367) (-0.241) (1.393) 
Interest Rate Change -0.0562 -0.0293 0.0021 0.0016 
 (-0.766) (-0.464) (1.361) (0.911) 
GDP Growth 0.0514 0.0252 -0.0020 -0.0009 
 (0.657) (0.350) (-0.895) (-0.341) 
Constant -0.4835 -7.0706 -0.0018 -0.2708 
 (-0.020) (-0.335) (-0.006) (-0.844)      
     
Observations 895 873 489 489 
Number of Insurers 379 367 246 246 
Number of Instruments 85 87 83 66 
Robust Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-test 8.278*** 3.894*** 16.01*** 9.741*** 
AR(1) -1.762* -1.871* -1.844* -1.679* 
AR(2) -0.996 -1.111 -1.036 -0.485 
Hansen/ Sargan Test (P-value) 70.34 (0.63) 77.39 (0.43) 68.43 (0.63) 51.01 (0.63) 
t-statistics in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 




   Table 4.8 shows the results of the joint impacts on insurers’ stability when the 
interaction terms “internal factors * competition” are included. By comparing these 
results with the findings from Table 4.6, it is easy to test whether competition is an 
essential factor of the underwriting cycle. As expected, it is safe to conclude that the 
competition is a good representative of the underwriting cycle because the impacts raised 
by the interaction terms are identical in both Tables 4.6 and 4.8. 
 
 
Table 4.8: Robustness - Interaction effects with Competition on Financial Stability - 
GMM 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Performance Leverage Reinsurance Liquidity Risk All 
VARIABLES Stability Stability Stability Stability Stability 
            
Lagged Stability 0.1445** 0.1177* 0.2034*** 0.2743*** 0.1846* 
 (2.122) (1.711) (2.905) (2.724) (1.924) 
Competition 8.0619* -1.7486* -0.2506 -1.5755 -11.3466 
 (1.902) (-1.757) (-0.531) (-1.428) (-1.371) 
Profit Efficiency 19.6685***    6.4893 
 (3.532)    (0.822) 
Performance * Competition -20.6268**    6.2318 
 (-2.195)    (0.468) 
Leverage  -0.0459**   -0.1596 
  (-2.067)   (-0.841) 
Leverage * Competition  0.0886**   0.2081 
  (2.389)   (0.843) 
Reinsurance   0.0415*  -6.3847 
   (1.687)  (-1.095) 
Reinsurance * Competition   0.5293**  11.9135* 
   (2.044)  (1.665) 
Liquidity Risk    -1.2804** -74.1945* 
    (-2.277) (-1.770) 
Liquidity Risk * Competition    12.0100* 965.7323* 
    (1.759) (1.786) 
Firm Size 1.1899 7.2395 0.7076 0.4873 -7.3010 
 (0.183) (0.830) (0.148) (0.062) (-1.163) 
Size^2 -0.0044 -0.3742 -0.0217 0.0896 0.4227 
 (-0.012) (-0.773) (-0.080) (0.185) (1.132) 
Premium Growth Rate 0.1026 0.1161 0.0728 0.2553*** 0.2770*** 
 (1.287) (1.649) (1.261) (4.160) (3.246) 
Business Volatility -2.3700*** -2.1731*** -2.0497*** -1.7919*** -3.0700*** 
 (-3.752) (-4.974) (-7.147) (-3.969) (-7.284) 
Stock -2.3463** -1.4826 -1.4027*** 4.5842 -6.4646 
 (-2.212) (-0.827) (-2.808) (0.903) (-1.178) 
Interest Rate Change -0.1558 0.1172* 0.0088 0.0801 -0.0087 
 (-1.226) (1.730) (0.211) (0.806) (-0.060) 
GDP Growth 0.0945 -0.0076 -0.0384 -0.1404 -0.1098 
 (0.682) (-0.067) (-0.614) (-1.179) (-0.627) 
Constant -9.1185 -25.3421 2.9788 -7.4310 43.1370 
 (-0.314) (-0.658) (0.142) (-0.230) (1.372)       
      
Observations 594 721 798 862 519 
Number of Insurers 293 320 327 359 256 
Number of Instruments 101 121 140 86 116 
Robust Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-test 4.010*** 9.020*** 7.126*** 9.703*** 2089*** 
AR(1) -1.709* -1.681* -1.892* -1.745* -1.745* 
AR(2) -0.851 -0.916 -1.347 -1.119 0.308 
Hansen/ Sargan Test (P-value) 85.30 (0.59) 102.1 (0.67) 121.7 (0.64) 72.12 (0.54) 82.18 (0.88) 
t-statistics in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
P a g e  | 229 
 
 
   Except for using competition to represent the underwriting cycle, those impacts raised 
by the interactions can also be explained from a competition perspective. In other words, 
the results from Table 4.8 suggest that better-performing insurers are riskier in the 
competitive market, as such firms have incentives to use riskier strategies in order to 
maintain their market shares. In contrast, insurers who bear more leverage risk, liquidity 
risk or use more reinsurance have a lower likelihood of being insolvent in the competitive 
market, as they should have already paid attention to the harmful effects originating from 
competition. 
 
4.4.3.2 Z-score Efficiency as the proxy of the Insurer’s Soundness (Stability) 
   Apart from using competition to represent the underwriting cycle, an alternative 
measurement — Z-score efficiency — is used to represent financial soundness. In the 
original model, Equation 4.4, the Z-score considers the insurers’ stability from the point 
of return. However, there is a potential limitation of using the Z-score to represent 
financial soundness, as it is not able to reflect an individual firm’s position relative to its 
counterparts (Fang, Hasan and Marton, 2011). This is especially true when the 
competition is considered because one of the outcomes of intensive competition the 
forced exit of inefficient firms from the market. Therefore, the stability efficiency variable, 
which can overcome this limitation, is adopted here to identify an insurer’s stability. 
Tabak, Fazio and Cajueiro (2012), Tan (2016) and Tan and Floros (2018) present a similar 
approach. Equation (A4.1), in Appendix 4, shows the detail of the mathematical model 
used to estimate the z-score efficiency.  
 
   First, Models 3 and 4 from Table 4.7 study the impact of competition on insurers’ 
stability efficiency. Consistent with the prior findings, the competition-fragility 
hypothesis and the MMR hypothesis are both confirmed. Then, Table 4.9 shows the 
desired impacts of the interaction terms on insurers’ stability efficiency. The estimated 
results are almost identical to the prior results; this further identifies the robustness and 
unbiasedness of the main conclusions. It is worth noting that, due to the nature of stability 
efficiency, the results not only reveal the potential driving forces of a firm’s stability but 
also discover its financial health position relative to its counterparts in the market. 
Specifically, the results of Model 1 indicate that better-performing insurers take a 
relatively high insolvency risk in a competitive market compared to other insurers. 
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Similarly, insurers with more leverage risk, liquidity risk or use of more protections are 
more stable than others (see Models 2 to 5). 
 
Table 4.9: Robustness - Interaction effects with Competition on Stability Efficiency - 
GMM 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Performance Leverage Reinsurance Liquidity Risk All 
VARIABLES Stab. Efficiency Stab. Efficiency Stab. Efficiency Stab. Efficiency Stab. Efficiency 
            
Lagged Stability Efficiency 0.3132*** 0.2673** 0.4053*** 0.3415*** 0.3266*** 
 (3.550) (2.579) (3.620) (4.311) (4.314) 
Competition 0.1965** -0.0505*** -0.0433* -0.0077 0.0154 
 (1.970) (-3.022) (-1.797) (-0.482) (0.212) 
Profit Efficiency 0.5019***    0.2642*** 
 (4.690)    (4.352) 
Performance * Competition -0.4271**    0.0162 
 (-2.071)    (0.120) 
Leverage  -0.0050*   0.0019 
  (-1.800)   (0.850) 
Leverage * Competition  0.0065*   -0.0025 
  (1.885)   (-0.849) 
Reinsurance   -0.0095  0.0319 
   (-1.146)  (0.813) 
Reinsurance * Competition   0.0983*  -0.0954* 
   (1.665)  (-1.672) 
Liquidity Risk    -0.0828* -0.3064** 
    (-1.854) (-2.118) 
Liquidity Risk * Competition    1.0779* 4.0011** 
    (1.858) (2.125) 
Firm Size 0.1778 0.1436 0.0933 0.1836** 0.0913 
 (1.550) (1.080) (1.326) (2.075) (1.547) 
Squared Size -0.0111* -0.0087 -0.0067* -0.0126** -0.0062* 
 (-1.663) (-1.193) (-1.680) (-2.466) (-1.899) 
Premium Growth Rate 0.0016* 0.0014 0.0017* 0.0042*** -0.0007 
 (1.817) (1.648) (1.661) (4.552) (-0.899) 
Business Volatility -0.0391*** -0.0388*** -0.0414*** -0.0404*** -0.0355*** 
 (-5.652) (-4.572) (-5.166) (-7.269) (-7.061) 
Stock 0.0666 -0.0897 0.0419 0.0264 0.0051 
 (1.209) (-1.649) (0.895) (0.713) (0.136) 
Interest Rate Change -0.0004 0.0006 0.0024 0.0031** 0.0012 
 (-0.447) (0.269) (1.444) (2.201) (1.103) 
GDP Growth -0.0051** -0.0022 -0.0032 -0.0044* -0.0027 
 (-2.228) (-0.661) (-1.229) (-1.828) (-1.187) 
Constant -0.6020 -0.1302 0.0065 -0.3010 -0.1157 
 (-1.267) (-0.211) (0.020) (-0.828) (-0.417)       
      
Observations 468 444 474 489 426 
Number of Insurers 241 226 236 246 211 
Number of Instruments 106 102 121 149 151 
Robust Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-test 15.61*** 11.29*** 9.563*** 4142*** 3288*** 
AR(1) -1.677* -1.658* -1.902* -2.141** -1.686* 
AR(2) -0.977 -0.921 -1.287 -1.159 -1.381 
Hansen/ Sargan Test (P-value) 92 (0.539) 81.04 (0.739) 115.2 (0.324) 127.9 (0.698) 141.3 (0.295) 
t-statistics in parentheses      
 
4.4.4 The Impact of Control Variables 
 
   In line with Shim (2015) and Eling and Jia (2018), there is evidence to support an 
inverted U-shaped relationship between an insurer’s firm size and its financial soundness, 
though this relationship is only significant in the long-term models. Inconsistent with 
previous studies (see Lee and Urrutia, 1996; and Chen and Wong, 2004), the impact of a 
premium growth rate on stability is significant and positive in the short-term; this implies 
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that a higher premium growth enhances a firm’s stability in the short-term. Regarding 
business volatility, the results confirm that it negatively and significantly influences 
insurers’ health in both the long- and short-term. Finally, stock insurers are found to be 
less stable. This result is in line with those of Ho, Lai and Lee (2013) and Shim (2015). 
 
4.4.5 The Validity of Models  
   The F-test and the value of adjusted R-squared verify the validity of the OLS fixed-
effect model. The GMM dynamic models are required to meet the assumptions of 
overidentification restrictions and no second-order correlations. As expected, all the 
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Section 4.5 Conclusion  
 
   The main purpose of this chapter is to study the driving forces that influence insurers’ 
financial soundness in the U.K. non-life market. Although there are many studies 
concerning this issue in the banking industry, the literature has not been as developed in 
the insurance industry. Notably, the influence of the underwriting cycle is neglected in 
the U.K. market. By applying one of the most widely used methods, i.e. the AR(2) model, 
we achieved results that confirm the existence of the underwriting cycle in the U.K. non-
life market; the length is about five years on average.  
 
   By focusing the period from 1996 to 2017, the results of regressions confirm that both 
internal factors (i.e. performance, leverage, reinsurance and liquidity) and external factors 
(i.e. the underwriting cycle) are essential, though some of the impacts may vary between 
the long- and short-term. Apart from investigating the individual influences, the 
interaction terms, which are between the internal factors and the proxy of the underwriting 
cycle, are included in the regressions to answer how the impacts of internal factors vary 
according to changes in market conditions, i.e. the soft market or the hard market. The 
findings show that the underwriting cycle influences insurers’ operational strategies and 
financial health. The impacts of internal factors on stability need to be jointly determined 
with the underwriting cycle.  
 
Table 4.10 presents the summary of all hypotheses and relevant results. Panel A indicates 
that individual factors influence insurers’ financial soundness (Z-score) differently. Panel 
B shows the impacts on insurers’ Z-scores, after jointly considering the internal factors 
and the underwriting cycle, i.e. including the interaction terms. The results indicate that 
the underwriting cycle does influence insurers’ operational strategies, and managers in 
the insurance companies have already paid attention to the harmful effects the originate 
from such a cyclical pattern. Panels C and D present the results from the robustness and 
sensitivity tests. The competition is used to represent the underwriting cycle in the former, 
while the Z-score is replaced by z-score efficiency (stability efficiency) to represent 
insurers’ soundness in the latter panel. As shown, the impacts of interaction terms on 
stability are identical in all three models (Panels B to D). Thus, from one side, it is safe 
to believe that competition is one of the potential driving factors of the underwriting cycle. 
This research has potential public implications. For example, insurers may need to adjust 
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their underwriting and managerial strategies to achieve efficient and effective operations, 
in response to different phases of the underwriting cycle. For regulators, legislators and 
consumer groups, this research provides some understanding of how to maintain stability 
in the insurance market and may help clarify insurers’ health positions. Further, it points 
out the importance of external pressure on insurers’ stability. 
 
 
Table 4.10: Summary of Hypotheses and Results 
              Panel A: Hypotheses 1-5                          Results 
Hypothesis 1: Performance + 
Hypothesis 2: Leverage - 
Hypothesis 3: Reinsurance + 
Hypothesis 4: Liquidity Risk + 
Hypothesis 5a: Underwriting Cycle - 
Robust Test: Competition - 
Robust Test: Squared Competition  + 
Panel B: Hypothesis 5b – Interactions with Underwriting Cycle 
Performance * Underwriting Cycle - 
Leverage * Underwriting Cycle + 
Reinsurance * Underwriting Cycle + 
Liquidity Risk * Underwriting Cycle + 
Panel C: Robustness – Interactions with Competition 
Performance * Competition - 
Leverage * Competition + 
Reinsurance * Competition + 
Liquidity Risk * Competition + 
Panel D: Robustness - Impacts on Stability Efficiency 
Performance * Competition - 
Leverage * Competition + 
Reinsurance * Competition + 
Liquidity Risk * Competition + 
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CHAPTER 5: Conclusion 
 
   There is a notable link between an economy’s financial development and insurance 
market growth. Financial developments involve the effort of protecting a population’s 
properties against unexpected events; such events are hard to avoid and may lead to losses. 
For this reason, the insurance concept was developed as a means of protection against 
such undesirable events or losses. The existing literature has indicated that the insurers 
are not only exposed to systemic risks but also significantly influence the stability of the 
financial system. Thus, because of the insurance-specific characteristics, its importance 
and stabilisation, analysing the insurance industry is crucial for different stakeholders – 
with the expectations of stabilising the financial system, preventing unexpected losses 
and enhancing economic health. The UK insurance industry has been chosen because it 
is one of the most advanced/developed insurance markets in the global market. In 
particular, three vital factors – performance, capital structure and soundness (stability) – 
which are insurers’ fundamental concerns, have been studied in this thesis.  
 
   This thesis contributes to the ongoing discussions on insurers’ performance, capital 
structure and financial soundness (stability). Specifically, it aims to determine the impacts 
of risk-related practices on these vital concerns, with further consideration of the external 
influences.  
 
   To be more specific, Chapter 1 provides an overview of the UK insurance market in 
terms of operational performance, from 1996 to 2017. Two performance indicators – 
efficiency and productivity – are estimated by the SFA. By identifying insurers’ 
performance, two questions have been answered: (1) How well is the firm being operated? 
And (2) How has the market evolved over time? The main findings show no significant 
improvement on efficiencies from the past 20 years. Compared with the best-practice 
player, most of the UK insurers may increase their cost efficiency and profit efficiency 
by 40% and 70%, respectively. Thus, it is reasonable to state that they have put more 
efforts on cost management than on profit generation. Regarding the sub-markets, the life 
insurers always demonstrate the lowest performance compared with the others. Besides, 
the UK insurers suffer productivity declines on the average level, and the main driving 
force is the decrease in the markup ability. 
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   Chapter 1 mainly contributes to ongoing discussions on insurer’s performance (Eling 
and Luhnen, 2010a; Eling and Luhnen, 2010b; Bertoni and Croce, 2011). First, the UK 
insurance industry is an important contributor to economic growth both in the country 
itself and worldwide, and is ranked as the largest across the EU and the third-largest in 
the world. However, in contrast to the number of studies related to the US market or the 
EU market, the number of studies that focus on the UK market is relatively low. Therefore, 
it is essential to fill the gap and draw a full picture of this important market. Second, it is 
the first and most comprehensive study to investigate the UK insurance market. In order 
to obtain a more accurate overview of insurers’ performance, this chapter encompasses 
various aspects, which are generally covered in three areas: (1) different performance 
indicators - efficiency and productivity; (2) types of insurers - life, non-life and composite 
insurers; (3) types of ownership - stocks and mutual insurers. Third, in comparison to 
other performance studies related to the UK market, the sample used in this chapter can 
be considered the largest, and its acquired data are also the most recent and the widest in 
coverage regarding time.  
 
   It is thus essential to gain insights into the driving forces behind the insurers’ 
performance. Chapter 2 explores the relation between risk-related activities (risk-taking 
and risk management) and the insurers’ performance in the UK market over the 1996–
2013 period. Both cost and profit efficiencies represent insurers’ performance from two 
different perspectives. The findings confirm that both risk-taking and risk management 
practices significantly affect the insurers’ performance. Indeed, the significant effects of 
the interactions between risk-taking and risk management activities on the insurers’ 
performance are also proven, indicating the joint impacts on the insurers’ performance.   
 
   This chapter mainly contributes to ongoing studies on revealing the determinants of 
insurer’s efficiency (Lin, Wen and Yang, 2011; Biener, Eling and Wirfs, 2016; Bikker, 
2016; Eling and Schaper, 2017). Firstly, this study investigates the impact of both risk-
taking behaviours and risk management activities on the insurers’ performance, but most 
of the extant studies only focus from one perspective (Lin, Wen and Yang, 2011; Biener, 
Eling and Wirfs, 2016). Secondly, it is the first study to consider the interaction effects 
between different insurers’ risk-taking behaviours and risk management activities. It is 
worth to determine such impacts, because insurers’ risk-taking behaviours and risk 
management activities are often jointly considered. Third, this chapter responds to 
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measurement issues and employs product risk, diversification strategy and pricing risk as 
underwriting risk measures. This provides more detailed information on insurers’ 
underwriting strategies. Fourth, it is vital to consider the impact on both cost and profit 
efficiencies, as two efficiencies capture different information. Overall speaking, the 
findings can help insurers devise appropriate strategies combining both business and 
operational activities at the aggregated level to improve performance. Regulators can also 
use the results to establish regulations or standards related to insurers’ business and 
operational activities. 
 
   Chapter 3 determines the factors affecting the insurers’ capital structure in the UK 
market, concerning both internal and external factors. By focusing on the UK insurance 
market from 1998 to 2017, the results not only confirm the significant influences of the 
targeted factors but also reveal that different market structure indicators represent various 
concepts of the market. Furthermore, by having internal behaviours and external 
pressures interact, the results suggest that the impact of internal behaviours on the capital 
structure varies according to the changes in the market structure.  
 
   Several contributions can be made to the literature (Campello, 2003; Shiu, 2011; Cheng 
and Weiss, 2012; Altuntas, Berry-Stölzle and Wende, 2015; Dhaene et al., 2017). Firstly, 
in contrast to the banking studies on capital structure, there is relatively little investigation 
on determinants of insurers’ capital structure. Secondly, the impact of market structure 
(e.g., competition) on an insurer’s capital structure is ambiguous. It is important to fill the 
gap. Therefore, the main contribution of this study is to determine how market structure 
affects UK insurers’ capital structure directly and indirectly—for example, considering 
the individual effect of market structure and its interactions with firm-specific 
characteristics on the UK insurance market’s capital structure. Third, this chapter 
responds to measurement issues and employs Boone indicator, Lerner Index and HHI as 
market structure measures. By implying three different indicators, it provides a 
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   It is important to ensure that the insurers maintain the ability to meet their obligations 
and further enhance their soundness (stability). Thus, Chapter 4 determines the influence 
of performance and risk-related practices on the soundness (stability) of general insurers, 
paying particular attention to the impact of the underwriting cycle. The results confirm 
the existence of the underwriting cycle, with a five-year duration in the UK market. 
Furthermore, evidence supports the argument that the underwriting cycle influences 
insurers’ operational strategies and further affects their financial health. Then, the impacts 
of internal factors on stability need to be jointly determined with the underwriting cycle. 
Lastly, by using competition to represent the underwriting cycle, it is reasonable to 
confirm that competition is a potential driving force behind the underwriting cycle 
because they have identical impacts on the insurers’ soundness. 
 
   This chapter mainly contributes to ongoing discussions on insurers’ financial soundness 
(e.g., Cummins, Rubio-Misas and Vencappa, 2017; Alhassan and Biekpe, 2018; Eling 
and Jia, 2018). Firstly, the question of how the underwriting cycle may interact with 
insurers’ stability has not been well-studied. The relationship will provide insight into 
how to improve a firm’s stability in response to pricing restrictions (caused by 
underwriting cycle). Additionally, it is vital to pay attention to changes in an insurer’s 
financial soundness after changes in an insurer’s risk-related behaviour. This chapter 
contributes to the literature by incorporating the influence of the underwriting cycle on 
an insurer’s financial soundness (stability or risk-taking behaviour), including the 
interaction term between both internal and external factors in consideration of their joint 
effects. Answering the abovementioned questions can help regulators endorse 
supervisions to reduce insolvency risk and promote financial stability in the market. 
 
   Apart from the abovementioned specific contribution, this study also generally 
contributes to the literature from the following perspectives:  
1. The UK market has its specific features and research contributions. However, 
relatively few studies have focused on the unitary UK market.  
2. This thesis can claim that its study sample is the largest in quantity, and its 
acquired data also provide the most recent and the second widest coverage in 
terms of the study period (from 1996-2017).  
3. It is beneficial to research on the UK insurance market to provide a clear 
indication of the standard and a potential benchmark to its counterparts, such as 
P a g e  | 238 
 
developed markets (e.g., the US or the German market) or emerging markets 
(e.g., the Chinese market). 
4. The obtained results can constitute a reference for regulatory purposes, such as 
setting guidelines for insurers’ behaviours, promoting competition, and so on. 
 
   This thesis has provided comprehensive results on the effect of various risk-related 
factors (risk-taking behaviours or risk-management activities) on the UK insurer’s 
performance, capital structure and financial soundness However, there remain some 
limitations and challenges for future research. First, this study focus only on the UK 
insurance market, it will be interesting to test whether similar or different conclusion will 
be existed in other countries, for example, the US market or the Chinses market, the 
former has a totally different feature from the UK market, and the latter is one of the high 
growth emerging markets. Further comparisons can be beneficial to understanding the 
similarities or differences. Second, although the most recent information used in this 
thesis is from 2017, it is not able to fully catch the impact of Solvency II, which is 
launched in 2016, on the insurance market. It will be reasonable to collect more data and 
make further time series analysis. Moreover, due to data limitation, the solvency capital 
requirement and minimum capital requirement (from Solvency II), which are better 
indicators of capital structure/requirement and insolvency risk, are not available to use. 
Additionally, due to data availability, it is not possible to make further analysis of the 
impact of BREXIT on the UK insurance market. However, it is crucial to make such 
analysis as it will be meaningful for future market developments, but it requires new data 
to be collected. 
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Summary of different topics of efficiency studies 
Distribution System: 
   By considering the influence of ‘distribution systems’, the degree of efficiency in 
various distribution channels can be compared. According to (Berger, Cummins and 
Weiss (1997), an insurance package could be promoted in two ways: either directly by 
insurers to customers (a direct issue) or indirectly via third-party independent agencies 
(an indirect issue).  
 
   Under the indications of the product-quality hypothesis,1 although service intensity and 
quality could be effectively leveraged within the process of issuing an insurance package 
via third-party independent distribution channels (agencies), a consideration of additional 
cost is also required (Berger, Cummins and Weiss, 1997). Conversely, even if there is no 
cost efficiency advantage in promoting an insurance package via third-party independent 
distribution channels (in comparison to direct channels), its advantage in terms of profit 
efficiency (again in comparison to direct channels) is clear.  
 
   Similarly, Brockett et al. (1998, 2004b, 2004a), Carr, Cummins and Regan (1999) and 
Klumpes (2004) further argue that more efficiency can be observed from the independent 
distribution system in comparison to direct systems. Apart from these findings, Ward 
(2002) also confirmed that more efficiency could be generated by using a singular 
distribution system, in comparison to using multi-distribution channels. The recent study 
of bancassurance, Fiordelisi and Ricci, (2010) consider from the perspectives of 
ownership and distribution channels separately. They found that captives (controlled by 
the bank) and joint ventures (50-50) outperform independent companies.  
 
Intercountry Comparisons:  
   By using country-specific macro factors to compare efficiency scores in different 
insurance markets, differences across countries can be determined.  
 
   Based on investigations of efficiency in Nigeria (Barros and Obijiaku, 2007), Malaysia 
(Mansor and Radam, 2000) and Australia (Worthington and Hurley, 2002), substantial 
international differences in average efficiency are detected. In addition, according to 
Diacon, Starkey and O’Brien (2002), apart from the appearance of varied average 
efficiency among countries, the general tendency is towards decreasing average 
efficiency among EU-15s from 1996 to 1999. Kasman and Turgutlu (2011) draw a similar 
conclusion by studying 22 EU non-life markets, with their results indicating that cost 
inefficiency exhibited an upwards trend in most countries over the 1995–2002 period, 
after the implementation of ‘one single market’ (deregulation in the EU zone). 
 
   Moreover, bsed on the investigation of EU-14s from 1997-2006 by Zanghieri (2009),  
 
1 Berger, Cummins and Weiss (1997) developed two hypotheses: the market imperfection hypothesis and 
the product quality hypothesis. Under the market imperfection hypothesis, the existence of the surviving 
independent financial advisers is due to market imperfection. It is assumed that efficient firms will expect 
to earn higher risk-adjusted profit than the inefficient firms Alternatively, under the product-quality 
hypothesis, independent financial advisers offer a high cost for producing ‘higher quality’ products or great 
service intensity. 
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it is worth mentioning that country-specific factors could be regarded as a strong mediator 
in influencing efficiencies. Zanghieri also argues that different firm-specific factors, such 
as size, would drive efficiency results differently for life and non-life businesses. 
 
   Recently, Eling and Schaper (2017) study the impact of changing environmental factors, 
i.e., factors not under the control of managers, on a firm’s performances, and further 
emphasise the importance of considering such external factors. They further confirm that 
business environments, such as general economic, regulation and stock market 
performance, and insurance market conditions are important drivers of efficiency in 14 
EU life markets from 2002 to 2013.1 A similar conclusion is made in an earlier study from 
Huang and Eling (2013), who focused on non-life markets in the BRIC countries (Brazil, 
Russia, India and China).  
 
Regulation Changes and External Pressures: 
   By investigating the impact of external factors (i.e., regulatory factors, business 
environment factors) on a firm’s performance (see, Chen and Wong (2004), Pope and Ma 
(2008) and Klein and Wang (2009)), two goals can be achieved: (1) Regulators and 
supervisors can impose new rules based on firms’ performance; and (2) Firms need to 
adjust internal controls in a new regulatory environment. Since 1994, EU insurance 
companies have faced a few dramatic regulatory reforms, such as the deregulation in 1994, 
the reinsurance directive issued in 2007 and the Solvency II in 2016. One of the 
motivations for the deregulation reform is to enhance the degree of competition, and thus 
further encourage insurers to boost their production and efficiency. 
 
   Cummins and Rubio-Misas (2006) indicated that increased competition in the domestic 
market was one of the most significant characteristics of deregulation. Deregulation puts 
pressure on domestic firms to innovate due to competition and to introduce new 
technologies to improve the firm’s cost position. For example, in Spain, the number of 
firms declined by 35%, while firm size increased by 275%; meanwhile, the unit product 
price declined as well during the 1989–1998 period (Cummins and Rubio-Misas, 2006).  
 
   By using data collected from Germany and the UK for the 1991-2002 period,  Hussels 
and Ward (2007) hypothesis that efficiency enhancement would appear due to 
deregulation in Europe. However, they find no clear evidence to support their hypothesis. 
That said, the hypothesis was strongly accepted by Turchetti and Daraio (2004), in the 
Italian insurance market from 1982 to 2000, and in Austria from 1994 to 1999 
(Ennsfellner, Lewis and Anderson, 2004). Yet, Mahlberg and Url (2000) find that the 
deregulation could lead to a decreasing tendency towards efficiency. Kasman and 
Turgutlu (2011) also point out that cost efficiency exhibits downwards trend in the EU-
22’s non-life market after the implementation of ‘one single market (deregulation in the 
EU zone)’.  Similarly, in the US market, as emphasised by Ryan and Schellhorn (2000), 
no efficiency changes are detected under the circumstances of the implementation of risk-
based capital requirements.  
 
 
1 Different environmental factors contribute to efficiency differently. For example, economic maturity and 
capital market performance are positive drivers; regulation (restricted capital requirements) and 
unemployment are negatively related to efficiencies; inflation and interest rate levels have negative impacts 
on technical efficiency but positive impacts on cost efficiency. (Eling and Schaper, 2017) 
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   The liberalisation of the EU insurance sector resulted in an increasing number of 
mergers and acquisitions, about which Cummins and Weiss (2004) reported that there 
were 2595 M&As involved in the EU market from 1990 to 2002. Since M&As could also 
stimulate market competition, which would in turn further influences the degree of 
efficiency as defined by Cummins, Tennyson and Weiss (1999) and Cummins and Xie 
(2008), M&As could be regarded as a beneficial strategy (e.g. value-enhancing) for both 
the acquiring and target firms. In addition, according to Fenn et al. (2008), the adoption 
of acquisitions and mergers could lead to efficiency gains under the liberalisation of the 
EU market. However, it was suspected by Klumpes (2007) that acquiring companies 
would achieve greater efficiency, whereas target companies would not gain such benefits 
in the EU market. As stated by Kim and Grace (1995), even though target firms are shown 
to lack efficiency in doing business, their efficiency as a whole could be enhanced when 
combined with the acquiring firm in the US life market. However, Shim (2011) also find 
that the acquirer’s performance decreased and earning volatility increased after the 
M&As.  
 
   From the most recent study, by Eling and Schaper (2017), the impact of several different 
external factors on life insurers’ efficiencies were detailed more comprehensively. Three 
central dimensions constituting the business environment were outlined – general 
economic, capital market and insurance market condition – in which seven sub-factors 
are involved.1 To be more precise, both economic maturity and stock market performance 
had a positive impact on efficiency, whereas unemployment and regulation were negative 
contributors.   
 
Organizational Form, Corporate Governance Issues: 
   This application is aimed at comparing the degree of efficiency among companies 
associated with different features. For example, extensive discussions and academic 
research have given particular attention to insurers’ ownership structure issues, e.g. 
Mayers and Smith (1981, 1986, 1988), Lamm-Tennant and Starks (1993), Pottier and 
Sommer (1997) and Brockett et al. (2004b). One of the key reasons for such interest in 
insurers’ ownership structures is that certain ownership structure has an advantage in 
controlling particular types of conflicts among owners, managers and policyholders 
(Mayers and Smith, 1981). In supporting the managerial discretion hypothesis,2 Pottier 
and Sommer (1997) state that stock insurers are more prevalent in group businesses than 
in their mutual counterparts.  
 
   As reviewed by Cummins, Weiss and Zi (1999), most professionals admitted that 
mutual firms are generally less efficient in comparison to stock firms, and this assertion 
is also forwarded by Brockett et al. (2004b) and Diboky and Ubl (2007). Diboky and Ubl 
(2007) show that hybrid forms (i.e. stock firms owned by a mutual) are inferior to pure 
stock firms in the German life market, in terms of comparing efficiency scores. A similar 
conclusion is reached by Lai and Limpaphayom (2003), who find that no significant 
difference in terms of ROA performance between mutual and stock firms; and yet 
Keiretsu insurers outperformed in Japan non-life market. Furthermore, Jeng, Lai and 
McNamara (2007) indicate that efficiency enhancements could also be identified after de-
mutualisation. However, in the case of US and German markets, exceptions also existed 
 
1 The seven sub-factors are as followed: economic maturity, unemployment, information, interest rate level, 
stock market performance, competition and regulation (capital adequacy) (Eling and Schaper, 2017). 
2  The managerial discretion hypothesis predicts that different ownership structures may have certain 
comparative advantages in particular lines of business.   
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(Greene and Segal, 2004; Luhnen, 2009). As suggested by Greene and Segal (2004), 
equivalent efficiency and profitability are found in both stock and mutual insurers. Also, 
Biener, Eling and Wirfs (2016) find no evidence to support the notion that stock insurers 
are more efficient in Swiss life and non-life markets.  
 
   Apart from ownership form issues, many researchers have made varied considerations 
from different corporate governance perspectives. Size is one of the factors that plays a 
crucial role, such as scale-efficient firm operates at a constant return to scale (CRS); 
meanwhile, scale-inefficient firms operate at either an increasing return scale (IRS) or a 
decreasing return scale (DRS). For example, Worthington and Hurley (2002), Canton et 
al. (2005), Cummins and Xie (2013) and Alhassan and Biekpe (2015) all provide 
evidence that size has a significant impact on a firm’s efficiency and CRS – especially, a 
non-linear effect of size is found.1 This implies that larger insurers should downsize to 
improve efficiency, while policymakers should encourage consolidation among small- 
and medium- -size firms. Instead, Grace and Timme (1992) and Yuengert (1993) find that 
larger-size insurers operated at CRS rather than at DRS.  
 
   Other corporate governance factors, such as the age of the firm, the reinsurance ceded 
and the insurer’s leverage, are found to be negatively related to its technical efficiency by 
Alhassan and Biekpe (2015). Their leverage-related findings are in line with Jensen and 
Meckling’s (1976) ‘conflict of interest’ hypothesis2 and Biener, Eling and Wirfs’ (2016) 
results in Swiss insurance market. However, these last results were inconsistent with those 
of Adams and Buckle (2003) and Luhnen (2009) and the ‘free-cash flow’ hypothesis 
suggested by Jensen (1986), who claimed that high leverage induced better management 
efficiency.3  
 
   Board characteristics have also been studied, by Hardwick, Adams and Zou (2011) who 
find that different board members would have different impacts on efficiency; Bahloul, 
Hachicha and Bouri (2013) conclude that the optimal power of the CEO would allow the 
insurance firm to be more productive and more efficient.  
 
 
1 The convex relationship arose from both Cummins and Xie (2013) and Alhassan and Biekpe (2015) 
because the coefficient of the linear term is negative, and the quadratic term of size is positive. This also 
refers to a non-linear ‘U-shaped’ relationship between a firm’s size and its efficiency, and Worthington and 
Hurley (2002) also confirm this result. Canton et al. (2005)  provide a possible explanation for this U-shape: 
that differences in managerial inability across smaller firms are limited due to limited types of issued 
products. The largest firms face more competition, which forces them to become more efficient.  
2 Two types of conflicts occur in the insurance company: owner-manager conflict and owner-policyholder 
conflict. The former arises because the manager may not always act in the best interest of shareholders, 
while the latter arises because policyholders’ claims to an asset have priority over shareholders’ rights. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that the optimal capital structure should be determined by the trade-
off between these two conflicts. This implies that higher leverage leads to lower performance due to the 
conflict between owners and policyholders. Cummins and Nini (2002) provide a detailed study of optimal 
capital structures in the US property-liability insurance market. 
3  According to Jensen (1986) ‘control hypotheses (free-cash flow hypothesis)’, debt creation enables 
managers to effectively bond their promise to pay out future obligations. If the firm does not maintain their 
promise to make payments (interests or principles), then the debtholder may take the firm into bankruptcy 
court. And should this action happen before shareholders receive their dividends, then the debt reduce the 
cash flow available for spending at the discretion of managers.  
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   Last but not least, an insurer’s business strategies, i.e., business scope, product/ 
geographical diversification,1 and other underwriting risks, have also been given attention 
as one of the driving factors of performance improvement. Luhnen (2009), Cummins et 
al. (2010) and Shim (2011) find that insurers writing more specialised business should be 
more cost efficient than those with more diversified businesses, a result supported by the 
strategic focus hypothesis. Cummins and Zi (1998) also suggest that the most 
internationally diverse insurers suffer diseconomies. In contrast to above, product or 
geographic diversifications are found to be positively connected to efficiency Mahlberg 
and Url (2003), Cummins and Xie (2013) and Alhassan and Biekpe (2015). 
Moreover, Ansah‐Adu, Andoh and Abor (2011) and Alhassan, Addisson and Asamoah 




   The mentioned studies focus on the influence of both external and internal on a firm’s 
efficiency. Inversely, an insurer’s operational and management quality (i.e. efficiency or 
productivity) also contributes significantly to a firm’s behaviours (Miller, 1996), which 
can in turn be used as potential predictors of business failures. For example, Siems (1992), 
Psillaki, Tsolas and Margaritis (2010) and Li, Crook and Andreeva (2014) use efficiency 
as a failure predictor, and revealing that management quality is critical to business failures.  
Wheelock and Wilson (2000) and Luo (2003) further demonstrate that more efficient 
banks are less likely to fail. Eling and Jia (2018) also confirm a similar result between 
efficiency and business failure from the EU insurance industry. By revealing such a 
relationship, both managers and supervisors can identify potential insolvency at an earlier 
stage and have more time to take further actions.  
 
 
 Mathematical (In)efficiency Models 
   As we mentioned in literature review section, different developments/assumptions of 
efficiency estimation are used in this study, and detail of each assumption is discussed 
here. In this research, (in)efficiency is estimated econometrically by using a Stochastic 
Frontier Analysis (SFA). The advantage is that both random error and inefficiency are 
combined in a composited error term (Berger and Humphrey, 1997). 
 
   An early study from Schmidt and Sickles (1984), assume that inefficiency is individual-
specific and time invariant; therefore, the model could be defined as a distribution free 
model:   
y𝑖𝑡 = f(𝐱𝒊𝒕; 𝛃) +  ε𝑖𝑡 
where f(𝐱𝒊𝒕; 𝛃) stands for a linear function of the variables in the vector x𝑖𝑡, y𝑖𝑡 can be 
treated as cost, profit, revenue in this study, and ε𝑖𝑡 = v𝑖𝑡 − u𝑖, here, v𝑖𝑡 is the error term 
and u𝑖  is the time-invariant inefficiency of individual i. The model can be estimated 
assuming either u𝑖 is a fixed parameter or a random variable. Therefore, we could have 
model 1 and model 2 as followed.   
 
Model 1: Fixed-Effect Model (Schmidt and Sickles, 1984) 
 
 
1 The conglomeration and strategic focus hypotheses explain the relationship between product 
diversification and efficiency. The conglomeration hypothesis predicts diversified insurers to be more 
efficient, while the strategic focus hypothesis, on the other hand, indicates a negative relationship. 
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      y𝑖𝑡 =  β0 + x𝑖𝑡β + v𝑖𝑡 − u𝑖 
   =  α𝑖 + x𝑖𝑡β + v𝑖𝑡 
 
where α𝑖  =  β0 − u 𝑖, and αi, i=1,…,N, are assumed to be fixed parameters, once the αi 
are available, the estimated value of u𝑖 (inefficiency) can be obtain by:  
 
ui = max(αi) − αi ≥ 0,          i = 1, … , N 
 
, and the firm-specific efficiency can be obtained from exp (-u𝑖).  
 
Model 2: Random-Effect Model (Kumbhakar, 1987) 
   In this RE model, it is possible to assume that α𝑖 is random and uncorrelated with the 
repressors. There are two different methods to estimate the (in)efficiency. Whereas one 
method is to estimate it by the generalized least squares (GLS) technique; the other is to 
impose distribution assumptions on random components. Then, it could be estimated the 
parameters by the maximum likelihood (ML) method (Pitt and Lee, 1981). Once the 
parameters are estimated, the inefficiency term could be calculated by Jondrow et al.’s 
(1982) function, and efficiency term can be estimated by Battese and Coelli’s (1988) 
function (Kumbhakar, 1987). The Pitt and Lee (1981)’s MLE model is used in this paper 
as follow: 
y𝑖𝑡 = f(𝐱𝒊𝒕; 𝛃) +  ε𝑖𝑡 
            y𝑖𝑡 =  β0 + x𝑖𝑡β + v𝑖𝑡 − u𝑖 
         =  α𝑖 + x𝑖𝑡β + v𝑖𝑡 
 
where ε𝑖𝑡 = v𝑖𝑡 − u 𝑖 and v𝑖𝑡  ~ N
(0, σu
2) and u𝑖  ~ 𝑁
+(𝜇, σu
2  ). If µ is equal to 0, the above 
estimation of inefficiency u𝑖  would follow either half-normal or truncated-normal 
destruction. By following approach from Pitt and Lee (1981) and Kumbhakar and Lovell 
(2000), the likelihood function would be obtained as follow: 
 
lnLi = constant + lnΦ (
μi∗
σ∗






















 } − Tln(σv)






μi∗ =  
μσv
2 −  σu
2  ∑ εitt
σv2 + Tσu2
        and       𝜎∗







   Thus, the MLE of the parameters is obtained by maximizing the log-likelihood function, 
and then inefficiency of each firm can be obtained from following equation (Jondrow et 
al., 1982):  









]          
 
and the efficiency can be computed by Battese and Coelli’s (1988) function: 
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Model 3: Time-Varying Models (Kumbhakar, 1990) 
   By following Kumbhakar (1990)’s time varying development, the following generic 
formulation is used to create the framework: 
 
yit = f(xit; β) + εit 
εit = vit − uit          
uit = G(t)ui              
                                    v𝑖𝑡  ~ N(0, σu
2)    and    u𝑖  ~ 𝑁
+(𝜇, σu
2  )    
 
, where G(t)>0 stands for the function of time (t), then 𝑢𝑖𝑡 ≥ 0, 𝑢𝑖 ≥ 0. Thus, the 
inefficiency 𝑢𝑖𝑡 changes over time and across individual. There are two components from 
the above equation  𝑢𝑖𝑡 : one is non-stochastic time component G(t), the other is a 
stochastic component 𝑢𝑖 . And there are different assumptions on G(t), non-stochastic 
time component, the assumption made by Kumbhakar (1990) is considered, as it has two 
parameters in the G(t) function and it is more flexible than Battese and Coelli (1992) and 
Kumbhakar and Wang’s (2005) model. Kumbhakar’s (1990) assumption is made as 
 
G(t) = [1 + exp(𝛾1t + 𝛾2𝑡
2)]−1 
where 𝛾1and 𝛾2 are coefficients of time dummy. If 𝛾1 = 𝛾2 = 0, this model is reduced to 
the time-invariant random effect model (Model 2).  
 
   Again, the likelihood function can be obtained from Kumbhakar and Lovell’s (2000) 
approach and the equation should be the same as in Model 2, but with different mean (μi∗) 
and variance (𝜎∗
2) equations:  
 
μi∗ =  
μσv
2 − σu
2  ∑ G(t)εitt
σv2 + σu2 ∑ 𝐺(𝑡)2𝑡
        and       𝜎∗




𝜎𝑣2 + 𝜎𝑢2 ∑ 𝐺(𝑡)2𝑡
  
 
   Once the parameter estimates are obtained, inefficiency of each firm can be obtained 
from Jondrow et al.’s (1982) approach and efficiency obtained from Battese and Coelli’s 
(1988) approach as shown in model 2.  
 
Model 4: Persistent Inefficiency model (Kumbhakar and Heshmati, 1995) 
   Mundlak (1961) states that identifying the level of persistent inefficiency is important, 
because it reflects the effects of input like operational style, which is unlikely to be 
changed over short term. Thus, Kumbhakar and Heshmati’s (1995) model districts 
between the persistent and residual component of inefficiency, the former varies across 
firm but not over time, while the latter is time-varied. Their model is shown bellowed: 
      y𝑖𝑡 = f(𝐱𝒊𝒕; 𝛃) +  ε𝑖𝑡 
𝜀𝑖𝑡 =  𝑣𝑖𝑡 −  𝑢′𝑖𝑡 
𝑢′𝑖𝑡 =  𝑢𝑖𝑡 +  𝜏𝑖     
where 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is composited error term, 𝑣𝑖𝑡 is statistical noise, 𝑢′𝑖𝑡 is the overall inefficiency, 
and 𝜏𝑖 represents the persistent inefficiency (varied by firms, but unlikely to change over 
time) and 𝑢𝑖𝑡 is the time varying inefficiency. Both fixed-effect and random-effect model 
can be estimated, and the estimation process and further detail can be found in Kumbhakar 
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and Heshmati (1995).  
 
Model 5: Model with separate Firm Effects, Persistent Inefficiency and Time-Varying 
Inefficiency (Kumbhakar, Lien and Hardaker, 2014) 
   This final model summaries some of the features or overcome some of the limitations 
of the previous models, is developed by Kumbhakar, Lien and Hardaker (2014). The 
model is specified as:  
y𝑖𝑡 =  f(𝐱𝒊𝒕; 𝛃) + 𝜇𝑖  +  𝑣𝑖𝑡 −  u𝑖𝑡 −  𝜏𝑖   
 
where 𝜇𝑖 is the heterogeneity effect which vary across firms only, 𝑣𝑖𝑡 is the random shock 
(or statistical noise), u𝑖𝑡  is time-varying inefficiency and 𝜏𝑖  represents the persistent 
inefficiency.  
 
   Colombi, Martini and Vittadini (2011) pointed out that ML method based on 
distributional assumptions on these components can be used to estimate this model.  
Multistep procedure is applied as followed: 
1. Rewrite the above equation as 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼0
∗ + 𝑓(𝑥𝑖𝑡; 𝛽) + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 
            where 𝛼0
∗ =  𝛼0 − 𝐸(𝜏𝑖) − 𝐸(𝑢𝑖𝑡);   𝛼𝑖 =  𝜇𝑖 − 𝜏𝑖 + 𝐸(𝜏𝑖);  
            and      𝜀𝑖𝑡 =  𝑣𝑖𝑡 − 𝑢𝑖𝑡 + 𝐸(𝑢𝑖𝑡).  
            Both 𝛼𝑖 and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 have zero mean and constant variance.  
2. Estimated β by using standard random effect panel regression; and the predicted 
value of both 𝛼𝑖 and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 would be given.  
3. By using 𝜀𝑖𝑡 =  𝑣𝑖𝑡 −  𝑢𝑖𝑡 + 𝐸(𝑢𝑖𝑡) , the time varying inefficiency 𝑢𝑖𝑡 , can be 
estimated as predicted 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is obtained from step 2.  
4. Here, 𝐸(𝑢𝑖𝑡) = (𝜎𝑢√2/𝜋 ); and both approaches from Jondrow et al. (1982) and 
Battese and Coelli (1988) can be used to find inefficiency and efficiency score, 
respectively.  
5. 𝜏𝑖 can be estimated by a similar method as in step 3 and 4, but with 𝛼𝑖 =  𝜇𝑖 −
𝜏𝑖 + 𝐸(𝜏𝑖) and 𝐸(𝜏𝑖) = (𝜎𝑢√2/𝜋).  
6. The overall efficiency score is obtained from the product of time-varying 
efficiency and persistent efficiency.  
 
 
Approaches used to select output vectors in financial services industry: 
    Three principal approaches used to measure outputs in financial services: the user-cost 
approach (Hancock, 1985), the intermediation approach (Brockett et al., 1998), and the 
value-added approach (Berger and Humphrey, 1992), to be specific: 
 
• The user-cost method: Hancock (1985) refers to when the product is considered 
to be a financial output, if the financial returns (costs) on an asset (a liability) is 
more (less) than the opportunity cost of funds; otherwise, it is treated as a financial 
input. This measurement is based on determining the output’s (or input’s) net 
contribution to the revenues of the financial firm. However, Cummins and Weiss 
(2011) mention that this approach is especially problematical for insurance 
industry because it is difficult to estimate the precise data on product revenues and 
opportunity costs for insurers, as the data are not available in the insurance 
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industry (insurance policies are priced implicitly.). From Eling and Luhnen’s 
(2008) survey study, they conclude that none of the recent studies uses this 
approach due to the mentioned difficultlies. 
 
• The intermediation approach views that the insurance company could be 
regarded as a financial intermediary where insurers are borrowing funds (premium) 
from policyholders, investing the funds in capital markets to generate returns, and 
then using this income to pay out claims, benefits, taxes and other costs (Brockett 
et al., 1998). Thus, in this approach, inputs are borrowed funds and outputs are 
assets. Eling and Luhnen (2008) also mention that only a few studies employ this 
approach and taking return on investment (ROI), liquid assets to liability, and 
solvency scores and some investment-related measurements as outputs, see, 
Brockett et al.(2004b, 2005), Lin, Wen and Yang (2011) and Yaisawarng, 
Asavadachanukorn and Yaisawarng (2014). However, Cummins and Weiss (2011) 
point out this approach would not be optimal for insurance industry as insurers 
provided many services in addition to financial intermediation. Ignoring the 
distinction among insurers’ businesses will prove a less accurate result.  
 
• The value-added approach was first introduced by Berger and Humphrey (1992). 
Later, Cummins and Weiss (2011) suggest this approach as being the most 
appropriate method for studying insurance efficiency. This approach considers all 
assets and liabilities categories of having some output characteristics, and it counts 
outputs as important variables if those outputs contribute a significant added value 
based on operating cost allocation (Berger et al., 2000); otherwise, the others are 
treated as unimportant outputs, intermediate products, or inputs, depending on 
their other characteristics.  Eling and Luhnen (2010) summarised that 80 of the 95 
studies apply this method, e.g. Berger and Humphrey (1992), Yuengert (1993), 
Cummins and Turchetti (1996), Cummins and Zi (1998), Cummins, Tennyson 
and Weiss (1999), Cummins, Weiss and Zi (1999), Ward (2002), Cummins et al. 
(2010) and Cummins and Xie (2013). 
 
 
Details of the Insurer’s Principal Services 
   The insurers usually provide three principal services, which can be used to define the 
measurable proxies of insurers’ outputs: 
 
• Risk-pooling and risk-bearing:  
Insurers collect premiums from the pool of policyholders and redistribute most of 
the funds to those policyholders who suffer losses. Zanghieri (2009) indicates that 
risk pooling and risk bearing function could be seen as the insurer providing a 
mechanism for policyholders, who are exposed to insurable accidents or 
contingencies, and to engage in risk reduction through pooling them together. 
Cummins and Weiss (2011) also state that insurers create added value by 
supplying underwriting, acturical and other operating expenses incurred in the risk 
pool, and by holding further equity capital to cushion unexpected loses. 
 
• Financial intermediation: 
Insurers invest the collected premiums in capital markets or traded securities that 
are not available to most of the individual policyholders, and return the capital 
P a g e  | 290 
 
plus interest payment at a pre-specified date or when the claims are due (Cummins 
and Weiss, 2011).  
 
• ‘Real’ financial services relating to insured losses: 
According to Zanghieri (2009), insurers provide some services related to loss 
precention, financial advice, pension and benefit schemes to policyholders. This 
service is closely related to the risk-pooling and risk-bearing activities, which also 
exploit insurers’ expertise in risk management and finance.  
 
 
Test for the existence of efficiency convergences 
The existence of efficiency convergences is tested by applying the concept of both σ-
convergence and β-convergence.1 
Estimating Efficiency Convergence 
   The tendency for insurers to achieve an identical level of efficiency over time is defined 
as efficiency convergence. In line with Alhassan and Biekpe (2015), the growth theory of 
convergence suggested by  Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1990, 1991) and Sala-i-Martin (1996) 
is adopted to exam the rate of efficiency convergence. The β-convergence and σ-
convergence are the most widely used concepts in the classical literature; β-convergence 
refers to the ability of inefficient firms to become efficient or improve their efficiency for 
those efficient one, and σ-convergence refers to the reduction in the dispersion of 
efficiency over time. According to Sala-i-Martin (1996), both β- and σ-convergence are 
related, and evidence of β-convergence is a necessary condition for σ-convergence. 
Therefore, β-convergence need to be confirmed first, and estimated by employing Casu 
and Girardone (2009) and Alhassan and Biekpe’s  (2015) dynamic regression model: 
∆𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛿∆𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽ln𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 , 
                                                              Equation (1.7) 
where 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 is the efficiency score for insurer i at time t; 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 is the efficiency score for 
insurer i at time t-1; ∆𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = ln𝑦𝑖,𝑡 − ln𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1; α is the constant term and 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is the time-
varying error term;  δ is the coefficient of the lagged depend variable; β is the coefficient 
of interest that represents the rate of efficiency convergence. The β-convergence is 
occurred if the value of β is negative, it indicates the catch-up existed; and the higher 
absolute value of β means a faster speed of convergence. After confirming β-convergence, 
the model for σ-convergence is as followed: 
 
 
1 The concept is first developed and used by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1990, 1991). This concept has been 
applied by many banking studies (see example, (Weill, 2009; Casu and Girardone, 2010; Zhang and 
Matthews, 2012)), and a few insurance studies, such as ( Alhassan and Biekpe, 2015). 
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∆𝐸𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜑∆𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜎ln𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
Equation (1.8) 
where ∆𝐸𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐸𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1, in which 𝐸𝑖,𝑡 = ln𝑦𝑖,𝑡 − ln?̅?𝑡 and 𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 = ln𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 − ln?̅?𝑡−1. 
Similarly, ∆𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 = 𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 − 𝐸𝑖,𝑡−2.  𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 is the efficiency score for insurer i at time t-1; 
?̅?𝑡 and ?̅?𝑡−1 are the average efficiency scores for the market at time t and t-1, respectively. 
α and 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 remains as defined before; and the coefficient of dynamic variables ∆𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 is 
φ. 𝜎 is the parameter that the rate of convergence from 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 to ?̅?𝑡. Both Equations (1.7) 
and (1.8) are estimated using the system generalised method of moments (Arellano and 
Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998) with forward orthogonal and Windmeijer finite-
sample correction (Windmeijer, 2005). 
 
Result of Efficiency Convergence 
   To test the existence of β-convergence and σ-convergence, Equations (1.7) and (1.8) 
are estimated by the dynamic GMM technique. Table 1.8 presents the estimation results. 
Columns (1) and (2) show whether the convergences exist in cost behaviours, while 
Columns (3) and (4) focus on profit behaviours. As discussed, β-convergence is a 
necessary condition for σ-convergence. Furthermore, the results shown in Table 1.8 
confirm the existence of β-convergence and σ-convergence in both cost and profit 
behaviours. Comparing Columns (1) and (3) shows that the speed of convergence in cost 
performance is faster than the catch-up in profit performance since the absolute value of 
β is more significant in the cost function. These results indicate that a cost-inefficient 
insurer spends less time on becoming a cost-efficient firm compared with a profit-
inefficient insurer. Then, the results presented in Columns (2) and (4) suggest that insurers 
are more comfortable with converging their profit performance to the industry level 
because the value of σ in the profit function is larger than in the cost function. 
 
 Tables 1.8 Test for β-convergence and σ- convergence 










VARIABLES Δ𝑦𝑖𝑡  ∆𝐸𝑖,𝑡 Δ𝑦𝑖𝑡 ∆𝐸𝑖,𝑡 
          
Δ𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 0.4546***  0.1432**  
 (3.179)  (2.261)  
𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.6174**  -0.2889**  
 (-2.369)  (-2.265)  
∆𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1  0.3534**  -0.4593*** 
  (2.218)  (-4.271) 
𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1  0.0314**  0.2858*** 
  (2.306)  (4.284) 
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Constant -0.3421** 0.1172*** -0.3576** 0.5178*** 
 (-2.455) (2.700) (-2.044) (4.780)      
Observations 965 316 961 622 
Number of Firms 252 140 254 178 
Number of 
Instruments 66 45 119 82 
Robust Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-test 5.187*** 5.703*** 2.804* 14.24*** 
AR(1) -2.312** -0.628 -2.948*** -2.471** 
AR(2) 0.978 0.269 -1.042 0.161 
Hansen (p-value) 63.14 (0.472) 48.95 (0.214) 135.4 (0.105) 82.29 (0.378) 
t-statistics in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A1.1 Cost Efficiency from Different Models for All Insurers 
 
Year SS84 FE KUM87 KUM90 KH95 KLH14       
      
1996 0.0414 0.6206 0.6846 0.0332 0.6193 
1997 0.0412 0.6240 0.6622 0.0330 0.6204 
1998 0.0426 0.6127 0.6303 0.0345 0.6243 
1999 0.0419 0.6231 0.6258 0.0341 0.6295 
2000 0.0449 0.6047 0.5915 0.0360 0.6120 
2001 0.0506 0.5623 0.5372 0.0410 0.6022 
2002 0.0487 0.5669 0.5336 0.0387 0.5986 
2003 0.0496 0.5695 0.5317 0.0392 0.6018 
2004 0.0486 0.5716 0.5243 0.0382 0.5955 
2005 0.0529 0.5667 0.5194 0.0424 0.5997 
2006 0.0556 0.5544 0.5044 0.0442 0.5937 
2007 0.0552 0.5435 0.4937 0.0440 0.5913 
2008 0.0524 0.5828 0.5429 0.0403 0.6119 
2009 0.0537 0.5640 0.5274 0.0410 0.6024 
2010 0.0519 0.5522 0.5223 0.0413 0.5990 
2011 0.0557 0.5602 0.5401 0.0442 0.5927 
2012 0.0521 0.5541 0.5432 0.0408 0.5876 
2013 0.0521 0.5482 0.5517 0.0403 0.5810 
2014 0.0507 0.5632 0.5855 0.0414 0.6107 
2015 0.0514 0.5623 0.6089 0.0418 0.6102 
2016 0.0524 0.5484 0.6273 0.0420 0.5917 
2017 0.0600 0.5353 0.6545 0.0482 0.5711 
      








Table A1.2 Profit Efficiency from Different Models for All Insurers 
      
Year SS84 FE KUM87 KUM90 KH95 KLH14 
            
1996 0.0153 0.4309  0.0087 0.2469 
1997 0.0142 0.4210  0.0090 0.2654 
1998 0.0138 0.4140  0.0086 0.2611 
1999 0.0122 0.3739  0.0069 0.2147 
2000 0.0120 0.3493  0.0071 0.2172 
2001 0.0127 0.3638  0.0068 0.2198 
2002 0.0131 0.3885  0.0075 0.2308 
2003 0.0137 0.4020  0.0079 0.2419 
2004 0.0180 0.4937  0.0108 0.3054 
2005 0.0172 0.4705  0.0106 0.3051 
2006 0.0179 0.4911  0.0110 0.3165 
2007 0.0194 0.4980  0.0122 0.3274 
2008 0.0205 0.4733  0.0124 0.3027 
2009 0.0177 0.4726  0.0108 0.3081 
2010 0.0217 0.4829  0.0132 0.3066 
2011 0.0183 0.4563  0.0100 0.2715 
2012 0.0187 0.4731  0.0116 0.3059 
2013 0.0192 0.4769  0.0115 0.3006 
2014 0.0227 0.4731  0.0134 0.2913 
2015 0.0234 0.4817  0.0127 0.2708 
2016 0.0231 0.4857  0.0144 0.3124 
2017 0.0243 0.4768  0.0154 0.3166 
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Dynamic Panel Threshold Model 
   The dynamic panel threshold model is used to provide a robustness check of the 
individual effectiveness arising from different strategies and risk management activities. 
The results from the threshold analysis further suggest that taking risks and protections 
below or beyond a certain level leads to inefficient operations.  
 
   As a further step to test the hypotheses 1-6, by following Mamatzakis and Bermpei's 
(2014) banking study, the panel GMM-threshold model that is originated from Kremer, 
Bick and Nautz (2013) is introduced to have robustness check. This approach further 
allows for the regime changes of the individual vital variables, which affect the insurer’s 
cost and profit performances. The adopted threshold model takes the following form: 
 
𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜃𝑖 + 𝜆1𝐼(𝑞𝑖,𝑡 ≤ 𝛾)𝑚𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿1𝐼(𝑞𝑖,𝑡 ≤ 𝛾) + 𝜆2𝐼(𝑞𝑖,𝑡 ≥ 𝛾)𝑚𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
(A2.1) 
where 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖,𝑡 stands for both cost and profit efficienies, while 𝜃𝑖 is the firm-specific fixed 
effect and 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is the error term. I is the indication function that specified the regimes, in 
which 𝑞𝑖,𝑡  is the interested threshold variables, they are the level of underwrting risk, 
invetsment risk, capital holdings and reinsurance purchased; and 𝛾 indicates the threshold 
value which classified the obeservations into two categories: high and low regimes, in 
which the observations is above a threshold value and below the threshold, respectivly. 
𝜆1  and 𝜆2  represents the regression coefficients of the threshold variable in different 
regimes that are estimated with the usage of the GMM estimator (Arellano and Bover, 
1995). By extending Hansen's (1999) threshold model, the term of regime dependent 
intercept, 𝛿1, is included in Kremer, Bick and Nautz's (2013) model in order to mitigate 
the inconsistent estimating for the value of threshold and and its coefficients magnitudes 
of two regimes (Bick, 2010).  𝑚𝑖,𝑡 is a vector of explanatory variables that include firm-
specific and business environment factors, in which a subset of variables can be treated 
as exogenous variables that are uncorrelated to error term, and another subset of 
endogenous variables, which is correlated to error term. The advantage of using this 
GMM-threshold model is to consider endogeneity issues to avoid serial correlation in the 
transfomed errors (Arellano and Bover, 1995). To be more specific, the orthogonal 
deviations transformation for the error term is adopted, in which the average of all future 
observations of a variable is subtracts.  
 
   The estimation follows steps as; first, following Caner and Hansen (2004), a reduced 
form regression for endogenous variables as a function of instruments is estimated. The 
predicted values are then replacing the endogenous variables in Equation (A2.1); in the 
second step, Equation (A2.1) is estimated via ordinary least squares for a fixed threshold 
value 𝛾 when the predicted values are used. Finanlly, the estimator of the threshold value 
is selected by the minimizayion of the concerntrated sum of squared errors, i.e., ?̂? =
𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑚𝑆𝑛(𝛾)
1. Once the ?̂? is found, the regression coefficients, 𝜆1 and 𝜆2 for two regimes, 
can be estimated by GMM estimator (Caner and Hansen, 2004).  
 
 
1 Following (Hansen, 1999; Caner and Hansen, 2004), in order to determining the 95% confidence interval 
of the threshold value, the critical value is given by Γ = {𝛾: 𝐿𝑅(𝛾) ≤ 𝐶(𝛼)}, where 𝐶(𝛼) is the asymptotic 
distribution of the likelihood ratio statistic LR(𝛾) at 95% level. And this LR is adjusted to control for the 
number of time period used for each cross section (Hansen, 1999). 
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Threshold Estimations for Individual Factors 
   As mentioned above, the dynamic panel threshold model is applied to make a robustness 
check of the individual vital factors—the risk-taking factors and risk management factors. 
The results of the threshold estimation for each of the six key factors are presented in 
Tables A2.1 to A2.7. The lowercase letters a and b in the headings of each table represent 
the cost model and profit model, respectively. To maintain an adequate number of 
observations, these models do not control for business type or organisational form. 
 
Product Risk Threshold Variable 
   In Table A2.1a, the threshold value for product risk is found to be 34.9%. This indicates 
that an insurer, with risky business accounting for more than 35% of its total business, 
would damage its cost structure. Further, more than 2/3 of the observations are located in 
the higher regime—insurers with risky business accounting for more than 35% of their 
total business amount, facing a significant negative impact of -0.05. Insurers located in 
the lower regime receive a much less significant adverse impact of -0.009. Indeed, these 
negative impacts align with the previous findings. Surprisingly, no significant impact 
arising from greater product risk is found in the profit function (Table A2.1b).  
 
Business Diversificant as Threshold Variable 
   In line with the previous finding indicating that business diversification should enhance 
insurers’ cost efficiency, the results shown in Table A2.2a confirm this positive impact. 
Although insurers enjoy the benefits of business diversification on cost performance, it 
will have less of an effect on cost structure if the insurer issues more than five lines of 
business. Regarding the profit model (Table A2.2b), the positive impact on profit 
performance remains as expected in both regimes, but the significant result is only found 
in the higher regime, in which insurers usually write more than four lines of business. 
 
Area Diversificant as Threshold Variable 
   The evidence of two regimes is found in both the cost model (Table A2.3a) and the 
profit model (Model A2.3b). From the cost model, the different magnitudes of the 
significant, negative impact are found in both regimes. This implies that having 
businesses in more than one geographic market hurts the insurers’ cost performance, 
while the magnitude of the negative effect is reduced when the number of geographic 
markets increases. From the profit table, two significant, opposite effects are observed in 
the different regimes. The insurer will enjoy the benefit of geographic diversification 
when it has businesses in more than three geographic markets; otherwise, geographic 
diversification may be too costly and followed by decreasing profit. Also, more than half 
of the observations enjoy the benefit of geographic diversification on improving profit 
performance.   
 
Pricing Risk as Threshold Variable 
    An existing threshold splits the sample into two regimes, in both the cost model (Table 
A2.4a) and the profit model (Table A2.4b). The expected, positive impact of pricing risk 
on cost performance is found in both regimes. On the other hand, two opposite impacts 
are revealed in the regimes of the profit model—the positive associated with insurers 
facing a lower level of pricing risk and the negative confirmed for insurers taking greater 
pricing risk (as shown in the higher regime). However, there are two cautions: (i) the 
desired impact is only significant when insurers take a higher level of pricing risk (high 
regime) in both models; and (ii) the desired impact in the higher regime is also much 
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stronger than the observed impact in the lower regime. Fortunately, more than 50% of the 
observations are located in the higher regime.  
 
Investment Risk as Threshold Variable 
   An investment risk threshold value of 0.0038 splits the sample into (i) insurers who take 
low investment risks and face a much stronger adverse effect on cost performance and (ii) 
insurers who take high investment risks and bear a smaller negative impact on cost 
performance. Also, from the observation allocation numbers (Table A2.5a), two-thirds of 
the observations are located in the regime with a higher level of investment risk indicating 
that insurers enjoy the weakened damage effect resulting from taking additional risk.  
 
   The results of the profit model (Table A2.5b) indicate that insurers accepting a certain 
amount of investment risk, with a ceiling of 0.0018, enjoy a much stronger, significant 
benefit on improving profit efficiency. It is worth noting that only 13% of the observations 
are located in the low regime.   
 
Capital as Threshold Variable 
   Regarding the capital level, the results from the threshold model indicate that an insurer 
holding a limited amount of capital can significantly enhance its cost efficiency, while a 
reverse effect can be seen if the amount of capital is beyond a certain amount (Table 
A2.6a). Even though the negative effect on cost efficiency is insignificant, it is still 
necessary to be cautious because the adverse magnitude is much larger than the benefit 
of holding capital. From the profit table (Table A2.6b), a consistently positive result is 
confirmed in both regimes, while it is only significant in the higher regime. It may be said, 
then, that holding capital can effectively improve an insurer’s profit efficiency because 
almost all observations are located in the significant, higher regime. 
 
Reinsurance as Threshold Variable 
   Tables A2.7a and A2.7b present the results of the threshold analysis for the cost model 
and the profit model, respectively. The positive coefficient (the benefit) shown in the cost 
table and the negative coefficient (the adverse impact) presented in the profit model 
confirm the findings from previous sections. To be specific, the result from the cost table 
indicates that an insurer using more reinsurance can significantly improve its cost 
efficiency because the magnitude of the significant beneficial effect is more abundant in 
the higher regime than the insignificant effect in the lower regime. Although the impact 
of using reinsurance is negative on profit performance, this adverse impact is smaller 
when using more reinsurance (higher regime) than using less reinsurance (lower regime). 
However, the result is only significant in the lower regime, and the two-thirds of 
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Table A2.1a: Product Risk on Cost Efficiency 
Product Risk as Threshold Variable 
Threshold Estimate   
Product Risk 3.5525 (34.9)  
95% Confidence Interval 3.3569 (28.7) 3.5946 (36.4) 
   Estimates  SE 
Impact of Product Risk 
Product Risk Less -0.0091** 0.004245 
Product Risk Greater -0.051382*** 0.019025 
Impact of Covariance 
Business Diversification -0.002023 0.005439 
Area Diversification -0.006732*** 0.002286 
Pricing Risk  0.008268*** 0.002397 
Investment Risk -0.549201** 0.248754 
Firm Size -0.248034* 0.146341 
Square of Firm Size  0.015028* 0.009143 
Liquidity  0.009617*** 0.003003 
Market Share -0.341762 2.312255 
Stock Market Return -0.000115 0.000135 
GDP per Capita -0.00001*** 0.000003 
Unemployment Rate -0.003714** 0.001591 
Inflation Rate  0.000326 0.002111 














Table A2.1b: Product Risk on Profit Efficiency 
Product Risk as Threshold Variable    
Threshold Estimate   
Product Risk 2.8391 (17.1)  
95% Confidence Interval 1.9315 (6.9) 4.1912 (66.1)      
   Estimates  SE 
Impact of Product Risk 
Product Risk Less 0.001674 0.005447 
Product Risk Greater 0.012172 0.010397      
Impact of Covariance   
  
Business Diversification  0.013633** 0.006403 
Area Diversification  0.003473 0.005054 
Pricing Risk -0.000366 0.00203 
Investment Risk -0.087751 0.293754 
Firm Size  0.104671** 0.050977 
Square of Firm Size -0.00634** 0.003112 
Liquidity -0.033612** 0.015498 
Underwriting Income  0.023806*** 0.003263 
Stock Market Return  0.00105*** 0.000264 
GDP per Capita Growth -0.007459*** 0.001823 
Unemployment Rate -0.009657*** 0.002918 
Inflation Rate -0.008045** 0.004028 
Concentration  0.521934** 0.170265 
δ  0.056564 0.038617 
Observation 860 
Low Regime 110 
High Regime 750 
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Table A2.2a: Business Diversification on Cost Efficiency 
Business Diversification as Threshold Variable  
Threshold Estimate   
Business Diversification 1.0334 (5)  
95% Confidence Interval -0.0233 (3) 1.0429 (6)      
   Estimates  SE 
Impact of Business Diversification 
Business Diversification Less  0.023086*** 0.00768 
Business Diversification Greater  0.014316* 0.00827      
Impact of Covariance   
  
Product Risk -0.011833*** 0.00328 
Area Diversification -0.004672** 0.002114 
Pricing Risk  0.007024*** 0.002231 
Investment Risk -0.23693 0.220061 
Firm Size -0.027086 0.037103 
Square of Firm Size  0.001421 0.002078 
Liquidity  0.009307*** 0.002858 
Market Share -3.625668*** 1.230576 
Stock Market Return -0.00023** 0.000103 
GDP per Capita -0.000009*** 0.000003 
Unemployment Rate -0.003775** 0.001627 
Inflation Rate -0.001055 0.001725 
δ  0.02275* 0.01364 
Observation 634 
Low Regime 447 
High Regime 187 






Table A2.2b: Business Diversification on Profit Efficiency 
Business Diversification as Threshold Variable 
Threshold Estimate   
Diversified Business 0.4679 (4)  
95% Confidence Interval 0.0020 (3) 1.3085 (6)      
   Estimates  SE 
Impact of Business Diversification       
Business Diversification Less  0.056456 0.03824 
Business Diversification Greater  0.0156* 0.009078      
Impact of Covariance   
  
Product Risk  0.062142** 0.024748 
Area Diversification  0.001141 0.005186 
Pricing Risk -0.004428 0.002786 
Investment Risk  0.03222 0.484041 
Firm Size  0.15625** 0.069507 
Square of Firm Size -0.009205** 0.004059 
Liquidity -0.001781 0.004997 
Underwriting Income  0.027067*** 0.00374 
Stock Market Return  0.000893*** 0.00029 
GDP per Capita Growth -0.006577*** 0.001982 
Unemployment Rate -0.007775** 0.00304 
Inflation Rate -0.008431* 0.004702 
Concentration  0.579531*** 0.196318 
δ  0.003852 0.017119 
Observation 860  
Low Regime 346  
High Regime 514   
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Table A2.3a: Area Diversification on Cost Efficiency 
Area Diversification as Threshold Variables 
Threshold Estimate   
Area Diversification -0.6385 (1)  
95% Confidence Interval -0.6515 (1) 0.4541 (3)      
   Estimates  SE 
Impact of Area Diversification       
Area Diversification Less -0.154809*** 0.034273 
Area Diversification Greater -0.009229*** 0.002574      
Impact of Covariance   
  
Product Risk -0.011606*** 0.00367 
Business Diversification  0.006494* 0.003939 
Pricing Risk  0.007007*** 0.001998 
Investment Risk -0.434577** 0.208553 
Firm Size -0.033535 0.032975 
Square of Firm Size  0.001636 0.001795 
Liquidity  0.008962*** 0.002668 
Market Share -4.465176** 1.795616 
Stock Market Return -0.000303*** 0.000094 
GDP per Capita -0.000015*** 0.000003 
Unemployment Rate -0.004096*** 0.001502 
Inflation Rate  0.00062 0.001883 
δ -0.130992*** 0.027808 
Observation 634 
Low Regime 239 
High Regime 395 






Table A2.3b: Area Diversification on Profit Efficiency 
Area Diversification as Threshold Variables    
Threshold Estimate   
Area Diversification 0.1652 (3)  
95% Confidence Interval -0.7646 (1) 0.8316 (4)      
   Estimates  SE 
Impact of Area Diversification         
Area Diversification Less -0.055281*** 0.015756 
Area Diversification Greater  0.011635* 0.006821      
Impact of Covariance   
  
Product Risk -0.003385 0.003826 
Business Diversification  0.013226** 0.006413 
Pricing Risk  0.000213 0.002055 
Investment Risk -0.186651 0.294571 
Firm Size  0.100487** 0.048579 
Square of Firm Size -0.006073** 0.002996 
Liquidity -0.037153** 0.016732 
Underwriting Income  0.02414*** 0.003302 
Stock Market Return  0.000933*** 0.000267 
GDP per Capita Growth -0.006501*** 0.001838 
Unemployment Rate -0.007227** 0.002963 
Inflation Rate -0.007366* 0.004027 
Concentration  0.520684*** 0.172896 
δ -0.010871 0.010458 
Observation 860 
Low Regime 379 
High Regime 481 
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Table A2.4a: Pricing Risk on Cost Efficiency 
Pricing Risk as Threshold Variables 
Threshold Estimate   
Pricing Risk -2.5060 (0.0816)  
95% Confidence Interval -2.9922 (0.0505) -1.5532(0.2116)      
   Estimates  SE 
Impact of Pricing Risk       
Pricing Risk Less  0.00005 0.00393 
Pricing Risk Greater  0.015217*** 0.004042      
Impact of Covariance   
  
Product Risk -0.011744*** 0.004372 
Business Diversification  0.002627 0.005157 
Area Diversification -0.005782** 0.002371 
Investment Risk -0.594494** 0.239491 
Firm Size -0.280821** 0.139846 
Square of Firm Size  0.017236** 0.008772 
Liquidity  0.010452*** 0.003051 
Market Share -0.965763 2.270777 
Stock Market Return -0.000117 0.000137 
GDP per Capita -0.00001*** 0.000003 
Unemployment Rate -0.004272*** 0.001635 
Inflation Rate  0.000722 0.002095 
δ -0.02962** 0.01307 
Observation 634 
Low Regime 246 
High Regime 388 








Table A2.4b: Pricing Risk on Profit Efficiency 
Pricing Risk as Threshold Variables 
Threshold Estimate   
Pricing Risk  -2.1735 (0.1138)  
95% Confidence Interval -3.8114 (0.0221) -1.4312 (0.2390)      
   Estimates  SE 
Impact of Pricing Risk          
Pricing Risk Less  0.002839 0.004357 
Pricing Risk Greater -0.006285** 0.002789      
Impact of Covariance   
  
Product Risk -0.00486 0.004063 
Business Diversification  0.044186** 0.018842 
Area Diversification -0.002198 0.004968 
Investment Risk -0.081904 0.29817 
Firm Size  0.090228 0.055418 
Square of Firm Size -0.005751** 0.003284 
Liquidity -0.002775 0.004599 
Underwriting Income  0.02501*** 0.003209 
Stock Market Return  0.001041*** 0.000256 
GDP per Capita Growth -0.007055*** 0.001654 
Unemployment Rate -0.007311*** 0.002602 
Inflation Rate -0.003782 0.004578 
Concentration  0.385433** 0.190163 
δ  0.006838 0.013685 
Observation 860 
Low Regime 386 
High Regime 474 
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Table A2.5a: Investment Risk on Cost Efficiency 
Investment Risk as Threshold Variables 
Threshold Estimate   
Investment Risk 0.0038  
95% Confidence Interval 0.0011 0.0091      
   Estimates  SE 
Impact of Investment Risk 
Investment Risk Less -2.992999* 1.779581 
Investment Risk Greater -0.63781*** 0.232237      
Impact of Covariance   
  
Product Risk -0.011115*** 0.003567 
Business Diversification  0.004684 0.004441 
Area Diversification -0.00733*** 0.002383 
Pricing Risk  0.005035 0.00346 
Firm Size -0.031918 0.035644 
Square of Firm Size  0.001478 0.002002 
Liquidity  0.009014*** 0.002782 
Market Share -3.190873*** 1.221209 
Stock Market Return -0.000309*** 0.000111 
GDP per Capita -0.000007*** 0.000003 
Unemployment Rate -0.002125 0.001525 
Inflation Rate -0.000957 0.001845 
δ -0.004337 0.005301 
Observation 634 
Low Regime 217 
High Regime 417 








Table A2.5b: Investment Risk on Profit Efficiency 
Investment Risk as Threshold Variables 
Threshold Estimate   
Investment Risk 0.0018  
95% Confidence Interval 0.0010 0.0087      
   Estimates  SE 
Impact of Investment Risk         
Investment Risk Less 26.293563** 10.272085 
Investment Risk Greater 0.071299 0.292259      
Impact of Covariance     
Product Risk -0.000903 0.004778 
Business Diversification  0.012183* 0.006474 
Area Diversification  0.004145 0.004945 
Pricing Risk -0.000936 0.002096 
Firm Size  0.042432 0.055267 
Square of Firm Size -0.003485 0.003193 
Liquidity  0.001861 0.004614 
Underwriting Income  0.047945*** 0.009983 
Stock Market Return  0.000654** 0.000315 
GDP per Capita Growth -0.005272*** 0.001844 
Unemployment Rate -0.005765*** 0.002802 
Inflation Rate -0.007295* 0.003842 
Concentration  0.668683*** 0.178102 
δ -0.01009 0.01233 
Observation 860 
Low Regime 108 
High Regime 752 
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Table A2.6a: Capital on Cost Efficiency 
Capital as Threshold Variable 
Threshold Estimate   
Capital -1.2011 (0.3001)  
95% Confidence Interval -3.6052 (0.0272) -0.9782 (0.3760)      
   Estimates  SE 
Impact of Capital         
Capital Less  0.009167*** 0.002826 
Capital Greater -0.021258 0.01994      
Impact of Covariance     
Product Risk -0.010312*** 0.003432 
Business Diversification  0.004199 0.004556 
Area Diversification -0.004601** 0.002348 
Pricing Risk  0.007955*** 0.002423 
Investment Risk -0.389132* 0.204699 
Firm Size -0.04994 0.040026 
Square of Firm Size  0.002743 0.002156 
Liquidity  0.009088*** 0.00268 
Market Share -3.357168*** 1.213 
Stock Market Return -0.000169 0.000105 
GDP per Capita -0.000015*** 0.000004 
Unemployment Rate -0.00584*** 0.001769 
Inflation Rate  0.00602** 0.00285 
δ  0.020252 0.022591 
Observation 634 
Low Regime 357 
High Regime 277 







Table A2.7b: Capital on Profit Efficiency 
Capital as Threshold Variable 
Threshold Estimate   
Capital -4.1006 (0.0166)  
95% Confidence Interval -4.1006 (0.0166) -2.8411 (0.05836)      
   Estimates  SE 
Impact of Capital         
Capital Less 0.009425 0.007768 
Capital Greater 0.023954*** 0.00725      
Impact of Covariance     
Product Risk -0.003314 0.003782 
Business Diversification  0.012282* 0.006413 
Area Diversification  0.003966 0.005046 
Pricing Risk -0.000786 0.002077 
Investment Risk -0.122376 0.296159 
Firm Size  0.10424** 0.050502 
Square of Firm Size -0.00608** 0.003103 
Liquidity -0.041379** 0.016435 
Underwriting Income  0.022267*** 0.00337 
Stock Market Return  0.001052*** 0.000271 
GDP per Capita Growth -0.007344*** 0.001878 
Unemployment Rate -0.011163*** 0.002923 
Inflation Rate -0.007476* 0.003979 
Concentration  0.543122*** 0.170802 
δ -0.015486 0.041735 
Observation 860 
Low Regime 48 
High Regime 812 
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Table A2.7a: Reinsurance on Cost Efficiency 
Reinsurance as Threshold Variable 
Threshold Estimate   
Reinsurance -0.8068 (0.4463)  
95% Confidence Interval -2.4860 (0.0832) -0.4397 (0.6443)      
   Estimates  SE 
Impact of Reinsurance         
Reinsurance Less 0.000531 0.00179 
Reinsurance Greater 0.016494** 0.006466      
Impact of Covariance   
  
Product Risk -0.01074*** 0.003569 
Business Diversification  0.003672 0.004386 
Area Diversification -0.005198** 0.002097 
Pricing Risk  0.005692** 0.002251 
Investment Risk -0.372013* 0.198396 
Firm Size -0.015184 0.034296 
Square of Firm Size  0.000911 0.001875 
Liquidity  0.008032*** 0.002743 
Market Share -4.348*** 1.225755 
Stock Market Return -0.000227** 0.000105 
GDP per Capita -0.000009*** 0.000003 
Unemployment Rate -0.004104*** 0.001512 
Inflation Rate  0.0001 0.001763 
δ -0.026537*** 0.005796 
Observation 634 
Low Regime 360 
High Regime 274 







Table A2.7b: Reinsurance on Profit Efficiency 
Reinsurance as Threshold Variable 
Threshold Estimate   
Reinsurance 0.5628  
95% Confidence Interval -0.0227 0.5628      
   Estimates  SE 
Impact of Reinsurance         
Reinsurance Less -0.001171*** 0.000347 
Reinsurance Greater -0.000608 0.000703      
Impact of Covariance   
  
Product Risk -0.000521 0.004028 
Business Diversification  0.010941* 0.006213 
Area Diversification  0.000536 0.004801 
Pricing Risk -0.006261 0.005136 
Investment Risk  0.078021 0.286927 
Firm Size  0.104048** 0.04953 
Square of Firm Size -0.00654** 0.003072 
Liquidity -0.000537 0.004648 
Underwriting Income  0.025917*** 0.003426 
Stock Market Return  0.000795*** 0.000283 
GDP per Capita Growth -0.005491*** 0.00166 
Unemployment Rate -0.006623** 0.002517 
Inflation Rate -0.008779** 0.003922 
Concentration  0.432027** 0.171757 
δ -0.023613*** 0.008115 
Observation 860 
Low Regime 615 
High Regime 245 









Introduction on Financial Reforms in the EU 
   The concept of ‘single passport,’ namely the Third Generation Insurance Directive, was 
implemented in 1994. It allows insurers from EU member countries to conduct business 
across all EU countries. The main object is to increase competition by removing entry 
barriers. According to Fenn et al. (2008), a huge wave of mergers and acquisitions 
(M&As) has appeared in the EU insurance industry—2,595 M&As from 1990 to 2002 
(Cummins and Weiss, 2004). From 2003 to 2014, there were 2,142 M&As in the EU 
market, of which 697 were from the UK market.  
 
   The Financial Conglomerates Directive (Directive 2002/87/EC) was introduced in 2002, 
and EU countries were asked to incorporate the directive into national law by 2004. The 
objective is to enhance effective supervision via setting up a regulatory board framework 
for financial conglomerates, such as, banking groups and insurance groups. The overall 
aim is to achieve greater financial stability and consumer protection. 
 
   The Reinsurance Directive was approved in 2005 by the European Parliament and 
implemented by 2007. This directive allows reinsurers to have their head office in one of 
the member countries for writing reinsurance business across the EU. Thus, both primary 
insurers and reinsurers may benefit from the enhanced ability to diversify into a broad 
range of activities. 
 
Discussions on Various Measurements on market Structure 
   The structural method, such as Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (Herfindahl, 1950; 
Hirschman, 1980) and N-firm Concentration Ratio, is widely used to test Structure-
Conduct-Performance (SPC) hypothesis that implies a close relationship between market 
power and firm’s performance (Bain, 1951). These methods gauge the degree of 
competition by determining the level of concentration (Degryse, Kim and Ongena, 2009). 
 
   Besides, the N-firm concentration ratio only represents the market shares of the N 
largest firms but ignores the other smaller firms in the market, while HHI does consider 
the entire players in the market. As argued by (Al-Muharrami, Matthews and Khabari, 
2006), HHI attaches the importance to the larger firms relative to the smaller one; it means 
this index still takes into account the relative size of the firms in the market.  
 
   By investigating the degree of competition via different approaches in the U.S. banking, 
Bolt and Humphrey (2015) reveal the reason of regulators use HHI to represent 
competition was that it could be predictive of high prices in a concentrated sector, while 
the authors also questioned that how well the structural methods can capture competition.  
 
   Although concentration is a reasonable proxy for competition when the SPC hypothesis 
is supported, Claessens and Laeven (2004) and Sekkat (2009) still questioned that it was 
an unreliable indicator of competition because the highly competitive behaviour could be 
observed in a concentrated market (e.g., Shaffer, 1993; Shaffer and DiSalvo, 1994; ten 
Raa and Mohnen, 2008). In an early study from Berger (1995a), the author already 
pointed that the concentration measurement (HHI) only focused on market share while it 
neglected the effect of firm’s efficiency (Efficiency-Structure hypothesis, see Demsetz 
(1973)). As suggested by Bolt and Humphrey (2015), the competition would be 
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understated if the higher concentration (higher HHI) was  achieved by better management 
that could be lowering the overall costs.  
 
   Due to the above shortcomings associated with structural models, the non-structural 
models, so-called New Empirical Industrial Organisation (NEIO) approaches, are more 
preferred to indicate competition as they involve considering a firm’s conduct/behaviour 
to analyse the market. The Lerner index (Lerner, 1934), the Panzar-Rosse H statistic 
(Panzar and Rosse, 1987), and the Boone indicator (Boone, 2008) have been widely 
adopted to determine the degree of competition in the financial industry (see, Bikker and 
Haaf, 2002; Claessens and Laeven, 2004; Bachis, Diacon and Fenn, 2007; Berger, 
Klapper and Turk-Ariss, 2009; Beck, De Jonghe and Schepens, 2013a; Alhassan and 
Biekpe, 2016; Cummins, Rubio-Misas and Vencappa, 2017). 
 
   Lerner index, so-called price-cost margin, usually captures information on a firm’s 
profit-maximising behaviour that is at the time when the firm sets the output price higher 
than the marginal cost. Thus, the larger(smaller) the distance between price and marginal 
cost, the weaker(intenser) the competition associated with the market (Lerner, 1934). 
Specifically, this markup (the difference between price and marginal cost) is used to 
identify the monopoly pricing power. However, there are drawbacks suffered by using 
this approach. First, this method is mainly criticized by the fact that it is a proxy for 
pricing power instead of measuring competition (Beck, De Jonghe and Schepens, 2013a). 
Then, the availability of price information on inputs and outputs is a challenge. Third, 
there is a possibility that the index can be negative (Agoraki, Delis and Pasiouras, 2011; 
Soedarmono, Machrouh and Tarazi, 2011; Coccorese, 2014), then it might be somewhat 
misleading as the fact that market power cannot be negative in the long term (e.g., it’s 
unlikely to have the price below marginal cost in long-run). However, being a time-
varying and individual-based index is superior (Leroy and Lucotte, 2017).  
 
   In line with the former, the P-R H statistic can also be derived from the profit-
maximising condition. This method assumes that the market power of firms is based on 
the extent to which the degree of changing in input prices are reflected in revenue earned 
(Vesala, 1995). It is estimated by using a reduced-form revenue function with different 
choices of the dependent variables (a vector of input prices) and control variables, and 
the H statistic is obtained by summing up the coefficient (elasticity) concerning input 
prices. Besides, there are two shortages associated with P-R model. First, to apply this 
methodology, a long-run equilibrium, which is the zero profit constraint holds, need to be 
achieved in the market (Bikker and Haaf, 2002; Schaeck and Cihák, 2014; Mulyaningsih, 
Daly and Miranti, 2015). Nevertheless, this criteria is hard to achieve because of the 
market entry and exit (Claessens and Laeven, 2004; Tan, 2016). Second, as criticized by 
Bikker, Shaffer and Spierdijk (2012), H statistic provides a less informative and non-
ordinal result that indicates a monopoly behaviour; meanwhile, both revenue and price 
functions are used to estimate the H statistic while they do not provide the same 
estimations (also see, Gischer and Stiele (2009)). Last, van Leuvensteijn et al. (2011) 
further argues that there are uncertainties associated with this estimation because it is hard 
to predict H statistic via the static model.  
 
   Besides, under Demsetz's (1973) efficiency-structure hypothesis, Boone (2008) 
developed a theory that suggested output was reallocated from less efficient towards more 
efficient firm, and expected that the impact of competition on firm’s performance should 
be varied by the extent to which firms’ efficiency level. Explicitly, the author assumed 
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that efficient firms, who should receive superior performance, could be more beneficial 
in a competitive market. In another word, the inefficient firm would be punished more 
harshly in such condition. Meanwhile, this effect is amplified when there are more intense 
competitive pressures (Stiroh, 2000). As noticed by Schaeck and Cihák (2014), 
advantages of using Boone indicator as the measurement of competition can be 
summarised as, first, it overcomes drawbacks associated with traditional concentration 
that captured only the outcomes of competition, whereas the Boone index measures the 
conducts among banks in a competitive environment 1 . Second, it represents the 
reallocation effect, which is one of the features of strengthening competitive pressure. 
Third, if comparing to P-R H statistic, the assumption of long-run equilibrium is not 
required. Moreover, the Boone indicator does not suffer from the problem of overlooking 
product substitutability that is pointed out by Vives (2008).2 However, the main weakness 
associated with this method is that the assumption of constant marginal cost may not be 




























1 For example, competition can force firms to exit the market via failure or merger that leads to an increased 
in the level of concentration. In such a case, the concentration measurement only captures the result of 
competition, but not the degree of competition (even underestimate the degree of competition).  
2 Changes in the level of competition can be commonly achieved by, changes in entry barriers (such as, the 
decline in entry costs or eliminate entry requirements), enhanced interactions among firms (such as 
competitive strategies) and close product substitutes. Vives (2008) questioned the suitability of using Lerner 
index to measure competition as its connection with the degree of product substitutability is ambiguous. 
On the other hand, Boone (2008) confirms that the more efficient firms are beneficial under these conditions.  
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Table A3.1: Individual Factor Effects on Change in Leverage – OLS 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 Boone Lerner HHI 
VARIABLES Change in Leverage Change in Leverage Change in Leverage 
        
Lagged Leverage 0.3371 0.0503 0.3378 
 (1.296) (0.178) (1.291) 
Retained Earning -2.0082* -1.0969 -1.9842* 
 (-1.747) (-1.190) (-1.734) 
Boone Indicator 0.7241   
 (0.134)   
Lerner Index   -23.2934  
  (-1.212)  
HHI   0.0286 
   (0.156) 
Income Volatility 0.1480 -1.3428 0.1280 
 (0.171) (-1.063) (0.146) 
Business Volatility -0.1905 0.2848 -0.1858 
 (-0.458) (1.472) (-0.444) 
Reinsurance  -1.4028* -1.6378** -1.3997* 
 (-1.822) (-2.137) (-1.824) 
Cost of Equity  -0.0081 0.0415 -0.0080 
 (-0.168) (0.860) (-0.169) 
Firm Size 4.5168 8.4563 4.5590 
 (1.210) (1.076) (1.186) 
Liquidity  -0.2110 -0.4511 -0.1708 
 (-0.335) (-0.525) (-0.297) 
Investment Return 1.9149*** 0.9714 1.9246*** 
 (2.697) (0.030) (2.597) 
Tax Payment -0.0644 -1.2521 -0.0627 
 (-0.136) (-1.116) (-0.132) 
Interest rate -0.2385 -0.9108 -0.2290 
 (-0.366) (-0.978) (-0.375) 
Inflation Rate 0.1014 -0.3965 0.0178 
 (0.057) (-0.312) (0.015) 
GDP Growth -0.5991* -0.9098 -0.6138* 
 (-1.800) (-1.546) (-1.708) 
Constant -46.1854 -73.5391 -46.7618 
 (-1.250) (-1.065) (-1.185)     
    
Observations 993 651 993 
Number of Firms 389 288 389 
Adjusted R-squared 0.010 0.017 0.010 
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
F-test 2.26 0.68 2.321 
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Tables A3.2: Summary of Economic Impact 
Variable Observations  Mean    
Panel A: Market Structure – Boone Indicator 
Economic Impact of Leverage (Boone) 27,302 0.045573 
Economic Impact of Retain Earnings (Boone) 27,302 0.157241 
Panel B: Market Structure – Lerner Index 
Economic Impact of Leverage (Lerner) 27,302 0.003396 
Economic Impact of Retain Earnings (Lerner) 27,302 0.052224 
Panel C: Market Structure – HHI 
Economic Impact of Leverage (HHI) 27,302 0.046252 
Economic Impact of Retain Earnings (HHI) 27,302 0.15426 
Notes: According to (Cheng and Weiss, 2012a), the trade-off theory is more important than pecking 
order theory if the economic impact of leverage is larger than the economic impact of retained earnings; 
otherwise, the pecking order theory dominants the trade-off theory.  
Across all three models, the economic impact of retained earnings is larger than the economic impact of 
leverage. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that the pecking order theory dominants the trade-off theory 























P a g e  | 312 
 
 
Table A3.3: Interacted Effects with Boone*Lerner on Capital Structure - OLS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Leverage Leverage Leverage Leverage Leverage Leverage 
              
Lagged Leverage  0.2791*** 0.4803*** 0.3075*** 0.2757*** 0.2745*** 0.2042*** 
 (4.559) (6.466) (3.921) (4.360) (4.457) (3.464) 
Boone Indicator -0.4639* 0.0959 -0.4251*** -0.1719 -0.4419*** -0.2540* 
 (-1.855) (0.779) (-3.155) (-1.276) (-3.267) (-1.901) 
Lerner Index -1.4141 0.1289 -1.0484 0.5170 -1.3736* -1.4335** 
 (-0.690) (0.207) (-1.498) (0.412) (-1.737) (-2.035) 
Boone*Lerner 0.3972      
 (0.203)      
L. Leverage*Boone*Lerner  -3.7574***     
  (-3.425)     
Retained Earnings    -0.1713**    
   (-2.500)    
R. Earnings*Boone*Lerner   0.4531    
   (1.184)    
Income Volatility    0.1924***   
    (2.611)   
I. Volatility*Boone*Lerner    -1.1622**   
    (-2.124)   
Business Volatility      -0.0967*  
     (-1.657)  
B. Volatility*Boone*Lerner     0.2335*  
     (1.795)  
Reinsurance      -0.2122*** 
      (-3.309) 
Rein.*Boone*Lerner      0.3901 
      (1.338) 
Cost of Equity  0.0115** 0.0114** 0.0113** 0.0122** 0.0117** 0.0134* 
 (2.299) (2.256) (2.363) (2.383) (2.302) (1.912) 
Firm Size -0.0467 -0.0531 -0.0457 -0.0473 -0.0558 -0.0066 
 (-0.352) (-0.424) (-0.342) (-0.369) (-0.401) (-0.069) 
Liquidity  0.0204 0.0293 0.0115 0.0158 0.0153 -0.0089 
 (0.476) (0.692) (0.252) (0.360) (0.315) (-0.166) 
Investment Return 2.7571*** 2.6950*** 2.7636*** 2.6276*** 3.1366*** 7.7724*** 
 (2.880) (2.774) (2.790) (2.870) (2.662) (2.657) 
Tax Payment -0.0273 0.0041 -0.0111 -0.0261 -0.0402 -0.0355 
 (-0.446) (0.072) (-0.197) (-0.442) (-0.623) (-0.817) 
Interest rate 0.0148 0.0148 0.0266 0.0109 0.0111 -0.0064 
 (0.718) (0.733) (1.301) (0.544) (0.523) (-0.255) 
Inflation Rate -0.1045** -0.0749** -0.0936** -0.1065** -0.0996** -0.0955** 
 (-2.388) (-2.015) (-2.216) (-2.449) (-2.297) (-2.221) 
GDP Growth -0.0006 -0.0028 -0.0024 0.0025 -0.0050 0.0047 
 (-0.034) (-0.158) (-0.141) (0.149) (-0.282) (0.236) 
Constant 2.0511** 1.5166 1.9543* 1.4585 2.2126* 1.0878 
 (1.979) (1.473) (1.766) (1.501) (1.852) (1.159) 
              
Observations 2,749 2,749 2,715 2,743 2,667 2,330 
Number of Firms 511 511 508 510 499 452 
Adjusted R-squared 0.180 0.212 0.209 0.184 0.192 0.166 
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-test 7.5 9.1 6.98 7.5 5.29 7.173 
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Table A3.4: Interacted Effects with Boone*HHI on Capital Structure - OLS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Leverage Leverage Leverage Leverage Leverage Leverage 
              
Lagged Leverage  0.2801*** 0.4738*** 0.2954*** 0.2817*** 0.1809*** 0.1876*** 
 (3.682) (4.466) (3.521) (3.630) (2.619) (3.150) 
Boone Indicator 0.7284 -0.1119 -0.5506*** 0.0865 -0.4613** -0.4150* 
 (0.752) (-0.639) (-2.923) (0.348) (-2.391) (-1.954) 
HHI 0.0253 0.0000 -0.0098 0.0039 0.0017 0.0060 
 (0.891) (0.006) (-1.182) (0.438) (0.266) (0.851) 
Boone*HHI -0.0370      
 (-1.198)      
L. Leverage*Boone*HHI  -0.0076***     
  (-4.025)     
Retained Earnings    -0.2803***    
   (-3.035)    
R. Earnings*Boone*HHI   0.0042    
   (1.402)    
Income Volatility    0.3666***   
    (3.244)   
I. Volatility*Boone*HHI    -0.0083**   
    (-2.176)   
Business Volatility      -0.0698**  
     (-2.546)  
B. Volatility*Boone*HHI     0.0007  
     (1.413)  
Reinsurance      -0.3444*** 
      (-3.461) 
R.*Boone*HHI      0.0007 
      (0.393) 
Cost of Equity  -0.0078 -0.0087* -0.0067 -0.0075 -0.0071 -0.0053 
 (-1.440) (-1.665) (-1.222) (-1.348) (-1.349) (-0.833) 
Firm Size -0.2503* -0.2641* -0.2371 -0.2740* -0.3837** -0.3707** 
 (-1.710) (-1.864) (-1.600) (-1.855) (-2.375) (-2.034) 
Liquidity  0.0579 0.0632 0.0525 0.0726 0.0388 -0.0245 
 (0.999) (1.154) (0.889) (1.337) (0.591) (-0.343) 
Investment Return 0.1145*** 0.1139*** 0.1130*** 0.1156*** 0.1071*** 0.2404*** 
 (2.730) (2.755) (2.703) (2.748) (2.627) (6.098) 
Tax Payment -0.0164 -0.0139 0.0037 -0.0152 -0.0139 -0.0155 
 (-1.009) (-0.868) (0.253) (-1.032) (-0.910) (-1.329) 
Interest rate 0.0941*** 0.0965*** 0.1047*** 0.0902*** 0.1029*** 0.0557** 
 (3.848) (3.989) (4.317) (3.647) (3.911) (2.072) 
Inflation Rate -0.1605** -0.1259* -0.1508** -0.1514** -0.1272* -0.1358** 
 (-2.113) (-1.901) (-2.003) (-2.106) (-1.763) (-1.965) 
GDP Growth -0.0174 -0.0218 -0.0199 -0.0144 -0.0271* -0.0037 
 (-1.134) (-1.430) (-1.302) (-0.860) (-1.694) (-0.206) 
Constant 3.3320* 3.8994*** 4.3484*** 3.4109** 5.5693*** 4.5569*** 
 (1.881) (3.100) (3.390) (2.506) (3.992) (3.081)        
       
Observations 4,519 4,519 4,471 4,495 4,151 3,665 
Number of id 616 616 613 615 587 548 
Adjusted R-squared 0.162 0.179 0.173 0.172 0.137 0.190 
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-test 7.43 8.02 7.43 8.66 6.14 12.02 
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Table A3.5: Interacted Effects with Lerner*HHI on Capital Structure - OLS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Leverage Leverage Leverage Leverage Leverage Leverage 
              
Lagged Leverage  0.2803*** 0.5139*** 0.3088*** 0.2767*** 0.2753*** 0.2062*** 
 (4.535) (4.924) (3.919) (4.336) (4.436) (3.510) 
HHI 0.0063 0.0169* 0.0039 0.0084 0.0040 0.0112 
 (0.599) (1.728) (0.536) (0.983) (0.517) (1.330) 
Lerner Index -0.8775 0.2583 -1.4061** -0.5297 -1.6650** -1.4308** 
 (-0.557) (0.439) (-2.405) (-0.993) (-1.986) (-2.115) 
Lerner*HHI -0.0110      
 (-0.300)      
L. Leverage*Lerner*HHI  -0.1006**     
  (-2.312)     
Retained Earnings    -0.2407***    
   (-2.782)    
R. Earnings*Lerner*HHI   0.0268*    
   (1.883)    
Income Volatility    0.1452**   
    (2.160)   
I. Volatility*Lerner*HHI    -0.0113   
    (-0.905)   
Business Volatility      -0.1120*  
     (-1.683)  
B. Volatility*Lerner*HHI     0.0077*  
     (1.725)  
Reinsurance      -0.2269*** 
      (-3.170) 
Rein.*Lerner*HHI      0.0127 
      (1.339) 
Cost of Equity  0.0113** 0.0128** 0.0111** 0.0118** 0.0115** 0.0133* 
 (2.240) (2.467) (2.307) (2.308) (2.253) (1.887) 
Firm Size -0.0875 -0.0874 -0.0817 -0.0886 -0.0987 -0.0511 
 (-0.640) (-0.634) (-0.594) (-0.659) (-0.686) (-0.516) 
Liquidity  0.0049 0.0144 -0.0049 0.0009 -0.0012 -0.0293 
 (0.110) (0.339) (-0.105) (0.020) (-0.024) (-0.522) 
Investment Return 2.7555*** 2.7342** 2.7820*** 2.7249*** 3.1330*** 7.9349*** 
 (2.745) (2.582) (2.777) (2.727) (2.626) (2.662) 
Tax Payment -0.0380 -0.0106 -0.0201 -0.0395 -0.0502 -0.0401 
 (-0.618) (-0.173) (-0.348) (-0.633) (-0.773) (-0.988) 
Interest rate 0.0320 0.0335 0.0431* 0.0283 0.0282 0.0099 
 (1.463) (1.479) (1.863) (1.292) (1.220) (0.376) 
Inflation Rate -0.0084 -0.0106 0.0031 -0.0104 -0.0064 -0.0093 
 (-0.210) (-0.278) (0.075) (-0.264) (-0.159) (-0.247) 
GDP Growth 0.0026 -0.0009 0.0011 0.0080 -0.0018 0.0064 
 (0.157) (-0.050) (0.064) (0.475) (-0.106) (0.324) 
Constant 1.6247 1.1171 1.6213 1.2663 1.9234 0.6810 
 (1.481) (0.975) (1.456) (1.049) (1.605) (0.766) 
              
Observations 2,749 2,749 2,715 2,743 2,667 2,330 
Number of Firms 511 511 508 510 499 452 
Adjusted R-squared 0.176 0.198 0.206 0.177 0.189 0.164 
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-test 7.43 7.4 6.97 6.88 4.98 7.269 
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Further sensitivity and robustness check: the Non-linear Relationship-the Square of 
Market Structure: Boone2, Lerner2 and HHI2 
 
   For further sensitivity and robustness check, two more issues are considered. First, as 
discussed in the literture section, both Pandey (2004) and Berger, Klapper and Turk-Ariss 
(2009) found a non-linear relationship between market structure (i.e. market power) and 
the firm’s capital structure. The former comfirmed that there was a cubic relationship, 
and an inverted U-shape was suggested by the latter. Then, testing the existence of the 
non-linear relationship and the combined impact with other factors on the insurer’s capital 
stucture is also essential.  
 
   Secondly, many authors have studied the impact of organisational form on the firm’s 
capital stucture. For example, Cheng and Mary A Weiss (2012) identify the assumption 
of the presence of differences in behaviours that related to firms’ capital structure 
adjustments, between mutual and stock insurers. Harrington and Niehaus (2002) suggest 
that mutual insurers had less access to the capital market, and that it is more costly to raise 
capital (i.e. equity) than holding capital. Thus, it is reasonable to expect that holding 
capital is less costly in mutual firms.1 On the other hand, based on Mayers and Smith's 
(1981, 1986) agency theory, Mayers and Smith (2005) argue that it is harder to exert 
control over managers effectively in the mutual firm; then, Cheng and Mary A Weiss 
(2012) further assume that the cost of holding capital should be less in stock firms. In 
addition, Adams, Hardwick and Zou (2008) suggest that the usage of reinsurance would 
also be different between two organisational forms due to the ability to raise capital.2 
Thus, the issue of organisational forms is worth to be controlled. 
 
   Based on the findings from Pandey (2004) and Berger, Klapper and Turk-Ariss (2009) 
and the above discussions on the organisational form , Equation 3.12 can be re-written as: 
 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑖,𝑡 = (1 − 𝛿)[𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑖,𝑡−1] + (𝛿𝛼1)𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡
+ (𝛿𝛼2)𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡
2 + (𝛿𝛼3)𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡
+ (𝛿𝛼4)𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + (𝛿𝛼5)𝑅𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + (𝛿𝜆𝑛)𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖,𝑡,𝑛
+ (𝛿𝜌𝑛)𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖,𝑡,𝑛
′′ + (𝛿𝜙𝑚)𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡,𝑚 + 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
(3.13) 
where, the 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡
2  is the square of market strcture proxies (i.e. Boone 
Indicator, Lerner Index and HHI ). And 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖,𝑡,𝑛
′′  denotes the interaction terms 
between the square of these proxies and the nth regressor. Then, the potencial non-linear 
impact can be tested by adding these variables. Moreover, a dummy variable Stock, which 
indicates stock type insurers by assigned a value of 1, is also included for sensitivity and 
robustness check.   
 
1 Based on Harrington and Niehaus's (2002) logic, the cost of holding capital is lower than the cost of 
raising capital for mutual firms. Meanwhile, for stock insurers, the cost of raising capital is lower than the 
cost of holding. Thus, it is impossible to assume that the cost of holding for mutual is higher than the cost 
of holding for stock insurers, because the mutual raising cost can not be higher than stock raising the cost, 
under Harrington and Niehaus's (2002) logic.  
2 Mayers and Smith (1990), Wells, Cox and Gaver (1995) and Cummins et al. (2008) provided studies on 
the discrepancy in purchasing reinsurance between stock and mutual insurers. Mayers and Smith (1990) 
found evidence that mutual firms reinsured more businesses than stock insurers. In contrast, Cole and 
McCullough (2006) and Cummins et al. (2008) supported that stock insurers would like to utilize more 
reinsurance. 
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   The estimation results in Tables A3.7 to A3.9 present the non-linear relationships 
between market structure and insurers’ leverage ratios, as discussed by Pandey (2004), 
Berger, Klapper and Turk-Ariss (2009) and Guney, Li and Fairchild (2011). Separately 
including the interaction terms for the level of market structure and the square of market 
structure (from various concepts) allows this study to test whether the non-linear 
relationship may affect insurers’ leverage levels via different channels (or behaviours). It 
also allows the researchers to determine whether the impacts of the variables of interest 
(or the interested behaviours) would change due to this non-linear relationship. Although, 
the results are estimated by both the OLS fixed effect and the dynamic GMM approach, 
the discussions are mainly focusing on the dynamic model. 
 
    In Table A3.7b, the result of Model 1 indicates that the relationship between 
competition and leverage ratio appears to be inverse U-shaped, implying that insurers are 
willing to accept more leverage (e.g., business leverage) when market competition 
becomes intensive. However, up to a certain point, insurers begin reducing their leverage 
ratios by either taking less leverage or generating more equity, if the competition becomes 
too strong in the market. Further, Models 2 and 5 indicate that insurers, who already hold 
a massive amount of leverage or issue more risky businesses, will increase their leverage 
to a certain level corresponding to the level of increased competition. They will then 
adjust their leverage ratios downwards to maintain stability in fiercer competition. 
Conversely, insurers with more retained earnings, income volatilities and reinsurance 
protection will reduce their leverage to a certain point, then increase it after the inflexion, 
corresponding to rising market competition (see Models 3, 4 and 6 from Table A3.7b).   
 
   The coefficients of the Lerner index, the square of the Lerner index and their interaction 
terms are statistically significant across all models in Table A3.8b, indicating that the 
impacts of pricing power (market power) on capital structure are non-linear. Thus, Model 
1 reveals that insurers may tend to reduce leverage use when they start to gain pricing 
power, while they will increase their leverage when their pricing power moves beyond a 
certain level. Considering this non-linear impact together with insurers’ behaviours, 
Models 3, 5 and 6 show that insurers start to increase their leverage ratios if they have 
more retained earnings, risky businesses and reinsurance protections at the time they start 
developing pricing power; however, these insurers prefer reducing the leverage amount 
when their pricing power is further strengthened. An opposite pattern, which is a U-
shaped relationship, can be found in Models 2 and 4, suggesting that insurers who hold 
higher past leverage and carry more income volatilities are willing to lessen their leverage 
until their pricing power increases to one inflexion point. Soon after their pricing power 
is beyond the inflexion point, they start expanding their leverage. 
 
   Finally, regarding the impacts of market concentration on insurers’ capital structure, the 
associated parameters are negative at the level term and positive at the squared term 
(Model 1), indicating that this is a significant, U-shaped relationship. This implies that 
insurers operating in a more concentrated market are willing to have a higher leverage 
ratio than those in a less concentrated market. The non-linear U-shaped relationship is 
also confirmed in cases of retained earnings and reinsurance (see Models 2, 3 and 6 in 
Table A3.9b). This implies that insurers with a higher level of past leverage, massive 
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retained earnings or more reinsurance reduce leverage ratios when the market is becoming 
concentrated, while they decide to accept more leverage to maximise their output levels 
if the market is relatively more concentrated. Notably, insurers, who accept more 
uncertainties from both investment and business activities (Models 4 and 5), enlarge their 
leverage when the concentration level is low; then, they might reduce leverage again 
when the market becomes more concentrated. 
 
   Therefore, the above findings support Pandey’s (2004) and Berger, Klapper and Turk-
Ariss’s (2009) suggestions, indicating that market structure has a non-linear impact 
(through various concepts) on firms’ capital structures. However, Soedarmono, 
Machrouh and Tarazi (2013) do not find any evidence for this non-linear relationship. It 
is also worth noting that non-linear relationships are more significant in the short-run than 
in the long-run. However, most of the significant effects are consistent in both models. 
Further, the inconsistent results across Tables A3.7 to A3.9 confirm two previously 
proved findings: (1) three individual concepts (or three measurements) represent different 
information about market structure; and (2) the impact of market structure has different 
impacts on insurers’ capital structures via various channels. Finally, regarding the 
differences between two organisational forms, the impacts of the main variables remain 
consistent and valid in all models, after controlling for organisational form, but there are 
no strong, significant coefficients associated with the dummy variable of stock insurers. 
Moreover, it is safe to assume that there are no distinct differences between the two 




Table A3.6: Summary of Non-linear Relationship 
Panel A: Hypothesis – Interactions with Boone Squared 
Boone2 Inverse U 
Lagged Leverage*Boone2 Inverse U 
Retained Earnings*Boone2 U-Shape 
Income Volatility*Boone2 U-Shape 
Business Volatility*Boone2 Inverse U 
Reinsurance*Boone2 U-Shape 
Panel C: Hypothesis – Interactions with Lerner Squared 
Lerner 2 U-Shape 
Lagged Leverage* Lerner 2 U-Shape 
Retained Earnings*Lerner2 Inverse U 
Income Volatility*Lerner2 U-Shape 
Business Volatility*Lerner2 Inverse U 
Reinsurance*Lerner2 Inverse U  
Panel D: Hypothesis - Interactions with HHI Squared 
HHI 2 U-Shape 
Lagged Leverage* HHI 2 U-Shape 
Retained Earnings*HHI2 U-Shape 
Income Volatility*HHI2 Inverse U 
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 Table A3.7a: Interacted Effects with Boone2 on Capital Structure - OLS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES Leverage  Leverage Leverage Leverage Leverage Leverage Leverage 
                
Lagged Leverage  0.1934*** 0.3489*** 0.2940*** 0.2817*** 0.1793*** 0.1858*** 0.1873** 
 (3.059) (3.809) (3.510) (3.641) (2.606) (3.132) (1.965) 
Boone Indicator -0.2452 -0.5102* 0.2977 0.9286 0.0815 -1.1492** 0.9312 
 (-0.697) (-1.891) (0.879) (1.246) (0.226) (-2.277) (0.752) 
Boone2 -0.1416 0.3796 -0.8265** -0.5447 -0.5545 0.6727 -0.0606 
 (-0.394) (1.618) (-2.209) (-0.897) (-1.419) (1.588) (-0.063) 
Lagged Leverage*Boone  0.4201**     0.2039 
  (2.481)     (1.063) 
Lagged Leverage*Boone2  -0.6337***     -0.2451 
  (-3.467)     (-1.157) 
Retained Earnings  -0.1227**  -0.1621*    -0.0664 
 (-2.578)  (-1.794)    (-0.661) 
Retained Earnings*Boone   -0.6375**    -0.4768* 
   (-2.357)    (-1.857) 
Retained Earnings*Boone2   0.7172***    0.4747** 
   (2.726)    (2.287) 
Income Volatility 0.1592**   0.4493***   0.5932** 
 (2.462)   (2.992)   (2.547) 
Income Volatility*Boone    -0.3534   -0.9176 
    (-0.852)   (-1.532) 
Income Volatility*Boone2    -0.0697   0.3667 
    (-0.200)   (0.787) 
Business Volatility  -0.0367**    -0.0784***  -0.0732 
 (-1.982)    (-2.795)  (-1.506) 
Business Volatility*Boone     0.0233  0.1277 
     (0.431)  (1.106) 
Business Volatility*Boone2     0.0138  -0.0909 
     (0.319)  (-1.147) 
Reinsurance -0.2795***     -0.2729*** -0.2487*** 
 (-4.019)     (-2.771) (-2.622) 
Reinsurance*Boone      -0.5052** -0.3848** 
      (-2.419) (-2.031) 
Reinsurance*Boone2      0.5050** 0.4065** 
      (2.376) (1.984) 
Cost of Equity  -0.0041 -0.0075 -0.0061 -0.0071 -0.0068 -0.0050 -0.0031 
 (-0.635) (-1.511) (-1.113) (-1.291) (-1.294) (-0.784) (-0.477) 
Firm Size -0.4184** -0.2574* -0.2377 -0.2738* -0.3798** -0.3712** -0.4137** 
 (-2.191) (-1.848) (-1.598) (-1.851) (-2.324) (-2.021) (-2.273) 
Liquidity  0.0040 0.0615 0.0504 0.0736 0.0383 -0.0196 0.0109 
 (0.065) (1.170) (0.856) (1.347) (0.585) (-0.276) (0.180) 
Investment Return 0.2381*** 0.1147*** 0.1140*** 0.1159*** 0.1077*** 0.2405*** 0.2406*** 
 (6.288) (2.761) (2.751) (2.752) (2.632) (6.093) (6.686) 
Tax Payment -0.0031 -0.0123 0.0108 -0.0141 -0.0140 -0.0156 0.0012 
 (-0.316) (-0.769) (0.695) (-0.967) (-0.915) (-1.332) (0.118) 
Interest rate 0.0488* 0.0896*** 0.0884*** 0.0757*** 0.0792*** 0.0408 0.0494* 
 (1.751) (3.360) (3.183) (2.670) (2.913) (1.484) (1.772) 
Inflation Rate -0.1412** -0.0794 -0.1232 -0.1142 -0.1368* -0.1518** -0.1241** 
 (-2.263) (-1.228) (-1.577) (-1.503) (-1.906) (-2.336) (-2.052) 
GDP Growth 0.0040 -0.0132 -0.0063 -0.0045 -0.0147 0.0020 -0.0013 
 (0.184) (-0.778) (-0.354) (-0.240) (-0.843) (0.101) (-0.059) 
Constant 4.9411*** 3.8012*** 3.8708*** 3.2189*** 5.5965*** 4.9384*** 3.9616** 
 (2.989) (3.274) (3.192) (2.645) (3.923) (3.145) (2.565) 
                
Observations 3,511 4,519 4,471 4,495 4,151 3,665 3,511 
Number of Firms 533 616 613 615 587 548 533 
Adjusted R-squared 0.210 0.191 0.174 0.173 0.138 0.192 0.220 
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-test 13.87*** 8.3*** 6.55*** 6.55*** 5.58*** 11.69*** 10.06*** 
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 Table A3.7b: Interacted Effects with Boone2 on Capital Structure - GMM 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES Leverage Leverage Leverage Leverage Leverage Leverage Leverage 
                
Lagged Leverage  0.1975*** 0.3097* 0.4530*** 0.4989*** 0.3994*** 0.1618** 0.8357*** 
 (2.820) (1.809) (4.558) (4.707) (3.054) (2.195) (2.920) 
Boone Indicator 0.7774* -1.0253* 0.2296 5.0109*** 0.1794 -1.8766* 0.0448 
 (1.921) (-1.960) (0.970) (2.728) (0.287) (-1.900) (0.013) 
Boone2 -0.8398* 0.9059** -0.5437** -2.4879** -1.1454* 1.2599 2.1010 
 (-1.799) (2.051) (-2.047) (-2.253) (-1.733) (1.572) (0.760) 
L. Leverage*Boone  1.0131**     -1.5965** 
  (2.188)     (-1.986) 
L. Leverage*Boone2  -1.1482***     1.0673* 
  (-2.783)     (1.778) 
Retained Earnings  -0.6618***  -0.1811**    -0.0069 
 (-3.250)  (-2.017)    (-0.029) 
R. Earnings*Boone   -0.4735*    -1.1253* 
   (-1.830)    (-1.693) 
R. Earnings*Boone2   0.5471*    0.9433* 
   (1.941)    (1.885) 
Income Volatility 0.2588**   1.2261***   1.2989** 
 (2.095)   (3.614)   (1.998) 
I. Volatility*Boone    -2.3748***   0.0519 
    (-2.748)   (0.031) 
I. Volatility*Boone2    1.0056*   -1.3077 
    (1.841)   (-1.037) 
Business Volatility  0.0134    -0.1501  0.1033 
 (0.344)    (-1.521)  (0.695) 
B. Volatility*Boone     0.4126*  -0.1606 
     (1.846)  (-0.487) 
B. Volatility*Boone2     -0.2424*  0.0134 
     (-1.695)  (0.056) 
Reinsurance -0.5390***     -0.2720* 0.3852 
 (-3.293)     (-1.658) (1.474) 
Rein.*Boone      -0.9914** -1.7720** 
      (-2.161) (-2.513) 
Rein.*Boone2      0.9643** 1.2590** 
      (2.265) (2.297) 
Cost of Equity  0.0100 -0.0005 0.0266** -0.0069 -0.0037 0.0047 0.0082 
 (1.165) (-0.076) (2.254) (-1.101) (-0.485) (0.575) (1.076) 
Firm Size -0.2990 -0.2318 0.0689 0.3243** 0.3817*** -0.2752 0.1008 
 (-1.065) (-1.307) (0.396) (2.207) (2.694) (-0.871) (0.545) 
Liquidity  0.0768 0.1094 0.6389 0.1091 0.1698 0.3670 -0.1178 
 (0.638) (1.323) (1.048) (0.938) (1.407) (0.438) (-0.773) 
Investment Return 0.2927*** 0.1213*** 0.0277 0.1823** 0.1343* 0.2674*** 0.3139*** 
 (6.987) (2.590) (0.413) (2.196) (1.694) (4.636) (8.552) 
Tax Payment 0.0412 -0.0123 0.0395 -0.1151 0.0012 -0.1760 0.0419** 
 (1.642) (-0.111) (0.623) (-0.777) (0.066) (-0.726) (2.185) 
Interest rate 0.0020 0.0685** -0.0302 0.0053 -0.0340 -0.0556 -0.0074 
 (0.036) (2.336) (-0.811) (0.208) (-0.567) (-1.063) (-0.160) 
Inflation Rate 0.0672 0.0387 -0.0593 -0.0295 -0.2218* -0.2542* -0.0782 
 (0.643) (0.507) (-1.157) (-0.611) (-1.961) (-1.684) (-1.209) 
GDP Growth 0.0413 -0.0037 0.0006 0.0025 0.0497 -0.0369 0.0295 
 (1.137) (-0.286) (0.038) (0.210) (1.647) (-1.019) (1.169) 
Stock  -0.7949 -0.3124 -0.0675 -0.2601 -1.5099 0.1185 
  (-1.105) (-0.214) (-0.271) (-0.825) (-1.000) (0.364) 
Constant 2.2883 3.3555** 1.0609 -4.1850*** -0.8057 5.7260* -2.5980 
 (1.060) (2.191) (0.505) (-2.820) (-0.712) (1.802) (-1.500)         
        
Observations 3,354 4,186 4,471 4,495 3,821 3,665 3,189 
Number of Firms 503 565 613 615 534 548 476 
Instruments 204 160 125 165 136 111 202 
Robust Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-test 11.52*** 8.699*** 6.340*** 11.04*** 8.247*** 8.714*** 8.178*** 
AR(1) -3.058*** -3.345*** -3.727*** -3.363*** -3.076*** -2.935*** -3.237*** 
AR(2) 0.606 1.472 0.797 0.977 1.070 1.035 -0.449 
Hansen Test 197.6 (0.30) 155.6 (0.26) 107 (0.54) 143.5 (0.61) 130.9 (0.23) 105.1 (0.23) 168.2 (0.63) 
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 Table A3.8a: Interacted Effects with Lerner2 on Capital Structure - OLS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES Leverage  Leverage Leverage Leverage Leverage Leverage Leverage 
                
Lagged Leverage  0.2397*** 0.8328*** 0.3075*** 0.2757*** 0.2734*** 0.2047*** 0.7213*** 
 (3.766) (4.119) (3.915) (4.358) (4.423) (3.468) (4.886) 
Lerner Index -5.0219*** -1.7178 -5.1887*** 0.7182 -5.7275*** -3.8569 4.3211 
 (-2.713) (-1.076) (-3.083) (0.425) (-3.271) (-1.632) (1.512) 
Lerner2 8.3861** 0.1202 9.0126*** -2.7183 9.9618*** 4.7716 -11.3515* 
 (2.347) (0.040) (2.863) (-0.810) (3.038) (1.090) (-1.674) 
L. Leverage*Lerner  -11.1046***     -9.5466*** 
  (-2.985)     (-2.985) 
L. Leverage*Lerner2  41.7744**     37.4161** 
  (2.503)     (2.429) 
Retained Earnings  -0.1210**  -0.3009**    -0.0860 
 (-2.468)  (-2.136)    (-0.773) 
R. Earnings*Lerner   2.0188    -0.4714 
   (1.471)    (-0.403) 
R. Earnings*Lerner2   -2.7585    2.6519 
   (-1.255)    (1.238) 
Income Volatility 0.0934**   0.3342***   0.3156** 
 (2.009)   (2.649)   (2.248) 
I. Volatility*Lerner    -3.1498**   -2.5417 
    (-2.274)   (-1.435) 
I. Volatility*Lerner2    6.3569**   3.1177 
    (2.200)   (0.936) 
Business Volatility  -0.0167    -0.1631*  -0.1073** 
 (-0.884)    (-1.754)  (-2.199) 
B. Volatility*Lerner     0.7580*  0.8570** 
     (1.834)  (2.185) 
B. Volatility*Lerner2     -0.8028**  -1.3360* 
     (-1.986)  (-1.778) 
Reinsurance -0.1505**     -0.2819** -0.1527 
 (-2.462)     (-2.546) (-1.412) 
Rein.*Lerner      1.8902 0.2209 
      (1.433) (0.191) 
Rein.*Lerner2      -6.2126 -0.6390 
      (-1.611) (-0.203) 
Cost of Equity  0.0133** 0.0128** 0.0118** 0.0129** 0.0122** 0.0136* 0.0143** 
 (1.994) (2.365) (2.431) (2.491) (2.339) (1.924) (2.158) 
Firm Size -0.0255 -0.0877 -0.0761 -0.0859 -0.0877 -0.0408 -0.0504 
 (-0.261) (-0.722) (-0.561) (-0.645) (-0.615) (-0.423) (-0.533) 
Liquidity  -0.0262 0.0122 -0.0067 -0.0014 0.0063 -0.0136 -0.0251 
 (-0.480) (0.294) (-0.146) (-0.033) (0.130) (-0.252) (-0.489) 
Investment Return 7.8003*** 2.4107*** 2.7967*** 2.6851*** 3.1141*** 7.5754*** 7.2746*** 
 (2.657) (2.869) (2.758) (2.690) (2.623) (2.615) (2.770) 
Tax Payment -0.0307 0.0130 -0.0198 -0.0276 -0.0442 -0.0359 -0.0098 
 (-0.764) (0.252) (-0.326) (-0.456) (-0.692) (-0.882) (-0.247) 
Interest rate 0.0124 0.0272 0.0396* 0.0232 0.0285 0.0057 0.0106 
 (0.472) (1.367) (1.817) (1.127) (1.324) (0.225) (0.436) 
Inflation Rate -0.0256 -0.0143 -0.0129 -0.0319 -0.0193 -0.0334 -0.0216 
 (-0.718) (-0.435) (-0.373) (-0.939) (-0.551) (-0.942) (-0.642) 
GDP Growth 0.0079 0.0110 0.0005 0.0069 -0.0052 0.0052 0.0142 
 (0.402) (0.579) (0.031) (0.405) (-0.297) (0.261) (0.749) 
Constant 0.9608 1.8354* 1.9701* 1.4598 2.2461* 1.2315 0.4540 
 (1.036) (1.849) (1.799) (1.258) (1.878) (1.252) (0.483) 
                
Observations 2,281 2,749 2,715 2,743 2,667 2,330 2,281 
Number of Firms 447 511 508 510 499 452 447 
Adjusted R-squared 0.191 0.225 0.208 0.183 0.193 0.166 0.225 
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-test 5.46 10.13 6.65 6.72 4.66 6.33 6.194 
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 Table A3.8b: Interacted Effects with Lerner2 on Capital Structure - GMM 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES Leverage Leverage Leverage Leverage Leverage Leverage Leverage 
                
Lagged Leverage  0.3601*** 0.9794*** 0.3208* 0.3722*** 0.3683*** 0.3064*** 1.1579*** 
 (4.300) (3.067) (1.742) (5.242) (4.884) (3.587) (2.897) 
Lerner Index -9.3230*** -9.2908* -11.3370*** 6.9829 -7.6461*** -0.6268 12.2907* 
 (-2.969) (-1.956) (-2.700) (1.624) (-3.217) (-0.134) (1.694) 
Lerner2 19.4512*** 6.9451 18.5188* -13.0141 14.9491*** 0.6110 -37.1639* 
 (3.156) (1.007) (1.748) (-1.493) (2.969) (0.071) (-1.902) 
LLeverage*Lerner  -15.2712**     -15.2413** 
  (-2.184)     (-2.205) 
LLeverage*Lerner2  91.7649**     64.0929** 
  (2.165)     (2.032) 
Retained Earnings  -0.2011*  -0.7951***    0.4129** 
 (-1.842)  (-2.811)    (2.043) 
REarnings*Lerner   7.2581**    -7.4372** 
   (2.199)    (-2.374) 
REarnings*Lerner2   -16.0847*    18.8054** 
   (-1.895)    (2.511) 
Income Volatility 0.2172**   0.7232***   0.5643** 
 (2.141)   (3.061)   (2.283) 
IVolatility*Lerner    -6.0435***   -5.1963* 
    (-2.648)   (-1.816) 
IVolatility*Lerner2    10.5902**   9.8629 
    (2.012)   (1.525) 
Business Volatility  -0.0340    -0.1400**  -0.0629 
 (-1.353)    (-2.040)  (-0.894) 
BVolatility*Lerner     0.7678**  0.4138 
     (2.038)  (0.687) 
BVolatility*Lerner2     -1.1038**  -0.2371 
     (-2.131)  (-0.246) 
Reinsurance -0.3488***     -0.4563* 0.2026 
 (-2.866)     (-1.745) (0.895) 
Rein.*Lerner      6.4390** -4.4208 
      (2.241) (-1.484) 
Rein.*Lerner2      -18.5788** 11.5211 
      (-2.280) (1.429) 
Cost of Equity  0.0075 0.0008 0.0183** 0.0036 -0.0049 -0.0013 0.0083 
 (1.001) (0.142) (2.102) (0.467) (-0.657) (-0.167) (1.045) 
Firm Size 0.3008* 0.1285 0.2583* 0.0491 0.3972** 0.3120* -0.0438 
 (1.816) (1.348) (1.679) (0.303) (2.045) (1.949) (-0.301) 
Liquidity  0.1414 0.0735 0.1654 0.3315 0.5645 0.0800 -0.0647 
 (1.379) (0.986) (1.532) (1.002) (1.470) (0.667) (-0.368) 
Investment Return -1.2311 1.8547*** 1.8238*** 3.8970*** 3.5596* 7.8500** 2.5611 
 (-0.743) (2.772) (4.535) (4.149) (1.695) (2.461) (1.104) 
Tax Payment 0.2252 -0.0215 0.0349 -0.1725 -0.0005 -0.1113 -0.0180 
 (0.841) (-0.359) (0.291) (-0.322) (-0.004) (-1.419) (-0.394) 
Interest rate 0.0022 0.0402* 0.0316 0.0156 0.0324 0.0400 0.0039 
 (0.050) (1.690) (0.638) (0.406) (0.628) (0.858) (0.121) 
Inflation Rate 0.0555 0.0367 -0.0656 -0.0120 0.1608* 0.0664 -0.0223 
 (0.716) (0.699) (-1.086) (-0.240) (1.859) (0.766) (-0.417) 
GDP Growth 0.0145 0.0094 -0.0522 0.0174 -0.0238 -0.0584 0.0118 
 (0.413) (0.373) (-1.247) (0.942) (-0.598) (-1.510) (0.479) 
Stock  0.5405 0.7002 0.9167 1.1134 1.4508 0.6029 
  (0.889) (0.793) (0.962) (0.735) (1.537) (0.801) 
Constant -2.1637 -0.1403 -0.8207 -1.3152 -2.6754 -3.2341** -0.6813 
 (-1.368) (-0.150) (-0.550) (-0.761) (-1.148) (-2.321) (-0.445) 
                
Observations 1,748 2,749 2,715 2,743 2,667 2,330 2,281 
Number of Firms 385 511 508 510 499 452 447 
Instruments 184 225 198 135 220 250 302 
Robust Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-test 10.63*** 10.04*** 66*** 8.949*** 5.324*** 5.748*** 4.501*** 
AR(1) -2.313** -2.918*** -2.110** -2.683*** -2.639*** -2.326** -2.573** 
AR(2) 0.173 0.752 -0.541 0.576 0.641 0.954 0.470 
Hansen Test 191 (0.11) 223.2 (0.25) 182.5 (0.48) 119.3 (0.48) 208.2 (0.40) 247.6 (0.26) 273.3 (0.52) 
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 Table A3.9a: Interacted Effects with HHI2 on Capital Structure - OLS 
  (9) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Leverage  Leverage  Leverage  Leverage  Leverage  Leverage  Leverage  
                
Lagged Leverage  0.1962*** 0.1003 0.2967*** 0.2849*** 0.1822*** 0.1905*** 0.7920 
 (3.082) (0.104) (3.517) (3.632) (2.616) (3.178) (0.946) 
HHI -0.0145 0.0137 0.0346 -0.1952 -0.0138 0.0863 0.0086 
 (-0.242) (0.218) (0.517) (-1.370) (-0.169) (0.782) (0.050) 
HHI2 0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0006 0.0024 0.0002 -0.0010 -0.0001 
 (0.362) (-0.193) (-0.669) (1.338) (0.215) (-0.684) (-0.038) 
Lagged Leverage*HHI  0.0144     -0.0381 
  (0.257)     (-0.816) 
Lagged Leverage*HHI2  -0.0003     0.0006 
  (-0.331)     (0.972) 
Retained Earnings  -0.1338***  2.7494    0.5445 
 (-2.710)  (1.626)    (0.642) 
Retained Earnings*HHI   -0.1639*    -0.0366 
   (-1.738)    (-0.809) 
Retained Earnings*HHI2   0.0022*    0.0005 
   (1.736)    (0.819) 
Income Volatility 0.1684***   -1.7210   -1.0946 
 (2.610)   (-1.037)   (-0.765) 
Income Volatility*HHI    0.0987   0.0664 
    (1.115)   (0.851) 
Income Volatility*HHI2    -0.0012   -0.0008 
    (-1.086)   (-0.813) 
Business Volatility  -0.0410**    0.0679  0.5403* 
 (-2.199)    (0.335)  (1.833) 
Business Volatility*HHI     -0.0064  -0.0311** 
     (-0.615)  (-2.026) 
Business Volatility*HHI2     0.0001  0.0004** 
     (0.641)  (2.089) 
Reinsurance -0.2826***     -1.1227 -1.2955 
 (-4.021)     (-1.045) (-1.229) 
Reinsurance*HHI      0.0401 0.0497 
      (0.717) (0.904) 
Reinsurance*HHI2      -0.0005 -0.0006 
      (-0.690) (-0.821) 
Cost of Equity  -0.0046 -0.0091* -0.0073 -0.0083 -0.0077 -0.0061 -0.0041 
 (-0.717) (-1.653) (-1.338) (-1.509) (-1.455) (-0.959) (-0.636) 
Firm Size -0.4517** -0.2693* -0.2486* -0.2843* -0.4021** -0.4026** -0.4513** 
 (-2.425) (-1.873) (-1.692) (-1.924) (-2.526) (-2.224) (-2.418) 
Liquidity  -0.0022 0.0614 0.0483 0.0775 0.0358 -0.0290 -0.0049 
 (-0.035) (1.037) (0.804) (1.392) (0.534) (-0.402) (-0.081) 
Investment Return 0.2331*** 0.1143*** 0.1131*** 0.1156*** 0.1068*** 0.2353*** 0.2325*** 
 (6.167) (2.792) (2.764) (2.779) (2.666) (5.950) (6.168) 
Tax Payment -0.0016 -0.0160 0.0065 -0.0187 -0.0150 -0.0167 -0.0027 
 (-0.160) (-0.982) (0.416) (-1.186) (-0.976) (-1.374) (-0.249) 
Interest rate 0.0728** 0.1160*** 0.1281*** 0.1046*** 0.1195*** 0.0711** 0.0717** 
 (2.488) (4.826) (5.286) (4.275) (4.407) (2.583) (2.442) 
Inflation Rate -0.0453 -0.0345 -0.0350 -0.0550 -0.0382 -0.0439 -0.0515 
 (-0.916) (-0.667) (-0.692) (-1.082) (-0.722) (-0.869) (-0.989) 
GDP Growth 0.0054 -0.0101 -0.0136 -0.0011 -0.0210 0.0040 0.0051 
 (0.277) (-0.625) (-0.835) (-0.058) (-1.319) (0.221) (0.252) 
Constant 4.8699** 3.3663** 2.9225 7.2941*** 5.4414** 2.7261 4.5063 
 (2.543) (2.394) (1.510) (2.638) (2.507) (0.962) (1.163)         
        
Observations 3,511 4,519 4,471 4,495 4,151 3,665 3,511 
Number of Firms 533 616 613 615 587 548 533 
Adjusted R-squared 0.208 0.160 0.170 0.166 0.135 0.187 0.209 
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-test 13.93 7.11 7.32 8.6 6.17 9.91 9.423 
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  Table A3.9b: Interacted Effects with HHI2 on Capital Structure - GMM 
  (6) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Leverage Leverage Leverage Leverage Leverage Leverage Leverage 
                
Lagged Leverage  0.2407*** 5.4956** 0.3432*** 0.2235*** 0.5880*** 0.5046*** 8.7402* 
 (3.138) (2.061) (3.268) (2.814) (4.984) (4.837) (1.802) 
HHI -0.1090* 0.2541 0.2484 -1.0666* -0.2969** -0.4949** -1.3018* 
 (-1.819) (1.461) (1.182) (-1.930) (-2.094) (-2.482) (-1.663) 
HHI2 0.0013* -0.0036 -0.0031 0.0136** 0.0036** 0.0061** 0.0146 
 (1.704) (-1.520) (-1.206) (1.988) (2.065) (2.369) (1.488) 
L. Leverage*HHI  -0.2775*     -0.4877* 
  (-1.789)     (-1.769) 
L.Leverage*HHI2  0.0039*     0.0065* 
  (1.794)     (1.675) 
Retained Earnings  -0.3511**  4.9098**    -0.7954 
 (-1.997)  (2.195)    (-0.235) 
R. Earnings*HHI   -0.2838**    0.0364 
   (-2.341)    (0.198) 
R. Earnings*HHI2   0.0038**    -0.0004 
   (2.397)    (-0.168) 
Income Volatility 0.4614***   -9.0182   -14.4273*** 
 (3.757)   (-1.577)   (-2.832) 
I. Volatility*HHI    0.5013*   0.7497*** 
    (1.682)   (2.854) 
I. Volatility*HHI2    -0.0066*   -0.0091*** 
    (-1.744)   (-2.773) 
Business Volatility  -0.1933**    -1.0134*  0.1291 
 (-1.971)    (-1.841)  (0.177) 
B. Volatility*HHI     0.0516*  -0.0106 
     (1.788)  (-0.285) 
B. Volatility*HHI2     -0.0006*  0.0002 
     (-1.759)  (0.323) 
Reinsurance -0.2908**     4.3457** 2.1936 
 (-2.416)     (2.191) (0.629) 
Rein.*HHI      -0.2186** -0.1478 
      (-2.138) (-0.831) 
Rein.*HHI2      0.0027** 0.0019 
      (2.003) (0.804) 
Cost of Equity  0.0051 -0.0085 0.0248 0.0075 -0.0288 -0.0086 -0.0324** 
 (0.695) (-1.583) (1.482) (0.798) (-1.560) (-0.630) (-1.986) 
Firm Size -0.0176 0.4195* -0.3512* 0.3581*** 0.1343 -0.0914 -0.1172 
 (-0.137) (1.953) (-1.879) (3.102) (0.695) (-0.629) (-0.373) 
Liquidity  -0.0057 -0.1171 0.0796 0.1929 0.1454 0.1093 0.2659 
 (-0.030) (-0.281) (0.914) (1.302) (1.053) (0.882) (1.480) 
Investment Return 0.2343*** 0.0403 0.1153** 0.0975 0.2625** 0.3036*** 0.3198*** 
 (2.866) (0.301) (2.275) (1.575) (2.359) (6.325) (6.461) 
Tax Payment 0.0617 -0.2756 0.0931 -0.0435 0.0085 0.0030 0.0037 
 (0.758) (-1.003) (0.968) (-1.069) (0.342) (0.333) (0.025) 
Interest rate -0.0201 0.0250 0.1027** 0.0322 0.0624 0.0518 0.0407 
 (-0.566) (1.063) (2.494) (0.818) (1.344) (1.143) (0.689) 
Inflation Rate -0.0624 -0.0100 -0.0648 -0.2108** -0.0021 0.0644 -0.0885 
 (-1.380) (-0.234) (-0.699) (-2.345) (-0.025) (0.780) (-0.850) 
GDP Growth 0.0209 0.0102 0.0011 0.0128 -0.0152 0.0013 0.0181 
 (1.039) (0.731) (0.040) (0.428) (-0.710) (0.062) (0.374) 
Stock  0.9301 1.1232 0.3088 0.0487 0.2384 0.6361 
  (1.033) (0.600) (0.346) (0.145) (0.761) (1.212) 
Constant 2.2964 -8.1871** -2.0853 18.0616* 5.6421 11.0125*** 28.5189* 
 (1.371) (-2.398) (-0.517) (1.663) (1.474) (2.682) (1.787)         
        
Observations 3,511 4,519 4,471 4,495 3,821 3,354 3,511 
Number of Firms 533 616 613 615 534 493 533 
Instruments 183 87 151 161 152 131 349 
Robust Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-test 4.885*** 16.09*** 4.343*** 6.121*** 8.671*** 14.91*** 6.166*** 
AR(1) -3.023*** -3.938*** -3.250*** -3.198*** -3.171*** -3.217*** -1.786* 
AR(2) 0.480 1.424 0.434 0.664 1.208 1.496 -0.0449 
Hansen Test 188.9 (0.12) 85.30 (0.135) 151.3 (0.16) 165.3 (0.18) 147.9 (0.23) 120.5 (0.34) 329.4 (0.38) 
t-statistics in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 




Table A4.1: Individual effects on Z-score components ROTA-OLS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Performance Leverage Reinsurance Liquidity Risk Underwriting Cycle All 
VARIABLES ROTA ROTA ROTA ROTA ROTA ROTA 
              
Profit Efficiency 19.5360***     17.7573*** 
 (8.627)     (8.965) 
Leverage  -0.0063***    -0.0060*** 
  (-5.742)    (-13.110) 
Reinsurance   -6.5901   -4.7241 
   (-1.501)   (-1.558) 
Liquidity Risk    0.0137**  0.0192*** 
    (2.039)  (5.388) 
Underwriting Cycle     -2.9708* -1.4573 
     (-1.848) (-1.414) 
Firm Size 0.9126 -15.1894 -19.3051 -12.9604 -12.7843 -18.1301** 
 (0.062) (-0.641) (-0.875) (-0.645) (-0.644) (-1.979) 
Squared Size -0.1452 0.7871 1.0337 0.6991 0.6883 0.8666* 
 (-0.183) (0.581) (0.816) (0.602) (0.600) (1.702) 
Premium Growth Rate -0.0042 0.2204** 0.2394** 0.2104** 0.2419** -0.0137 
 (-0.065) (2.210) (2.482) (2.283) (2.575) (-0.193) 
Business Volatility 0.7715 -0.5177 -0.6997* -0.3614 -0.3945 0.4870 
 (1.635) (-1.053) (-1.759) (-0.857) (-0.941) (1.286) 
Interest Rate Change 0.1609* 0.1099 0.0329 0.1516 0.0426 0.0503 
 (1.709) (0.836) (0.278) (1.349) (0.347) (0.508) 
GDP Growth -0.0789 0.0187 -0.0219 -0.0378 -0.1554 -0.2067* 
 (-0.763) (0.115) (-0.135) (-0.264) (-1.072) (-1.895) 
Constant -0.8508 75.2824 94.0345 61.4069 72.1715 94.5699** 
 (-0.013) (0.758) (1.002) (0.735) (0.858) (2.361) 
              
Observations 666 859 952 996 1,009 583 
Number of Insurers 325 377 391 413 423 285 
Adjusted R-squared 0.219 0.011 0.024 0.007 0.011 0.281 
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-test 14.94*** 5.83*** 1.86*** 20.53*** 1.93*** 571879*** 
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Table A4.2: Individual effects on Z-score components SD ROTA -OLS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Performance Leverage Reinsurance Liquidity Risk Underwriting Cycle All 
VARIABLES SD ROTA SD ROTA SD ROTA SD ROTA SD ROTA SD ROTA 
              
Profit Efficiency 3.0428*     0.8300 
 (1.897)     (0.608) 
Leverage  -0.0018    -0.0063*** 
  (-0.552)    (-33.435) 
Reinsurance   -2.0459   -0.1168 
   (-0.865)   (-0.054) 
Liquidity Risk    -0.0044  -0.0029 
    (-0.954)  (-0.788) 
Underwriting Cycle     -2.3442** -1.1375 
     (-2.266) (-1.443) 
Firm Size 2.9006 -8.6711 -12.1276 -8.7077 -5.2654 -4.2133 
 (0.374) (-0.786) (-1.123) (-0.870) (-0.838) (-0.604) 
Squared Size -0.1958 0.4944 0.6563 0.4720 0.2729 0.1877 
 (-0.454) (0.763) (1.042) (0.804) (0.725) (0.474) 
Premium Growth Rate 0.0292 0.0487 0.0644 0.0669 0.0851 0.0688 
 (0.490) (0.759) (0.786) (0.845) (1.059) (1.039) 
Business Volatility 1.6255*** 1.8680*** 1.5424*** 1.6404*** 1.6208*** 1.4395*** 
 (5.545) (6.736) (6.385) (6.392) (6.441) (5.557) 
Interest Rate Change 0.1797** 0.0770 0.0477 0.0918 0.0149 0.1453 
 (2.083) (0.963) (0.552) (1.152) (0.191) (1.543) 
GDP Growth -0.0174 0.0501 -0.1537 -0.1472 -0.2442 -0.0862 
 (-0.200) (0.480) (-0.718) (-0.731) (-1.159) (-1.196) 
Constant -11.3342 36.1461 55.5983 39.1297 33.8573 26.4079 
 (-0.333) (0.807) (1.226) (0.956) (1.260) (0.881) 
              
Observations 666 860 955 998 1,012 583 
Number of Insurers 325 377 393 414 424 285 
Adjusted R-squared 0.176 0.066 0.051 0.049 0.052 0.175 
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-test 6.92*** 9.65*** 10.91*** 20.2*** 11.29*** 1234*** 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table A4.3: Individual effects on Z-score components CAPITAL -OLS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Performance Leverage Reinsurance Liquidity Risk Underwriting Cycle All 
VARIABLES CAPITAL CAPITAL CAPITAL CAPITAL CAPITAL CAPITAL 
              
Profit Efficiency 0.0369     -0.0047 
 (0.539)     (-0.100) 
Leverage  -0.0001***    -0.0002** 
  (-3.560)    (-2.272) 
Reinsurance   -0.0416   -0.1102** 
   (-1.287)   (-2.277) 
Liquidity Risk    0.0002*  0.0002 
    (1.687)  (0.403) 
Underwriting Cycle     0.0553** -0.0059 
     (2.301) (-0.303) 
Firm Size -0.1117 -0.0610 0.0410 -0.0257 -0.0411 -0.0386 
 (-0.611) (-0.581) (0.393) (-0.255) (-0.444) (-0.399) 
Squared Size 0.0020 -0.0020 -0.0073 -0.0037 -0.0029 -0.0024 
 (0.199) (-0.324) (-1.212) (-0.629) (-0.542) (-0.432) 
Premium Growth Rate -0.0016 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0004 -0.0009 -0.0012 
 (-1.422) (-0.046) (0.022) (-0.297) (-0.753) (-0.938) 
Business Volatility -0.0168** -0.0210*** -0.0207*** -0.0212*** -0.0211*** -0.0094* 
 (-2.185) (-3.341) (-3.387) (-3.526) (-3.561) (-1.748) 
Interest Rate Change -0.0013 -0.0015 -0.0008 -0.0013 0.0003 -0.0004 
 (-0.812) (-1.158) (-0.660) (-1.105) (0.195) (-0.260) 
GDP Growth -0.0038 -0.0058*** -0.0044** -0.0051*** -0.0027 -0.0050** 
 (-1.617) (-3.356) (-2.318) (-2.678) (-1.400) (-1.992) 
Constant 1.1143 1.0350** 0.5230 0.8156* 0.6724 0.8933** 
 (1.364) (2.369) (1.168) (1.895) (1.639) (2.106) 
              
Observations 666 860 952 996 1,009 583 
Number of Insurers 325 377 391 414 424 285 
Adjusted R-squared 0.127 0.209 0.129 0.150 0.168 -0.703 
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-test 5.13*** 9.37*** 5.76*** 6.31*** 7.35*** 4.982*** 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Measurement of Stability Efficiency 
   The stability efficiency can be estimated by using Kumbhakar, Lien and Hardaker's 
(2014) Stochastic Frontier Analysis, as followed:  
ln 𝑍 − 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 = α0 +  ∑ 𝛼𝑔 ln 𝑄𝑖𝑔𝑡
2
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                             + ∑ 𝜌𝑔𝑇 ln 𝑄𝑖𝑔𝑡
2
𝑔
+ ∑ 𝜉𝑗𝑇 ln 𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡
3
𝑗
+ 𝜇𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 − 𝜏𝑖𝑡 − u𝑖𝑡      
Equation (A4.1) 
where, 𝑍 − 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒it  represents insurer’s stability at time t. The term 𝜇𝑖  is the 
heterogeneity effect, which vary across firms only; 𝑣𝑖𝑡 is the random shock (or statistical 
noise) and  𝜏𝑖  represents the persistent inefficiency. u𝑖𝑡  is time-varying inefficiency, 
which is the stability inefficiency. Consistence with value-added approach and insurance 
litertures (Cummins, Rubio-Misas and Zi, 2004; Hao and Chou, 2005; Cummins and 
Rubio-Misas, 2006; Yaisawarng, Asavadachanukorn and Yaisawarng, 2014), the outputs, 
𝑄𝑖𝑔𝑡 , is defined as net claims paid (claims incurred net of reinsurance) and total 
investment; and 𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡  measures the three input prices, i.e. labor, capital and technical 
reserves. The time trend variable (T) captures the changes over time in technology. The 
procedure amounts to using one of the input prices (e.g., 𝑃3𝑖𝑡) to normalized Z-score and 
other input price. Equation (A4.1) is in the translog form , and both Jondrow et al. (1982) 
and Battese and Coelli (1988)’s methods can be used to find the stability inefficiency and 
stability efficiency score, respectively. 
